Understanding the prospects of the WPS Agenda: looking at the case of Denmark

By: Sofia Sutera

International Joint Ph.D Programme “Human Rights, Society, and Multi-level Governance”- University of Padova, Human Rights Centre “Antonio Papisca”

In order to understand the potential the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda has in the near and even far future, it is necessary first of all to understand how this agenda is currently understood, implemented, and thus concretely lived. Only by observing the present situation is it possible to speculate on the future.

This essay examines the case of Denmark within the broader framework of NATO, analysing specifically how women’s representation is framed in the context of the Danish Armed Forces (DAF).

According to a poll conducted by the YouGov-Cambridge Globalism Project, while Denmark is one of the countries in the world to least identify as feminist^[1] (Orange and Duncan 2019), Denmark was the first country to adopt a National Action Plan (NAP) on the WPS Agenda in 2005.  The NAP was subsequently revised in 2008 and 2014. There are other signs that Denmark seems committed to gender issues:  37.4 percent of Denmark’s Parliament are women , the Gender Inequality Index[2] is 0.041, the WPS Index[3] is 0.845 (Our Secure Future 2019), and the Global Peace Index[4] is 1.316: data which depict Denmark as one of the most successful countries in the world in terms of gender equality (World Economic Forum 2020).Yet the DAF, while facing the societal imperative of including women, perform below the other NATO members in gender diversity (Schaub et al. 2012): indeed, data from  2017, when Denmark presented its last national report, indicate that the percentage of women who are part of Active Duty military personnel is 11.1 percent  NATO countries overall and 7.1 percent in Denmark[5]. Moreover, even if women have been part of the volunteer corps in the armed forces since 1934, it is only since 1992 that no more formal barriers to the participation of women in the armed forces have existed (Schaub et al. 2012, 4).

While in 2009 the Defense Command adopted a charter to promote the advancement of women to leadership roles “Flere kvinder i ledelse,”^[6] in 2011 the Ministry of Defense developed a Defense Action Plan for Equality containing specific measures for women and ethnic minorities. This resulted in the Ministry of Defense winning the “Diversity in the Workplace” (MIA)  Award in 2011 (Schaub et al. 2012, 5)^[7].

This diversity policy was published on the April 28, 2011 by the Defense Minister who stated that the collaboration between a wide range of people with different competences promotes learning, creativity and innovation. As such, increased diversity is an important way to better solve the tasks faced by the armed forces (Ministry of Defense 2011a). Nevertheless, while affirming that “the composition of the personnel within the entire Ministry of Defense must be diverse in terms of gender distribution, age composition, social origin, ethnic origin and so on” (Ministry of Defense, undated), this policy focuses entirely on women and ethnic minorities, considered the two areas to prioritize. Indeed, the Ministry of Defense underlines that “at the heart of the problem is the low number of women in uniformed positions and the number of ethnic minorities in both civilian and military posts” (Schaub et al. 2012, 10).

Particularly, diversity is considered paramount for the effectiveness of military operations: for instance, when “women participate in international missions, we are more easily in contact with the female part of the population. Danish women can act as role models for the local population and show that everyone must have the same opportunities” (Ministry of Defense 2011b, 4). Moreover, diversity is also considered a benefit in building a staff composition that reflects the general population, helping to create trust and respect in the population. These same arguments have been stressed again in 2020 (Ministry of Defense 2020).

The first words of the mentioned diversity policy underline that: “The Ministry of Defense authorities are, overall, one of Denmark’s largest workplaces. We work for peace, freedom and security with respect for human rights” (Ministry of Defense 2011b, 4). It continues by affirming that if the DAF want to “win the peace,” they need to promote democracy and equality, showing to local people, for instance, that women are equal to men and that both girls and boys have the right to go to school. The DAF can thus act as a role model for the local population. At the same time, the text recalls that diversity is relevant not only in international settings but also domestic ones.^[8] Indeed, different studies found that there is a positive correlation between diversity and a company’s financial performance, which in the case of a public company mostly translates in terms of greater efficiency (Ministry of Defense 2011b, 5).

Even recognizing that the overall number of women in the DAF is increasing, the policy stresses that their number (in 2011) is 6.4 percent, while the number of women in the workforce in Denmark is around 49percent (still in 2011). It also emphasizes that female role models in leadership positions may be a great motivating factor for young women to choose a career path in uniform by showing that the defense sector is an attractive workplace where gender is not an obstacle to a managerial career (Ministry of Defense 2011b, 13).

Acknowledging that “whoever you are, it will often be a challenge to be a minority, and women in uniform are often few in number” (Ministry of Defense 2011b, 22), the policy introduces several initiatives that have already been implemented or are going to be in order to attract and retain more women and ethnic minorities in the DAF. However, this policy observes these two groups only through the lens of diversity without any specific consideration for gender as the frame of reference. There is a generic reference to the WPS agenda in that the NAP outlined in UNSCR 1325 asks national armed forces to have a major number of women deployed in international operations, without though indicating any specific number to be reached (Ministry of Defense 2011b, 4), there is no reflection on what the gender implications for women or men are.

The result, therefore, has been no discussion of the concept of gender, homogenizing the women category in the overall armed forces entity from which they stand out, always accompanied by the category of ethnic minorities, only for statistical purposes. This is problematic. Firstly, the policy utilizes solely the Danish term “køn,” which can be interpreted both as sex and gender and thus does not highlight the dissimilarity between these two concepts. In fact, looking at the UN framework, where the WPS Agenda is placed, and quoting the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and the Advancement of Women (OSAGI 2001, 1) gender is defined as:

 “the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, as well as the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes”.

Likewise, the “Gender Equality Glossary” developed by UN Women, clearly distinguishes gender as:

“the roles, behaviors, activities, and attributes that a given society at a given time considers appropriate for men and women. In addition to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, gender also refers to the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. They are context/ time-specific and changeable […]” (UN WOMEN undated).

The term sex is defined as: “The physical and biological characteristics that distinguish males and females” (UN WOMEN undated).

Moreover, this approach does not take into account the reality that women are not a uniform category, either. Indeed, the evaluation of the last Danish NAP on the WPS agenda, released in October 2019, asks to: “strengthen the focus on the needs and experiences of diverse groups of women within the fourth NAP, acknowledging the impact that intersecting identities have on the WPS agenda (for example age, class, disability, sexuality, gender identity, ethnicity, religion and others)” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark 2019).

It is possible, therefore, to conclude that the potential of the WPS agenda is to an extent still embraced by the DAF. Despite the acknowledgment that this institution is distinguished by a peculiar mission of a very practical nature, it cannot but base its work on some theoretical foundations. As Kronsell (2012, 92) claims, “it is not necessarily the number of women present in the peacekeeping forces or in the military that is the key to gender awareness but rather the systematic work with gender strategies from the leadership level.” Indeed, among the six priority action areas in the field of the WPS agenda identified by the UN, the first requires to “make leadership accountable for the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security agenda, through improved data and gender analysis” (UN WOMEN 2019).

On the other hand, though, it is the UN itself that, in the context of the WPS agenda and specifically to the related Security Council resolutions, needs to provide a theoretical discussion on the concept of gender. While recognizing that the Security Council itself is charged with a specific mission, i.e., the fundamental task of maintaining international peace and security, this goal cannot but be founded on a comprehensive understanding of peace and security. Thus, a more in-depth analysis into the notion of gender and the category of women who embody the capacities of half the world’s population is necessary for the Security Council to achieve its purpose.

References:

Kronsell, A. (2012) Gender, sex and the postnational defense: Militarism and peacekeeping. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ministry of Defence (2011a) Mangfoldighedspolitik – vejen til bedre opgaveløsning, retrieved from: https://www.fmn.dk/nyheder/Arkiv/2011/Pages/Nymangfoldighedspolitik%E2%80%93vejentilbedreopgaveloesning.aspx (accessed 19/06/2020).

Ministry of Defence (2011b) Vejen til bedre opgaveløsning -Forsvarsministeriets mangfoldighedspolitik, retrieved from: https://www.yumpu.com/da/document/read/19966173/forsvarsministeriets-politik-for-mangfoldighed-kvinderiledelsedk (accessed 20/11/2020).

Ministry of Defence (2020) Mangfoldighed og ligebehandling, retrieved from: https://forsvaret.dk/da/om-os/kultur-fakta-historie/mangfoldighed-og-ligebehandling/ (accessed 20/11/2020).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (2019). Evaluation of the Danish National Action Plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, retrieved from: http://www.netpublikationer.dk/um/eval_danish_action_plan_resolution_1325/Pdf/eval_danish_action_plan_resolution_1325.pdf (accessed 19/06/2020).

Orange, R. and Duncan, P. (2019). And the least feminist nation in the world is… Denmark?, The Guardian, retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2019/may/10/and-the-least-feminist-nation-in-the-world-is-denmark (accessed: 19/06/2020).

Our Secure Future (2019) ‘NATIONAL ACTION PLAN MAP’. One Earth Future, retrieved from: https://oursecurefuture.org/projects/national-action-plan-mapping (accessed: 19/06/2020).

Schaub, G., Pradhan-Blach, F., Larsen, E. S., and Larsen, J. K. (2012) Diversity in the Danish Armed Forces. Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen, retrieved from: https://cms.polsci.ku.dk/publikationer/diversity1/Diversity_report.pdf (accessed 19/06/2020).

UN WOMEN (2019). In Focus: Women, peace and security, retrieved from: https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/women-peace-security (accessed 19/06/2020).

OSAGI, 2001. Concepts and definitions, retrieved from: https://www.un.org/womenwatch/osagi/pdf/factsheet2.pdf (accessed 20/11/2020).

UN WOMEN, undated. Gender Equality Glossary, retrieved from: https://trainingcentre.unwomen.org/mod/glossary/view.php?id=36&mode=letter&hook=S&sortkey=&sortorder=asc (accessed 19/06/2020).

[1] Just one in six Danes (Orange and Duncan 2019).

[2] The Gender Inequality Index measures gender inequalities through human development indicators: 0 is the best possible score and 1 is the worst possible score (http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii).

[3] The Women, Peace and Security Index is based upon indicators of security, inclusion and justice: 1 is the best possible score and 0 is the worst possible score (https://giwps.georgetown.edu/the-index/).

[4] The Global Peace Index measures the level of peacefulness of a State: 1 is the best possible score and 5 is the worst possible score (http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/06/GPI-2019-web003.pdf).

[5] Data based on the National Reports submitted by NATO member nations to the NATO Committee on Gender Perspectives, available at: https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2019_09/20190909_190909-2017-Summary-NR-to-NCGP.pdf (accessed 18/06/2020)

[6] “Charter for More Women in Leadership”, signed by the then Defence Secretary Tim Sloth Jørgensen on April 16, 2009.

[7] Prize launched in 2003 by the Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR). In 2007 also the Danish Emergency Management Agency won this prize.

[8] Particularly taking into account that the Defence is Denmark’s largest youth workplace thanks to the military service (Ministry of Defence 2011b, 10).

By: Amy Dwyer

Author bio: Amy Dwyer previously served as a programme development advisor on programmes in Myanmar, focusing on human rights, freedom of religion and belief and sexual violence in conflict. She currently work in international policy and research.

The National League for Democracy’s (NLD) landslide rise to power in 2015 was expected to catalyze Myanmar’s transition from an autocracy under military rule to a governing democracy, considered by many to be a symbol of hope.

Five years on, trust in the country’s peace process has declined as signatories have withdrawn from the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). Unmet demands for autonomy from Ethnic Armed Groups (EAGs) have resulted in heightened tensions and increased communal violence. The long-term persecution and expulsion of more than 700,000 Rohingya made news around the world in 2017, bringing to light the deeply rooted ethno-nationalist beliefs that continue to fuel divides and conflict across the country.[1]

Defending the Rohingya remains a particularly unpopular political position and one which Nobel Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi has so far being unwilling to publicly take. Ethnic minority leaders have repeatedly accused the government of instituting a “Burmanization” policy to suppress non-Bamar religions, while the government’s tepid attempts to calm nationalist agitation and emphasize the importance of democratic pluralism have been read by ultra-nationalist Buddhist groups as a threat to the country’s dominant religion.

The November 2020 national elections, Myanmar’s third in six decade, saw the NLD’s landslide re-election. With over a million minority groups disenfranchised, experts argue that the result has validated the “personality cult” surrounding the party’s de-facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi as “the only icon for the Bamar majority”. This, accompanied by heightened economic hardships due to Covid-19, threatens a rise in open conflict.[2]

On the other hand, the NLD’s renewed mandate provides a timely opportunity to reassess the government’s role in the country’s peace process and reinvigorate the NCA. The party already highlighted its desire to build a democratic federal union in its election manifesto. To meaningfully achieve this, the NLD must address the past grievances of Myanmar’s diverse ethnic minority groups, build their trust in public institutions and implement a more flexible and inclusive approach to peace negotiations.

