Society as the Battlefield: Reframing Women, Peace and Security in an Era of Hybrid Threats

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Society as the Battlefield: Reframing Women, Peace and Security in an Era of Hybrid Threats

by Dr. Lauren Van Metre | President & CEO, Women In International Security (WIIS)

The global security environment is undergoing rapid and dangerous transformation. Militarization is accelerating. Hybrid warfare is reshaping conflict. Authoritarianism is rising. At the same time, the institutions that have guided the international order for eighty years are straining under the weight of these new realities. The world is in a liminal moment—an in-between space where the old order is breaking down and the contours of the new one remain uncertain.

The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda itself was born in a similar moment of upheaval. As the Cold War ended, dissolving norms and institutions gave rise to civil wars, ethnic violence, and violent extremism. WPS emerged from women’s cross-border solidarity—women who refused to be silent and demanded representation. They insisted that their experience – and their leadership –  shape the future of peace and security.

That same audacity today to adapt WPS to a new constellation of threats. While we celebrate the achievements of WPS, we must prepare for a profoundly different future – a  threat environment defined not only by armed conflict, but by hybrid warfare, democratic erosion, and authoritarian resurgence.

Two Strategic Certainties

For all the uncertainty of this moment, two realities are unmistakably clear: militarization is accelerating, and authoritarianism is rising. Hybrid warfare sits at the center of both. And, in a world engaged increasingly in hybrid warfare, WPS must operate not only as a peacebuilding framework, but as a strategic security doctrine.

Authoritarian powers now use disinformation, cyber operations, election interference, economic coercion, and social manipulation not merely to confuse democracies, but to break them from within. These strategies spread fear, divide societies, distort public trust, justify executive overreach, and undermine electoral integrity. Central to this approach is the manipulation of gender itself—weaponizing misogyny, restricting women’s rights, and suppressing women’s political participation as a means for eroding democracy itself. Gender is a powerful lever for authoritarian consolidation.

Western security institutions increasingly recognize that if societies are the battlefield, then citizens are the frontline of defense. NATO and other security bodies now emphasize societal resilience as a form of strategic deterrence. Yet resilience is still frequently framed as requiring only a “gender lens” or perspective. That framing is no longer sufficient.  If gender is a terrain of modern, hybrid warfare, then WPS must be a strategic countermeasure, not a simple add-on.

If adapted to hybrid warfare, the WPS pillars become a framework for societal resilience and a strategy of deterrence and prevention:

  • Prevention requires interrupting the disinformation-to-mobilization pipelines that fuel gender-based violence, political intimidation, and the suppression of women’s leadership.
  • Participation demands that women lead within security institutions as societies militarize—ensuring that necessary defense efforts do not erode democratic norms from within.
  • Protection must now include digital, political, and physical protection networks for women political leaders, journalists, activists, and movements targeted by authoritarian actors.
  • Relief and Recovery must prepare women to lead the restoration of social cohesion and democratic order when societies recoil from authoritarian capture as we have seen in November’s U.S. electoral outcomes in Virginia and New Jersey.

In an era when hybrid threats aim to fracture society itself, WPS is not a complement to security strategy—it is a security strategy. It reinforces civic fabric, strengthens democratic resilience,, and provides deterrence rooted not only in military capability, but in societal resilience.

WPS as a Political Strategy for Democratic Renewal

Recalibrating the security dimension of WPS (the “S”)  is necessary—but insufficient. We must develop a political strategy and reframe WPS as a political movement—not merely a normative framework.

According to Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), roughly 70 percent of the world’s population now lives under authoritarian or oligarchic rule. The WPS agenda—with its core demands for participation, accountability, and inclusion—is fundamentally a democratization movement. In much of the world today, and increasingly within multilateral institutions themselves, WPS functions not as a consensus framework, but as an opposition movement.

That reality has strategic implications. Successful democratic opposition movements share several core traits—and WPS must increasingly adopt them.

First, successful movements build coalitions of coalitions. WPS cannot stand alone. It must link arms with labor, youth, faith communities, and environmental movements whose aspirations overlap with its own. That also means standing in strong solidarity with movements that have popular momentum, if they advance WPS goals.  Leaders within the WPS ecosystem must be equipped not only with policy expertise, but with the political skills needed to build, sustain, and activate broad-based alliances. 

Second, successful movements control the narrative. Fear is the fuel of authoritarianism. Hope is its antidote—and one of the most powerful political tools available. The WPS agenda must move away from narratives of  “backlash” and “erosion” and instead tell a compelling story of what is possible: the clarity and the vision of the WPS agenda.

