Advancing Women’s Role in the Security Sector in Nigeria

By Eric Rudberg

Female participation in both conflict prevention and conflict resolution enhances security interests. Studies have found that a significant inclusion of women and civil society groups in a peace negotiation makes the resulting agreement 64% less likely to fail and 35% more likely to last at least fifteen years.^[1]  Evidence has repeatedly illustrated that full and meaningful participation of women in peace operations broadens the perspective on conflict management, allows for more inclusive political resolutions, and, in the end, improves international peacebuilding strategies. It has also been shown that there is a direct correlation between the meaningful participation of women in peacekeeping and the performance and effectiveness of peacekeeping units.^[2] This participation of uniformed women peacekeepers can be divided between the police component, justice and correction, and, finally, the military.  Of the three, this paper will exclusively examine the military component in depth.  It will explore the importance of meaningful participation of female peacekeepers as well as examine the current status of military women in peacekeeping operations. 

Importance of Meaningful Participation of Female Peacekeepers

The increase of women’s participation in global peacekeeping operations has been shown to improve the effectiveness and stability of a mission. Missions with more women personnel are more likely to achieve their mandate and bring sustainable peace.^[3]  However, evidence strongly shows that it is the “meaningful” participation of women and not just numbers that matters. The Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations defines meaningful participation as “the presence and leadership of women in UN peace operations, across all ranks and functions.”  According to the Elsie Initiative, women can participate meaningfully “when they contribute to, and are included in, all aspects of operational and mission planning, and decision-making processes…[and] when they hold operational command and leadership positions, and non-traditional as well as non-stereotypical roles.” Additionally, women can participate meaningfully “when they have access to the same training, promotion and career advancement opportunities as their colleagues who are men;…when they hold positions that are in line with their training, rank and area of expertise; and when their workplace is free from all forms of harassment, bullying and intimidation.”^[4]

Meaningful participation of female peacekeepers improves the operation and performance of a peacekeeping force. They enhance the overall holistic approach in today’s peacekeeping operations by contributing an additional perspective to the planning and key decision-making process, especially those affecting civilians, particularly women and girls.^[5] A diversity of backgrounds and experiences has been proven to enhance a unit’s performance and ability to solve problems. This female perspective enables the peacekeeping operation to successfully address the needs of the entire civilian population it is there to serve.^[6]  Female peacekeepers also bring a unique set of tactical skills that their male counterparts often do not possess, including the ability to physically screen/search females.^[7]  Knowing that peacekeepers are supposed to abide by the cultural sensitivity of not having males searching females, it is not uncommon for spoilers, also known as the opposing force, to have females carry illicit items under their clothing since the females will probably not be screened and searched.

Women peacekeepers’ access to the local population is particularly valuable when there are cultural restrictions around interaction across gender lines and in venues that are closed to men.^[8] Reflecting on her service in Afghanistan, Major General Kristin Lund pointed out that, “being a female, from my recent deployment in Afghanistan, I had access to 100% of the population, not only 50%.”^[9] Locals often feel more comfortable liaising and sharing information with military troops that include women peacekeepers, giving them better situational awareness of the environment they are operating in.^[10] The ability to gain the trust of local populations is a vital component of any peacekeeping operation.^[11] It results in good intelligence and a reduction in violence in the communities that peacekeepers seek to protect.^[12]

Female peacekeepers often cultivate trust and confidence with local communities which in turn encourages these populations to work with the peacekeeping force by reporting a variety of crimes, in particular, sexual violence. Major General Lund explains, “if a woman has been gang-raped by men, she will most likely approach a woman in uniform rather than a man. And men that are raped will, I think, also approach a woman soldier rather than a man.”^[13] Women’s participation is also connected with fewer misconduct complaints lodged against the peacekeeping force since these women are perceived as being more effective at de-escalating potential violence and are less threatening.^[14] Finally, the inclusion of female peacekeepers has been associated with fewer allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse committed by the peacekeeping force.^[15] Studies have found that an increase in the proportion of women from zero to five percent reduces the expected count of sexual allegations by half.^[16]

Current Status of Women in Peacekeeping Operations

Despite evidence that the meaningful participation of women in the military contingent of  peacekeeping operations is both the right and smart thing to do, they are routinely underrepresented. For example, led by the United Nations Department of Peace Operations, there are currently twelve peacekeeping missions deployed worldwide to help countries navigate the difficult path from conflict to peace.^[17] According to the Contribution of Uniformed Personnel to UN by Mission, Personnel Type, and Gender spreadsheet for October 2022, out of 63,310 strictly military peacekeeping troops deployed to these twelve missions, only 3,789 are female, or roughly 6.0%.^[18] However, this percentage has very slowly been increasing throughout the years.  In 1993, women comprised less than 1% of the uniformed personnel deployed.^[19] In 2015, UN Security Council Resolution 2242 encouraged the Secretary-General, in collaboration with member states, to “double the numbers of women in military and police contingents of UN peacekeeping operations over the next five years.”^[20]  Regardless of this call to action, there has not been a significant increase in female participation since the end of 2009.^[21] In 2018, UN member states adopted the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy 2018-2028, which set the goal of 15% for female participation in the military contingent by 2028.^[22] It also established annual targets for the Secretariat to accomplish this lofty goal. The target for 2022 was 9% but fell short by 1,909 female peacekeepers.^[23]

Nevertheless, some countries have managed to deploy significantly higher percentages of female peacekeepers.  As of October 2022, of the fifteen countries that deploy over 1,000 troops to peacekeeping operations, South Africa, Ghana, Ethiopia, and the United Republic of Tanzania exceeded the UN’s contribution target (9%) for the percentage of women deployed.  Additionally, multiple countries that deploy fewer troops have done better. Nigeria, for example, has 21.5% of women in their peacekeeping forces (14/65) and Estonia is at 100% (1/1). On the opposite end of the spectrum is India, which only deploys 51 women on their missions (0.9%), despite being the second largest troop-contributing country in the world, with 5,548 troops deployed.^[24] As of October 2022, the top three UN peacekeeping missions with the highest number of female troops are the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) with 781, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) with 776, and the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) with 746.  In spite of those large numbers, relative to the proportion of the total force, female troops only made up 6.4% of MINUSCA, 5.9% of UNMISS, and 6.0% of MONUSCO. The top three missions with the highest proportion of female troops are the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) at 40.0% (8/20), the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) at 8.9% (66/740), and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) at 7.3% (692/9490).^[25]

Although the number of female peacekeepers and the proportion of the military contingent made up of women is slowly increasing, this does not mean that meaningful participation of women is rising in UN peacekeeping missions. Often, women peacekeepers who do serve are limited to stereotypical roles such as nursing, community engagement, administration, and domestic services, which include such tasks as cooking, cleaning, and laundry, irrespective of their skills and experience.^[26] Missions with a higher percentage of combat-related forces tend to have the lowest percentages of women, in part because of a reluctance to send female peacekeepers to dangerous areas of conflict, where there are higher levels of sexual exploitation and abuse or higher numbers of peacekeeping deaths. The belief that women cannot protect themselves is still prevalent among peacekeeping forces today.^[27]

  This tendency results in women peacekeepers being underutilized since they rarely conduct patrols or interact with locals, especially with the women and children in the community.  Even though their numbers and proportions are expanding, women might not be deploying to missions evenly or where they might be most needed. Consequently, these operations lack added benefits and the potential impact that meaningful participation of females brings to a mission.^[28] Ambassador Melanne Verveer bluntly explained, “Inclusion is not enough for meaningful participation, which is what matters in the end.”^[29]

There are numerous barriers and challenges women must overcome in order to participate in peace operations. Females experience similar stigmas and taboos throughout their military careers regardless of their rank, nationality, or background. These stigmas and taboos create challenges at the individual and community level, within women’s national defense structures, and within UN peace operations.^[30] In July 2018, the Elsie Initiative published a baseline study which was the first attempt to systematically gather, analyze, and categorize the barriers female soldiers face in their pursuit of deploying on peacekeeping operations. Fourteen different barriers that can prevent women from deploying on peacekeeping operations were identified and organized into six main categories: equal access to opportunities, deployment criteria, the working environment, family constraints, equal treatment during deployment, and career-advancement opportunities.^[31] Since the baseline study was published, further research has reduced and combined these fourteen barriers into ten: eligible pool, deployment selection, deployment criteria, household constraints, top-down leadership, inadequate accommodation and equipment, negative experiences, disincentives to redeploy, stereotypical gender roles, and social exclusion.^[32]  Many of these barriers address cultural challenges women face in their home countries, both in society and within the military itself. Studies show that when a troop-contributing country has a better record of gender equality, it is more likely to send female peacekeepers. In other words, when a country strives to gender mainstream its own national military, it is more likely to send women to a peacekeeping mission, which, therefore, improves the gender balancing in said mission.^[33] Ghana is an example of this since it was among one of the few countries globally to have started enlisting females as far back as 1958, barely a year into its independence. It is also given credit for having trained the first female officer pilots in the sub-region in 1965.^[34] Thus, it is not surprising that Ghana’s contributing percentage for female peacekeepers in October 2022 was 14.1%.^[35]

On October 31, 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1325 to address women, peace, and security. This groundbreaking resolution highlighted a shift in UN policy to engage more females in peacekeeping operations.^[36] It stressed “the importance of their equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security.”^[37] In the two decades since Resolution 1325, the UN has continued to adopt numerous other resolutions and initiatives aimed to address the underrepresentation of women in UN peace operations. This includes both the Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy 2018-2028 and Resolution 2242, which, among other things, encourages troop-contributing countries to hit targeted female participation percentages. Also, in August of 2018, 152 member states of the UN committed to “ensuring full, equal and meaningful participation of women in all stages of the peace process” and “recommit[ted] to increasing the number of civilian and uniformed women in peacekeeping at all levels and in key positions” in their Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN

Peacekeeping Operation as part of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative.^[38] This initiative was a call by UN Secretary-General António Guterres for a renewed collective engagement with UN peacekeeping and to mutually commit to reaching for excellence for all those involved.^[39] Most recently, in August 2020, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2538 which unequivocally recognizes “the indispensable role of women in increasing the overall performance and effectiveness of peacekeeping operations.”^[40] It also offers clear direction on how member states can increase the deployment of female peacekeepers. Finally, it supports the need to ensure that the working culture is gender-sensitive for women, and addresses threats and violence against them.^[41] Despite all of these efforts, female military troops continue to be a rarity in UN peacekeeping operations. 

Conclusion

The meaningful participation of women is not only an extremely important issue for peacekeeping but also for gender equality. The benefit they bring to a mission can be the difference between success and failure. Because of this advantage, everything possible must be done to ensure that women are an integral part of every peacekeeping operations.  It is inspiring to imagine how the world will be once this is accomplished. The UN, along with all its member states, must continue to strive for this goal.

The opinions expressed here are solely the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Women In International Security or its affiliates

After graduating from the United States Military Academy, Eric served as an Army infantry officer, which included two combat tours in Iraq. Wanting to share the hard lessons he had learned, once out of the Army, he began to train and mentor future peacekeepers across Africa through the State Department’s Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI). He then returned to academia and earned both a master’s in Security Policy Studies and a graduate certificate in Global Gender Policy from The George Washington University.  He now serves as the Finance and Operations Analysis for the African Team within GPOI where he works on increasing the meaningful participation of females in peacekeeping operations. 

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^[1] Jamille Bigio and Rachel B. Vogelstein, “How Women’s Participation in Conflict Prevention and Resolution

Advances U.S. Interests” (Council on Foreign Relations Press, October 2016), 1, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2016/10/Discussion_Paper_Bigio_Vogelstein_Women%20in%20CPR_OR .pdf.