This op-ed provides an overview of ethno-nationalist roots in Myanmar and how this has impacted peace dialogues, before outlining what this means for rebuilding trust in the peace process and how likely this is.[1]

Ethno-nationalist roots and manifestations

Ethnic identity in Myanmar, arguably the country’s most politically significant marker, is stratified in policy, law and socio-behavioral norms. Myanmar’s transition from a wholly closed society to a gradually open one has seen the fragile union of 135 (recognized) ethnic groups and the carving of a national identity that defines people in fixed, exclusionary terms (Buddhist or non-Buddhist, Bamar or non-Bamar, and taingyinthar lumyo, which translates to “the kind of people who belong in the country).”[3]

The International Crisis Group notes a recurring perception in Myanmar that Buddhism is an inherently peaceful and non-proselytizing religion, therefore vulnerable to oppression from more “aggressive” faiths.[7] Research suggests that increasing Islamophobia in the West and “anti-Buddhist” actions in the Middle East and South Asia has exacerbated and legitimized such concerns.[8]

Britain’s colonial legacy played a significant role in generating division. As Great Britain started to promote separate ethnic states, including non-Buddhist ones, anti-colonial movements started using religious education to preserve a perceived loss of Buddhist culture. Buddhist teaching started to be reinforced through dhamma (Sunday) schools that continue to operate across the country to this day – including in non-Buddhist states.[9] The Buddhist Young Men’s Association emerged to counteract increasing religious antipathy among youth,[10] and patriotic organisations known as wunthanu aimed to mobilize disillusioned communities in support of Buddhist nationalism.[11]

As Myanmar entered a new democratic era in 2015, the debate over the role of Buddhism within politics was recast leading to a further surge in ethno-nationalist groups. Buddhist groups expressed ongoing concern that the NLD’s “pluralistic” approach placed the country’s majority religion at risk, resulting in emergence of ultra-nationalist groups such as the Ma Ba Tha (the Committee to Protect Race and Religion), which consider it their duty to protect Buddhism. Led by monks who are considered to hold greater legitimacy on religious issues than the government, its tactics have been legitimized by an old Myanmar saying that is also the motto of the current Immigration Ministry: “A race does not face extinction by being swallowed into the earth, but from being swallowed up by another race.”

The Ma Ba Tha has played a prominent role in civic education, service delivery, justice and dispute resolution in areas where the government is perceived to be weak. It has provided a channel for women to meaningfully participate in local community development initiatives, and it is an anchor for youth who faced high unemployment and uncertainty during Myanmar’s rapid transition. Underlying the popularity of nationalist narratives is a sense of economic anxiety and a feeling that “ordinary” people are not seeing tangible benefits from the reforms the NLD promised in 2015.

Democratic transition

Before assuming power, the NLD symbolized Myanmar’s biggest cause: the struggle against authoritarianism. Following fifty years of military rule, the party represented a victory in the uphill struggle against injustice and repression, assuring voters that one of its three key priorities would be to end the country’s long-running ethnic conflict and civil war.[12]

Despite concerns that the military (Tatmadaw) would continue to rule Myanmar in practice and that the NLD’s position would be largely symbolic, the government has built a working relationship with the Tatmadaw, which under the 2008 Constitution still occupies 25 per cent of Parliamentary seats and has the authority to appoint senior ministers. In 2018, the NLD announced plans to transfer the General Administration Department – the country’s leading agency for public administration – from the Tatmadaw-controlled Ministry of Home Affairs to a civilian government ministry, demonstrating a promising step towards greater civilian control of the government.

Hopes were also high that the NLD would consolidate the complicated peace process it inherited from the previous Thein Sein administration. In 2015, Myanmar’s National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was signed between the government and non-state ethnic armed groups (EAGs) following an 18-month negotiation period. The agreement granted federalism and security sector reform to EAGs in exchange for their disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.[13] Despite six EAGs not signing the agreement and concerns being raised regarding its lack of inclusivity, it paved the way for a political dialogue process. The following year, the NLD hosted the first 21^st Century Panglong Conference with the goal of achieving a permanent peace accord.

Stalled peace process

Nevertheless, the peace process has faced ongoing challenges and the NLD has struggled to maintain formal dialogue with the ten NCA signatories, resulting in the temporary withdrawal of organisations such as the Karen National Union and Restoration Council of Shan State in 2018. Negotiations with non-signatories have also stalled. Only EAGs that signed the NCA were invited to the first Panglong Conference, and past human rights violations were excluded from discussions.[14] Reports have referred to the dialogue as largely “performative”,[15] and despite commitments to host talks every six months, a third Panglong Conference has been postponed four times.[16]

The International Crisis Group (2020) argues that the NLD made a fundamental mistake in adopting a formalized approach to peace talks, missing an opportunity to gradually build trust with and credibility among EAG leaders through regular, informal meetings. Efforts to reach bilateral ceasefires with various armed actors,[3] as a precursor to signing the NCA, have failed due to unrealistic demands placed on the groups to accept major restrictions within their operations, demonstrating a lack of understanding and legitimization of their grievances.

The peace process has equally faced challenges from EAGs and the military, the former of which has articulated broad, non-specific “ideals” that hinder progress in negotiations. The military has been blamed by ethnic groups for continued operations against them, only announcing unilateral ceasefires ahead of increased attention during the election campaign.[17] A Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JCMC) was set up by the government to implement and monitor adherence to NCA provisions, but all national and local bodies are chaired by military officers, while EAGs are only able to appoint vice chairs.[18] An independent evaluation in 2019 found that the JCMC remains a “passive monitoring operation”, relying on reporting from members and lacking capacity to ensure the protection of civilians against violations committed by NCA signatories.[19]

Disillusion among ethnic groups

As hopes for decentralization and reconciliation have diminished, disillusion with the government and electoral democracy has increased, and threats from insurgent groups such as the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army and Kachin Independent Army have intensified.[20] White the latter supported the NLD in 2015, by 2018 it condemned Aung San Suu Kyi’s failure to address ethnic minority concerns in the peace process.

Exclusion is most evident in Rakhine State, where the government refused the Arakan National Party the opportunity to form its own state government after performing strongly in the 2015 elections. In early 2018, state police targeted an anniversary gathering organized by ethnic Rakhine to mark the end of the independent Rakhine kingdom and its fall to the Burmans.[21] What followed was the government’s arrest and imprisonment of the state’s leading political figure and an escalation of clashes between EAGs and the Tatmadaw. UNHCR referred to the ongoing persecution of the Rohingya in Rakhine State as a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” International pressure[4] against such military operations, including from the International Court of Justice, grew and as recently as 2020, Amnesty International collected evidence of airstrikes on civilians targeting Rohingya and Christian minorities.[22]

As the NLD struggled to harness the grassroots energy of ethnic groups which originally supported its cause, and as groups conceded that it has not lived up to the high expectations placed on it when first taking office, ultra-nationalist groups such as the Ma Ba Tha risked filling its role, offering a sense of order and cause to disillusioned communities and using this to propagate its concerns.

Studies argue that the NLD adopted a “staunchly nationalist position,” failing to introduce legislation to overthrow such groups.[23] Minimal attempts to restrict the influence of the Ma Ba Tha merely pushed coordination of members into the shadows and resulted in “branch-off” nationalist groups now beyond the Ma Ba Tha’s sole control, such as the 969, Dhamma Wunthanu Rakhita and various myo-chit (“love for one’s own race”) youth groups. Any further restrictions risk inciting clashes with armed groups that hold informal alliances with the Ma Ba Tha and have promised to defend Buddhism with force where required.

2020 elections: rebuilding trust

In a transitional country like Myanmar, interpersonal trust and tolerance are fundamental to a democratic society. Despite nominally boasting the trappings of a developing democracy, institutions and mindsets in Myanmar change slowly. A positive appreciation for the “other” is still poorly rooted in the country’s human rights arena, with many civil society actors – though traditionally allies in promoting inclusivity and protecting the most marginalized – operating as representatives of their own groups rather than proponents of wider agendas. Speaking out for minority rights is still considered by many to be a taboo, carrying a heavy risk of reprisal under the country’s repressive legislation.[5] A nationwide 2018 survey by the People’s Alliance for Credible Elections found that only 18 per cent of 2,364 citizens respondents felt other ethnic or religious groups could be trusted.[24]

The recent elections represent a pivotal milestone for Myanmar’s democratic transition, presenting both challenges and opportunities. Despite the announcement of solidarity among Kachin, Kayah, Mon, Chin and Karen parties,[25] Myanmar’s first-past-the-post system has continued to facilitate a “winner takes all” culture that excludes ethnic parties from having a political platform.[26] Nevertheless, the NLD possesses unparalleled political capital, placing it in a unique position to rebuild momentum for the peace process and defuse tensions in line with its manifesto. This can only be achieved if it rediverts its focus from garnering political support among its ethnic-majority Burman base to building trust with the country’s minority ethnic groups. The NLD must re-examine its own role in the peace process and ensure a more inclusive approach to dialogue, recognising that its neutral stance perpetuates perceptions of the party being a “manifestation” of Burman Buddhist ideals aligned with the military. Finally, if communities do not feel their grievances have been addressed, lasting reconciliation is unlikely.[27]

Recommendations

State

• Encourage greater inclusion of minority ethnic groups in the peace process through introducing quotas for representation, providing training and incentives, ensuring access to information and addressing barriers to participation.

International community

• Advocate a truth commission to address past human rights violations.[28] This should fully comply with international human rights special procedures, including cooperation with fact-finding missions investigating crimes against the Rohingya.

EAGs

• Build consensus across ethnic lines where possible and organize, coordinate and amplify common positions to the government, including specific requests with timeframes and lines of responsibility. These should be realistic as trust is built over time.

Military

• Gestures towards ethnic groups should not be tokenistic but instead build on trust and commitment to a more collaborative peace process. Provide opportunities for ethnic groups to chair and exercise genuine leadership within the JCMC and invite non-NCA signatories to engage in dialogue.

Civil society

• Document, organize and articulate the concerns of ethnic minority communities to decisionmakers. Critically question and explore prejudices within the human rights community and consider the perspectives, interests and needs of “the other”. Promote a more collective sense of identity where ethnicity and religion become less of a divider and common beliefs, customs and norms become more of an equalizer.

References

[1] Several organisations and actors are cited: the country’s governing party (the NLD); the military (Tatmadaw), which occupies 25 per cent of Parliamentary seats; ethnic, state-level parties represented in the Assembly of the Union (such as the Arakan National Party); non-state ethnic organisations not currently represented, and their armed insurgent wings – some of which are signatories of the NCA (Karen National Union, Restoration Council of Shan State, Kachin Independence Party, Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Arakan Army); ethnic groups (including Shan, Rakhine/Arakan, Chin, Mon, Karen, Kayah, Rohingya, Buddhist, Bamar, Kachin, Ta’ang); and ethno-nationalist groups (the Ma Ba Tha, 969, Dhamma Wunthanu Rakhita, myo-chit).

[2] During the review, the state reiterated its stance that there existed no minority community under the name of the Rohingya.

[3] Such as the Arakan Army, the Kachin Independence Army, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army.

[4] The NLD have refused to cooperate meaningfully with UN Fact-Finding Missions into the investigations against senior military officials for the genocide of ethnic Rohingya Muslims, rejecting visas for Special Rapporteur Yanghee Lee and limiting access to the country by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (see Human Rights Watch, Myanmar Events of 2019, 2019).

[5] See Section 18 of the Peaceful Assembly and Procession Law, which is used to detain human rights defenders.

[1] Amnesty International, Caged Without a Roof: Apartheid in Myanmar’s Rakhine State (London: Amnesty International, November 2017)

[2] Mahtani, S., and Diamond, C., Suu Kyi’s Godlike Status Drove her Myanmar Election Win. It Threatens to Rip the Country Apart (Washington, DC: The Washington Post, 18 November, 2020)

[3] Callahan, M. and Zaw Oo, Myo, Myanmar’s 2020 Elections and Conflict Dynamics, No. 146 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, April 2019)

[4] Human Rights Watch, Burma: Discriminatory Laws Could Stoke Communal Tensions (New York: HRW, 23 August, 2015)

[5] U.S Department of State, Burma Human Rights Report (Washington, DC: U.S Department of State, 2016)

[6] Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Burma: The Rise of Ethnic Parties in the Political System (Part II) (Washington, DC: CSIS, 17 April, 2014)

[7] International Crisis Group, Buddhism and State Power in Myanmar (Brussels: ICG, 5 September, 2017)

[8] Ibid.

[9] openDemocracy, What’s Attracting Women to Myanmar’s Buddhist Nationalist Movement? (London: openDemocracy, 30 January, 2018)

[10] Ibid.