Third, successful movements shift the arena of contestation. When governments close institutional doors, movements carry their struggle to the public. When formal processes stall, pressure is built from outside them. WPS must increasingly draw strength from civic mobilization, grassroots leadership, and public-facing advocacy, not only from technocratic processes within multilateral institutions.

By building broad coalitions, shaping narratives grounded in democratic possibility, and shifting political struggle into arenas where public voice is strongest, WPS becomes not only a policy framework but an engine of democratic renewal.  This is how movements win. And this is how WPS must now move: not as a siloed agenda tucked inside institutions, but as a bold, collective political force capable of reshaping them.

The Strategic Imperative Ahead

If fully activated—strategically, politically, and collectively—the Women, Peace and Security agenda offers not only protection for women, but a pathway toward more resilient, inclusive, and democratic societies. In a world where the frontline increasingly runs through information systems, civic trust, political participation, and social cohesion, WPS is not simply about women’s inclusion in security. It is about the future of security itself.

The above remarks were delivered by Dr. Van Metre as part of WIIS’ 1325@25 Conference, “The Future of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda: Advancing Innovation, Resilience, and Collective Action,” on November 12th, 2025.

About the Author

Dr. Lauren Van Metre is the President & CEO of WIIS, bringing over two decades of experience as a leading expert in peace and security. Her distinguished career includes key roles at the U.S. Department of Defense, the State Department, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the National Democratic Institute, where she contributed to major conflict resolution and prevention initiatives. Her leadership has provided an invaluable contribution to policy and programming in some of the world’s most fragile and conflict-affected regions. Read her full bio here.

A Future without Women, Peace and Security?

We are heading into unchartered dark waters on Women, Peace and Security (WPS). Norms, alliances, institutions, and resources–carefully formed over time–are currently under threat; either undermined by new geopolitical priorities, or under attack in an increasingly polarized world. Yet at a time when WPS has never been more questioned, the need for WPS might never have been greater. In 2022, 600 million women lived in direct proximity to armed conflict.

What lessons are there then for the next generation who has to promote WPS during more challenging times?

For me, the answer is the same as it was 25 years ago. There is great potential in data and evidence-based research. This belief is even stronger today, as we now know substantially more. This is progress I have had the privilege to follow since 1999, when I was hired at Uppsala University to support the UN-led project Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations, a project which was to result in the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action. At the time, the UN was under strong pressure from demands emanating out of the UN Decade of Women, the Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action, and the ECOSOC decision on gender mainstreaming. Research was included in the project, as knowledge in 1999-2000 was both scarce and piecemeal. My overview and studies of the UN operations in Namibia and Cambodia aimed to improve the understanding of how the UN could support ongoing localized processes on women’s empowerment. The research was not easy; only a handful of previous studies existed on which I could build. The lack of gender disaggregated data was another major obstacle.

Today, data and research are instead so extensive that it can be difficult for policy to keep up with new and nuanced findings. We now know that women’s direct engagement in war, as combatants, soldiers, or as political actors, is more prevalent and complex than we expected. Politically-based attacks targeting civilian women’s political engagement for peace underline that women’s agency is already a part of conflict resolution. In terms of the impact of war, we better understand why and how gender plays into targeting of violence, including by conflict-related sexual violence. We know that women’s economic and social rights and capacity contribute to post-war security and rebuilding. Such knowledge allows for more targeted actions, but also for reconsidering some existing approaches to WPS.

My vision for the future is one that sees closer and more organized cooperation between decision-makers and researchers to capitalize on emerging knowledge. This is not an innovative request. Already at the first Open Debate on WPS held in October 2000, Croatia importantly acknowledged the significance of strong collaboration. Making this vision real requires practical and long-term formats of more equal exchanges. For example, I have organized and led a research group on WPS at the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) between 2009-2017 and arranged a research-policy dialogue forum over two years during Norway’s term in the UN Security Council.

I remain hopeful that systematically utilizing the extensive and growing pool of evidence-based research findings can help defend and reinvigorate WPS.

