Women in Cybersecurity: Strengthening Global Security Policy and Governance

By WIIS Global Member Ayushi Chaudhary

Abstract

Cybersecurity has become a central pillar of global security, yet cyber governance remains structurally gender imbalanced. Women continue to comprise only about one-quarter of the global cybersecurity workforce despite an estimated global workforce shortage of nearly five million professionals (ISC2 2024). This underrepresentation creates a governance gap that limits institutional resilience, reduces analytical diversity, and weakens the ability of governments and organizations to respond effectively to increasingly sophisticated and interconnected cyber threats. Drawing on examples from the United States, the European Union, and women-led cybersecurity initiatives in developing regions, this policy brief demonstrates how greater inclusion in cybersecurity leadership strengthens risk management, improves cross-sector coordination, and enhances long-term resilience. It concludes with policy recommendations focused on institutional reform, workforce development, and expanding women’s participation in national and international cyber governance.

I. The Policy Problem: Gender Exclusion as a Cybersecurity Governance Gap

Cybersecurity has become a core pillar of international security architecture, directly shaping critical infrastructure protection, financial stability, democratic systems, and national defense operations. Despite this centrality, cybersecurity governance structures continue to operate with limited gender representation, creating a structural gap in decision-making capacity.

Current workforce data illustrates the extent of this imbalance. Women represent only approximately 24 percent of the global cybersecurity workforce, while organizations worldwide face an estimated shortage of nearly 4.8 million cybersecurity professionals (ISC2 2024). The World Economic Forum similarly identifies workforce shortages as one of the greatest challenges to strengthening global cyber resilience (World Economic Forum 2024). These figures suggest that exclusion is not driven by a lack of talent, but rather by structural barriers in education pathways, recruitment practices, promotion systems, and long-term professional retention.

This is not solely an equity concern; it is a governance constraint. Cyber threats increasingly operate across civilian, military, economic, and diplomatic domains simultaneously, requiring integrated policy responses that combine technical expertise with institutional, legal, and behavioral analysis. When leadership structures lack diversity, policy frameworks risk narrower threat perception, weaker anticipation of systemic spillover effects, and reduced adaptability during crises.

Recent cyber incidents demonstrate why this broader perspective matters. The 2021 Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack disrupted fuel supplies across the eastern United States and required coordinated responses from the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of Energy, state governments, and private infrastructure operators. Rather than representing a purely technical failure, the attack exposed vulnerabilities across energy security, supply chains, emergency management, and public confidence. Modern cyber threats therefore require governance structures capable of integrating multiple perspectives and coordinating across institutions.

As cyberattacks continue to evolve in sophistication, strengthening cybersecurity governance depends not only on technological innovation but also on building leadership teams capable of anticipating complex, interconnected risks. Expanding women’s participation in cybersecurity leadership should therefore be understood as strengthening institutional capacity rather than simply advancing workplace diversity.

II. Why Gender Diversity Strengthens Cybersecurity Governance

Research on organizational behavior, cybersecurity workforce development, and strategic decision-making consistently finds that diverse teams perform more effectively in complex, high-uncertainty environments. Cybersecurity is not purely technical; it is a socio-technical system involving infrastructure, human behavior, economic systems, legal institutions, diplomacy, and public trust. Protecting these interconnected systems requires leaders capable of integrating multiple perspectives into strategic decision-making.

Studies across both the public and private sectors demonstrate that diversity strengthens organizational performance by reducing groupthink, improving innovation, and expanding the range of risks considered during decision-making. McKinsey & Company’s Diversity Wins report found that organizations with greater gender diversity in executive leadership are more likely to outperform their industry peers financially, while research published in the Harvard Business Review concludes that cognitively diverse teams solve complex problems more effectively because they evaluate a broader range of alternatives and challenge existing assumptions (McKinsey & Company 2020; Reynolds and Lewis 2017). These findings are particularly relevant in cybersecurity, where anticipating emerging threats often depends upon questioning conventional assumptions before adversaries exploit new vulnerabilities.

Women in cybersecurity and security policy frequently contribute perspectives that emphasize cross-sector coordination, preventive risk identification, and long-term resilience planning. Although these approaches are not exclusive to women, expanding participation increases the diversity of experiences and analytical frameworks represented within leadership teams. This broader range of expertise is particularly valuable in cyber governance, where reactive strategies alone are insufficient against adaptive threat actors that continuously evolve tactics across jurisdictions, industries, and technologies.