[11] Tharaphi Than, Nationalism, Religion, and Violence: Old and New Wunthanu Movements in Myanmar, Volume 13, No. 4 (Arlington: Institute for Global Engagement, December 2015)

[12] International Crisis Group, Rebooting Myanmar’s Stalled Peace Process (Brussels: ICG, 19 June, 2020)

[13] Institute for Security and Development Policy, Myanmar’s Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (Washington, DC: ISDP, October 2015)

[14] Mon, Y, Controversy, Progress at the Third Panglong Conference (Yangon: Frontier Myanmar, July 16, 2018)

[15] International Crisis Group, Rebooting Myanmar’s Stalled Peace Process (Brussels: ICG, 19 June, 2020)

[16] Ganesan, N. Taking Stock of Myanmar’s Ethnic Peace Process and the Third Twenty-First Century Panglong Conference (South Korea: The Institute for Peace and Unification Studies, October 2018)

[17] International Crisis Group, Peace and Electoral Democracy in Myanmar (Brussels: ICG, 6 August, 2019)

[18] Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee, Joint Monitoring Committee Guideline for Each Level (Draft) (Yangon: JCMC, 2015)

[19] Banim, Guy P. and Maung Maung, Tin, Final Independent Evaluation of the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC) Support Platform Project (SPP) Myanmar (UN: New York, September 2019)

[20] International Crisis Group, Myanmar: A Violent Push to Shake Up Ceasefire Negotiations (Brussels: ICG, 24 September, 2019)

[21] The Independent, Myanmar Police Shoot Dead Seven Buddhist Demonstrators and Injure 12 as Celebration in Rakhine Turns Violent (London: The Independent, 17 January, 2018)

[22] Amnesty International, Myanmar: Indiscriminate Airstrikes Kill Civilians as Rakhine Conflict Worsens (London: Amnesty International, July 2020)

[23] International Crisis Group, Peace and Electoral Democracy in Myanmar (Brussels: ICG, 6 August, 2019)

[24] People’s Alliance for Credible Elections, Citizens’ Mid-Term Perceptions of Government Performance (Yangon: PACE Myanmar, September 2018)

[25] The Irrawaddy, Ethnic Political Parties Merge to Seek Stronger Representation in 2020 Election (Yangon: The Irrawaddy, 11 September, 2018)

[26] International Crisis Group, Peace and Electoral Democracy in Myanmar (Brussels: ICG, 6 August, 2019)

[27] Pierce, P., and Reiger, C, Navigating Paths to Justice in Myanmar’s Transition (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, June 2014)

[28] Huchet, L, Dealing with Myanmar’s Past: A Call for a Truth Commission (Bristol: E-International Relations, 29 December, 2019)

By: Sarah Freeman

Today cyberattacks continue to rise, and security efforts have risen in response. In 2017, the global cybersecurity market was estimated at $92.7 billion with a projected growth of 10 percent between 2018 and 2026.[1] In spite of this market growth, organizations seem unable to counter the growth in cyberattacks. However, Snyder noted the importance of a two-phased approach that considers both defense and deterrence. Although defensive efforts remain the primary focus of organizations seeking to stem the tide of cyberattacks, nation security may require an active cyber deterrence strategy.

There is no universally accepted definition for cyber deterrence. Snyder noted in his seminal work, Deterrence and Defense: “The object of military deterrence is to reduce the probability of enemy military attack, by posing for the enemy a sufficiently likely prospect that he will suffer a net loss as a result of the attack, or at least a higher net loss or lower net gain than would follow from his not attacking.”[2] Central to this concept, however, is the assumption that the enemy is known. When applied to the field of cybersecurity, that is not always the case. In fact, the cyber domain is, by its very essence, a place that promotes anonymity.  For example, in 1996 Goldschlag et. al. identified an approach known as onion routing that challenged origin traffic analysis.[3] In this design, the onion routing obfuscates the point of origin by forcing the connection through a series of nodes defined by the first routing node. This concept would eventually serve as the basis for Tor in 2002, [4] which is still in use today, as well as modern proxy servers and services. In this modern space, attribution activity is challenged by both the attacker’s desire to remain hidden and the technology itself.

Suitable retaliation for a cyberattack is based on the premise that the perpetrator of a cyberattack can be identified, and that this identification will take place in a timely manner. Without the proper attribution (i.e., high confidence and timely assessments), accountability within the international space cannot be guaranteed. Although no international norms for cyber warfare have been adopted, the field of chemical and biological security provide some clarity on the significant of accountability. In 2012, a chemical weapons attack breached a twenty year moratorium, which has been followed by more than 200 chemical weapon attacks.[5] Although speaking on chemical weapons proliferation, Hersman emphasizes that without suitable accountability, entities will be encouraged to continue its use.[6] The same can be said about cyber weapons, however, and punishment in this context also assumes an international norm has been established. Although some work in this area has been done, more questions remain.

Following a July 2018 NATO meeting in Brussels, NATO participants emphasized the importance of defense and deterrence applied to cyber as well as kinetic domains. This announcement represented a key moment in NATO policy and the interpretation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, recognizing that “Cyber defense is part of NATO’s core task of collective defense.”[7] Participants also acknowledged that although their efforts remained focused on ensuring a military outcome, efforts could not be limited to this response.[8] Additionally, the group acknowledged that military success is based not only on military infrastructure, but the continued availability and integrity of critical infrastructure (on which military missions are dependent). As cyberattacks directed against civilian and enabling critical infrastructure have become more prevalent, additional risk to defense and deterrence actions is introduced.

Adoption of Article 5 requires NATO countries to: 1) define when an adversary’s activities move from a cyber threat to a cyberattack; 2) identify the perpetrator in a timely manner; and 3) maintain the strategic capability and access to provide a response.

Case Study: TV5MONDE and the Cyber Caliphate

The following case studies highlight the challenges with post-attack cyber attribution since 2015.

In August 2015, a targeted attack in France directed against TV5MONDE’s networks disrupted broadcast services and corrupted a number of internet-connected hardware.[9] Interestingly, although this attack primarily targeted TV5MONDE’s operational technology, the adversaries also conducted a wide-reaching and sophisticated reconnaissance campaign to enable this cyberattack, even targeting a third-party provider of remote-controlled cameras based in the Netherlands. Custom malware was created to target and corrupt the specific technology used by TV5MONDE. TV5MONDE’s websites, Facebook, and Twitter pagers were publicly defaced by a group identifying themselves as the Cyber Caliphate.[10] Ultimately, restoration and recovery cost $5.6 million in the first year, as well as $3.4 million for increased protection services following the incident.[11]

Within two months of the initial attack, additional cyber forensic evidence contradicted the original claim (i.e., Cyber Caliphate) and instead indicated that this attack was likely conducted by APT28 (Advanced Persistent Threat),[12] a Russia-based, state sponsored group whose activity has been attributed to the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the Russian General Staff.[13]  Specifically, the Cyber Caliphate website was hosted on the same IP block that historically hosted APT28 attack infrastructure.[14] Additionally, this website used the same server and registrar as past APT28 activity.[15] According to FireEye, a U.S.-based cyber intelligence firm, the Cyber Caliphate employed several tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) similar to APT28.[16] Additionally, and perhaps more significantly, FireEye noted that at the time of the TV5MONDE attack, APT28 also targeted a number of other journalists using the same attack infrastructure.[17]

Case Study: Yemen Cyber Army

Throughout the spring of 2015, the Yemen Cyber Army conducted a variety of cyberattacks against a variety of Saudi and pro-Saudi targets. An initial attack included the website defacement of the pro-Saudi London newspaper, Al Hayat, and the leaking of the names of Al Hayat’s subscribers.[18] The Yemen Cyber Army followed this attack with a more direct attack against the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs on May 20, 2015.[19]

One news outlet reported that the Yemen Cyber Army gained control over more than 3,000 Saudi government computers following the May breach, allowing them to collect the personal information of key diplomats (e.g., addresses and phone numbers) but also emails.[20] The group also successfully gained access to classified government documents, including historical correspondence with other foreign governments that dated back to 1980.[21] To ensure widespread release, the Yemen Cyber Army disclosed these sensitive documents in conjunction with WikiLeaks.[22]

However, even early analysis raised questions of the origin of the attack, with some security researchers  hypothesizing Iranian involvement, primarily based on the perceived differences in cyberattack capabilities between Iran and the nascent Yemeni program.[23] Additionally, after the attack, a representative of the Yemen Cyber Army published a post in Pastebin taking credit for the event and identifying themselves as the “Cutting Sword of Justice.”[24] Interestingly, cybersecurity and open source analysis firm Recorded Future noted that this phrase had only been used in conjunction with a 2012 attack against Saudi Aramco (also known as Shamoon), during which Iranian hackers destroyed 30,000 computers with a malicious wiper.[25] Following the attack, sensitive Ministry of Foreign Affairs documentation was also published to the website, QuickLeak.ir, a website that is primarily used by Iranian hackers. Finally, the exploits of the Yemen Cyber Army were consistently published first by an Iranian media outlet, Fars News Agency, leading some to speculate that the news firm had insider knowledge.[26]

Case Study: NotPetya Ransomware Attack

On June 27, 2017, Ukraine’s Constitution Day, a ransomware campaign devastated multiple industries throughout the country. The ransomware was distributed through a supply chain attack, during which a third-party software supplier was compromised before pushing out a malicious update file to all of its users.[27] [28] Infected users’ computers then displayed text indicating that their files had been encrypted and unlocking access to these files required payment of $300 worth of Bitcoin.[29]

Attackers targeted MeDoc, a Ukrainian third-party software supplier, and manipulated its updates to initially spread the software. Because MeDoc’s user base is located primarily in Ukraine, this software served as a natural infection vector for attackers seeking to maximize their damage in that country. While infections would ultimately spread globally, the majority of activity remained in Ukraine.

Although the initial attack appeared as a criminal ransomware campaign, security researchers began to question the validity of this assessment. A thorough review of the malware source code revealed that although it shared large portions of the code associated with the Petya ransomware sold in criminal forums and marketplaces, significant alterations to the code had been made. For example, the new variant used the EternalBlue exploit for propagation within networks, a change from the original Petya variant.[30]

Additionally, the attackers were not financially motivated and failed to maintain working infrastructure to collect payment from their victims. For example, the email that the attackers created to receive payments was taken down by the email provider, and no attempt was made to create a new account.[31] Ultimately, payments made by victims would raise just over $10,000,[32] a relatively small amount given the number of computers that were infected globally.

Case Study: 2019 Co-option of APT34 Toolkit

In June 2019, U.S. cybersecurity firm Symantec published their findings that as early as November 2017 the APT Turla[33] compromised the command and control infrastructure owned by APT34.[34]^,[35] Afterwards, Turla employed this APT34 command and control infrastructure to drop their own malware on victim systems that had already been infected with APT34 malware. This first instance of command and control co-option for re-infection occurred in January 2018.[36] Turla continued to take advantage of this infrastructure to infect additional victims for the next 18 months.[37] Analysis of Turla’s activity indicates that they attempted to infect as many as 35 countries, mostly in the Middle East, and were successful infecting 20 of these.[38]

The success of this APT as well as those mentioned in the previous case studies emphasizes the importance of reviewing all cyberattack artifacts with a discerning analytic eye.

Today individuals, organizations, and governments continue to experience a barrage of cyberattacks, challenging existing defensive postures. For many, defensive investments are not enough to repel all of these attacks. However, deterrence by punishment is only possible in situations where the perpetrator of a cyberattack is known and identified quickly after an attack. Cyber weapons, by their very nature, allow for the creation of perfect copies through the copying and theft of source code, where only imitations are possible with chemical or biological weapons. Ultimately, analysts attempting to answer questions of attribution will have to come to terms with lower confidence assessments, at least for the near future.

[1] Reuters, “Cyber Security Market Size 2019, Share, Segments, Global Industry Overview, Trends, Growth, Regional Analysis and Forecasts 2026,” August 8, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/brandfeatures/venture-capital/article?id=141321.

[2] Glenn Herald Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961).

[3] David M. Goldschlag et al. “Hiding Routing Information,” in Information Hiding, R. Anderson, ed., LNCS vol. 1174, Springer-Verlag, 1996, pp. 137-150.

[4] Ian Goldberg, “Privacy Enhancing Technologies for the Internet III: Ten Years Later,” in Digital Privacy: Theory, Technologies, and Practices, Alessandro Acquisti et al., editors, (New York: Auerbach Publications, December 2007).

[5] Rebecca K.C. Hersman and William Pittinos, “Restoring Restraint: Enforcing Accountability for Users of Chemical Weapons,” in CSIS International Security Program, June 2018, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/180607_Hersman_RestoringRestraint_Web.pdf?vzlG2wFfZBmfAKs1yB1PmnAQD4EZBBSj.

[6] Ibid.

[7] NATO, “Brussels Summit Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels 11-12 July 2018,” Press Release (2018) 074, 11 Jul. 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/uk/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm.

[8] Laura Brent, “NATO’s Role in Cyberspace: Cyberspace as a Domain of Operations,” in the Three Swords Magazine, v. 34, 2019, pp. 56-59.

[9] Gordon Corera, How France’s TV5 was almost destroyed by ‘Russian hackers,’ Technology, BBC News, October 10, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37590375.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] According to MITRE, alternative names for APT28 include SNAKEMACKEREL, Swallowtail, Group 74, Sednit, Sofacy, Pawn Storm, Fancy Bear, STRONTIUM, Tsar Team, Threat Group-4127, and TG-4127.