About the Author

Louise Olsson is the Research Director at The Peace Research Institute Oslo’s (PRIO) Global Norms, Politics and Society Department and leads PRIO’s Gender Research Group. Actively connecting research with policy making, her work centers on gender dynamics in conflict, women’s rights in peace processes, and the implementation of the WPS agenda, particularly in Nordic national security and defense policies. Her writing has appeared in numerous journals, including International Negotiations, Global Governance, Social Science Research, Journal of Global Security Studies, and International Peacekeeping. Prior to her role at PRIO, Olsson was a Senior Advisor on gender and WPS at FBA, supported the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Norway’s UN Security Council Term (2021-2022), and worked in the Swedish government agency, contributing to military gender training in the Nordic region. Olsson received her PhD from the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University in 2007.

Image Courtesy of Folke Bernadotte Academy.

By: Grace Fyfe

This policy memorandum highlights the increasing prevalence of Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence (TFGBV) in Panamá, especially against women in politics. It offers recommendations to ensure the Ministry of Women, civil society, and tech companies actively participate in solving this problem. 

Background  

Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence (TFGBV) has become an increasingly prevalent concern for women, gender minorities, and even men in recent years. The International Center for Research on Women defines TFGBV as an “action by one or more people that harms others based on their sexual or gender identity or by enforcing harmful gender norms. This action is carried out using the Internet and/or mobile technology and includes stalking, bullying, sexual harassment, defamation, hate speech, and exploitation” (ICRW, 2018). In 2021, the overall prevalence rate of online violence against women globally (including women with personal experiences and witness experiences) was over 80% (The Economist, 2021).  

TFGBV has detrimental effects on women’s involvement in politics and their agency within the public sphere as a whole. Worldwide, 41.8% of women in parliamentary positions worldwide have experienced the spread of extremely humiliating or sexually charged images of themselves through social media (IPU, 2016). Politically active women have repeatedly slowed down, paused, or altogether stopped their social media presence after experiencing online violence (NDI, 2019). The inability of women to express their political opinions and concerns online prevents them from having a voice in policymaking as a whole, especially in the modern political climate.  

At the regional level, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) experiences the second-highest rate of TFGBV globally, with an overall prevalence rate of 91% (The Economist, 2021). Panamá is not immune to this growing issue. For example, in 2023, a gender-based violence case was brought against a Panamanian cartoonist to the detriment of the country’s former attorney general (Newsroom Panamá, 2023). While the case was decided in the prosecution’s favor, reactions from the public, including influential political figures, made it clear that more progress must be made to eradicate TFGBV in Panamá (Crítica, 2023).  

IPANDETEC, a non-profit based in Panama City, has worked to raise awareness and gather data on TFGBV in Central America. Their report on Panamá’s 2024 elections indicates that only 19% of candidates were women (IPANDETEC, 2024). In their review of 34 of those candidates, 2,488 violent comments were found on the candidates’ Instagram posts, and 493 violent comments were found on X posts. Furthermore, 25% of such comments across platforms were targeted at one candidate in particular (IPANDETEC, 2024). Panamanian women in politics have been severely subjected to TFGBV, necessitating a more significant response from the country’s governing bodies. 

Countless international, regional, and national policies and programs have responded to the risk of this phenomenon. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) emphasizes the role gender-based violence plays in pushing women out of politics. In addition, Article 3 of the Belém do Pará Convention (also known as The Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and Eradication of Violence against Women) explicitly states that every woman has the right to be free from violence in both the public and private spheres (OAS, 1994). Panamá’s Ley (law) 82 adopts preventative measures against violence against women and reforms the penal code to classify femicide and punish acts of violence against women. Additionally, Ley 184 aims to prevent, punish, and eradicate political violence against women.  

Notably, Panamá has been a regional leader in finding policy-based solutions to TFGBV. In November of 2024, the National Assembly, Ministry of Women, and members of civil society organized Building Safe, Inclusive, and Violence-Free Digital Spaces, a meeting aimed at promoting the digital empowerment of women and recognizing the potential for technology to amplify their political participation as well as its role in perpetuating GBV. The Follow-up Mechanism to the Belém do Pará Convention (MESECVI) hosted meetings in Panama City to present and gather input on a draft Inter-American Model Law to Prevent, Punish, and Eradicate Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence against Women.  

Still, the country must take a stronger stance on TFGBV and GBV. Accessibility to official data on gender-based violence (GBV) in Panamá is relatively limited. A majority of widely available data focuses on intimate-partner violence (IPV) and femicide. UN Women estimates the lifetime rate of physical and/or sexual IPV in Panamá to be at a rate of 14.4%. However, the data the UN relies on comes from reports published in 2009 and 2011. Experts have pointed out that while Panamá has made great legal strides in combatting GBV, data collection has yet to be unified at the public level (Santamaria et al., 2019). Without this general data on GBV, as well as data on other specific manifestations such as TFGBV, it becomes challenging to understand the causes and impacts of this violence.  