^[2] Jennifer Pulliam, “Women in Peacekeeping: A Key to Peace – and a U.S. Priority,” DipNote: Military and Security (blog), May 29, 2020, https://www.state.gov/women-in-peacekeeping-a-key-to-peace-̶-and-a-u-s-priority/.

^[3] Charles Kenny, “The Elsie Fund: Good News for UN Peacekeeping,” Center For Global Development (blog), March 28, 2019, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/elsie-fund-good-news-un-peacekeeping.

^[4] “Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations,” Government of Canada, February 21, 2017, https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/gender_equality-egalite_des_genres/elsie_initiative-initiative_elsie.aspx?lang=eng.

^[5] “Female Military,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed February 9, 2023, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/female-military.

^[6] Renee Coulouris, “Why We Need More Women in Peacekeeping,” Foreign Policy Rising (blog), March 27, 2019, https://foreignpolicyrising.com/2019/03/27/why-we-need-more-women-in-peacekeeping/.

^[7] “Female Military.”

^[8] Kacie Candela, “Women’s Roles as UN Peacekeepers: A Status Report,” PassBlue, August 7, 2018, https://www.passblue.com/2018/08/07/womens-roles-as-un-peacekeepers-a-status-report/.

^[9] Alexandria Ivanovic, “Why the United Nations Needs More Female Peacekeepers” (United Nations University, July 9, 2014), https://unu.edu/publications/articles/why-un-needs-more-female-peacekeepers.html. 11 “Female Military.”

^[10] “Female Military.”

^[11] Ivanovic, “Why the United Nations Needs More Female Peacekeepers.”

^[12] Arabella Phillimore, “We Need More Female Peacekeepers in War Zones,” Financial Times, October 16, 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/87e2c5cc-4ef1-11e9-8f44-fe4a86c48b33.

^[13] Candela, “Women’s Roles as UN Peacekeepers.”

^[14] Jamille Bigio and Rachel B. Vogelstein, “Increasing Female Participation in Peacekeeping Operations,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 26, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/report/increasing-female-participation-peacekeeping-operations.

^[15] Jamille Bigio and Rachel B. Vogelstein, “CFR Policy Innovation Memorandum Advocates for More Female Peacekeepers,” Council on Foreign Relations (blog), September 27, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/blog/cfr-policy-innovation-memorandum-advocates-more-female-peacekeepers.

^[16] Charles Kenny, “Wanted: More Women Peacekeepers,” Center For Global Development (blog), October 11, 2016, https://www.cgdev.org/blog/wanted-more-women-peacekeepers.

^[17] “Where We Operate,” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed February 9, 2023, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate.

^[18] “Contribution of Uniformed Personnel to UN by Mission, Personnel Type, and Gender” (United Nations Peacekeeping, 31 Oct 22), https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/07_gender_statistics_55_october_2022.pdf.

^[19] Kleopatra Moditsi and Aditi Gorur, “Overcoming Hurdles for Women Peacekeepers in the Field,” Stimson Center (blog), May 29, 2020, https://www.stimson.org/2020/overcoming-hurdles-for-women-peacekeepers-in-the-field/.

^[20] “Security Council Resolution 2242 (2015)” (New York, NY: United Nations Security Council, October 13, 2015), 5, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N15/311/09/PDF/N1531109.pdf?OpenElement.

^[21] Daniel de Torres, “The UN Wants to Deploy More Women in Peacekeeping, so Why Are There so Few?,” Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (blog), September 10, 2018, /un-wants-deploy-more-women-peacekeepingso-why-are-there-so-few.

^[22] “Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy 2018-2028” (New York: Department of Peace Operations, January 2019), 4, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/uniformed-gender-parity-2018-2028.pdf.

^[23] “Contribution of Uniformed Personnel to UN by Mission, Personnel Type, and Gender.”

^[24] “Women Peacekeepers: Gender Imbalance” (United Nations Peacekeeping, October 2022), 4–5, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/operational_effect_and_women_peacekeepers_october_2022.pdf.

^[25] “Contribution of Uniformed Personnel to UN by Mission, Personnel Type, and Gender.”

^[26] “Reducing Barriers for Uniformed Women in Peace Operations: DCAF’s Contribution to the Elsie Initiative” (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance), 5, accessed February 9, 2023, https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Elsie_Gender_Factsheet_2019_GSD_0.pdf.

^[27] Candela, “Women’s Roles as UN Peacekeepers.”

^[28] Caron E. Gentry, Laura J. Shepherd, and Laura Sjoberg, eds., The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security (London ; New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2019), 342.

^[29] Melanne Verveer, “Championing Gender – Sensitive Security Sector Reform” (Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, October 13, 2020), https://giwps.georgetown.edu/event/championing-gender-sensitive-security-sector-reform/.

^[30] Lotte Vermeij, “Addressing Taboos and Stigmas Military Women in UN Peace Operations Experience,” IPI Global Observatory (blog), February 9, 2023, https://theglobalobservatory.org/2020/10/addressing-taboos-stigmas-military-women-un-peace-operations-experience/.

^[31] Marta Ghittoni, Léa Lehouck, and Callum Watson, “Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations: Baseline Study” (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, July 2018), 47, https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/Elsie_GenderReport_2018_Final.pdf.

^[32] Solene Brabant, “Assessing Barriers and Opportunities for Women’s Participation in Peacekeeping,” A Propos 162 (September 2019): 16, https://www.swisspeace.ch/apropos/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/september-2019.pdf .

^[33] Gentry, Shepherd, and Sjoberg, The Routledge Handbook of Gender and Security, 342.

^[34] “Ghana Attains UN Target of Women Deployment in Peacekeeping Missions,” Ghana Web, October 13, 2020, https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Ghana-attains-UN-target-of-women-deployment-in-Peacekeeping-Missions-1083970.

^[35] “Women Peacekeepers: Gender Imbalance,” 4.

^[36] Ivanovic, “Why the United Nations Needs More Female Peacekeepers.”

^[37] “Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000)” (New York, NY: United Nations Security Council, October 31, 2000), 1, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/720/18/PDF/N0072018.pdf?OpenElement.

^[38] “Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations,” August 16, 2018, 1, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/a4p-declaration-en.pdf.

^[39] “Action for Peacekeeping (A4P),” United Nations Peacekeeping, accessed February 9, 2023, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/action-for-peacekeeping-a4p.

^[40] “Security Council Resolution 2538 (2020)” (New York, NY: United Nations Security Council, August 28, 2020), 1, https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/RES/2538(2020).

^[41] “New Security Council Resolution on Women and Peacekeeping Announced,” Security Women, September 7, 2020, https://www.securitywomen.org/post/new-security-council-resolution-on-women-and-peacekeepingannounced.

By Joan Johnson-Freese & Alexandra Nicole Islas

The answer to this question is: not likely. The 118^th Congress, extending from January 3, 2023 – January 3, 2025 includes 149 women (107D, 42R), two more than the previous record of 147, set in 2022, thereby constituting 27.9% of Congressional seats. However, beyond hyper-partisanship, differing views among Congresswomen regarding the meaning of “agency” is a neglected factor in the larger debate about women legislators and bipartisanship. Women have stepped forward in a bipartisan fashion on issues where there is no logical counterargument, such as the military needing to provide body armor appropriate to women soldier’s physiques or the need to keep the government open. But differing views on agency can be divisive. Understanding what agency is, differing views of how it is obtained and suppressed, as well as how agency affects gender relations and even violence provides a more granular view of what might be expected from the growing number of women legislators.

In 2013, a U.S. government shutdown seemed inevitable until a bipartisan group of 20 women senators saved the day. Time magazine heralded them as “the only adults left in Washington” for their willingness to reach across the aisle and find a compromise that avoided a costly shutdown. In that article Senator John McCain said, “Imagine what they could do if there were 50 of them,” inferring that women lawmakers would act more cooperatively than their male counterparts.

Research indicates that men and women tend to act differently regarding how they approach conflict resolution. Of the five types of conflict resolution approaches—competing, avoidance, accommodating, compromise and collaboration—men favor the first two, and women the last three. But women are not always and inherently peacemakers. The 2013 example of bipartisanship may have been a one-off because the Senators saw it in everyone’s interest to keep the U.S. government open as both parties get blamed when the government shuts down.

The Importance of Personal Agency

Agency is an often overlooked and little understood concept of significant importance. Social science researchers have found that personal agency, simply stated as the ability to take meaningful action in your own interest, correlates with feelings of happiness and life satisfaction because it allows individuals to feel in control of their own lives. For example, a 2011 study found that conservatives were happier than liberals, in part because of their strong sense of personal agency. Recently, however, conservative—typically Republicans—have been described and describe themselves as angry, some even supportive of political violence, with many feeling a loss of agency (e.g. control over their personal circumstances) they once felt. A recent Secret Service report on mass violence in the U.S. cites men facing “major life stressors” as a key component in the dramatic rise in mass violence.

Feelings of loss of control among white, often poor, American men have given rise to the Great Replacement Theory, a racist, sexist, anti-immigration theory that blames negative circumstances on others and pushes authoritarian responses to address their woes. Men who believe this theory feel angry at women, believing they are among those “stealing their jobs” and robbing them of their masculinity, and control. Given the traditional dominance of men, including in writing and interpreting laws, they have been allowed to suppress women’s agency. Now, the shifting sands of who is gaining and losing personal agency has affected both men and women.

Agency can be suppressed through personal experience as well. In environments where “the system” isn’t trusted, and where women have seen others report harassment or assault and nothing was done or the woman suffered backlash, women who should have agency based on legal principles nevertheless often do not exercise it. In the United States, an estimated one in three women experience sexual assault in their lifetime, but only 28% of sexual assault victims report their assault to the police. In the workplace specifically, the well-publicized U.S. example of sexual harassment at Fox News by CEO Roger Ailes was exposed only after years of fear-based toleration.

Agency Among Women Lawmakers

Regarding shaping and voting on legislation, important differences exist among women regarding how one “gets” and maintains agency.  Generally, liberal women support policies and laws advancing women’s rights and thereby seek to grant agency to women as a group. Conservative women, however, tend to support traditionally held conservative tenets of gender blindness, limited government, individualism and traditionalism, thereby making agency an individual issue and placing emphasis on personal tenacity and self-reliance. Conservatives believe that most people get ahead if they work hard. Conservative women often associate feminism with “victimization” and adamantly reject any such association, focusing instead on positive personal achievement. Rather than #MeToo, “moving on” is the mantra of conservative women, as a superior vision of female empowerment.

These differing views on agency shapes legislation. Liberals, for example, see reproductive health as a group issue and support legislation to require employers and insurance companies to cover contraception costs as part of health care. Conservatives, on the other hand, including conservative women, will more likely see cost coverage as a personal responsibility and vote against government intervention requiring employers or insurance carriers to provide such.

Regarding women in the workforce, views on agency can also intercede, evidenced in a 2020 fight in California over “gig work” at places like Uber and Lyft. All of the 21 women that voted yes on the bill were Democrat, while both of the two women that voted no were Republican. Whereas liberal women there supported efforts to mandate that gig work  pay benefits that help women as a group long-term, conservative women argued against such efforts as hindering individual women’s near-term opportunities to earn (flexible gig work often being attractive to women) if businesses pay workers less due to having to pay benefits.

Another aspect of workforce disagreement is found regarding the gender pay gap. Many Republican women see the gap as attributable to choices women freely make about professions and jobs that result in lower pay, part of what is frequently referred to as choice feminism. When the House voted on the Paycheck Fairness Act in December 2022 not one Republican woman voted in favor, arguing the bill would spur more litigation against employers and therefore hurt women in the workforce. The bill required employers to prove why pay disparities between sexes existed, banned employers from asking employees about their salary history and built in avenues for employee recourse if they thought they were being paid unfairly.  Republican Representative Elise Stefanik offered an alternative bill, the Wage Equity Act, that would encourage but not require employers to conduct voluntary pay analyses and protect workers who discuss their pay with colleagues, but under employer-set parameters.