[13] Robert Mueller, “Indictment – United States of America vs. Viktor Borisovich Netyksho et al.,” Department of Justice, July 13, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/file/1080281/download.

[14] Sheera Frenkel, “Experts Say Russians May Have Posed As ISIS to Hack French TV Channel,” Buzz Feed News, June 9, 2015, https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/sheerafrenkel/experts-say-russians-may-have-posed-as-isis-to-hack-french-t#.rbO51WDnKm.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Pierluigi Paganini, “FireEye claims Russian APT28 hacked France’s TV5Monde Channel,” Security Affairs, June 10, 2015, https://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/37710/hacking/apt28-hacked-tv5monde.html.

[17] Ibid.

[18] “Yemen Cyber Army Hack Pro-Saudi Website, War Readers to Support Houthi Revolution” Jerusalem Post, April 14, 2015, https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Yemen-Cyber-Army-hack-Pro-Saudi-website-warn-readers-to-support-Houthi-revolution-398018.

[19] Ibid.

[20] “Yemeni group hacks 3,000 Saudi government computers to reveal top secret docs – report,” Russia Today, May 22, 2015, https://www.rt.com/news/261073-yemen-cyber-hack-saudi/.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Lorenzo Franceschi-Bicchierai, “There’s Evidence the ‘Yemen Cyber Army’ Is Actually Iranian: Researchers uncover clues that indicate the new hacking group has links to Iran,” Vice, June 26, 2015, https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/wnj9gq/theres-evidence-the-yemen-cyber-army-is-actually-iranian.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Thomas Brewster, “Is This Ukrainian Company The Source Of The ‘NotPetya’ Ransomware Explosion?” Forbes, June, 27, 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/06/27/medoc-firm-blamed-for-ransomware-outbreak/#5af6166573c8.

[28] Ellen Nakashima, “Russian military was behind ‘NotPetya’ cyberattack in Ukraine, CIA concludes,” Washington Post, Jan. 12, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-military-was-behind-notpetya-cyberattack-in-ukraine-cia-concludes/2018/01/12/048d8506-f7ca-11e7-b34a-b85626af34ef_story.html.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Kaspersky Lab, “New Petya / NotPetya / ExPetr ransomware outbreak,” June 27, 2017, https://usa.kaspersky.com/blog/new-ransomware-epidemics/11710/.

[31] Iain Thomson, “Everything you need to know about the Petya, er, NotPetya nasty trashing PCs worldwide: This isn’t ransomware – it’s merry chaos,” The Register, June 28, 2017, https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/06/28/petya_notpetya_ransomware/.

[32] Bill Chappell, “’Petya’ Ransomware Hits At Least 65 Countries; Microsoft Traces It to Tax Software,” NPR, June 28, 2017, https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/28/534679950/petya-ransomware-hits-at-least-65-countries-microsoft-traces-it-to-tax-software.

[33] According to MITRE, Turla is a Russia-based advanced persistent threat that has been active since 2004. Group activity is also tracked under the names Waterbug

[34] According to MITRE, APT34 is a suspected Iranian threat group that has been active since at least 2014. It is also known as OilRig and Helix Kitten.

[35] Catalin Cimpanu, “Russian APT hacked Iranian APT’s infrastructure back in 2017: Turla APT hacked Iran’s APT34 group and used its C&C servers to re-infect APT34 victims with its own malware,” June 20, 2019, ZDNet, https://www.zdnet.com/article/russian-apt-hacked-iranian-apts-infrastructure-back-in-2017/.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Charlie Osborne, “Russian APT Turla targets 35 countries on the back of Iranian infrastructure: The state-backed group’s hacking activities are more widespread than previously thought,” ZDNet, October 21, 2019, https://www.zdnet.com/article/russian-apt-turla-targets-35-countries-on-the-back-of-iranian-infrastructure/.

[38] Ibid.

By Agnes E. Venema

What Are Deepfakes?

In some ways, deepfakes are to video what photoshopping is to images. Just like photoshopped images, some are created better than others. It involves the manipulation of videos in such a way that, when well-made, it is impossible to distinguish from an original video. Deepfakes can be created in roughly two different ways: image creation and morphing. Image creation is a process by which a neural network looks at faces and creates their own image based on the samples it has been given. An example of image creation is the website ThisPersonDoesNotExist.

Deepfakes created through morphing merge one face with another, or superimpose expressions of one face onto another, creating video. Combined with voice cloning or using voice actors, morphing can lead to incredibly realistic videos that are entirely fictitious, such as the deepfake of President Nixon delivering the speech that was prepared in case of a moon landing disaster. A distinction must be made between deepfakes and “cheapfakes.” The latter is the manipulation of existing footage by slowing down or speeding up certain sections to exaggerate part of the video or by selectively editing content. Both U.S. Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi and U.S. journalist Jim Acosta became the target of cheapfakes.

Deepfakes are slowly starting to garner more interest from a broader range of people, because they are starting to become more accessible and prevalent. This shift has arguably come about because of two interrelated phenomena: better quality and proliferation. First of all, the deepfakes we see surfacing today are better than they were last year. The rapid evolution of deepfakes is staggering, and we are already at a point where well-made deepfakes are nearly impossible to detect. This is potentially very problematic in terms of reliability of audio-visual evidence in court, as further elaborated upon in this article. 

Secondly, the creation of deepfakes used to require quite specific technical knowledge and powerful hardware. However, we are fast moving into a territory where the code for creating deepfakes is readily available online, and fewer pictures are necessary to create a realistic deepfake. While the most realistic deepfakes still require quite a bit of data to train the system, this is fast changing. For instance, we are seeing apps launched that use a single picture to impose that face onto famous movie scenes using the same techniques. Dr. Donovan rightfully points out that the commercialization of deepfakes is the next step. It is a matter of time before we can order personalized deepfake ecards. But what can be used for birthday card fun can also be used for nefarious purposes.

Why are Deepfakes a gendered security issue?

Given that deepfakes can easily be mistaken for real video footage, the potential damage of deepfakes can be immense. This is where the connection to image-based sexual violence, colloquially known as revenge porn, requires further exploration. A 2019 Adult Online Hate, Harassment and Abuse report from the UK lists six types of image-based sexual violence, defining this type of abuse as “sexual photoshopping.” Although the report does not mention the word deepfake, it highlights the fact that the harm suffered is the same as more “traditional” forms of image-based sexual violence. Keeping this in mind, it is worthwhile to note that most research has shown that the vast majority of victims of revenge porn are women (the report cites different studies, putting the percentages between 60 percent and 95 percent). Furthermore, research indicates that men are more likely than women to perpetrate image-based abuse. The gendered aspect of deepfakes, especially when sexual in nature, is therefore not to be underestimated.

How deepfakes, especially sexually explicit ones, affect women differs from country to country and depends on the prevalent views of women at play. Considering deepfakes are hard to distinguish from real videos, it is worthwhile looking at the consequences women suffered from revenge porn. In BBC’s The She Word, two Zimbabwean women told their stories of having become the victim of revenge porn; one was disowned and consequently unable to finish her education, while the other lost her job. In India, journalist Rana Ayyub experienced a deepfake pornographic slander campaign after she advocated for justice for an eight-year old girl who had repeatedly been raped and then killed. These are not uncommon experiences; women have reported that they find it difficult to maintain or find employment after becoming the target of image-based sexual violence. To add insult to injury, some of the online service providers where this type of online abuse takes place have been slow in acknowledging the problem, and reacting to it remains challenging.

In addition to highlighting the professional repercussions, the 2019 report also stressed the intangible effects of image-based sexual violence, such as loss of autonomy, experiencing a violation of privacy, trust issues, and experiencing a silencing effect where these women choose to withdraw from (online) life as a coping strategy. Victims of revenge porn have indicated they suffer from anxiety or depression, PTSD, or substance abuse. Importantly, one study showed that male victims of image-based sexual violence indicate that they feel less shame and blame themselves less for what happened than female victims do in the same situation. Without inferring causality, male victims indicated a higher percentage of positive police responses when they went to report their case than women did. What must be considered, however, is whether the more negative police response to women reporting the abuse is mirroring a wider held societal belief that women should have done more to avoid abuse, better known as victim-blaming. 

Advocates who try to shift the narrative from one blaming women for having created or shared explicit imagery to one that holds those publishing the images accountable can also expect online abuse and vitriol, as this Australian example illustrates. Especially in combination with doxing—the act of making a person’s contact details publically available online—revenge porn, whether deepfake or real, can lead to threats to women’s lives. Rana Ayyub had her phone number published after the deepfake video of her surfaced, leading to a barrage of men contacting her to ask how much she would charge for sex. In some cases, the combination of doxing and revenge porn has led to women receiving threats of rape, being stalked, or being subjected to violence. Research has shown that overall this type of online abuse and harassment disproportionately  affects women. 

The link with deepfakes is that people can become the target of “revenge porn” without the publisher being in possession of sexually explicit images or footage of the target. They can be created out of any number of casual photographs or images that are scraped from the internet to achieve the same goal. This means that practically everyone who has taken a selfie or posted a picture of themselves online runs the hypothetical risk of having a deepfake created in their image.

Security Implications of Deepfakes

Until recently, deepfakes were the problem of high-profile women who had lots of images posted of them online. More recently, however, deepfakes are starting to gain more attention, likely because of the reasons outlined above: better quality deepfakes, less need for highly technical skills or hardware, and thus a rapid proliferation of deepfakes. Furthermore, because of this proliferation, more people are starting to understand that deepfakes are not only tools to create non-consensual porn, but that they can become another tool in disinformation and fake news campaigns that have the power to sway elections and ignite frozen or low-intensity conflicts. 

In one of the first articles on the topic, Chesney and Citron hypothesize that a deepfake video of U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan could endanger the troops and the broader U.S. Afghanistan policy, or that a deepfake about an imaginary assassination plot could be detrimental for the Iran-Iraq relationship. While those were hypothetical scenarios, the mere existence of a video that was believed to be a deepfake has already led to an attempted coup in Gabon. Malaysia also saw its political landscape affected when a deepfake video of a male aide to a minister confessing to sodomy—which is illegal in Malaysia—and implicating the Minister of Economics Affairs was released. The Prime Minister of Malaysia dismissed the video as a deepfake, but the country was gripped by it, showing just how influential a deepfake can be in swaying popular opinion.

It should therefore come as no surprise that opposition movements, especially those in less democratic countries, are at risk of having deepfakes used against them as a tool to silence them by attacking their credibility, especially in more conservative societies. Consider for example the current crisis in Belarus, where political opposition is headed by three women. One can easily imagine how a strategically released deepfake could damage the credibility of these political leaders. Deepfakes do not, however, have to be lewd or sexual in nature, although that is often perceived as the most scandalous use and affects women disproportionately, as explained above. However, deepfakes alleging a wide range of issues, including corruption and fraud, can have damaging effects. Therefore, the international security implications of strategically released deepfakes, combined with organic and paid for viral content on social media, are not to be underestimated. 

The security implications of deepfakes are therefore threefold: at the international level, strategic deepfakes have the potential to destabilize precarious peace;  at the national level, deepfakes may be used as a tool to unduly influence elections, the political process, or discredit opposition, which is a national security concern, especially if foreign powers are involved in the creation and distribution of such deepfakes; and at the personal level, the scope for using deepfakes in the creation of sexually explicit video has the potential to disproportionately affect women, particularly in the public sphere. Women disproportionately suffer from the exposure of sexually explicit material compared to men and are more often subject to threats to their physical safety. This in turn has ongoing effects on their (mental) health.

Policy Considerations

Certifications and Disclaimers

Policy makers need to be aware that deepfakes are used for a range of legitimate purposes, including artistic and satirical creations. Banning deepfakes outright is therefore not a path consistent with fundamental freedoms, such as the freedom of speech. One possible legislative proposal could include the obligation to include a content warning or disclaimer. We see these types of warnings in television and film relating to product placement and the use of animals, where movies receive “No Animals Were Harmed” end-credit certifications. This could be a non-invasive solution that allows for the use of deepfakes in creative fields but requires producers to take responsibility and inform their audiences. 

Consent and “Know Your Customer”

A further area of concern is the commercialization of deepfakes that Dr. Donovan alluded to. Policy or legislation to manage this upcoming industry needs to consider the privacy of the person whose face may be depicted in the deepfake. This is closely tied to the notion of consent to use one’s image. One policy solution would be to require that service providers ask for such consent before accepting an order to create a deepfake. Given the potential harm of deepfakes, legislators may want to consider “know your customer” legislation that is already in place in the banking and financial services industries. Of course, the fact that internet services can be provided from anywhere in the world means that offshore companies can easily circumvent such legislation, but customers within the jurisdiction may face legal repercussions if they falsely claim to provide images with the consent of the person depicted. 