Recommendations  

Data Collection and Dissemination: The Ministry has made strengthening institutions one of its key efforts, including strengthening gendered indicators. The Ministry of Women should thus expand and streamline its collection and dissemination of data on GBV within Panamá.

  • Data Collection. A deliberate effort should be made to collect sex-disaggregated data on TFGBV in the country and share that data with relevant national, regional, and international institutions (i.e., the OAS and the UN).
  • Revitalize Institutions.This could be further supported by the revitalization of the Informe Nacional Clara González, Situación de la Mujer Panameña, which appears to only provide information through 2016. 
  • More Funding. Collaboration with and funding of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like IPANDETEC may aid in collecting and disseminating this data.

Legal Protections: The Ministry of Women should explore the possibility of expanding the legal protections for victims of GBV to include violence that is facilitated by technology. 

  • Leverage Laws. Ley 82 and Ley 184 already provide a strong basis for these legal protections. The existence of such laws should be leveraged in order to persuade the National Assembly to take up such an effort.
  • Civil Society Inclusion. NGOs, survivors of TFGBV, and gender experts should be consulted in creating such legal protections. Ensuring that laws are trauma-informed creates a basis for stronger responses and eventual prevention.  
  • Inter-American Consultation. Consultations with MESECVI and its effort to craft an Inter-American Model Law to Prevent, Punish, and Eradicate Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence against Women should continue and work in tandem with this national effort. 

Platform Accountability: The Ministry of Women should consider collaborating with major tech companies, including Meta (i.e., Instagram and WhatsApp) and X, to ensure greater accountability in preventing the spread of TFGBV on their platforms. 

  • More Advocacy. The Ministry should advocate for sharing social media data between companies and vetted researchers to understand systemic risks better and mitigate TFGBV. Users’ privacy should be protected when sharing this data. 
  • More Tech Funding. Encouraging platforms to provide more substantial psycho-social resources to users could also prove helpful, especially for women in politics. For example, Meta does not appear to provide such resources to journalists, politicians, and women activists. 
  • More Experts. Calling on platforms to address their gender imbalances may lead to better long-term policies. The Ministry could do so by nominating a Panamanian expert to join Meta’s Global Women’s Safety Expert Advisors, which only includes two experts from LAC. 

Community Outreach: The Ministry of Women should ensure that it focuses a considerable amount of its effort on community-based programs that address the root causes of TFGBV.  

  • Build Tools. Pamphlets provided by the Ministry to Unidad Preventiva Comunitaria (UPC) centers and other community resources (i.e., gyms, hospitals, and schools) should explicitly mention TFGBV as a manifestation of violence against women and GBV on all pamphlets. Creating a separate pamphlet solely focused on TFGBV will also prove effective. 
  • Create Education Programs. The Ministry should craft programs for school-aged children to respond to TFGBV by focusing on issues like digital literacy and the construction of new masculinities. Collaboration with NGOs like Fundación ProEd and Equimundio will be helpful in the planning and implementation of such programs. 

Conclusion

Panamá has the opportunity to be a regional, if not international, leader in the response to Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence. These recommendations align perfectly with the Ministry’s goal to place women’s demands on the public agenda regarding issues like gender based violence, political participation, and empowerment. In collaboration with government entities, civil society, and tech companies, the Ministry can make the Internet safe for all. 

About the Author

Grace Fyfe is a recent graduate of The George Washington University, where she studied International Affairs with a concentration in gender and conflict resolution. She has interned with the U.S. Department of State, Americares, and Partners of the Americas, focusing on community building, partnership development, and gender equity. When she’s not researching ways to build safer communities, you can usually find her coaching high school speech and debate.

References  

Country detail page – Panama: UN Women Data Hub. UN Women Data Hub. (n.d.-a). https://data.unwomen.org/global-database-on-violence-against-women/country profile/Panama/country-snapshot

Country fact sheet – Panama: UN Women Data Hub. UN Women Data Hub. (n.d.-b).  https://data.unwomen.org/country/panama  

It’s Everyone’s Problem: Mainstreaming Responses to Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence. Columbia SIPA Institute of Global Politics. (2024).  