Marginal Bipartisanship

Following a “Golden Age” of bipartisanship between 1969-79, U.S. Congressional bipartisanship has dropped significantly overall. The Lugar Center – McCourt School Bipartisan Index provides scores and rankings for Members of Congress that measure bill sponsorship and co-sponsorship data based on the degree to which members of opposite parties agree on the same issue with their votes. Looking at the data from 2021, of the 435 Members of Congress total, 24% had a positive bipartisan score, with women making up only 26% within that number. Women operating in a still male-dominated environment often feel especially bound to uphold the positions of their designated political party, thereby suppressing their agency as legislators.

Navigating voter and partisan constraints on agency has been an issue for women in both political parties.  Republican women lawmakers and 2022 candidates, for example, found reproductive rights a difficult minefield to navigate after the Republican-supported 2022 Supreme Court reversal of Roe v Wade and the subsequent landslide win for reproductive rights in Kansas. On the Democratic side, progressive women have found themselves at odds with their more conservative party leadership, which is largely motivated by a drive for party consensus, thus inhibiting their agency. Further, women frequently have less power than men to combat the backlash that is commonly present when straying across party lines, especially on highly polarized issues; witness Liz Cheney’s fall from grace in the Republican party.

But all is not lost. There are a number of issues of concern to all women ripe for addressing through legislation. A recent study found women politicians are more than three times as likely to be targeted by harassment or threats than their male counterparts. The anger and violence among white men spurred by their feelings of lost agency has been a trigger for women being targeted. With their numbers growing, Republican women politicians are finding themselves targets of misogynist colleagues and pundits much as Democratic women politicians long have experienced, giving both a vested interest in addressing the doxxing, trolling, sexual deepfakes, harassment, and violence that all women politicians suffer.

Mid-term elections evidenced many voters stepping away from extremism, which perhaps will open the door for cooperation or compromise among more women on more issues. And, as the number of women legislators increase, the pressures for them to conform to the masculine competitive ethos of their still-dominant male counterparts will wane. When that happens, the full extent of Senator McCain’s 2013 statement will be put to the test.  Sometimes, reframing issues away from ones of contention like correcting the gender wage gap towards those likely to get more women into non-traditional workforces, which both parties support, provides space for bipartisanship. A willingness to consider reframing issues to ones where cooperation can occur might prove the bipartisan difference women can make.

The opinions expressed here are solely the authors’ and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Women In International Security or its affiliates

Authors

Joan Johnson-Freese is a Senior Fellow with Women in International Security and the author of multiple books and articles on women and politics, her latest is Women vs Women, The Case for Cooperation (2022). https://joanjohnsonfreese.carrd.co/

Alexandra Nicole Islas is pursuing a degree in the field of International Relations at Harvard Extension School, and is a Research Assistant for Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese on issues related to Women, Peace & Security. She is also an accomplished dancer, writer, and human rights advocate focusing on increased security through the development of arts and education programs internationally. https://scholar.harvard.edu/alexandranicoleislas

By Liliya Khasanova

The protests in Iran in the name of Mahsa Amini are one of many examples of how the advancement of technology enables us to speak up, spread the word, and learn about human rights violations. Online anonymity and, therefore, reduced accountability for gender-based violence affects the vulnerability of individuals. There is no doubt now that the internet has become the most consequential communication technology of the human rights era.

Despite the technical universalism that technology grants us, there is a strong pushback on conceptual universalism in human rights in cyberspace, including gender issues. In multilateral settings, the efforts of states to regulate malicious state operations have been underpinned by cybersecurity concerns, with little attention paid to human rights protection. The gender dimension, if at all represented, is mainly in the norms of capacity-building and gender parity, avoiding direct referrals to gender equality and women’s rights.

Multilateral Forums under UN Auspices

Until 2021, two main forums had a mandate to discuss norms and rules on cybersecurity: the UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) (work completed in May 2021) and the UN Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) (mandate renewed 2021-2025). One of the main achievements of the GGE was an adoption of a consensus that international law applies to cyber operations (2013). However, how it applies is still very much contested. The complexity of cyberspace as a domain raises several contested issues among states on the definition of sovereignty, attribution of cyber-attacks, the applicability of international humanitarian law, due diligence, etc. The differences between the GGE and OEWG process lay in the nature and number of stakeholders included in the discussion: the latter includes all the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) members as well as non-governmental actors, as compared to experts from 25 states working in their personal capacity in the GGE. In a certain sense, continuing the mandate of the OEWG was a step intended to mitigate the risk of functional and geographical fragmentation of international law. In 2022, negotiations also began in the new UN ad hoc committee on cybercrime that is tasked with drafting a new cybercrime convention.

(Anti)gender Discourse in Cybersecurity Negotiations 

After analysing all the reports adopted by GGE and OEWG, documents of the preparatory process, and official commentaries of states, several observations can be made regarding the Women, Peace, and Security agenda and gender discourse in cyber security negotiations.

Firstly, openness and “multistakeholderism”, i.e. bringing multiple stakeholders together to participate in dialogue and implementation of responses, of the OEWG (as opposed to GGE) resulted in more gender-related remarks in preparatory work and, consequently, in the reports. As an example, an introduction to the latest 2021 OEWG report states:

“The OEWG welcomes the high level of participation of women delegates in its sessions and the prominence of gender perspectives in its discussions. The OEWG underscores the importance of narrowing the “gender digital divide” and of promoting the effective and meaningful participation and leadership of women in decision-making processes related to the use of ICTs in the context of international security.”

To be fair, the gender parity of delegates, both within the teams and among delegation leaders, is improving yearly. Around 38% of all the delegates to the last OEWG sessions were women, which is relatively high compared to other forums.

However, when it comes to gender mainstreaming in the sense of assessing and addressing the implications of information and telecommunication technologies (ICT) for girls, boys, men, women, and non-binary people, the multilateral forums lack consensus. For instance, out of four paragraphs that contained gender issues in the initial draft reports, only one (paragraph 56) that touches upon gender-sensitive capacity building could survive the opposition and was included in the final text of the 2021 OEWG report. Two others–the reference to gender-centred implications of malicious use of ICT and the concluding statement on the need to mainstream gender considerations in the implementation of norm–were cut out from the final text.

Despite the outstanding advocacy work by international human rights and women organizations represented at the negotiation forums, the pushback against gender discourse is persistent and strong. Today, in 2022, in a multilateral setting where states are the main decision-makers, there are still official positions that follow the mantra of a traditional, state-centric, and non-inclusive understanding of international peace and security. Russia, which is playing an active role in OEWG deliberations, affirmed in one of its official statements that “references to the problems of sustainable development, human rights and gender equality, which fall under the competence of other UN bodies, look inappropriate and are not directly related to the problem of ensuring international peace and security” [emphasis added]. To be fair, Russia formulated a position that is shared with most of the countries in the Middle East and some Asian, African and Latin American countries.

Cybersecurity multilateral negotiations are not unique in this sense. The issue is rooted in deep opposition to ‘gender ideology’ –the discourse(s) on gender equality and women’s rights, and especially the discourse(s) on sexual orientation and gender identity. It cannot be seen separately from the policy and governance narratives that became dominant in several countries in the past years: the rollback of women’s rights, gender equality, and perception of gender. For example, in Russia the state-sponsored anti-LGBTQ+ campaign culminated in the 2013 “anti-propaganda law” banning “propaganda of non-traditional sexual relations” to children and to the general public starting from December 1, 2022.[1] Eventually, the amendments to the Russian constitution in 2020 added a definition of marriage as “a relationship between one man and one woman,” which explicitly outlawed same-sex marriage.[2] Most of the Middle Eastern nations recently outlawed same-sex intimacy directly, punishing it with everything from fines to prison and, in Saudi Arabia, to the death penalty. Thus, this pushback on gender ideology, originating from national discourses, can be seen in rule-making procedures internationally.

The multilateral cyber negotiation scene under UN auspices is complicated nowadays with geopolitical tensions and competing interests and reflects the general crisis penetrating the international legal order. The rise in recent years of civilizational, cultural, and ideological confrontation set within the human rights agenda is reflected not only in official positions and approaches, but also in normative proposals in the OEWG and UNGA on cyber matters.

In such circumstances, the role of civil society and its contribution is critical in using a “humanitarian” agenda to persistently push back against an archaeal understanding of international security. Amidst geopolitical disputes, the deepening cleavages between western countries and Russia and China heavily influence the participation of certain stakeholders in meetings. In July 2022, during the first OEWG meeting, 27 NGOs were blocked from participation by Russia, after which some of the Russian NGOs were blocked by Ukraine in retaliation.[3] Harmonizing and aligning strategies and enhancing cooperation between stakeholders could help overcome the increasing geopolitical pressure that civil society organizations experience nowadays in cyber negotiation forums.

To work against the effects of these and other efforts to repress international attempts at advancing a gender equality agenda, effective gender mainstreaming is possible only when gender research is less fragmented and supported by rigorous data collection practices. Partially, the strong transnational opposition against “gender ideology” comes from the misconception of the notion of “gender (identity).” This leads to a broad delegitimization of scientific knowledge on gender as such. “Gender” becomes a red flag even where it is not necessarily a contested concept. Acknowledging and defining this disagreement might help avoid the broad hostility toward everything related to gender. Highlighting and respecting cultural and religious traditions and perceptions while conducting detailed and concise research on gender and cyber can help focus on the “humane” component rather than ideological confrontation.

The opinions expressed here are solely the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Women In International Security or its affiliates

NOTES

[1] Russian Federation, Federal Law No. 135-FZ of 2013, on Amendments to Article 5 of the Federal Law “On the Protection of Children from Information Harmful to their Health and Development;” Russian Federation, Federal Law No. 478-FZ of 05.12. 2022. on Amendments to the Federal Law on “Information, information technologies and security of information” and other legislative acts of Russian Federation.”

[2] Constitution of the Russian Federation as amended and approved by the All-Russian vote on July 1, 2020 [working translation] https://rg.ru/2020/07/04/konstituciya-site-dok.html.

[3] Hurel, Louise Marie, “The Rocky Road to Cyber Norms at the United Nations”, Council on Foreign Relations, September 6, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/blog/rocky-road-cyber-norms-united-nations-0.

By Tristen Thakar, University of Pittsburgh WIIS Chapter

Since mid-June, high levels of rain have unleashed catastrophic flash floods along the Kabul and Indus rivers, leaving over a third of Pakistan submerged in water. This has displaced over 7.6 million people throughout the country, including around 598,000 Afghans living in refugee camps.[1] Along with countless people losing their homes, over 1,500 people have lost their lives, including around 600 children.[2] Everyone in Pakistan is being affected by these floods, but pregnant women are being hit the hardest.

The United Nations Population Fund estimates that around 650,000 pregnant women and young girls have been affected by this disaster; in September 2022 alone, around 73,000 women were expected to give birth.[3] Many of these women need things like prenatal care and the presence of skilled medical staff, not to mention the special medical support for the child or mother that might be needed post-birth. All this is extremely difficult to find. In addition, it is still common for many women in Pakistan to deliver at home, and with many women currently living in plastic tents after losing their homes, the need for safe spaces to give birth in the coming weeks or months will be very important.

Meeting the other needs of these women will not be easy, either. Many pregnant women around the country struggle to find even basic food and clean water. Without homes to give birth in, many of them are scrambling to find other options. Traveling to healthcare facilities is difficult. The World Health Organization reports that of the 1,460 health facilities that were damaged by the summer floods, 432 were completely demolished.[4] Healthcare workers, essential medicines, and other medical supplies are in short supply, which means that many pregnant women will not receive the full treatment they might need even if they can reach a working healthcare location. This puts pregnant women in a very difficult situation.