Digital Literacy

Given the limitations of jurisdictions and the lack of borders in the cyber domain, it is unlikely that legislative or policy proposals as suggested above will eradicate the malicious use of deepfakes. This is why policy makers ought to consider how to best teach digital literacy. Deepfakes rely on the premise that “seeing is believing.” In order to combat this deeply held bias, media literacy projects are sprouting like mushrooms, and various companies, including Microsoft, are launching tools that should help the general public assess the authenticity of video footage. Global standards for digital literacy are being developed and included in school curricula worldwide. Particular attention must also be paid to cohorts that may be hard to reach, due, for instance, to limits on broader technological literacy and arising from implications of the digital divide. 

For instance, Danielle Citron acknowledges there is a generational divide and cites research that claims that the over-55 generation is more likely to spread falsehoods and fake news. Such research was not specifically done on deepfakes, but it is likely that deepfakes will exacerbate this phenomenon. Therefore, any digital literacy policies ought to consider all age groups and all levels of society in order to bridge digital and generational divides. By way of example, targeted strategies for older populations may need to be considered.

Agnes E. Venema is a PhD Researcher pursuing and Marie-Skłodowska Curie scholarship recipient pursuing a joint doctoral degree in Intelligence and National Security at the “Mihai Viteazul” National Intelligence Academy in Romania and the University of Malta on the European Commission funded project Evolving Security SciencE through Networked Technologies, Information policy And Law (ESSENTIAL). Agnes’ research focuses on the intersection of emerging technologies, security, and law. You can follow her on Twitter @gnesvenema.

By Franziska Kuehl

On February 19, 2020 23-year-old Ferhat Unvar met some of his friends in the Arena Bar, a 24/7 Kiosk in Kesselstadt, Germany. It was late at night, somewhere around 10:00pm, when an armed man arrived at the establishment and opened fire. He has just done the same, minutes before, at another Shisha bar. His next destination is his home, where he kills his mother before ending his own life.

A total of eleven people died that day because of the shooter. You will not find his name in this article. There will be no analysis of how he proceeded, parallels to other attacks perpetrated by right-wing extremists, or the aftermath. This article will focus on what happened years before, something that Ferhat’s mother described in an open letter to Chancellor Angela Merkel in which the shooter had openly expressed his ambition to commit such an act publicly, and described his racist worldview in great detail to German authorities.[1]

This behavior was not only confirmed by outsiders but by the perpetrator himself in his so-called manifesto. The document provides insights into the various facets of his beliefs, which ultimately concluded in the shooter committing an attack. One of those beliefs, misogyny, links him directly to the incel scene, an internet subculture consisting of people who are continuously rejected by love interests, triggering them to feel forced to remain involuntary celibates.[2] This article will examine the connection to that scene, the process of radicalization, and realistic approaches to how that process could be prevented.

Firstly, it is important to clarify a few elements of inceldom, because the community is a bit more complex than just identifying every involuntary celibate as an incel. As with many other areas of extreme beliefs or ideologies, such as forms of terrorism or conspiracy theories, it can be argued that inceldom is a spectrum. As a source of mine within the incel scene correctly points out, being an incel does not have an overarching definition. He defines it as “a person who desires to be in a romantic or sexual relationship but is unable to.”[3] Although not incorrect, that definition only covers the bare minimum.

It is dangerous to generalize members of an entire community, yet it is essential to provide a brief overview over what those other elements entail. In general, male incels believe that women will not sleep with them because they are only attracted to the “Chads” of this world. A Chad is a fictional character representing the perfect male stereotype, around 20 percent of all men according to incel ideology. “Staceys,” another fictional character symbolizing all women, are only drawn to Chads’ superficial attractiveness. This in turn leads to two main conclusions in inceldom: Firstly, 80 percent of men are non-Chads and are not able to pursue physical or romantic relationships because of this. Secondly, women are only pulled towards extremely attractive men and do not have the intellect to focus on sentimentality or other characteristics not attached to physical attractiveness. Consequently, what is implied is that females should not have the same agency as men in modern day society.

Let me repeat again that this is a very broad view of the elements of inceldom, not representing the opinion of an individual but rather an agglomeration of many. However, there are varying opinions about how much of the description above is true and to what extent.

When you scroll through forums, chatrooms, or live streams run by incels, you will quickly notice that some of their opinions could not differ more. Even the fact that you see female incels (femcels) managing their own forums, exchanges between male incels amongst forums highlight the contrasting sides of this internet subculture. Some posts are black-white pictures of couples, depicting the user’s wishes to belong to someone, whilst others openly encourage each other to commit attacks, harm Chads, women, or even themselves. Additionally, some male incels do not seem to accept that women can face similar problems. My incel source explains: “Most people would agree women have far less trouble finding mates than men do in today’s society. Thus, one would expect their experiences to differ.”[4]

Consequently, it is essential to differentiate between the vast majority and a very specific trend within male inceldom. According to Alex DiBranco, interviewed by Tech against Terrorism, the modern incel movement was heavily influenced by a 22-year old mass shooter and his manifesto. In 2014, Elliot Roger killed six people (then himself) and injured thirteen in Isla Vista, California. Before the attack he published a so-called manifesto, referring to women as “animals” and fantasized about punishing all females for denying him sex. This document contains many elements that have been a constant in the misogynistic incel movement, setting them apart from those described by my anonymous incel source.[5]

How does this connect to the attack committed by the shooter? According to Colin Clarke, a senior fellow and researcher at the Soufan Center, the misogynistic element of incel ideology provides the connective tissue to white supremacy and other right-wing extremist trends.[6] In fact, women-focused content in those online spheres blend misogyny with idolizing traditional female stereotyping.[7] However, he also highlights that misogyny is not the only major element. A recent short-documentary by the German Y-Kollektiv, an online platform which regularly publishes short documentaries and is publicly sponsored, claims that a significant part of the German incel scene consists of men with immigration backgrounds – an apparent paradox.[8] Clarke argues that social isolation is a major component pulling individuals into the incel scene. Furthermore, various ideologies can simultaneously impact an individual.[9]

The short documentary also showcases the admiration some incels have for Elliot Rodger. In some spaces, he is perceived as an idol for everyone, and members encourage each other to do the same.[10] My source appears to be behaving contrarily, claiming that most people view individuals like Rodger negatively and rightfully highlights that one person committing an attack does not represent an entire community.[11] Despite the two of us disagreeing on many points, that is absolutely true. Hence, it is essential to mention that most forums I have personally seen had negative world views and were somewhat aggressive but did not necessarily threaten violence. People agreed to answer my questions, despite knowing that I am female and would be critical but as fair as possible about the incel community. For this, I give my source a lot of credit.

Yet, the ideology “inceldom” is very open to suggestion and interpretation, connecting to other, more violent corners in the internet, specifically right-wing ones, Jacob Ware, a research associate at the Council of Foreign Relations, explains that the main motivator for many incels is the conviction that they are not at fault for their circumstances. “They believe that there is something biologically wrong with women.” They blame feminism and modern society for their unfulfilled desires. That partly explains why incels usually do not accept femcels; in their minds, it is impossible for women to remain in forced celibacy. Additionally, femcels have not been as focused on in the media spotlight since they are not linked to public attacks in the same way male incels are. Hence, it could be said that femcels have not been perceived as threats by the public thus far.[12]

Yet, according to Renske van der Veer, neglecting femcels as potential perpetrators could be a mistake. She argues in a recent International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT) publication that although femcel groups appear to be less aggressive than their male counterparts, many of them subscribe to the same basic belief system and are just as radicalized as incels. Their growing agency within inceldom would allow them to emphasize anger or aggression against attractive people.[13] Despite their potential, femcels were not linked to so-called stochastic terrorism. Dr. Debbe Ging uses this terminology to explain the type of attacks committed by male incels in a recent podcast episode from Tech against Terrorism. She argues that the next attack can be predicted in type and modus operandi but not on an individual level. Ging also points out that many attackers are “impacted by partner violence,” creating “continuity” between those events and “public violence.”[14]

As Ware notes: “We know who the next attacker is going to be: He will most likely be male, of a certain age, and use an everyday object like a car or a knife to perpetrate the act,”, further describing stochastic terrorism and underscoring why he thinks that incels should be included in counter-terrorism efforts.[15] According to him, they do fulfil many of the above-mentioned criteria, describing the effects radicalizing materials can have on vulnerable or lonely people who are a product of our society. His idea of preventing radicalization is employing some sort of filter so the vulnerable groups would not be exposed to said content. For this, Ware recommends building cooperation between the public and private sectors. Thus, the scope of counter-terrorism approaches ought to be extended to include incel communities.[16]

Clarke argues similarly, believing that monitoring forums is of great importance despite the country-dependent legal frameworks. “I absolutely think it is critical to monitor this ideology, especially as it intersects and overlaps with other forms of violent extremism, acting as an accelerant to push individuals to move from behind the keyboard and toward action.”[17]

A British counter-terrorism practitioner who was interviewed for this article advocates for a different approach. He identified various perpetrators who showed signs of being dangerous well before committing attacks. Most notably, the case of the German Wings Pilot Andreas Lubitz exemplifies how poor communication can backfire. The pilot was diagnosed with severe mental disorders by two different psychiatrists, yet his employer was not informed and continued to let Lubitz fly. On March 25, 2015, he was the co-pilot on an Airbus flight from France to Germany that crashed in the Alps. All 148 passengers and crew died. An investigation unearthed that Lubitz single-handedly activated the plane’s descent, leading to its collision with a mountain.[18]

Some researchers, such as Renske van der Veer, and practitioners interviewed suggest that many incels suffer from mental health issues. Allowing healthcare professionals to report potentially dangerous patients is an option, but doctors are wary because it violates the Hippocratic Oath of the profession or the moral compass of other people in similar positions, such as priests.

In conclusion, how to address the seemingly growing threat from the incel scene or other online sub-cultures is highly complex, specifically because, from what we know, only a small number of incels become a terrorist threat. Yet, a dive into the scene allows us to exemplify the rise of self-regulating internet subcultures that provide gateways to more violent and radicalized scenes, particularly White supremacy and right extremist circles. However, the ultimate goal should be preventing vulnerable members of society seeking out those extremist internet spaces and forums in the first place.

Footnotes
[1] Der Spiegel, “Hanau Anschlag,” https://www.spiegel.de/psychologie/hanau-anschlag-wie-es-der-mutter-eines-toten-fuenf-monate-spaeter-geht-a-ba5d2762-8b44-49c8-a72a-957f1823c715
[2] International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, “Male supremacy and the Hanau attack between online misogyny and far-right violence,” http://icct.nl/publication/male-supremacism-and-the-hanau-terrorist-attack-between-online-misogyny-and-far-right-violence/
[3] E-mail exchange with anonymous incel source
[4] ibid.
[5] Tech against Terrorism Podcast “7.Incels, misogyny and gender-based terrorism,” published on October 2, 2020, https://www.techagainstterrorism.fm/incels-online-misogyny-and-gender-based-terrorism/
[6] E-mail exchange with Colin Clarke
[7] The Soufan Center, https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-women-in-white-supremacist-online-ecosystems/
[8] Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArKsF6nbMHA
[9] E-mail exchange with Colin Clarke
[10] Youtube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ArKsF6nbMHA
[11] E-mail exchange with anonymous incel source
[12] Interview with Jacob Ware, September 3, 2020
[13] International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, https://icct.nl/publication/analysing-personal-accounts-of-perpetrators-of-incel-violence-what-do-they-want-and-who-do-they-target/
[14] Tech against Terrorism Podcast “7.Incels, misogyny and gender-based terrorism” published on October 2, 2020, https://www.techagainstterrorism.fm/incels-online-misogyny-and-gender-based-terrorism/
[15] Interview with Jacob Ware, September 3, 2020
[16] ibid.
[17] E-mail exchange with Colin Clarke
[18] E-mail exchange with anonymous counter-terrorism source

By Madison Beltz

COVID-19 has had a considerable impact on every economy in the world, but for many women in Latin America, personal security has been the price.

The Latin American and Caribbean regions have the highest levels of income inequality in the world, with wide gaps in living standards across regions, countries, and socioeconomic spheres. However, combined with pervasive gender inequality throughout Latin America, finding an adequate response to COVID-19 while still providing protections for women’s safety has been complicated.

By and large, women in Latin America are more at risk than men of losing their jobs and not returning to work due to the coronavirus crisis. Nahla Valji, senior gender adviser at the United Nations, commented on the pandemic’s effect, saying, “Historically, economic crises have hit industries that are male-dominated like manufacturing, agriculture, mining, but this time it’s the inverse.” With massive job losses as the pandemic rages through Latin America, the low-paid and informal sectors dominated by women (such as in retail, restaurants, and hotels) are those hardest hit by weeks of lockdowns and stay-at-home orders. In the Caribbean, where many economies depend heavily on tourism, some countries will see half of the working population lose their jobs. In Bolivia, Guatemala, and Peru, eight out of 10 women hold informal jobs where the threat of unemployment is most severe. Because women are employed in already precarious sectors, they are more likely to lose their access to any income and will be less protected by social welfare systems, such as unemployment insurance.