IPANDETEC. (2024, May). Monitoreo de Violencia Politica Digital hacia cadidatas a puestos de eleccion popular en las Elecciones Generales de Panama 2024.  

https://www.ipandetec.org/investigacion/  

MESECVI Launches Regional Consultations on the Model Law to Combat Technology Facilitated Violence Against Women in Argentina, Colombia, and Panama. OAS. (2024, December 2). https://www.oas.org/en/mesecvi/news.asp  

Ministerio de la Mujer – ministerio de la mujer. Ministerio de la Mujer. (n.d.). https://mujer.gob.pa/  

Navarro: Absurdo Y Vergonzoso La Condena contra Tuitero Edunar. Critica. (2023, August 7). https://www.critica.com.pa/nacional/navarro-absurdo-y-vergonzoso-la-condena-contra tuitero-edunar-451654  

Panama’s “ProEd Lecto Labs” gains recognition for literacy advancements. UNESCO. (2024, September 9). https://www.unesco.org/en/articles/panamas-proed-lecto-labs-gains recognition-literacy-advancements  

Promoting men’s engagement in early childhood development: A programming and influencing package. Equimundo. (2022, December 7).  

https://www.equimundo.org/resources/promoting-mens-engagement-in-early-childhood development-a-programming-and-influencing-package-2/  

Santamaría, A., Gerald, C., Chamorro, F., Herrera, V., Flores, H., Sandoval, I., Gómez, B., Harbar, E., Liriola, L., de León Richardson, R. G., Motta, J., & Moreno Velásquez, I. (2022). Social determinants of violence against women in Panama: results from population-based cross-sectional studies and a femicide registry. International health, 14(4), 363–372. https://doi.org/10.1093/inthealth/ihz116  

Technology-facilitated gender-based violence:. International Center for Research on Women. (2018). https://www.svri.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2018-07-24/ICRW_TFGBVMarketing_Brief_v8-Web.pdf 

THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT. (2021, March 1). Measuring the prevalence of online violence against women. The Economist. https://onlineviolencewomen.eiu.com/

Twitter user guilty of gender violence against attorney. Newsroom Panama. (2023, August 4). https://newsroompanama.com/2023/08/04/twitter-user-guilty-of-gender-violence-against attorney/

Women’s safety. Meta. (n.d.). https://about.meta.com/actions/safety/audiences/women/ 

By: WIIS Member Inaara Ali

This paper emphasizes the urgent need for the United Nations (UN) to integrate gender-based violence (GBV) considerations into arms control policies, promote women’s participation in disarmament processes, and develop improved gender-sensitive monitoring mechanisms for arms control initiatives. GBV is often exacerbated by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Despite efforts through the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons (PoA), gender-sensitive approaches to arms control remain underdeveloped. This paper recommends increasing women’s participation in arms control negotiations and applying existing methods of monitoring in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to a global scale. Implementing these changes will strengthen global efforts to reduce GBV, support sustainable development, and promote gender equality worldwide. 

Recent Gender-based Violence Dynamics

GBV is a global security issue that affects millions of women and girls worldwide.1 According to the United Nations, GBV can include “sexual, physical, mental and economic harm inflicted in public or in private,” including “threats of violence, coercion and manipulation,” as well as “intimate partner violence, sexual violence, child marriage, female genital mutilation and so-called ‘honour crimes.’”2 According to UN Women, one in three women and girls are at risk of experiencing such physical or sexual violence during their lifetime.3

Research shows that failing to involve women in economic, political, and other aspects of society can lead to stagnation in progress.4 Allowing GBV to persist will worsen gender inequalities, hinder societal development, and inflict significant harm on individuals. GBV causes both physical and psychological trauma, as rape and sexual assault can lead to unwanted pregnancies, complications during pregnancy and birth, and the transmission of sexually transmitted infections, including HIV.5 

In addition to physical harm, the social and economic repercussions of GBV often result in the loss of livelihoods for survivors and increased gender inequalities in the long term.6 Moreover, reporting or seeking services for GBV can expose survivors to further violence, social stigma, and ostracization. GBV also serves as a major barrier for women and girls trying to access other lifesaving services, such as food, shelter, and healthcare.7 The most tragic consequence of gender-based violence is femicide, with an estimated 51,100 women falling victim to this extreme form of violence in 2023 alone.8

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) has been shown to correlate with the rise in GBV, and increased access to firearms makes femicide more likely. Specifically, an increase of SALW in a country increases the likelihood of conflict violence, which then creates the conditions that facilitate CRSV.9 In the U.S., over two-thirds of all intimate partner homicides of women are committed with guns.10 Research conducted across four African countries reveals 70 to 90 percent of conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) incidents involve the use of firearms.11 Firearms function also as a mechanism to establish power through coercing, threatening, and dominating victims.12 Arms control is thus a necessary step toward reducing GBV and must be a focus of the international community. 