The key point to remember, however, is that the summer floods have exacerbated this situation, not created it. For years, Pakistani women have faced the same medical issues due to weak healthcare infrastructure, a continuing rise in birth rates, and lack of services throughout the country. As a result, Pakistan has the highest maternal mortality ratio (MMR) in South Asia and has made less progress on this front than other developing countries outside of the region. Studies have shown that between 2010 and 2018, 91,076 children were born in Pakistan, with an MMR during that time of 319 per 100,000 as compared to the average of 124 per 100,000 in comparable countries.[5]

These statistics show that Pakistan was already behind many other countries when it came to the care of pregnant women, even before the floods worsened their situation. The Pakistani government must make the improvement of its healthcare infrastructure a top priority during the rebuilding of the country. This is not just because it is right from a humanitarian perspective; it is a key element for economic development. Studies have shown that deficient birth outcomes such as preterm delivery and low birth weights lead to high healthcare costs, which negatively affects a state’s economic development.[6] Because of this, the Pakistani government should act with some urgency to better support these women. The rebuilding and improving of the Pakistani healthcare system should focus on four things: overseeing the construction of modern healthcare facilities;  improving roads so women–and all citizens–have reliable ways of getting treatment; working with industry-leading companies to create reliable medical supply chains so pregnant women and their babies can receive the medications they need; and creating new government programs to support pregnant women throughout their pregnancy and post birth.[7] The introduction of all of these elements will make a major impact on the lives of pregnant women.

In conclusion, the floods throughout Pakistan in the summer of 2022 have been tragic and life-changing for many people, but they should also be seen as a time for the Pakistani government to improve conditions for all Pakistani citizens and to make a serious effort to help women, especially pregnant ones. They need a lot of support and will continue to need this support long after the flooding subsides.

The opinions expressed here are solely the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Women In International Security or its affiliates. 

NOTES

[1] “Pakistan: Floods – Jul 2022 | ReliefWeb.” Accessed October 7, 2022. https://reliefweb.int/disaster/fl-2022- 000254-pak.

[2] “Pakistan: Floods – Jul 2022 | ReliefWeb.” Accessed October 7, 2022. https://reliefweb.int/disaster/fl-2022- 000254-pak.

[3] Human Rights Watch. “Flood-Affected Women in Pakistan Need Urgent Help,” September 2, 2022.  https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/02/flood-affected-women-pakistan-need-urgent-help

[4] Baloch, Shah Meer. “‘The Hospital Has Nothing’: Pakistan’s Floods Put Pregnant Women in Danger.” The  Guardian, September 14, 2022, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/14/the-hospital has-nothing-pakistans-floods-put-pregnant-women-in-danger.

[5] Aziz, Aleha, Sarah Saleem, Tracy L. Nolen, Nousheen Akber Pradhan, Elizabeth M. McClure, Saleem Jessani, Ana L.  Garces, et al. “Why Are the Pakistani Maternal, Fetal and Newborn Outcomes so Poor Compared to Other Low and  Middle-Income Countries?” Reproductive Health 17, no. 3 (December 17, 2020): 190.

https://doi.org/10.1186/s12978-020-01023-5.

[6] Aziz, Aleha, Sarah Saleem, Tracy L. Nolen, Nousheen Akber Pradhan, Elizabeth M. McClure, Saleem Jessani, Ana L.  Garces, et al. “Why Are the Pakistani Maternal, Fetal and Newborn Outcomes so Poor Compared to Other Low and  Middle-Income Countries?” Reproductive Health 17, no. 3 (December 17, 2020): 190.

https://doi.org/10.1186/s12978-020-01023-5

[7] Gajate Garrido, Gissele. “The Impact of Adequate Prenatal Care in a Developing Country: Testing the WHO  Recommendations.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1879464.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aziz, Aleha, Sarah Saleem, Tracy L. Nolen, Nousheen Akber Pradhan, Elizabeth M. McClure,  Saleem Jessani, Ana L. Garces, et al. “Why Are the Pakistani Maternal, Fetal and Newborn  Outcomes so Poor Compared to Other Low and Middle-Income Countries?” Reproductive  Health 17, no. 3 (December 17, 2020): 190. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12978-020-01023-5.

Baloch, Shah Meer. “‘The Hospital Has Nothing’: Pakistan’s Floods Put Pregnant Women in  Danger.” The Guardian, September 14, 2022, sec. World news.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/14/the-hospital-has-nothing-pakistans-floods put-pregnant-women-in-danger.

Human Rights Watch. “Flood-Affected Women in Pakistan Need Urgent Help,” September 2,  2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/09/02/flood-affected-women-pakistan-need-urgent help.

Gajate Garrido, Gissele. “The Impact of Adequate Prenatal Care in a Developing Country:  Testing the WHO Recommendations.” SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011.

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1879464.

“Pakistan: Floods – Jul 2022 | ReliefWeb.” Accessed October 7, 2022.

https://reliefweb.int/disaster/fl-2022-000254-pak.

“Pakistan: Floods – Jul 2022 | ReliefWeb.” Accessed October 7, 2022.

https://reliefweb.int/disaster/fl-2022-000254-pak.

By: Amy Dwyer

Author bio: Amy Dwyer previously served as a programme development advisor on programmes in Myanmar, focusing on human rights, freedom of religion and belief and sexual violence in conflict. She currently work in international policy and research.

The National League for Democracy’s (NLD) landslide rise to power in 2015 was expected to catalyze Myanmar’s transition from an autocracy under military rule to a governing democracy, considered by many to be a symbol of hope.

Five years on, trust in the country’s peace process has declined as signatories have withdrawn from the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Unmet demands for autonomy from Ethnic Armed Groups (EAGs) have resulted in heightened tensions and increased communal violence. The long-term persecution and expulsion of more than 700,000 Rohingya made news around the world in 2017, bringing to light the deeply rooted ethno-nationalist beliefs that continue to fuel divides and conflict across the country.[1]

Defending the Rohingya remains a particularly unpopular political position and one which Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi has so far being unwilling to publicly take. Ethnic minority leaders have repeatedly accused the government of instituting a “Burmanization” policy to suppress non-Bamar religions, while the government’s tepid attempts to calm nationalist agitation and emphasize the importance of democratic pluralism have been read by ultra-nationalist Buddhist groups as a threat to the country’s dominant religion.

The November 2020 national elections, Myanmar’s third in six decade, saw the NLD’s landslide re-election. With over a million minority groups disenfranchised, experts argue that the result has validated the “personality cult” surrounding the party’s de-facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi as “the only icon for the Bamar majority”. This, accompanied by heightened economic hardships due to Covid-19, threatens a rise in open conflict.[2]

On the other hand, the NLD’s renewed mandate provides a timely opportunity to reassess the government’s role in the country’s peace process and reinvigorate the NCA. The party already highlighted its desire to build a democratic federal union in its election manifesto. To meaningfully achieve this, the NLD must address the past grievances of Myanmar’s diverse ethnic minority groups, build their trust in public institutions and implement a more flexible and inclusive approach to peace negotiations.

This op-ed provides an overview of ethno-nationalist roots in Myanmar and how this has impacted peace dialogues, before outlining what this means for rebuilding trust in the peace process and how likely this is.[1]

Ethno-nationalist roots and manifestations

Ethnic identity in Myanmar, arguably the country’s most politically significant marker, is stratified in policy, law and socio-behavioral norms. Myanmar’s transition from a wholly closed society to a gradually open one has seen the fragile union of 135 (recognized) ethnic groups and the carving of a national identity that defines people in fixed, exclusionary terms (Buddhist or non-Buddhist, Bamar or non-Bamar, and taingyinthar lumyo, which translates to “the kind of people who belong in the country).”[3]

The International Crisis Group notes a recurring perception in Myanmar that Buddhism is an inherently peaceful and non-proselytizing religion, therefore vulnerable to oppression from more “aggressive” faiths.[7] Research suggests that increasing Islamophobia in the West and “anti-Buddhist” actions in the Middle East and South Asia has exacerbated and legitimized such concerns.[8]

Britain’s colonial legacy played a significant role in generating division. As Great Britain started to promote separate ethnic states, including non-Buddhist ones, anti-colonial movements started using religious education to preserve a perceived loss of Buddhist culture. Buddhist teaching started to be reinforced through dhamma (Sunday) schools that continue to operate across the country to this day – including in non-Buddhist states.[9] The Buddhist Young Men’s Association emerged to counteract increasing religious antipathy among youth,[10] and patriotic organisations known as wunthanu aimed to mobilize disillusioned communities in support of Buddhist nationalism.[11]

As Myanmar entered a new democratic era in 2015, the debate over the role of Buddhism within politics was recast leading to a further surge in ethno-nationalist groups. Buddhist groups expressed ongoing concern that the NLD’s “pluralistic” approach placed the country’s majority religion at risk, resulting in emergence of ultra-nationalist groups such as the Ma Ba Tha (the Committee to Protect Race and Religion), which consider it their duty to protect Buddhism. Led by monks who are considered to hold greater legitimacy on religious issues than the government, its tactics have been legitimized by an old Myanmar saying that is also the motto of the current Immigration Ministry: “A race does not face extinction by being swallowed into the earth, but from being swallowed up by another race.”

The Ma Ba Tha has played a prominent role in civic education, service delivery, justice and dispute resolution in areas where the government is perceived to be weak. It has provided a channel for women to meaningfully participate in local community development initiatives, and it is an anchor for youth who faced high unemployment and uncertainty during Myanmar’s rapid transition. Underlying the popularity of nationalist narratives is a sense of economic anxiety and a feeling that “ordinary” people are not seeing tangible benefits from the reforms the NLD promised in 2015.

Democratic transition

Before assuming power, the NLD symbolized Myanmar’s biggest cause: the struggle against authoritarianism. Following fifty years of military rule, the party represented a victory in the uphill struggle against injustice and repression, assuring voters that one of its three key priorities would be to end the country’s long-running ethnic conflict and civil war.[12]

Despite concerns that the military (Tatmadaw) would continue to rule Myanmar in practice and that the NLD’s position would be largely symbolic, the government has built a working relationship with the Tatmadaw, which under the 2008 Constitution still occupies 25 per cent of Parliamentary seats and has the authority to appoint senior ministers. In 2018, the NLD announced plans to transfer the General Administration Department – the country’s leading agency for public administration – from the Tatmadaw-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs to a civilian government ministry, demonstrating a promising step towards greater civilian control of the government.

Hopes were also high that the NLD would consolidate the complicated peace process it inherited from the previous Thein Sein administration. In 2015, Myanmar’s National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was signed between the government and non-state ethnic armed groups (EAGs) following an 18-month negotiation period. The agreement granted federalism and security sector reform to EAGs in exchange for their disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.[13] Despite six EAGs not signing the agreement and concerns being raised regarding its lack of inclusivity, it paved the way for a political dialogue process. The following year, the NLD hosted the first 21^st Century Panglong Conference with the goal of achieving a permanent peace accord.

Stalled peace process

Nevertheless, the peace process has faced ongoing challenges and the NLD has struggled to maintain formal dialogue with the ten NCA signatories, resulting in the temporary withdrawal of organisations such as the Karen National Union and Restoration Council of Shan State in 2018. Negotiations with non-signatories have also stalled. Only EAGs that signed the NCA were invited to the first Panglong Conference, and past human rights violations were excluded from discussions.[14] Reports have referred to the dialogue as largely “performative”,[15] and despite commitments to host talks every six months, a third Panglong Conference has been postponed four times.[16]

The International Crisis Group (2020) argues that the NLD made a fundamental mistake in adopting a formalized approach to peace talks, missing an opportunity to gradually build trust with and credibility among EAG leaders through regular, informal meetings. Efforts to reach bilateral ceasefires with various armed actors,[3] as a precursor to signing the NCA, have failed due to unrealistic demands placed on the groups to accept major restrictions within their operations, demonstrating a lack of understanding and legitimization of their grievances.