Women, even without a crisis, are the primary caregivers of the sick, elderly, and children. This workload has been exacerbated by the COVID-19 crisis with an increasingly sick population and limited access to childcare. This increased workload disproportionately forces women out of the formal workforce. Furthermore, when women lose or leave their jobs, they lose their financial independence and, in turn, can become dependent on a violent partner. During times of crisis – such as natural disasters, wars, or pandemics – the risk of gender-based violence escalates.

This has proven to be true during the COVID-19 disaster as well. In Argentina alone, data from Observatorio Ahora Que Si Nos Ven reported 49 femicides from March 20 to May 10, 2020, averaging about one woman killed every 24 hours. In El Salvador, the Human Rights Attorney’s Office reported nine femicides in the first month of the lockdown. In Mexico, as of April 13, 2020, more women had been murdered (367) than had died due to COVID-19 (100) since the country’s first confirmed coronavirus case on February 28.

With such troubling figures, either change or chaos is imminent. In an unprecedented age of uncertainty and upheaval, it is meaningful to look to UNSCR 1325 and the broader Women, Peace and Security agenda (WPS) as the architecture for addressing such a crisis. The resolution, which addresses how women and girls are differentially impacted by crises, while also recognizing the critical role women can and do play in peace building and reconstruction, is instructive in several ways. Governments must provide measures that do not leave women behind and that include women in the decision-making process. Creating substantive plans to combat the disproportionate effect of crises on women is a necessity, but as the WPS agenda intimates, their inclusion in the process is essential. However, Latin American governments are not the only mediums for initiating change.

In recognizing this differential impact of the pandemic on women and girls, the potential of the private sector to invest in its female workforce is key. Commercial banks can play an important role in women’s business establishment and generally provide resources and voice to women’s economic participation. Moreover, companies’ insistence in investing in its female workforce equitably will spell change for both women and enterprises as an entire demographic is given access to the broader economy.  However, according to Valji, even more pertinent is the existence of women in positions of leadership “to ensure that solutions are informed by a diversity of views and experiences. … If not, we can deepen inequalities.”

Consequently, Latin America has become alight with feminist movements in wake of the increased level of femicides and sexual violence. Mumalá in Argentina has launched a campaign for a declaration of national emergency for women. In Mexico, more than six million women staged a protest in early March 2020 to emphasize their place in the economy, society, and to decry rising femicides. Says Tarah Demant of Amnesty International’s Gender, Sexuality, and Identity Program, “They know the solutions they need; now it’s up to the government to start listening.” In order to find stability in these nations, women must have a seat at the table in drafting legislation that targets the economic and security shortcomings increasingly exacerbated by the pandemic.

By: Dr. Eleanor Gordon, Ciara McHugh, Jane Townsley

Building Inclusive and Responsive Security Sector Institutions

Given that effective security and justice sector institutions are fundamental to sustainable peace, Security Sector Reform (SSR) – the reform or (re)construction of security and justice sector institutions – remains central to peacebuilding endeavors. A central principle of SSR is that security and justice sector institutions be both responsive and representative if they are to be effective and instill public confidence and trust. Gender-responsive SSR aims to develop institutions that address the security needs of women and men as well as people of diverse gender identities, with the aim of more equal representation of them. Despite policy guidance recognizing the need for more gender-responsive SSR, in practice women and their security needs continue to be marginalized in SSR efforts and security institutions.

When Risk Can Justify Inaction

This gap between policy and practice is often the result of arguments that unwelcome risks would arise from promoting a gender-responsive approach to SSR. These risks can legitimize inaction. They include risks to individuals, security sector institutions, and peacebuilding efforts and encompass security, programmatic, fiduciary, and reputational risks. They form three broad categories:

• Physical harm: if the principle of gender equality is not valued within society, efforts to recruit women to the security sector can expose these women to harm;
• Compromising operational effectiveness: arguments about risks to operational effectiveness in security institutions are based on assumptions that the skillset and aptitude of women can disrupt male bonding processes and institutional capacity;
• Destabilizing power relations: in societies lacking a commitment to gender equality, efforts to promote gender equality can result in accusations of challenging traditional patriarchal power relations, which can lead to backlashes against women’s increased empowerment.

These risks also result in complementary risks to the SSR program and, in consequence, to any implementing organization or donor, which are often very concerned to avoid reputational and fiduciary risks. This cycle further inhibits efforts to promote gender-responsive SSR. As OECD (2016, 15) has stated, institutional desires to avoid such risks “are a major barrier in scaling up and delivering more effective and transformative programs in fragile, at-risk and crisis-affected contexts.”

Risks and Tokenism

These arguments about risk tend to focus on recruitment of women to security sector institutions rather than on activities involved in building a comprehensive gender-responsive SSR. This is in part because gender-responsive SSR is often reduced to recruitment of women in security sector institutions and tokenism, ignoring that comprehensive gender-responsive SSR moves far beyond tokenistic recruitment of women and can help avoid some of the risks which often justify inaction. Comprehensive gender-responsive SSR includes:

• promoting meaningful and influential representation of women, men, and people of diverse gender identities;
• attending to institutional, structural, and cultural barriers to women’s recruitment, retention, and promotion;
• ensuring security sector institutions are responsive to the security needs of women, men, and people of diverse gender identities;
• taking into account the gender implications of security policies, procedures, and practices;
• attending to gender bias within security sector institutions and the way in which gender norms and expectations might cause harm.

Risk Analysis and Risk Management

These arguments about risk also tend to lead to inaction without undertaking a comprehensive risk analysis to determine the likelihood and magnitude of the potential risks, how risks can be mitigated and managed, and what risks may result from inaction. Given that risk avoidance can undermine program effectiveness, a comprehensive risk analysis would reveal how gender-responsiveness can increase operational effectiveness.

The Political Act of Risk Selection and Risk Aversion

Where an evaluation of risks leads actors to avoid taking action, it is necessary to ask who decides what constitutes a risk and which risks are worth taking.  It is necessary to recognize that these decisions are normative and political and tend to reflect and reinforce cultural norms and dominant power relations, including gendered power relations. Risks that arise as a result of hegemonic masculinities are therefore more likely to be regarded as acceptable or unavoidable (armed conflict, for instance), while those risks which appear to counter masculine norms are more likely to generate concern (e.g. those associated with advancing the principle of gender equality). This is especially the case among those individuals who may benefit from or align themselves with the traditional values enshrined within the patriarchal social order.

Institutions reflect and reproduce gender power relations and gendered inequalities. This is especially the case with security sector institutions that often serve to protect and promote hegemonic masculine norms. This understanding helps explain the gap between gender-responsive SSR policy and practice and the tendency for language of risk to trump the language of inclusion and equality. It further helps explain how informal rules, norms, and practices – such as gendered assumptions about the vulnerability of women and their capabilities, the appropriateness of women’s place and behavior, and normative assumptions about risk – can undermine formal rules regarding gender equality, responsiveness, and inclusion. Assumptions about risk are clearly informed by a “gendered logic of appropriateness” (see Chappell 2014 and other feminist institutionalist scholars). Risk taking and risk aversion are structured by informal rules that both reflect and reinforce gender power relations, thereby sustaining and justifying gender inequalities.

Missed Transformational Opportunities

When arguments about risk justify inaction on gender-responsiveness, opportunities are missed to advance a more effective, responsive, and accountable security sector that promotes the transformational change that can lead to sustainable and equitable peace. Comprehensive gender-responsive SSR has the potential to consolidate efforts to build a sustainable peace. This peace emerges through the renegotiation of gendered power relations and the distribution of resources, including access to security, justice, and power. Moreover, the long-term risks to gender equality, women’s security, and broader societal stability that arise from failing to enact a gender-responsive approach to SSR outweigh the risks of implementation. Unfortunately, the dominant patriarchal focus on preventing a recurrence of conflict in peacebuilding lends itself to focusing on the short-term and immediate risks, rather than longer term risks.

Conclusion

Women’s marginalization from SSR and security sector institutions occurs despite policy and a professed commitment to the principle of gender equality. This paradox of women’s continued marginalization stems from an attachment to gendered norms, which situate the woman as in need of protection but without the requisite security expertise to determine how best to respond to that need. A woman’s agency is consequently surrendered to others who often agree that women (notably early recruits in the security sector) should be marginalized from the security sector for their own good, as well as for the benefit of the institutions themselves (protecting their operational effectiveness) and wider society (protecting peacebuilding processes from unnecessary destabilization). It can be seen, therefore, that informal rules, practices and norms, imbued with gender biases, undermine efforts to promote gender-responsive SSR, even where formal rules and expectations exist. These informal rules, practices, and norms are especially likely to dilute or subvert reform efforts which challenge the gendered status quo (see Mackay and Murtagh 2019). Consequently, comprehensive gender-responsive SSR, which has the potential to lead to transformational change and avoid some of the practical risks discussed, is more likely to be framed as risky and potentially destabilizing as it is more likely to disrupt the gendered status quo. The language of “risk”, “stability,” and “appropriateness” is central to this process of undermining reform processes and to the continued marginalization of women within and through SSR programs.

For the full article, see: Gordon, E., McHugh, C. and Townsley, J. (2020) ‘Gender-Responsive Security Sector Reform and Transformational Opportunities’, Global Security Studies. https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogaa028.

By Maeve Murphy

In May 2020 I met with Dr. Yolande Bouka, an Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Studies at Queen’s University in Canada, to discuss several issues regarding academia and race, the relationship between white supremacy and IR, and her solutions for creating a more egalitarian, holistic discipline. As a scholar-practitioner, her research and teaching focus on gender, African politics and security, political violence, and field research ethics in conflict-affected societies. I was a student in Dr. Bouka’s course “Security Challenges in Africa” in Spring 2019.  Dr. Bouka was the first of my professors to integrate into coursework scholars from diverse backgrounds, including Black, indigenous and people of color (BIPOC), from the countries we were focusing on in class.

Dr. Bouka and I began our discussion with what she called the “genealogy of International Relations (IR) scholarship.” She told me that in order to understand what IR is as a scholarly discipline, we must critically explore its origins. The year 1918 was a pivotal juncture for the discipline, with the founding of an international studies department at a university in the United Kingdom, “in memory of the fallen students of our University for the study of those related problems of law and politics, of ethics and economics, which are raised by the prospect of a League of Nations and for the truer understanding of civilisation other than our own.”^[1] This set the stage for IR to be constructed from a European perspective, which after World War II became the established mainstream view. As Dr. Bouka put it, this post-war, winning side perspective is not “value neutral.”

Today, when introduced to the discipline of IR, students are required to read works written by scholars who most often are white men from a Western background. The list is long:  Thomas Hobbes, Carl von Clausewitz, Karl Marx, and more recently Hans Morgenthau, Jack Snyder, Joseph Nye, Robert Jervis, Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer… and the list goes on. Dr. Bouka noted that many introductory syllabi may take a week or so to introduce some “critical perspectives” with the works of feminist scholars like Cynthia Enloe, or postcolonial critics like Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey^[2], but the majority of scholars we memorize are from the same white men of the West. While these scholars are important to include to understand the intellectual traditions that shaped the discipline, they have approached these issues from a singular perspective. It could be argued that without a commitment to mainstreaming more diverse voices and juxtaposing perspectives, IR cannot be considered truly “international.”

In the aftermath of World War II, the discipline became dominated by American scholars who were overwhelmingly white men. Dr. Bouka pointed to the book, White World Order, Black Power Politics, in which author Robert Vitalis explores the history of IR as an American discipline.  He shows how the discipline had very few Black scholars who only existed in an academic sphere parallel to the white scholars who dominated the canon. American development of the field of IR allowed for the white supremacy embedded in America to bleed into academica. The canon of IR scholarship emphasizes Eurocentric^[3] ideas of rationality, state formation and sovereignty but only to the extent that it serves a Eurocentric audience. Dr. Bouka argued that the Eurocentric perception of concepts such as rationality or alliance, among others, establishes a “paternalistic framing of international relations and international affairs.” This framing “claims that sovereignty is a right of all states…But the reality is that some states are more ‘sovereign’ than others.” Dr. Bouka reminds us that this is the reason why it is difficult to imagine the international community considering the deployment of peacekeeping missions in North American or Western European countries, regardless of how unstable things could get, and why, despite escalating political violence at the hand of security forces against American citizens, there will never be international intervention in American domestic issues.

The Eurocentric, paternalistic^[4] framing of IR legitimizes the power of organizations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and allows them to impose their will upon countries that are ranked by Eurocentric standards, without the consistent inclusion of other voices or perspectives. While much of this work may be well-intentioned or even necessary, it is important to interrogate the intended audience and outcome of work, including development and peacekeeping. The unequal power balance between the “Western World/the Global North” and the “Global South” perpetuates the “othering” of non-white bodies, cultures, societies, and states. It also allows for non-white voices to be excluded from IR discourse, both academically and in policy. Dr. Bouka referenced the works of W. E. B. DuBois, who called this the “color-line”—racial segregation that established a hierarchy of race so implicit in American values that is in inextricable from them.^[5]  Dr. Bouka noted that while many actions to enforce this color-line domestically and internationally were overt, it is often more insidiously implied in treaties and agreements, policies and laws that, due to their covertly racist nature, are harder to recognize by the white dominated world of academia. Even with the best intentions, it can be very difficult to interrogate our norms because they are so normalized.