Evolution of Gender-Sensitive Arms Control Policy 

The recognition of the link between GBV and arms control evolved alongside broader efforts to understand the intersection of women and security in global discourse. In 2000, the UN Security Council established the WPS Agenda through Resolution 1325, which emphasized the disproportionate impact of armed conflict on women and girls.13 This groundbreaking resolution called for the increased participation of women in peace and security processes and the incorporation of a gender perspective in conflict prevention, resolution, and peacebuilding efforts. Additionally, it set the stage for future actions that would address the gendered dimensions of conflict and arms control. 

In 2001, the UN launched the Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) to combat the widespread proliferation of SALW.14 This policy instrument aimed to prevent the illicit trade of SALW, improve transparency among arms transfers, and strengthen international cooperation regarding stockpile management and weapons tracing. The PoA encouraged regional and international arms control efforts and sought to strengthen national regulations on arms transfers, with an emphasis on marking and tracing weapons traded internationally.15

The PoA  struggled to integrate gender-sensitive measures into arms control frameworks. Although the program acknowledged the impact of arms on civilians, including women and children, it did not fully address the gendered implications of small arms proliferation, especially in relation to GBV. Recognizing this gap, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) launched a Gender Mainstreaming Action Plan in 2003 to emphasize the importance of understanding the different impacts of weapons, including small arms, on men and women in disarmament efforts.16 However, concrete steps to address GBV remained limited in the broader framework. In 2010, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 65/69 on women, disarmament, nonproliferation, and arms control. This resolution encouraged member states, regional organizations, and the UN itself to promote the equitable representation of women in decision-making processes related to disarmament and arms control.17 Importantly, Resolution 65/69 recognized the critical contributions of women at local, national, and regional levels in efforts to mitigate the effects of small arms proliferation. 

The 2012 PoA Review Conference marked a turning point in the integration of gender-sensitive measures, as the international community began to focus on the gendered impacts of arms proliferation. Member states expressed grave concern about the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons, emphasizing the need for a deeper understanding of its disproportionate effects on vulnerable populations such as women, children, the elderly, and persons with disabilities. Furthermore, states underscored the importance of increasing women’s roles in policy making related to the illicit arms trade and pledged to explore ways to reduce the harm that SALW causes to women.18

In 2013, another major milestone was achieved with the ratification of the ATT, the first international treaty to formally acknowledge the link between GBV and arms control.19 The ATT became the first legally binding agreement to regulate the global trade in conventional arms, including small arms and light weapons. A key provision in the treaty, Article 7(4), mandates that states assess the risk that arms transfers might facilitate or contribute to GBV before authorizing any export.20 This provision aimed to prevent the transfer of arms to states or groups where there was a high likelihood of those weapons being used to perpetrate GBV or CRSV. 

Further reinforcing this commitment, in 2018, during the 3rd Review Conference of the PoA, states reaffirmed their previous pledges to address the gendered dimensions of small arms proliferation. They acknowledged the direct connection between the illicit trade in small arms and GBV, emphasizing the need to collect sex-disaggregated data to better understand the varying impacts of arms on different genders.21 States also pushed for the integration of gender mainstreaming into policies and programs aimed at combating the illicit trade in small arms. That same year, the Latvian Presidency of the Arms Trade Treaty made gender and GBV a central theme of its leadership.22 They pushed the ATT group to focus on three primary objectives: 

  • Ensuring gender-balanced representation in ATT-related decision-making processes,
  • Addressing the gendered impacts of armed violence and conflict, 
  • Ensuring the implementation of GBV-related risk assessments in accordance with the treaty’s provisions. 

These efforts represent the continued determination of ATT members to improve the support for GBV prevention through the treaty’s implementation. In fact, the implementation of Article 7(4) of the ATT is still in progress. While there is a lack of reporting from many countries on its impacts, there are early signs of its successes. A majority of states party to the ATT “have indicated GBV as a concern that they are already applying prior to authorizing an export.”23 This shows that many states have developed specific risk assessment procedures relating to GBV since the treaty’s ratification. 