The peace process has equally faced challenges from EAGs and the military, the former of which has articulated broad, non-specific “ideals” that hinder progress in negotiations. The military has been blamed by ethnic groups for continued operations against them, only announcing unilateral ceasefires ahead of increased attention during the election campaign.[17] A Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JCMC) was set up by the government to implement and monitor adherence to NCA provisions, but all national and local bodies are chaired by military officers, while EAGs are only able to appoint vice chairs.[18] An independent evaluation in 2019 found that the JCMC remains a “passive monitoring operation”, relying on reporting from members and lacking capacity to ensure the protection of civilians against violations committed by NCA signatories.[19]

Disillusion among ethnic groups

As hopes for decentralization and reconciliation have diminished, disillusion with the government and electoral democracy has increased, and threats from insurgent groups such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and Kachin Independent Army have intensified.[20] White the latter supported the NLD in 2015, by 2018 it condemned Aung San Suu Kyi’s failure to address ethnic minority concerns in the peace process.

Exclusion is most evident in Rakhine State, where the government refused the Arakan National Party the opportunity to form its own state government after performing strongly in the 2015 elections. In early 2018, state police targeted an anniversary gathering organized by ethnic Rakhine to mark the end of the independent Rakhine kingdom and its fall to the Burmans.[21] What followed was the government’s arrest and imprisonment of the state’s leading political figure and an escalation of clashes between EAGs and the Tatmadaw. UNHCR referred to the ongoing persecution of the Rohingya in Rakhine State as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” International pressure[4] against such military operations, including from the International Court of Justice, grew and as recently as 2020, Amnesty International collected evidence of airstrikes on civilians targeting Rohingya and Christian minorities.[22]

As the NLD struggled to harness the grassroots energy of ethnic groups which originally supported its cause, and as groups conceded that it has not lived up to the high expectations placed on it when first taking office, ultra-nationalist groups such as the Ma Ba Tha risked filling its role, offering a sense of order and cause to disillusioned communities and using this to propagate its concerns.

Studies argue that the NLD adopted a “staunchly nationalist position,” failing to introduce legislation to overthrow such groups.[23] Minimal attempts to restrict the influence of the Ma Ba Tha merely pushed coordination of members into the shadows and resulted in “branch-off” nationalist groups now beyond the Ma Ba Tha’s sole control, such as the 969, Dhamma Wunthanu Rakhita and various myo-chit (“love for one’s own race”) youth groups. Any further restrictions risk inciting clashes with armed groups that hold informal alliances with the Ma Ba Tha and have promised to defend Buddhism with force where required.

2020 elections: rebuilding trust

In a transitional country like Myanmar, interpersonal trust and tolerance are fundamental to a democratic society. Despite nominally boasting the trappings of a developing democracy, institutions and mindsets in Myanmar change slowly. A positive appreciation for the “other” is still poorly rooted in the country’s human rights arena, with many civil society actors – though traditionally allies in promoting inclusivity and protecting the most marginalized – operating as representatives of their own groups rather than proponents of wider agendas. Speaking out for minority rights is still considered by many to be a taboo, carrying a heavy risk of reprisal under the country’s repressive legislation.[5] A nationwide 2018 survey by the People’s Alliance for Credible Elections found that only 18 per cent of 2,364 citizens respondents felt other ethnic or religious groups could be trusted.[24]

The recent elections represent a pivotal milestone for Myanmar’s democratic transition, presenting both challenges and opportunities. Despite the announcement of solidarity among Kachin, Kayah, Mon, Chin and Karen parties,[25] Myanmar’s first-past-the-post system has continued to facilitate a “winner takes all” culture that excludes ethnic parties from having a political platform.[26] Nevertheless, the NLD possesses unparalleled political capital, placing it in a unique position to rebuild momentum for the peace process and defuse tensions in line with its manifesto. This can only be achieved if it rediverts its focus from garnering political support among its ethnic-majority Burman base to building trust with the country’s minority ethnic groups. The NLD must re-examine its own role in the peace process and ensure a more inclusive approach to dialogue, recognising that its neutral stance perpetuates perceptions of the party being a “manifestation” of Burman Buddhist ideals aligned with the military. Finally, if communities do not feel their grievances have been addressed, lasting reconciliation is unlikely.[27]

Recommendations

State

• Encourage greater inclusion of minority ethnic groups in the peace process through introducing quotas for representation, providing training and incentives, ensuring access to information and addressing barriers to participation.

International community

• Advocate a truth commission to address past human rights violations.[28] This should fully comply with international human rights special procedures, including cooperation with fact-finding missions investigating crimes against the Rohingya.

EAGs

• Build consensus across ethnic lines where possible and organize, coordinate and amplify common positions to the government, including specific requests with timeframes and lines of responsibility. These should be realistic as trust is built over time.

Military

• Gestures towards ethnic groups should not be tokenistic but instead build on trust and commitment to a more collaborative peace process. Provide opportunities for ethnic groups to chair and exercise genuine leadership within the JCMC and invite non-NCA signatories to engage in dialogue.

Civil society

• Document, organize and articulate the concerns of ethnic minority communities to decisionmakers. Critically question and explore prejudices within the human rights community and consider the perspectives, interests and needs of “the other”. Promote a more collective sense of identity where ethnicity and religion become less of a divider and common beliefs, customs and norms become more of an equalizer.

The opinions expressed here are solely the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Women In International Security or its affiliates. 

References

[1] Several organisations and actors are cited: the country’s governing party (the NLD); the military (Tatmadaw), which occupies 25 per cent of Parliamentary seats; ethnic, state-level parties represented in the Assembly of the Union (such as the Arakan National Party); non-state ethnic organisations not currently represented, and their armed insurgent wings – some of which are signatories of the NCA (Karen National Union, Restoration Council of Shan State, Kachin Independence Party, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Arakan Army); ethnic groups (including Shan, Rakhine/Arakan, Chin, Mon, Karen, Kayah, Rohingya, Buddhist, Bamar, Kachin, Ta’ang); and ethno-nationalist groups (the Ma Ba Tha, 969, Dhamma Wunthanu Rakhita, myo-chit).

[2] During the review, the state reiterated its stance that there existed no minority community under the name of the Rohingya.

[3] Such as the Arakan Army, the Kachin Independence Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army.

[4] The NLD have refused to cooperate meaningfully with UN Fact-Finding Missions into the investigations against senior military officials for the genocide of ethnic Rohingya Muslims, rejecting visas for Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee and limiting access to the country by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (see Human Rights Watch, Myanmar Events of 2019, 2019).

[5] See Section 18 of the Peaceful Assembly and Procession Law, which is used to detain human rights defenders.

[1] Amnesty International, Caged Without a Roof: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State (London: Amnesty International, November 2017)

[2] Mahtani, S., and Diamond, C., Suu Kyi’s Godlike Status Drove her Myanmar Election Win. It Threatens to Rip the Country Apart (Washington, DC: The Washington Post, 18 November, 2020)

[3] Callahan, M. and Zaw Oo, Myo, Myanmar’s 2020 Elections and Conflict Dynamics, No. 146 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, April 2019)

[4] Human Rights Watch, Burma: Discriminatory Laws Could Stoke Communal Tensions (New York: HRW, 23 August, 2015)

[5] U.S Department of State, Burma Human Rights Report (Washington, DC: U.S Department of State, 2016)

[6] Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Burma: The Rise of Ethnic Parties in the Political System (Part II) (Washington, DC: CSIS, 17 April, 2014)

[7] International Crisis Group, Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar (Brussels: ICG, 5 September, 2017)

[8] Ibid.

[9] openDemocracy, What’s Attracting Women to Myanmar’s Buddhist Nationalist Movement? (London: openDemocracy, 30 January, 2018)

[10] Ibid.

[11] Tharaphi Than, Nationalism, Religion, and Violence: Old and New Wunthanu Movements in Myanmar, Volume 13, No. 4 (Arlington: Institute for Global Engagement, December 2015)

[12] International Crisis Group, Rebooting Myanmar’s Stalled Peace Process (Brussels: ICG, 19 June, 2020)

[13] Institute for Security and Development Policy, Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (Washington, DC: ISDP, October 2015)

[14] Mon, Y, Controversy, Progress at the Third Panglong Conference (Yangon: Frontier Myanmar, July 16, 2018)

[15] International Crisis Group, Rebooting Myanmar’s Stalled Peace Process (Brussels: ICG, 19 June, 2020)

[16] Ganesan, N. Taking Stock of Myanmar’s Ethnic Peace Process and the Third Twenty-First Century Panglong Conference (South Korea: The Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, October 2018)

[17] International Crisis Group, Peace and Electoral Democracy in Myanmar (Brussels: ICG, 6 August, 2019)

[18] Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee, Joint Monitoring Committee Guideline for Each Level (Draft) (Yangon: JCMC, 2015)

[19] Banim, Guy P. and Maung Maung, Tin, Final Independent Evaluation of the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC) Support Platform Project (SPP) Myanmar (UN: New York, September 2019)

[20] International Crisis Group, Myanmar: A Violent Push to Shake Up Ceasefire Negotiations (Brussels: ICG, 24 September, 2019)

[21] The Independent, Myanmar Police Shoot Dead Seven Buddhist Demonstrators and Injure 12 as Celebration in Rakhine Turns Violent (London: The Independent, 17 January, 2018)

[22] Amnesty International, Myanmar: Indiscriminate Airstrikes Kill Civilians as Rakhine Conflict Worsens (London: Amnesty International, July 2020)

[23] International Crisis Group, Peace and Electoral Democracy in Myanmar (Brussels: ICG, 6 August, 2019)

[24] People’s Alliance for Credible Elections, Citizens’ Mid-Term Perceptions of Government Performance (Yangon: PACE Myanmar, September 2018)

[25] The Irrawaddy, Ethnic Political Parties Merge to Seek Stronger Representation in 2020 Election (Yangon: The Irrawaddy, 11 September, 2018)

[26] International Crisis Group, Peace and Electoral Democracy in Myanmar (Brussels: ICG, 6 August, 2019)

[27] Pierce, P., and Reiger, C, Navigating Paths to Justice in Myanmar’s Transition (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, June 2014)

[28] Huchet, L, Dealing with Myanmar’s Past: A Call for a Truth Commission (Bristol: E-International Relations, 29 December, 2019)

By: Sofia Sutera

International Joint Ph.D Programme “Human Rights, Society, and Multi-level Governance”- University of Padova, Human Rights Centre “Antonio Papisca”

In order to understand the potential the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has in the near and even far future, it is necessary first of all to understand how this agenda is currently understood, implemented, and thus concretely lived. Only by observing the present situation is it possible to speculate on the future.

This essay examines the case of Denmark within the broader framework of NATO, analysing specifically how women’s representation is framed in the context of the Danish Armed Forces (DAF).

According to a poll conducted by the YouGov-Cambridge Globalism Project, while Denmark is one of the countries in the world to least identify as feminist[1] (Orange and Duncan 2019), Denmark was the first country to adopt a National Action Plan (NAP) on the WPS Agenda in 2005. The NAP was subsequently revised in 2008 and 2014. There are other signs that Denmark seems committed to gender issues: 37.4 percent of Denmark’s Parliament are women , the Gender Inequality Index[2] is 0.041, the WPS Index[3] is 0.845 (Our Secure Future 2019), and the Global Peace Index[4] is 1.316: data which depict Denmark as one of the most successful countries in the world in terms of gender equality (World Economic Forum 2020).Yet the DAF, while facing the societal imperative of including women, perform below the other NATO members in gender diversity (Schaub et al. 2012): indeed, data from 2017, when Denmark presented its last national report, indicate that the percentage of women who are part of Active Duty military personnel is 11.1 percent NATO countries overall and 7.1 percent in Denmark[5]. Moreover, even if women have been part of the volunteer corps in the armed forces since 1934, it is only since 1992 that no more formal barriers to the participation of women in the armed forces have existed (Schaub et al. 2012, 4).