In terms of solutions, Dr. Bouka told me that throughout her career she has actively sought the viewpoints and perspectives of a more diverse group of scholars. She noticed that IR students and academics have “been disciplined into this field to think that nothing else exists.” Dr. Bouka observed that: “the reality of IR, the reality of the connections between states, the connections between groups of people within states, the rivalry and the cooperation of social movements… is rarely captured by what we learn in North American, Western European textbooks…We do ourselves and the world a disservice when we base our analysis and our frameworks on theories that are very limited in scope.” According to Dr. Bouka, within the study and practice of IR in her regional area of focus, Africa, academics are socialized to believe “that African political entities were always dysfunctional, which is not true.^[6] This perception, she noted, has impacted “how the U.S. and the U.K. engage with African partners or Asian partners or even Latin American partners, in terms of development and in terms of security. The origins of the discipline continue to impact how we see the world and how we engage in policy in the 21st century.”

For Dr. Bouka, her goal as a scholar and her call to others is to examine different vantage points. IR scholars must be willing to ask critical questions to unsettle what “just is.” To say “it has always been this way” is not a valid reason to maintain a norm. We must ask ourselves, “how else could it be if we open our minds and our perspectives to what is really out there?” One difficulty here, she noted, is that the individualistic nature of many fields in social sciences encourages people to strive for their own recognition alone. The field of IR claims to serve an international audience, but in reality it only reflects a small portion of that audience. White scholars may be uncomfortable with diverting attention from themselves, but with access to positions and platforms with power and reach, it is their duty to elevate the work and voices of BIPOC scholars.

In the past several decades, this understanding that change within the study of international relations is essential, has prevailed, carrying with it buzzwords like “diversity,” “inclusion,” “decolonization of curricula” and “intersectionality.” This is relevant not only to the contributions of academic scholars but to the institutions of higher learning that house them. Universities in Western countries have elected deans and added staff in the name of diversification, but because our field has not changed dramatically we are forced to question our commitment to change. Black, indigenous, and people of color (BIPOC)^[7] face heightened expectations and other obstacles in academia that are not present for white scholars. Actively engaging with intersectionality^[8] is a crucial element of enacting this change, but we must interrogate how we operationalize it in academia and in our policy communities.

The conclusion is inescapable: IR is enriched by more diverse voices and perspectives. Dr. Bouka said:  “I do believe that engaging with scholars who are notoriously underrepresented makes our discipline richer. I think doing that means we are not holding space only for these groups, but… [incorporating them] among those people who are established [and in] very powerful institutions or in powerful countries. We need to be willing to step down and allow other people to be more visible. We need to be willing to cite their work.”  She added that we must “have conversations between underrepresented scholarship and scholarship that we consider canon. And if you really want to be revolutionary (this is where it gets a little bit scary for some people), it’s throwing some of the stuff out. That would be beneficial for the discipline, but also how we understand world politics.”  Academia, including the field of international relations (IR), is in need of profound change. For a field that theorizes about international actors, the classic IR canon and theories we rely on are overwhelmingly white and male, shockingly antiquated and devoid of diversity. It is our responsibility as scholars and practitioners to question and search beyond what is given to us.

Further reading:

• The intersectionality wars: When Kimberlé Crenshaw coined the term 30 years ago, it was a relatively obscure legal concept. Then it went viral. By Jane Coaston, Vox.
• White Privilege: Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack by Peggy McIntosh.
• Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics by Kimberle Crenshaw.
• “Wakanda, Afrofuturism, and Decolonizing International Relations Scholarship” by Yolande Bouka.
• The Case for Black With a Capital B by Lori L. Tharps, New York Times.
• White World Order, Black Power Politics by Robert Vitalis.
• Twitter trend #BlackInTheIvory
• Academics: it’s time to get behind decolonising the curriculum by James Muldoon, the Guardian.

^[1] Aberystwyth University History

^[2] note: all from Western countries and universities

^[3] Merriam-Webster: reflecting a tendency to interpret the world in terms of European or Anglo-American values and experiences

^[4] Further reading: Academics: it’s time to get behind decolonising the curriculum

^[5] Othering & Belonging: The Endurance of the Color Line

^[6] The Guardian: Story of cities #5: Benin City, the mighty medieval capital now lost without trace

^[7] New York Times: BIPOC background and meaning

^[8] See: further reading at the end of the blog

By Susan McLoughlin and Rachel Sedehi

Under the Trump administration, equal rights to health care are diminishing. Two recent Supreme Court decisions show why this is not surprising.

The 2012 Affordable Care Act (ACA) mandates that all employers provide birth control coverage for their workers.^[1] Previously, only faith-based organizations were eligible to be excused from this. In order to receive a religious exemption, they would have to undergo a comprehensive evaluation with a strict set of standards. If they qualified for a religious exemption, these employers were still obligated to accommodate their employees by finding birth control coverage through a third-party provider. However, on July 8, 2020, the Supreme Court upheld the Trump administration’s regulations to expand the list of those eligible for exemption beyond religious employers. Now, any company that feels providing birth control violates their moral code can be considered for exemption. The evaluation’s standards have also been broadened so that more exemptions can be granted than ever before. Those excused from the ACA mandate no longer need to find alternative sources of coverage for their employees. Essentially, previous ACA regulations allowed some religious employers to say “I am personally not comfortable with giving you this, but I can find someone who is,” but now nearly anyone can say that “I don’t want you to have this at all.”

John Bursch, a lawyer with a Christian-based legal advocacy group, the Alliance Defending Freedom, celebrated the decision, saying that “[t]he government has no business forcing pro-life and religious organizations to provide drugs and devices that can destroy life.” ^[2] In this statement, Bursch’s concerns relate only to abortion, but abortion is not birth control; it is a measure taken after fertilization.^[3]  Birth control prevents conception, limiting the number of abortions that Bursch and other pro-lifers are so concerned about. However, the court’s ruling adds yet another pro-religion case to a recent wave of other Trump court cases and laws that are religiously motivated.

The latest threat to health care for all includes the Department of Health and Human Services’ new rule that lifts nondiscrimination protections for LGBTQ+ people.^[4] The language of the rule specifically targets the definition of “sex,” essentially eliminating transgender people’s right to healthcare. The Trump administration originally proposed these changes in the “Conscience” Rule in late 2019, declaring that doctors have the individual right to reject health care services for any patient who they could not “consciously” serve.^[5] The rule was struck down by a U.S. District judge in late 2019 for including violations of federal law that were “numerous, fundamental, and far-reaching.” Despite the rightful dismissal of the Conscience Rule, the most current Supreme Court case on birth control began with the Little Sisters of the Poor’s fight for their “conscious rights.” The Little Sisters of the Poor is a non-profit Catholic organization run by nuns that provides the elderly poor with hospice care.^[6] The nuns feel that birth control coverage is a religious burden and want nothing to do with it.

The “Separation of Church and State” may no longer exist; in fact, they seem to have merged. 

In response to the Supreme Court’s verdict, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg wrote that “…the court casts totally aside countervailing rights and interests in its zeal to secure religious rights to the nth degree.”^[7] In other words, religion is not a valid reason to deny someone health care, and birth control is undeniably a part of health care. Religious women themselves take advantage of this form of health care. In a study done by the Center of Disease Control and Prevention, 87.5% of religious women reported using birth control – more specifically, 87.3% of Catholic women, 90.5% of women affiliated with Baptist and fundamentalist Protestant denominations, and 89.8% of women of other Protestant groups.^[8] Birth control is not uncommon; about 65% of the 72.2 million American women aged 15-49 are currently using contraception.^[9] However, not all of these women, religious or not, use birth control exclusively for pregnancy prevention. There are multiple health benefits to birth control methods like the pill. The pill can help to reduce bone thinning, prevent cysts in one’s breasts or ovaries, and minimize the negative aspects of one’s menstrual cycle, which can be debilitating for some women. It can also reduce the likelihood of more fatal problems, like serious infections of the reproductive organs, ectopic pregnancies, and prevent endometrial and ovarian cancers.^[10] If religious employers and others are morally offended by birth control, are they also not offended with ectopic pregnancies, bone thinning, and cancer?

No one should ever have to explain or justify why they need health care. Birth control is health care: it is not a matter of want, but a matter of need – and the Trump administration and the conservative Supreme Court have allowed employers to undermine, deny, and personally define the rights of their workers. Those who do not condone the use of birth control often do not support legalized abortion, either. If employers’ greatest concern is “destroying life,” then they should consider that more than 90% of abortions take place due to unintended pregnancies. A 2012 study at Washington University showed that providing birth control coverage to women cuts abortion rates by 62-78% compared to the national rate.^[11] If religious employers and organizations morally offended by birth control truly wanted to be proactive about denying reproductive rights, then providing birth control to their employees is actually the “conscience” thing to do.

The reality is that this decision, which gives employers the choice to opt out of accommodations that were formerly mandated under the ACA, will disproportionately affect economically disadvantaged populations. Let’s break down the demographics: 

Each year, about 50% of all pregnancies in the U.S. are not planned, and half of these pregnancies are a result of women not using contraception.^[12] In 2017, the CDC announced that teen pregnancy in the U.S. was at a historic low, and this was in part due to the fact that sexually active teens had more access to birth control than in previous years.^[13] In addition, a report conducted by the Guttmacher Institute found that granting legal access to birth control to people aged 17-18 correlates to more women attending post-secondary education and being employed as well as an increase in earning power.^[14] Thus, granting young people legal access to affordable birth control has a multitude of positive impacts. We also know that young adult women, who are most at risk to experience unintended pregnancies, are also more at risk to experience poverty.^[15] In 2018, the poverty rate in women aged 35-44 was 12.97%, yet this rate dramatically increased to 23.1% in younger women aged 18-24.^[16] Additionally, a poll conducted in 2010, before the ACA’s birth control provision was in effect, showed that 55% of women voters aged 18-34, as compared to 34% of women voters of all ages, struggled to afford birth control.^[17]

The statistics change even more drastically when looking at rates of poverty between white, non-Hispanic women, and women of color in America. According to data from the 2016 U.S. Census Bureau, 9.7% of white, non-Hispanic women live in poverty. In stark contrast, 22.8% of Native women, 21.4% of Black women, 18.7% of Latina women, and 10.7% of Asian women live in poverty.^[18] It is also important to consider that there are people other than cisgender women who use birth control, including transgender men and non-binary folks. We know that the LGBTQIA+ community, particularly transgender people of color, experience poverty at higher rates than non LGBTQIA+ people.^[19]

Populations that are already at a higher risk for unintended pregnancies means they are struggling to access birth control even under the regulations of the ACA. Yes, the risk of unintended pregnancy is highest among young adult women, but more specifically, these rates are highest among low-income women and women of color.^[20] The unintended pregnancy rate for non-Hispanic black women in 2011 was more than double when compared to non-Hispanic white women.^[21] In addition, Latinx teen pregnancy rates are more than 1.5 times higher than the national average.^[22] Taking a closer look at who can afford birth control, a national survey conducted in 2017 showed that only 39% of Black women aged 18-44 could afford birth control that was $10 or less.^[23] It is clear which populations are going to suffer the consequences of this rollback of accessible/affordable birth control, but what happens if these populations’ employers decide not to cover their birth control and opt out of accommodations? Will these statistics continue to rise so drastically?

The Trump administration’s rollback of sexual/reproductive healthcare, women’s, and LGBTQIA+ rights is not new. Here are other harmful policies that have been implemented thus far:

One of the first things Trump did when taking office was to not only reinstate but to expand the restrictions of the Global Gag Rule. This rule bans international organizations from receiving U.S. funding if they “refer, provide, or even mention abortion or abortion related services,” meaning that Trump asserted power over our bodies here in the U.S., and internationally.^[24] In 2019, the Title X Gag Rule was implemented, which essentially accomplishes the same thing as the Global Gag Rule but bans these types of grants within the U.S. Because of this domestic gag rule, it is estimated that 981 clinics in the U.S. that provided patients with services such as low-cost birth control, breast and cervical cancer screenings, and STD testing, no longer receive Title X funding.^[25]

The Trump administration has also taken an outlandishly hard stance regarding language used within UN documents. In April 2019, U.S. officials threatened the use of their veto power in the UN Security Council in order to remove language such as “sexual and reproductive health” and “gender” from a resolution.^[26] This specific resolution, which targeted the use of sexual violence as a weapon of war, was only passed after such language was removed. In a clear attempt to dismantle official recognition of transgender people, the administration argued that the term “gender” should be replaced with “women and girls” in all UN documents.^[27] They also claim that terms such as “sexual and reproductive health” are too closely related to abortion services, which they have taken a very strong position against.^[28]

Most recently, the U.S. Department of Education’s new Title IX rules are yet another example of the current administration rollback of women’s rights as well as access to reproductive/sexual healthcare. Title IX was created in 1972 and made it illegal for federally funded educational institutions to discriminate against their students or employees on the basis of sex.^[29] Today, we commonly hear about Title IX on college campuses and how it is used to protect students after incidences of sexual harassment or assault. Yet, these new Title IX rules, created by U.S. Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos, essentially weaken such protections in an explicitly stated attempt to reduce the number of sexual harassment/assault investigations in schools.^[30] Some examples of these rules include requiring schools to dismiss cases of sexual harassment/assault that occur in study abroad programs or outside of a school sanctioned programs as well as allowing schools to use re-traumatizing procedures during an investigations such as a live cross-examinations and presuming the harassment/assault never occurred.^[31] In addition, these new rules expand religious exemptions and allow for institutions who believe they have such exemptions to discriminate based on sex without informing the Department of Education or their students.^[32] This will be extremely harmful to students who currently access or are attempting to access birth control or abortion services on campus.