The WPS Agenda and Arms Control

The linkage between arms control and GBV is not explicitly included in the WPS agenda, despite it being the basis of the international community’s work and understanding of gender and security. Initially, feminist advocates emphasized women’s vital agency in conflict prevention and the role of disarmament in ending conflict, but these calls were largely excluded from the agenda.24 The absence of specific provisions for arms control or disarmament in the WPS framework has limited its scope, particularly in addressing how arms proliferation fuels GBV in conflict settings. While some later WPS resolutions, such as Resolution 2122 (2013), referenced the Arms Trade Treaty and its potential to reduce violence against women and girls, formal references to disarmament remain sparse, and the broader issue of arms control is only acknowledged in preambular language rather than in actionable provisions.25 Therefore, while the WPS agenda is crucial for promoting gender equality in peace and security, the framework has not adequately integrated arms control as a central component in the fight against GBV. 

However, inspired by the WPS agenda, the UNODA has taken significant steps to continue implementing gender in its work. Between 2019 and 2022, the UNODA implemented a global project to advance gender-responsive policies and actions in the fight against small arms trafficking and misuse, in alignment with the WPS agenda.26 Funded by the European Union, this initiative aimed to enhance the effectiveness of SALW control by promoting a gender-sensitive framework and encouraging the participation of women in all arms control decision-making processes. 

Through this project, UNODA worked to support the full implementation of the PoA on SALW, and contributed to achieving the objectives of the WPS agenda, as well as the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, particularly Goals 5 (gender equality) and 16 (peace, justice, and strong institutions).27 UNODA’s efforts during this period included the development of training materials on gender-mainstreaming in small arms control, the facilitation of regional dialogues, and the provision of assistance to eighteen countries to integrate gender perspectives into their national arms control policies. By strengthening civil society engagement and fostering partnerships with organizations such as the International Action Network on Small Arms, UNODA has played a crucial role in raising awareness of the link between small arms proliferation and GBV.28

Policy Implementation Strengths and Limitations

As a whole, the international community has proven an interest in supporting additional GBV prevention. Between 2022 and 2023, total financial commitments on GBV increased from $976 million to $5.1 billion, with 40% of commitments coming from UN member states.29 Increased funding will allow the UN and NGOs to apply more focus to intersecting issues like SALW. Arms control on its own has also received an increased interest from the UN. The 2024 Review Conference of the POA on SALW marked a paradigm shift toward prevention and violence reduction efforts focused on the demand side, which will better incorporate GBV issues.30

Despite the successes in international recognition of the issues and funding toward preventing GBV, there have been obstacles to implementation of the ATT. Specifically, the implementation of Article 7(4) has been inconsistent, especially in countries with the highest levels of GBV.31 While international funding for GBV efforts has improved, backlash against women’s rights has been triggered worldwide by economic instability, global conflict, and the COVID-19 pandemic.32 In many countries facing high rates of GBV, governments and society impose strict gender norms on women, putting shame on women for reporting GBV and discouraging programs that support female autonomy.33 

The backlash against women’s rights is also present in countries like the United States and some EU members, who are expected to fund and support ATT implementation. Under the Trump Administration, the U.S. has focused on slashing funding for international aid and gender-based programs.34 As a permanent Security Council member, the U.S. has the power to block attempts to implement new arms control strategies. These setbacks in gender-inclusive policy threaten to block meaningful GBV prevention. Consequently, the international community must continue to promote women’s voices. 

Recommendations

The UN Secretary-General should make combating GBV through arms control a priority in the agendas of decision- making bodies of the UN. The UN has a unique ability to set global norms and establish effective procedures that can guide states. This norm-setting power is particularly important for states that do not already have gender mainstreaming frameworks that address arms proliferation. The UN can introduce essential procedures that prioritize gender-sensitive arms control, ensuring states are held accountable for the role their arms trade plays in fueling violence against women and girls. 

While the UN recognizes the link between arms proliferation and GBV in both policy and statements, the inconsistent enforcement of these measures undermines global efforts to prevent such violence. Strengthening the implementation of gender-sensitive arms control provisions, such as those in the the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), would reinforce the UN’s commitment to gender equality and enhance the broader WPS agenda, fostering a stronger global response to the root causes of GBV. 

Including WPS Advisors in Arms Control Delegations

Women remain underrepresented in arms control negotiations, resulting in critical issues like GBV and CRSV being marginalized in decision-making processes. Without a strong participation of women, issues like GBV and CRSV are often left out of discussion.35 Research has demonstrated that when countries send a single representative, they typically select a male delegate, often sidelining the unique gendered impacts of arms proliferation.36

To address this, the UN Secretary-General should mandate that WPS advisors be included in delegations to all arms control conferences. This policy would ensure that GBV and the role of women in security are prioritized in discussions, and it would foster a more inclusive and effective approach to disarmament. Furthermore, by normalizing the presence of women in positions of power, the UN can challenge societal norms that discourage women from reporting violence and advocating for change, ultimately driving progress toward gender equality and more comprehensive arms control measures. 