While in 2009 the Defense Command adopted a charter to promote the advancement of women to leadership roles “Flere kvinder i ledelse,”[6] in 2011 the Ministry of Defense developed a Defense Action Plan for Equality containing specific measures for women and ethnic minorities. This resulted in the Ministry of Defense winning the “Diversity in the Workplace” (MIA) Award in 2011 (Schaub et al. 2012, 5)[7].

This diversity policy was published on the April 28, 2011 by the Defense Minister who stated that the collaboration between a wide range of people with different competences promotes learning, creativity and innovation. As such, increased diversity is an important way to better solve the tasks faced by the armed forces (Ministry of Defense 2011a). Nevertheless, while affirming that “the composition of the personnel within the entire Ministry of Defense must be diverse in terms of gender distribution, age composition, social origin, ethnic origin and so on” (Ministry of Defense, undated), this policy focuses entirely on women and ethnic minorities, considered the two areas to prioritize. Indeed, the Ministry of Defense underlines that “at the heart of the problem is the low number of women in uniformed positions and the number of ethnic minorities in both civilian and military posts” (Schaub et al. 2012, 10).

Particularly, diversity is considered paramount for the effectiveness of military operations: for instance, when “women participate in international missions, we are more easily in contact with the female part of the population. Danish women can act as role models for the local population and show that everyone must have the same opportunities” (Ministry of Defense 2011b, 4). Moreover, diversity is also considered a benefit in building a staff composition that reflects the general population, helping to create trust and respect in the population. These same arguments have been stressed again in 2020 (Ministry of Defense 2020).

The first words of the mentioned diversity policy underline that: “The Ministry of Defense authorities are, overall, one of Denmark’s largest workplaces. We work for peace, freedom and security with respect for human rights” (Ministry of Defense 2011b, 4). It continues by affirming that if the DAF want to “win the peace,” they need to promote democracy and equality, showing to local people, for instance, that women are equal to men and that both girls and boys have the right to go to school. The DAF can thus act as a role model for the local population. At the same time, the text recalls that diversity is relevant not only in international settings but also domestic ones.[8] Indeed, different studies found that there is a positive correlation between diversity and a company’s financial performance, which in the case of a public company mostly translates in terms of greater efficiency (Ministry of Defense 2011b, 5).

Even recognizing that the overall number of women in the DAF is increasing, the policy stresses that their number (in 2011) is 6.4 percent, while the number of women in the workforce in Denmark is around 49percent (still in 2011). It also emphasizes that female role models in leadership positions may be a great motivating factor for young women to choose a career path in uniform by showing that the defense sector is an attractive workplace where gender is not an obstacle to a managerial career (Ministry of Defense 2011b, 13).

Acknowledging that “whoever you are, it will often be a challenge to be a minority, and women in uniform are often few in number” (Ministry of Defense 2011b, 22), the policy introduces several initiatives that have already been implemented or are going to be in order to attract and retain more women and ethnic minorities in the DAF. However, this policy observes these two groups only through the lens of diversity without any specific consideration for gender as the frame of reference. There is a generic reference to the WPS agenda in that the NAP outlined in UNSCR 1325 asks national armed forces to have a major number of women deployed in international operations, without though indicating any specific number to be reached (Ministry of Defense 2011b, 4), there is no reflection on what the gender implications for women or men are.

The result, therefore, has been no discussion of the concept of gender, homogenizing the women category in the overall armed forces entity from which they stand out, always accompanied by the category of ethnic minorities, only for statistical purposes. This is problematic. Firstly, the policy utilizes solely the Danish term “køn,” which can be interpreted both as sex and gender and thus does not highlight the dissimilarity between these two concepts. In fact, looking at the UN framework, where the WPS Agenda is placed, and quoting the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women (OSAGI 2001, 1) gender is defined as:

“the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes”.

Likewise, the “Gender Equality Glossary” developed by UN Women, clearly distinguishes gender as:

“the roles, behaviors, activities, and attributes that a given society at a given time considers appropriate for men and women. In addition to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, gender also refers to the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. They are context/ time-specific and changeable […]” (UN WOMEN undated).

The term sex is defined as: “The physical and biological characteristics that distinguish males and females” (UN WOMEN undated).

Moreover, this approach does not take into account the reality that women are not a uniform category, either. Indeed, the evaluation of the last Danish NAP on the WPS agenda, released in October 2019, asks to: “strengthen the focus on the needs and experiences of diverse groups of women within the fourth NAP, acknowledging the impact that intersecting identities have on the WPS agenda (for example age, class, disability, sexuality, gender identity, ethnicity, religion and others)” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2019).

It is possible, therefore, to conclude that the potential of the WPS agenda is to an extent still embraced by the DAF. Despite the acknowledgment that this institution is distinguished by a peculiar mission of a very practical nature, it cannot but base its work on some theoretical foundations. As Kronsell (2012, 92) claims, “it is not necessarily the number of women present in the peacekeeping forces or in the military that is the key to gender awareness but rather the systematic work with gender strategies from the leadership level.” Indeed, among the six priority action areas in the field of the WPS agenda identified by the UN, the first requires to “make leadership accountable for the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, through improved data and gender analysis” (UN WOMEN 2019).

On the other hand, though, it is the UN itself that, in the context of the WPS agenda and specifically to the related Security Council resolutions, needs to provide a theoretical discussion on the concept of gender. While recognizing that the Security Council itself is charged with a specific mission, i.e., the fundamental task of maintaining international peace and security, this goal cannot but be founded on a comprehensive understanding of peace and security. Thus, a more in-depth analysis into the notion of gender and the category of women who embody the capacities of half the world’s population is necessary for the Security Council to achieve its purpose.

The opinions expressed here are solely the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Women In International Security or its affiliates. 

References:

Kronsell, A. (2012) Gender, sex and the postnational defense: Militarism and peacekeeping. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ministry of Defence (2011a) Mangfoldighedspolitik – vejen til bedre opgaveløsning, retrieved from: https://www.fmn.dk/nyheder/Arkiv/2011/Pages/Nymangfoldighedspolitik%E2%80%93vejentilbedreopgaveloesning.aspx (accessed 19/06/2020).

Ministry of Defence (2011b) Vejen til bedre opgaveløsning -Forsvarsministeriets mangfoldighedspolitik, retrieved from: https://www.yumpu.com/da/document/read/19966173/forsvarsministeriets-politik-for-mangfoldighed-kvinderiledelsedk (accessed 20/11/2020).

Ministry of Defence (2020) Mangfoldighed og ligebehandling, retrieved from: https://forsvaret.dk/da/om-os/kultur-fakta-historie/mangfoldighed-og-ligebehandling/ (accessed 20/11/2020).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2019). Evaluation of the Danish National Action Plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, retrieved from: http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/eval_danish_action_plan_resolution_1325/Pdf/eval_danish_action_plan_resolution_1325.pdf (accessed 19/06/2020).

Orange, R. and Duncan, P. (2019). And the least feminist nation in the world is… Denmark?, The Guardian, retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/may/10/and-the-least-feminist-nation-in-the-world-is-denmark (accessed: 19/06/2020).

Our Secure Future (2019) ‘NATIONAL ACTION PLAN MAP’. One Earth Future, retrieved from: https://oursecurefuture.org/projects/national-action-plan-mapping (accessed: 19/06/2020).

Schaub, G., Pradhan-Blach, F., Larsen, E. S., and Larsen, J. K. (2012) Diversity in the Danish Armed Forces. Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen, retrieved from: https://cms.polsci.ku.dk/publikationer/diversity1/Diversity_report.pdf (accessed 19/06/2020).

UN WOMEN (2019). In Focus: Women, peace and security, retrieved from: https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/women-peace-security (accessed 19/06/2020).

OSAGI, 2001. Concepts and definitions, retrieved from: https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/factsheet2.pdf (accessed 20/11/2020).

UN WOMEN, undated. Gender Equality Glossary, retrieved from: https://trainingcentre.unwomen.org/mod/glossary/view.php?id=36&mode=letter&hook=S&sortkey=&sortorder=asc (accessed 19/06/2020).

[1] Just one in six Danes (Orange and Duncan 2019).

[2] The Gender Inequality Index measures gender inequalities through human development indicators: 0 is the best possible score and 1 is the worst possible score (http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii).

[3] The Women, Peace and Security Index is based upon indicators of security, inclusion and justice: 1 is the best possible score and 0 is the worst possible score (https://giwps.georgetown.edu/the-index/).

[4] The Global Peace Index measures the level of peacefulness of a State: 1 is the best possible score and 5 is the worst possible score (http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/06/GPI-2019-web003.pdf).

[5] Data based on the National Reports submitted by NATO member nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, available at: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_09/20190909_190909-2017-Summary-NR-to-NCGP.pdf (accessed 18/06/2020)

[6] “Charter for More Women in Leadership”, signed by the then Defence Secretary Tim Sloth Jørgensen on April 16, 2009.

[7] Prize launched in 2003 by the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR). In 2007 also the Danish Emergency Management Agency won this prize.

[8] Particularly taking into account that the Defence is Denmark’s largest youth workplace thanks to the military service (Ministry of Defence 2011b, 10).

By Dr Vanessa F. Newby

What is meaningful participation in the context of national militaries and peacekeeping? In a recent paper co-authored with my colleague, Clotilde Sebag, we investigated this question. Drawing on publicly available empirical data we highlighted the problems inherent in mainstreaming Resolution 1325 across national militaries and peacekeeping operations. We found: first, that are women under-represented in their national militaries and in high-status combat positions affecting their chances of promotion. Second, societal inequality impacts the retention and recruitment of women in the armed forces. Third, we identified the occurrence of a unique feature of women’s service as military personnel: the relegation to specialised spaces in peacekeeping operations. We capture these issues under the term ‘sidestreaming’ and discuss how this occurs both in national militaries and peacekeeping operations.

In 2000 UNSCR 1325 called for gender mainstreaming across all peacekeeping operations.[1] Twenty years after the passing of Resolution 1325, the participation of women in international peace and security as military personnel remains limited. Women currently comprise around 11 percent of national militaries and just under five percent of uniformed military personnel in UN peacekeeping missions.[2] On 13 October 2015, UNSC Resolution 2242 called on the Secretary-General ‘to initiate, in collaboration with Member States, a revised strategy, within existing resources, to double the numbers of women in military and police contingents of UN peacekeeping operations over the next five years’.[3]

Increasing women’s participation in peace operations requires not only an increase in the actual number of women serving in national militaries but also a change in mind-set to improve recruitment and retention. While increasing numbers is important for mainstreaming, an increase in women’s meaningful participation in military life requires a shift in how status is awarded to different roles in the military and a change in how women are deployed.

Gender Sidestreaming

The concept of gender sidestreaming as we define it is: “the practice, deliberate or unintentional, of sidelining women and relegating them to specialised spaces in international peace and security while attempting gender mainstreaming or increased gender integration.” We felt this term captures how the process of gender mainstreaming can be subverted, fail to challenge hegemonic masculinity, and perpetuates a simplistic and traditional dichotomy of women and men’s capabilities as protector and protected.

In the context of national militaries and peacekeeping, sidestreaming highlights the tension between the overt recognition women receive for the unique roles they can play in military contexts where gender sensitivity is required; and simultaneously, how the low status of non-combat roles obscures women’s visibility and the value of their contribution. This negatively impacts female recruitment, retention and promotion leading to low representation in national militaries and contributes to the low numbers of female military personnel we see in peace operations.