What can we do to continue this fight for sexual/reproductive healthcare, women’s, and LGBTQIA+ rights?

If there is one piece of information you should gain from this article, it is that our Supreme Court justices make landmark decisions about every aspect of our lives – but don’t let that make you feel your livelihood is completely out of your hands. Instead, you should recognize how vital it is, now more than ever before, to vote in the upcoming election. Currently, there are five conservative Supreme Court justices and four liberal justices, at least one of whom will most likely retire very soon. Another four years of the Trump administration means more conservative justices and more rollbacks of sexual/reproductive healthcare, women’s, and LGBTQIA+ rights. Election day is November 3rd, and if you are mailing in your ballot you need to do so by October 20th. So please, if you can, go out and vote – this is your chance to make a real difference. And remember, no matter who you are and no matter what reason you use it, access to affordable birth control is a human right.

References

^[1] Radhakrishnan, Swapna Reddy Nina Patel Priya. “ACA’s Birth Control Mandate At The US Supreme Court: What’s At Stake?” Health Affairs, May 4, 2020. https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200430.180292/full/.

^[2] Liptak, Adam. “Supreme Court Upholds Trump Administration Regulation Letting Employers Opt Out of Birth Control Coverage.” The New York Times. The New York Times, July 8, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/us/supreme-court-birth-control-obamacare.html.

^[3] “Birth Control and Abortion: Methods, Rates, and Research.” Pandia Health, April 24, 2020. https://www.pandiahealth.com/resources/birth-control-abortion/.

^[4] Simmons-Duffin, Selena. “Transgender Health Protections Reversed By Trump Administration.” NPR. NPR, June 12, 2020. https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/06/12/868073068/transgender-health-protections-reversed-by-trump-administration.

^[5] Simmons-Duffin, Selena, and Colin Dwyer. “Judge Scraps ‘Conscience’ Rule Protecting Doctors Who Deny Care For Religious Reasons.” NPR. NPR, November 6, 2019. https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/11/06/776765601/judge-scraps-conscience-rule-protecting-doctors-who-deny-care-for-religious-reas.

^[6] Hawley, Erin. “The Little Sisters of the Poor Should Finally Get Their Win.” The Hill, May 13, 2020. https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/497416-the-little-sisters-of-the-poor-should-finally-get-their-win.

^[7] Liptak, Adam. “Supreme Court Upholds Trump Administration Regulation Letting Employers Opt Out of Birth Control Coverage.” The New York Times. The New York Times, July 8, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/08/us/supreme-court-birth-control-obamacare.html.

^[8] Daniels K, Mosher WD, Jones J. Contraceptive methods women have ever used: United States,

1982–2010. National health statistics reports; no 62. Hyattsville, MD: National Center for

Health Statistics. 2013.

^[9] Davis, Kimberly, and Joyce C. Abma. “Products – Data Briefs – Number 327 – December 2018.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, February 14, 2019. https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/products/databriefs/db327.htm.

^[10] Planned Parenthood. “What Are the Benefits and Advantages of Birth Control Pills?” Accessed August 4, 2020. https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/birth-control/birth-control-pill/what-are-the-benefits-of-the-birth-control-pill.

^[11] Williams, Diana Duke. “Access to Free Birth Control Reduces Abortion Rates.” Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis. Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis, December 14, 2018. https://medicine.wustl.edu/news/access-to-free-birth-control-reduces-abortion-rates/.

^[12] Williams, Diana Duke. “Access to Free Birth Control Reduces Abortion Rates.” Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis. Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis, December 14, 2018. https://medicine.wustl.edu/news/access-to-free-birth-control-reduces-abortion-rates/.

^[13] “About Teen Pregnancy.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, March 1, 2019. https://www.cdc.gov/teenpregnancy/about/index.htm.

^[14] Sonfield A. et al., The Social and Economic Benefits of Women’s Ability to Determine Whether and When to Have Children, New York: Guttmacher Institute, 2013, .

^[15] Planned Parenthood. “Survey: Nearly Three in Four Voters in America Support Fully Covering Prescription Birth Control.” Accessed August 4, 2020. https://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/newsroom/press-releases/survey-nearly-three-four-voters-america-support-fully-covering-prescription-birth-control.

^[16] Duffin, Erin. “Poverty Rate in the U.S. by Age and Gender 2018.” Statista. Statista, October 17, 2019. https://www.statista.com/statistics/233154/us-poverty-rate-by-gender/.

^[17] Planned Parenthood. “Survey: Nearly Three in Four Voters in America Support Fully Covering Prescription Birth Control.” Accessed August 4, 2020. https://www.plannedparenthood.org/about-us/newsroom/press-releases/survey-nearly-three-four-voters-america-support-fully-covering-prescription-birth-control.

^[18] Patrick, Kayla. Issue Brief. National Snapshot: Poverty Among Women and Families, 2016. National Women’s Law Center, 2017. https://tgpdenver.org/file_download/inline/63c5d2d7-4d29-4c81-a2bf-27bb50d47513.

^[19] Planned Parenthood. “Who’s Impacted by Attacks on Birth Control.” Accessed August 4, 2020. https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/fight-for-birth-control/facts/whos-most-impacted-by-attacks-on-birth-control.

^[20] Rep. Unintended Pregnancy in the United States. Guttmacher Institute, January 2019. https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/fb-unintended-pregnancy-us.pdf.

^[21] Rep. Unintended Pregnancy in the United States. Guttmacher Institute, January 2019. https://www.guttmacher.org/sites/default/files/factsheet/fb-unintended-pregnancy-us.pdf.

^[22] Planned Parenthood. “Who’s Impacted by Attacks on Birth Control.” Accessed August 4, 2020. https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/fight-for-birth-control/facts/whos-most-impacted-by-attacks-on-birth-control.

^[23] “The Lives and Voices of Black America on the Intersections of Politics, Race, and Public Policy.” Publitas. Perry Undem Research/Communication, September 25, 2017. https://view.publitas.com/perryundem-research-communication/black-american-survey-report_final/page/1.

^[24] “Tracking Trump – Global Gag Rule.” Planned Parenthood Action Fund. Accessed August 4, 2020. https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/tracking-trump/policy/global-gag-rule.

^[25] “Tracking Trump – The Title X Gag Rule.” Planned Parenthood Action Fund. Accessed August 4, 2020. https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/tracking-trump/policy/title-x-gag-rule.

^[26] Doorley, Nina Besser. “Trump Administration Escalates War on Words at the UN.” International Women’s Health Coalition. International Women’s Health Coalition, April 30, 2019. https://iwhc.org/2019/04/trump-administration-escalates-war-words-un/.

^[27] Borger, Julian. “Trump Administration Wants to Remove ‘Gender’ from UN Human Rights Documents.” The Guardian, October 25, 2018. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/24/trump-administration-gender-transgender-united-nations.

^[28] Doorley, Nina Besser. “Trump Administration Escalates War on Words at the UN.” International Women’s Health Coalition, April 30, 2019. https://iwhc.org/2019/04/trump-administration-escalates-war-words-un/.

^[29] “History of Title IX.” Women’s Sports Foundation, August 13, 2019. https://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/advocacy/history-of-title-ix/.

^[30] “DeVos’s New Title IX Sexual Harassment Rule, Explained.” National Women’s Law Center, July 21, 2020. https://nwlc.org/resources/devos-new-title-ix-sexual-harassment-rule-explained/.

^[31] “DeVos’s New Title IX Sexual Harassment Rule, Explained.” National Women’s Law Center, July 21, 2020. https://nwlc.org/resources/devos-new-title-ix-sexual-harassment-rule-explained/.

^[32] “DeVos’s New Title IX Sexual Harassment Rule, Explained.” National Women’s Law Center, July 21, 2020. https://nwlc.org/resources/devos-new-title-ix-sexual-harassment-rule-explained/.

By Dr. Katelyn Jones, Women, Peace and Security Fellow, Chicago Council on Global Affairs & Nicole Mattea, Women, Peace and Security Intern, Chicago Council on Global Affairs

COVID-19 has sent most of the world into isolation, causing unemployment rates to skyrocket and the global economy to reach unprecedented lows. With over 9 million cases worldwide and no vaccine in sight, healthcare and scientific communities are working to develop Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies as a means of combatting coronavirus and preparing for future pandemics. China, where the outbreak first began, has been using AI and other burgeoning technologies—including thermal scanners and facial recognition software—to track and monitor the virus, search for and apply treatment, and distribute resources. The rest of the world, too, is rushing to develop and adopt new AI technologies as a pandemic response. Russia and Poland, like China, are using facial recognition to enforce quarantines, and international companies like Amazon are using AI to track employees’ social distancing.

While AI is undeniably a promising avenue to monitor disease spread, we know very little about the social and political consequences of using AI to address global public health issues. What we do know from past AI applications, however, is that AI often reinforces racial and gender biases, further excluding and disempowering already marginalized persons. We argue that it is important to investigate AI as a tool to respond to and prevent pandemics, but it is essential to do so with careful attention to how AI can harm less powerful individuals, especially women and people of color. To do so, researchers need to take a feminist approach when developing, analyzing, and applying AI.

Although AI may seem objective, it is subject to human biases. AI has a history of gender bias and racial exclusion, originating from unrepresentative datasets and research used to train AI systems. A study on facial recognition software reported that such programs have significantly higher rates of error for women with dark skin than they do for men with light skin. AI systems have also shown to be affected by and influenced by gender stereotyping, with over 67 percent of digital assistants—meant to serve and assist in tasks—presented as female. The individuals designing AI, as well as the data used to create AI algorithms , have biases that reinforce discriminatory tendencies when left unchecked.

AI’s biases are particularly stark in medical research. In one case, health service company Optum sold an algorithm that excluded more than half of black patients that would have otherwise been flagged at risk of medical care. In 2016, a computer model was created to identify melanoma via image. However, limitations soon revealed that over 95 percent of the 100,000 imagesthat had been used to  generate the model  depicted white skin, thereby problematically underrepresenting persons of color. Additionally, medical AI algorithms often omit gender. Many medical algorithms are based on U.S. military data, where in some cases women only account for six percent of those studied. The overwhelming evidence for AI’s gender and racial biases in medicine should be an immediate and pressing concern for researchers and computer scientists when it comes to the use of AI, not just COVID-19 but also for future pandemics.

Unfortunately, biases are not a frontline concern in some of the biggest pushes for AI development today. Consider C3.ai DTI, a consortium of six leading research universities, AI software provider C3.ai, and Microsoft. Launched in March 2020, C3.ai DTI aims to develop new AI technology as a means of addressing present and future pandemics. With over $300 million in contributions, they are calling for proposals on how AI can be used as a tool for prevention, understanding, and treatment for COVID-19. C3.ai DTI’s call for proposals, though, makes no mention of how researchers are expected to address AI’s potential exclusion of individuals’ identities or likelihood of reinforcing existing inequities. Despite the overwhelming evidence that AI is often discriminatory, current AI efforts to address pandemics do not actively work to address biases or mitigate negative consequences.

This failure to address identity is alarming given the ways that COVID-19 has already disproportionately and negatively affected marginalized persons, especially women and people of color. To ensure that AI mitigates pandemics’ health consequences, and to prevent AI from exacerbating extant gender and racial divides, new AI developments must ensure that the data used are representative of the entire population. Moreover, researchers must carefully examine the potential negative sociopolitical consequences of applying their technologies.

To avoid both biased technologies and worsening social inequities, AI researchers would do well to take a feminist approach. This involves steps beyond hiring more women, which is undoubtedly helpful, but also changing the way data are collected and AI is tested and applied. Data must be gender-disaggregated to enable decision-makers to act to address the needs of those at heightened risk of infection and mortality.  Further, researchers need to consider how multiple axes of identity intersect and shape an individual’s interaction with systems of oppression. For example, a woman of color’s experience with AI will be different than a white woman’s experience, and analyses must involve an intersectional perspective to capture these variations. Researchers must ask questions like: Where are women in this dataset? Where are the people of color? How are individuals already impacted by longstanding inequities going to be affected by these technologies?  How, for example, might facial recognition software affect individuals’ daily sense of (in)security?

If AI is created and applied without critical attention to its biases, existing inequities will be exacerbated, and women and people of color will suffer. We need a feminist approach to develop effective AI.