Expanding the DRC’s Gender-Sensitive Monitoring and Reporting Mechanism 

As the UN looks to expand the scale of GBV prevention within arms control actions, it must apply more comprehensive tracking methods to an international scale. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the tracking tool developed in collaboration with the National Commission for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons and the reduction of armed violence (CNC-ALPC) and United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) is designed to monitor the implementation of the National Action Plan on small arms control.37 It assesses progress in integrating gender-responsive policies by collecting data on how small arms control measures impact gender-based violence, tracking policy effectiveness, and identifying gaps in enforcement. 

By systematically recording sex-specific data and gender-sensitive indicators, the tool provides valuable insights into the relationship between arms proliferation and GBV trends, ensuring that interventions are better targeted and more effective.38 Given its capacity to highlight the direct and indirect effects of arms control efforts on vulnerable populations, the tool could serve as a model for other states with high levels of armed violence and gender-based crimes. To strengthen global GBV prevention within arms control frameworks, the UN should incorporate this tracking mechanism into the ATT, ensuring that arms control policies are consistently evaluated through a gender-sensitive lens. 

Conclusion

The intersection of arms control and gender-based violence is a critical issue that requires urgent attention and action. While significant strides have been made in recognizing this link, much work remains to ensure that arms control policies and international agreements, such as the ATT, effectively mitigate the risks of GBV. The UN, with its unique position to set global norms and standards, must lead the way by embedding gender-sensitive provisions into arms control initiatives and promoting the active participation of women in related decision-making processes. 

The UN must also reevaluate existing monitoring tools and develop scalable, adaptable systems. These tools can foster greater accountability, improve data collection on GBV, and ensure that national action plans on small arms control and GBV are both comprehensive and effective. Ultimately, the UN’s leadership on SALW and GBV can help break the cycle of violence, advance gender equality, and establish new norms that protect women and girls from the devastating impacts of small arms proliferation.

About the Author:

Inaara Ali is a Master’s candidate in International Affairs at the George Washington University’s Elliott School, concentrating in Global Gender Policy. She previously earned her B.S. in Diplomacy and International Relations from Seton Hall University. Her research interests include gender-based violence, women, peace, and security, and arms control.

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  6. Ibid.
  7. Ibid.
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  11. Salama, 20.
  12. Ibid.
  13. UN Security Council, “Security Council resolution 1325 on women and peace and security,” S/RES/1325, October 31 2000, https://www.refworld.org/legal/resolution/unsc/2000/en/113308. 
  14. UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, “Small Arms and Light Weapons,” United Nations, https://disarmament.unoda.org/convarms/salw/.
  15. Ibid.
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  17. UN General Assembly, “Resolution 65/69,” 65th Session, January 13, 2011, https://docs.un.org/en/A/Res/65/69. 
  18. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Jana Wattenberg, “A Gender Framework for Arms Control and Disarmament,” WIIS Policy Brief, Washington, D.C., May 2021.
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  20. Ibid.
  21. de Jonge Oudraat and Wattenberg, “A Gender Framework for Arms Control and Disarmament.”
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  25. Ibid.
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  27. Ibid.
  28. Ibid.
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  31. Salama, 28.
  32. Generation Equality, “Generation Equality Accountability Report 2023.”
  33. Salama, 30.
  34. National Organization for Women, “Donald Trump’s Wrecking Ball on Government Funding Impacts Women and the Most Vulnerable,” January 29, 2025, https://now.org/media-center/press-release/donald-trumps-wrecking-ball-on-government-funding-impacts-women-and-the-most-vulnerable/.
  35.  R.S. Klein, “The Role of Women in Mediation and Conflict Resolution: Lessons for UN Security Council Resolution 1325,” Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice, vol. 18, no. 2, 2012, pp. 277–313, https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/crsj/vol18/iss2/7.
  36. de Jonge Oudraat and Wattenberg.
  37. UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, “New tool to track gender-responsive small arms control in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” United Nations, May 27, 2021, https://disarmament.unoda.org/update/new-tool-to-track-gender-responsive-small-arms-control-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo/.
  38. Ibid.