Resolution 1325 & The Windhoek Declaration

Some inspiration for what meaningful participation means can be found in the precursor to Resolution 1325, the Windhoek Declaration. In that document, the authors clearly understood that women need to be assimilated at all levels of a security institution:

In order to ensure the effectiveness of peace support operations, the principles of gender equity and equality must permeate the entire mission, at all levels, thus ensuring the participation of women and men as equal partners and beneficiaries in all aspects of the peace process…[4]

The declaration provided a comprehensive outline of the steps required to mainstream gender in UN peacekeeping: (1) the need to increase the number of women in military and police forces who are qualified to serve in peace operations at all levels including the most senior; (2) the need to encourage other potential troop contributing nations to develop longer term strategies that increase the number and rank of female personnel in their respective forces; and (3) that the eligibility requirements for all heads of mission and personnel should be reviewed and modified to facilitate the increased participation of women. [5]

Women Remain in Low Status and Specialised Positions

Our research found that not only were women in national militaries across the world still grossly under-represented, but that they are also located predominantly in spaces that have been feminised and regarded as low-status. This was true of militaries across the global north and south despite a great deal of rhetorical commitment from the global north.[6]

For example, NATO reports show that 33.1 per cent of servicewomen in member states’ armies were employed in non-combat services and supply corps, as technicians, military assistants, planning and management professionals, load masters, and different specialists.[7]

Furthermore, the lack of combat experience and low presence in high status occupations means women are often passed over for promotion. Our research found few women occupy higher rank positions in national militaries, and that women who do hold senior ranks are mostly in administrative roles.[8] Career progression in the military is highly inflexible, often requiring officers to obtain career targets following a strict timeline, and any absences, such as maternity leave, carry ‘career penalties’.[9] Moreover, promotions to higher ranks is often tied to having combat experience. By being barred from such roles, and being sidestreamed into administration and support, women are by and large not accessing the positions that later enable them to reach the most senior ranks.[10]

In addition, retention remains poor because servicewomen consistently report they are unable to balance family life with the demands of military life.[11] This speaks to the societal pressures women continue to face owing to their role as primary care provider within the family unit.

In peacekeeping, female military personnel in peacekeeping operations are often directed into specialised spaces restricting their full professional development. It is here that the tension between the ‘special’ role of women, and gender equality for female military personnel is very evident. Despite 1325 being a UN initiative, in the military aspect, peace operations are not being used as an opportunity to expand and grow women’s experience in combat or mainstream women in line with the resolution.

In conclusion we found that women’s visibility is only part of the problem and that a more gender-equitable military structure will be required to avoid sidestreaming.[12] Until now, gender has been dealt with by national militaries from an essentialist perspective. For national militaries to evolve, gender needs to be viewed as a learned social behaviour which could enable armed forces to recognise that so-called feminine and masculine behaviours can be trained. In turn this might lead to a more gender-balanced military environment. For meaningful participation to occur, we also suggest reducing or removing the need for lengthy combat experience to reach senior positions. Militaries need to find ways to reduce masculine hierarchies increasing the value of women’s contributions in a way that normalises their presence at all levels and in all roles.

The full open-access article this blog is based on can be viewed here: Newby, V., & Sebag, C. (2021). Gender sidestreaming? Analysing gender mainstreaming in national militaries and international peacekeeping. European Journal of International Security, 6 (2): 148-170. https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2020.20

The opinions expressed here are solely the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Women In International Security or its affiliates. 

About the author: Dr Vanessa F. Newby is President of Women in International Security Netherlands (WIIS-NL) and an Assistant Professor at Leiden University. Her research interests include women peace and security, human security, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, humanitarian aid and disaster response, and the international relations of the Middle East. Vanessa is the author of Peacekeeping in South Lebanon: Credibility and Local Cooperation with Syracuse University Press (2018) and has published in international peer-reviewed journals such as the European Journal of International Security, the Australian Journal of International Affairs, Third World Quarterly, Contemporary Politics and International Peacekeeping.

[1] United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325, para 2, p.2. It should be noted the concept of mainstreaming was developed by the Economic and Social Council at the UN, available at: {https://www.unwomen.org/en/how-we-work/un-system-coordination/gender-mainstreaming}, accessed 2 October 2020.

[2] United Nations Peacekeeping, Gender, August 2020, available at: {https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/gender}, accessed 1 October 2020.

[3] United Nations Security Council Resolution 2242 (2015) 13 October 2015, available at: {http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/2242}, accessed 20 November 2020.

[4] Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations, United Nations Security Council, A/55/138-S/2000/693 (2000), 14 July 2000, p. 2, available at: {https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/document/wps-s-2000-693.php}, accessed 20 November 2020.

[5] Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action, p. 4. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2538 (2020) reiterates the sentiment of these points.

[6] For example Laura J. Shepherd and Jacqui True, ‘The Women, Peace and Security agenda and Australian leadership in the world: from rhetoric to commitment?’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 68:3 (2014), pp. 257-284. In addition Western rhetorical commitment to WPS can be seen in its dedication to producing National Action Plans on WPS, see ‘The NAP Map’, available at: {https://oursecurefuture.org/projects/national-action-plan-mapping}, accessed 1 October 2020. See also the EU Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, available at: {https://www.consilium.europa.eu/register/en/content/out?&typ=ENTRY&i=ADV&DOC_ID=ST-11031-2019-INIT}, accessed 1 October 2020 , and NATO website for extensive material on its commitment to the WPS agenda, available at: {https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_91091.htm}, accessed 1 October 2020.

[7] NATO, ‘2016 Summary of the National Reports of NATO Member and Partner Nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives’ 2016, p. 17 available at: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_11/20171122_2016_Summary_of_NRs_to_NCGP.pdf

[8] Maryvonne Blondine, ‘Women in the armed forces: promoting equality, putting an end to gender-based violence’, Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, Report No.14073 2016, pp. 3, 10.

[9] Kidder et al., ‘Battlefields and Boardrooms’, p.16.

[10] Ministry of Defence (New Zealand), ‘Maximising opportunities for Military Women’ 2014, p. 30, available at: {https://www.defence.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/1b0daa8fb0/maximising-opportunities-military-women-nzdf.pdf} accessed 15 February 2020.

[11] Erika L. King, Diana DiNitto, Christopher Salas-Wright, David Snowden ‘Retaining Women Air Force Officers: Work, Family, Career Satisfaction, and Intentions,’ Armed Forces & Society 46: 4 (2020), pp.677-695; Kirsten M. Keller, Kimberly Curry Hall, Miriam Matthews, Leslie Adrienne Payne, Lisa Saum-Manning, Douglas Yeung, David Schulker, Stefan Zavislan, and Nelson Lim, ‘Addressing Barriers to Female Officer Retention in the Air Force’, RAND Corporation, 2018.

By Susan McLoughlin

Disclaimer: Although most of the research conducted around menstruation involves women and girls (which is why I often reference women and girls specifically), please remember that people of all genders menstruate, including gender-nonconforming people and transgender men.

Around the world, it is estimated that 1.9 billion people menstruate—nearly a quarter of the world’s population.[1] Yet, for many of these people, getting their period every month is a huge burden because of a phenomenon known as period poverty. According to the American Medical Women’s Association, period poverty is defined as “inadequate access to menstrual hygiene tools and education, including but not limited to sanitary products, washing facilities, and waste management.”[2] Of the people who menstruate, at least 500 million experience period poverty every month.[3]

Causes of Period Poverty

Although period poverty is a global problem, people living in low-income countries are disproportionately affected by this issue. Overwhelmingly, economic hardship is a major reason for high rates of period poverty. On average, people who menstruate use over 9,000 sanitary products in their life, and for someone already experiencing poverty, that adds up very quickly.[4]

In countries like Lebanon, where sanitary products are largely imported and there is an immense economic crisis, these products can be shockingly expensive.[5] Since the recent fall of the Lebanese currency, the pound, the price of sanitary products has risen by a staggering 500%.[6] In a report from Plan International, of the adolescent girls they surveyed in Lebanon, 66% reported they were financially unable to purchase sanitary pads.[7] As a result of the economic crisis, the Lebanese government decided to subsidize 300 “essential” imported products; although razors were deemed important enough to make the list, sanitary products were not.[8]

In a study conducted in rural western Kenya, where 63% of the population lives on less than one dollar a day, 10% of girls aged 15 or younger reported that they had transactional sex in order to receive pads.[9] This statistic shows a striking reality that the financial burden of sanitary products has put women and girls at risk of sexual exploitation and abuse. Severe period poverty is also due to a lack of physical access to these products. Andrew Trevett, UNICEF’s Kenya chief of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene, says “[T]here is also the issue of supply. Transactional sex for sanitary items happens because the items are not available in girl’s villages. In the countryside, girls are faced with no transport and can’t afford a bus fare. In some remote villages, there are no roads and there isn’t a bus service.”[10] On top of this, nearly 76% of women and girls in Kenya do not have access to adequate water and sanitation facilities when menstruating, meaning they are unable to practice menstrual hygiene management, also known as MHM.[11] MHM means being able to do things like changing your menstrual products in privacy as much as needed, using soap and water to wash parts of your body, and having access to safe facilities where you can dispose of these products.[12]

Social stigma around menstruation has also played a large role in the increase of period poverty. For example, in India, it is common for women to be considered “impure” and “unclean” during menstruation.[13] As a result, menstruating women are often prohibited from entering kitchens, participating in prayer, and touching holy books.[14] The spread of falsehoods and stigma around menstruation has led to generations of shame and secrecy around the topic. In a study done by the Tamil Nadu Urban Sanitation Support Programme (TNUSSP) in two Tamil Nadu villages, 84% of girls reported that they experienced “fear, panic, and confusion” during their first menstruation because they were never taught what menstruation is or how to prepare for it.[15] Additionally, many girls are taught to hide the purchase and disposal of sanitary products away from boys and men.[16] Since only 33.6% of women and girls in rural India use sanitary pads, many reuse and wash rags or cotton cloths as an alternative.[17] Yet, with over 163 million people in India lacking access to clean water, unhygienic conditions mean oftentimes these rags are not being washed properly, which can lead to infections such as bacterial vaginosis (BV) and urinary tract infection (UTI).[18],[19] Additionally, the pressure to keep menstruation a secret leads to many women drying these rags in dark corners of their homes, away from sunlight and fresh air.[20] These circumstances mean rags are also not being dried properly, further increasing the likelihood of infection.[21]

Period Poverty in the United States

Just like nearly every other country in the world, period poverty is also present in the United States. A survey conducted by Always, a menstrual product company, showed that 1 in 5 girls in the United States reported having missed school because they did not have access to menstrual products.[22] Despite the reality that children are missing school as a result of period poverty, only four states in the United States have laws that mandate public schools to provide menstrual products.[23] Reports also show that people of color and lower-income populations are experiencing period poverty at disproportionate rates. In a study published by BMC Women’s Health, 10% of the female college students surveyed had experienced continuous period poverty, and 14% had experienced period poverty at some point in that past year.[24] Yet, for Black and Latina women who were surveyed, these same statistics shot up to 19% and 24.5%, respectively.[25] Additionally, a study conducted in St. Louis showed that nearly two-thirds of the low-income women who were surveyed said they were unable to afford menstrual products, and many resorted to going to emergency rooms in order to obtain pads or postpartum underwear.[26]

The Impact of COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated many of the factors that cause period poverty. Firstly, the pandemic has created a global economic crisis that has disproportionately affected women. Although women make up 39% of the global workforce, they have accounted for 54% of overall unemployment.[27] As more and more women are experiencing economic hardship, rates of period poverty continue to rise. In a survey by U-Report, when asked what changes there have been in accessing menstrual products, 58% of people said that during this past year, they have had less money to buy these products.[28] On top of this, there has been a huge decrease in the physical supply of menstrual products available to people across the globe. The organization I Support Girls, which distributes menstrual products, bras, and underwear to individuals in need, reported that since the start of the pandemic, there has been a 35% increase in requests for products.[29] This has been a result of many factors, one of those being the closure of facilities that commonly offer sexual and reproductive health resources and information, like schools, health clinics, and community spaces.[30] Additionally, a report from Plan International showed that of the health professionals they surveyed across 30 different countries, 78% reported that there was “restricted access to [menstrual hygiene] products, through shortages or disrupted supply chains” as a result of the pandemic.[31]

What Does This Mean?

As a result of period poverty, there are serious consequences that menstruating people are faced with. As stated earlier, people who do not have access to or cannot afford menstrual hygiene products are often forced to use unhygienic materials such as dirty rags, which can lead to serious infection and even infertility.[32] There are also cases of people who undergo sexually exploitative measures in order to have access to these products.[33] Additionally, for menstruating children, not having access to these products often leads to them missing weeks of school or dropping out of school altogether. Without the proper products to efficiently stop their bleeding, people cannot leave their homes for the whole day in fear that they will bleed through clothes – and this fear/embarrassment is worsened with intense social stigma and the spread of misinformation about menstruation. As a result of both stigma and lack of access to hygiene products, in India, nearly 40% of students miss school during menstruation, and 1 in 5 drops out of school after their first menstruation cycle begins.[34] In addition, there have been studies that show higher rates of anxiety and depression in those who experience period poverty. In the BMC Women’s Health study cited earlier, 68% of the women who experienced period poverty every month showed symptoms of moderate to severe depression, compared to 43% in the population who had not experienced period poverty.[35] The main message here is that people who menstruate should not have to face the burden of financial, physical, mental, and social consequences just because they menstruate. Access to adequate and affordable menstrual hygiene products and management as well as education regarding menstruation is a basic human right. Yet, millions of people across the globe are being denied this right, and there is still little being done to address this issue for what it is: a global crisis.

Combatting Period Poverty

All three of the countries mentioned earlier – Lebanon, Kenya, and India – have abolished taxes on menstrual products.[36] In addition, Kenya became the first country to create a national “Menstrual Hygiene Management Policy,” which was established in 2019.[37] Although these policies should not be the only tactic used to combat period poverty, they are critical first steps. Unfortunately, these are steps the United States has not yet taken. In the United States, 30 states still consider menstrual hygiene products a “luxury,” meaning they are taxed products, and government programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (food stamps) and Medicaid do not cover the cost of tampons or pads.[38],[39] In 2019, the “Menstrual Equity For All Act” was introduced in the U.S. Congress, and although it has yet to be passed, this bill was created to “increase the availability and affordability of menstrual hygiene products for individuals with limited access.” [40]

In 2018, Scotland famously became the first country in the world to make menstrual hygiene products free for all students.[41] England followed suit shortly after, in 2020, when the British Department of Education funded a scheme that also made menstrual hygiene products free for all students.[42] Later in 2020, Scotland actually expanded their legislation to make these products free to everyone who needs them.[43] These key pieces of legislation are excellent examples that period poverty can be addressed on a national level and will hopefully inspire other countries to do the same. Four states in the United States – New York, New Hampshire, California, and Illinois – have implemented similar legislation.[44] New Hampshire, California, and Illinois all require public schools to provide free menstrual hygiene products to students. New York’s legislation is the most expansive and requires not only public schools but also prisons/detention facilities and city shelters to provide menstrual hygiene products at no cost.[45]

How to Help

There are many ways that you can work to fight period poverty in your own community, state, or country:

1. If you live in a state that does not have any legislation that addresses period poverty, call your state representative and demand that they institute laws that provide schools, prisons, shelters, etc. with free menstrual hygiene products.
2. If you live in a state that still taxes menstrual hygiene products, call your state representative and demand that they work to remove this tax.
3. Talk openly about menstruation with your family and friends. The more we talk about menstruation, the easier it will be to break down misinformation and stigma around it.
4. Donate to organizations that are fighting against period poverty. Below are a few examples of great organizations that are combating this crisis:
   1. The Pad Project
   2. Period
   3. Binti
   4. Freedom4Girls
   5. The Cora Project
   6. Sustainable Health Enterprises (SHE)
   7. Days for Girls
   8. Dawrati
   9. Alliance for Period Supplies
   10. The Desai Foundation

The opinions expressed here are solely the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Women In International Security or its affiliates. 

References:

[1] The Kulczyk Foundation and Founders Pledge, A BLOODY PROBLEM: Period poverty, why we need to end it and how to do it, Report (Warsaw: The Kulczyk Foundation, October 2020).

[2] Alexandra Alvarez, Period Poverty, Blog (Illinois: American Medical Women’s Association (AMWA), October 31, 2019).

[3] Alison Choi, How Social Media Helps Reduce Menstrual Stigma, Blog (Washington: Borgen Project, October 30, 2020).

[4] Leah Rodriguez, 4 Questions About Period Poverty: Answered, Blog (New York: Global Citizen, January 8, 2021).

[5] Ban Barkawi, Rags to reused pads – why more Lebanese women face period poverty, Blog (Minnesota: Thomas Reuters, July 17, 2020).

[6] Ban Barkawi, Rags to reused pads – why more Lebanese women face period poverty, Blog (Minnesota: Thomas Reuters, July 17, 2020).

[7] Plan International, Periods In a Pandemic: Menstrual hygiene management in the time of COVID-19, Report (United Kingdom: Plan International, 2020).

[8] Ban Barkawi, Rags to reused pads – why more Lebanese women face period poverty, Blog (Minnesota: Thomas Reuters, July 17, 2020).

[9] Penelope A. Phillips-Howard, et al., “Menstrual Needs and Associations with Sexual and Reproductive Risks in Rural Kenyan Females: A Cross-Sectional Behavioral Survey Linked with HIV Prevalence,” The Journal of Women’s Health, Vol. 24, Iss. 10 (New York: Mary Ann Liebert, Inc., October 20, 2015).

[10] Maya Oppenheim, “Kenyan girls forced into sex in exchange for sanitary products,” The Independent (July 5, 2019).

[11] Maya Oppenheim, “Kenyan girls forced into sex in exchange for sanitary products,” The Independent (July 5, 2019).

[12] Jane Wilbur, et al. “Systematic review of menstrual hygiene management requirements, its barriers and strategies for disabled people.” PloS one, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 (February 6, 2019).

[13] Diksha Ramesh, Breaking the Silence: Taboos and Social Stigma Surrounding Menstruation in Rural India, Policy Review (Washington, DC: Georgetown Public Policy Review, July 8, 2020).

[14] Suneela Garg and Tanu Anand, “Menstruation related myths in India: strategies for combating it.” Journal of family medicine and primary care, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 (2015).

[15] Diksha Ramesh, Breaking the Silence: Taboos and Social Stigma Surrounding Menstruation in Rural India, Policy Review (Washington, DC: Georgetown Public Policy Review, July 8, 2020).

[16] Diksha Ramesh, Breaking the Silence: Taboos and Social Stigma Surrounding Menstruation in Rural India, Policy Review (Washington, DC: Georgetown Public Policy Review, July 8, 2020).

[17] International Institute for Population Sciences (IIPS) and ICF, National Family Health Survey (NFHS-4), 2015-16, Report (Mumbai: Government of India – Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, 2017).

[18] Shreehari Paliath, Despite Improvement, India Still Has Most People Without Close Access To Clean Water, Blog (Mumbai: IndiaSpend, March 20, 2018).

[19] Padma Das et al. “Menstrual Hygiene Practices, WASH Access and the Risk of Urogenital Infection in Women from Odisha, India.” PloS one Vol. 10, Iss. 6 (June 30, 2015).

[20] Padma Das et al. “Menstrual Hygiene Practices, WASH Access and the Risk of Urogenital Infection in Women from Odisha, India.” PloS one Vol. 10, Iss. 6 (June 30, 2015).

[21] Padma Das et al. “Menstrual Hygiene Practices, WASH Access and the Risk of Urogenital Infection in Women from Odisha, India.” PloS one Vol. 10, Iss. 6 (June 30, 2015).

[22] Leah Rodrigues, 4 Questions About Period Poverty: Answered, Blog (New York: Global Citizen, January 8, 2021).

[23] American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Period Equity, THE UNEQUAL PRICE OF PERIODS: Menstrual Equity in the United States, Briefing Paper (New York: ACLU and Period Equity, December, 2019).

[24] Lauren F. Cardoso, et al., “Period poverty and mental health implications among college-aged women in the United States,” BMC Women’s Health, 21, Article 14 (January 6, 2021).

[25] Lauren F. Cardoso, et al., “Period poverty and mental health implications among college-aged women in the United States,” BMC Women’s Health, 21, Article 14 (January 6, 2021).

[26] Catherine Pearson, “Two-Thirds of Low-Income Women in 1 Major City Can’t Always Afford Tampons And Pads,” Huffington Post (New York: January 11, 2019).

[27] Anu Madgavkar, et al., “COVID-19 and gender equality: Countering the regressive effects,” McKinsey & Company (New York: July 15, 2020).

[28] U Report Global, Menstrual Hygiene Day 2020, Report (U Report Global, May 28, 2020).

[29] See I Support the Girls, Coronavirus Response (Maryland: http://www.isupportthegirls.org/).

[30] Leah Rodrigues, 4 Questions About Period Poverty: Answered, Blog (New York: Global Citizen, January 8, 2021).

[31] Plan International, Periods In a Pandemic: Menstrual hygiene management in the time of COVID-19, Report (United Kingdom: Plan International, May 28, 2020).

[32] Neelofar Sami, et al., “Risk factors for secondary infertility among women in Karachi, Pakistan.” PloS One, Vol. 7 No. 4 (April 27, 2012).

[33] Maya Oppenheim, “Kenyan girls forced into sex in exchange for sanitary products,” The Independent (July 5, 2019).

[34] IANS, “How COVID-19 impacted menstrual hygiene in India,” Telangana Today (February 16, 2021).

[35] Lauren F. Cardoso, et al., “Period poverty and mental health implications among college-aged women in the United States,” BMC Women’s Health, 21, Article 14 (January 6, 2021).

[36] My Period is Awesome, The Period Tax Around the World, Blog (Sweden: My Period is Awesome, October 12, 2020).

[37] Ministry of Health, Menstrual Hygiene Management Policy (Republic of Kenya: Ministry of Health, 2019).

[38] Deborah D’Souza, Tampon Tax, Blog (New York: Investopedia, February 16, 2021).

[39] Brittany Wong, “The COVID-19 Pandemic Is Making ‘Period Poverty’ Worse,” Huffington Post (January 22, 2021).

[40] H.R.1882 – 116th Congress (2019-2020): “Menstrual Equity For All Act of 2019.” (May 3, 2019). https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1882/text

[41] Nadia Khomami, “Scotland to offer free sanitary products to all students in world first,” The Guardian (August 24, 2018).

[42] Richard Adams, “Free period products to be available in schools and colleges in England,” The Guardian (January 17, 2020).

[43] Megan Specia, “Tackling ‘Period Poverty,’ Scotland is 1st Nation to Make Sanitary Products Free,” New York Times (November 24, 2020).

[44] American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and Period Equity, THE UNEQUAL PRICE OF PERIODS: Menstrual Equity in the United States, Briefing Paper (New York: ACLU and Period Equity, December, 2019).

[45] Emma Goldberg, “Many Lack Access to Pads and Tampons. What Are Lawmakers Doing About It?” New York Times (January 13, 2021).