Empirical evidence also suggests that diverse cybersecurity teams are better positioned to identify indirect and second-order consequences of cyber incidents, including disruptions to supply chains, financial ecosystems, public health systems, and public trust in democratic institutions (IBM Security 2020). The World Economic Forum similarly argues that strengthening cyber resilience requires sustained collaboration among governments, industry, academia, and civil society because cyber risks increasingly transcend organizational and national boundaries (World Economic Forum 2024). By incorporating a wider range of experiences and perspectives, diverse leadership teams improve strategic foresight and produce more comprehensive approaches to national cyber resilience.

Rather than viewing gender inclusion solely as a matter of representation, policymakers should recognize it as a strategic investment in institutional effectiveness. As cyber threats become more interconnected and complex, strengthening analytical diversity within cybersecurity leadership enhances governments’ ability to anticipate emerging risks, coordinate across sectors, and develop more resilient national and international cybersecurity strategies.

III. Women-Led Cybersecurity Leadership in Practice

United States Cybersecurity Governance

Anne Neuberger, Deputy National Security Advisor for Cyber and Emerging Technology, has played a central role in shaping U.S. cybersecurity strategy. Her work emphasizes systemic cyber defense, public-private coordination, and resilience across critical infrastructure sectors including energy, telecommunications, finance, and healthcare ((National Security Agency n.d.). This approach reflects a broader shift toward treating cybersecurity as an interconnected national ecosystem rather than isolated technical domains, requiring continuous coordination among federal agencies, industry partners, and international allies.

Cyberjustice and Digital Governance

Maya Wiley’s work highlights the intersection of technology policy, civil rights, and institutional accountability. Her research argues that cybersecurity vulnerabilities often reflect broader structural inequalities in access to technology, digital literacy, and public trust. By emphasizing transparency and equitable governance, Wiley demonstrates that cybersecurity policy must consider both technical resilience and democratic legitimacy (Leadership Conference Education Fund 2023). This perspective expands cybersecurity beyond technical defense into a broader challenge of governance and institutional resilience.

European Union Cyber Diplomacy Framework

The European Union’s Cyber Diplomacy Toolbox provides one of the world’s leading multilateral frameworks for responding to malicious cyber activity. The framework enables coordinated diplomatic responses, sanctions, cyber attribution, and international cooperation among EU member states while promoting collective resilience against cyber threats (Council of the European Union 2023). Complementing these efforts, the Women4Cyber Foundation, established by the European Cyber Security Organisation (ECSO), works to increase women’s participation in cybersecurity through professional development, mentoring, leadership programs, and policy engagement across Europe. Together, these initiatives demonstrate how strengthening workforce diversity can complement broader efforts to improve collective cyber resilience.

Cyber Capacity Building in Developing Contexts

Women-led cybersecurity initiatives are also expanding cyber resilience in developing regions. Nigeria’s CyberSafe Foundation, founded by cybersecurity advocate Confidence Staveley, promotes cybersecurity awareness, workforce development, and digital safety through initiatives such as the CyberGirls Fellowship, which trains young African women for careers in cybersecurity. Similarly, UN Women supports digital safety and cybersecurity initiatives that strengthen women’s participation in digital governance while improving community resilience against online threats (UN Women 2023). These programs connect national cybersecurity objectives with grassroots implementation, demonstrating that cyber resilience depends not only on state capacity but also on inclusive community engagement.

IV. Workforce Imbalance as a Structural Security Risk

Despite growing global demand, women remain significantly underrepresented in cybersecurity, comprising approximately one-quarter of the global workforce (ISC2 2024). This imbalance constitutes a structural vulnerability that limits the diversity of expertise available to governments, businesses, and international organizations confronting increasingly sophisticated cyber threats.

Key barriers include limited early exposure to cybersecurity careers, weak mentorship and sponsorship networks, underrepresentation in leadership positions, persistent institutional bias in hiring and promotion practices, and workplace cultures that contribute to higher rates of attrition. Together, these barriers create what researchers commonly describe as the “leaky pipeline,” a phenomenon in which women leave the cybersecurity profession at disproportionately higher rates throughout successive stages of education, hiring, promotion, and executive leadership. As a result, representation steadily declines despite growing numbers of women entering STEM education.

Addressing the leaky pipeline requires more than expanding recruitment. Organizations must also strengthen long-term retention through structured mentorship and sponsorship programs, leadership development opportunities, transparent promotion criteria, equitable compensation practices, flexible work arrangements, returnship programs for professionals re-entering the workforce, and inclusive workplace cultures that support career advancement.

Organizations such as Women in CyberSecurity (WiCyS) and Women In International Security (WIIS) have become important partners in addressing these structural barriers by providing mentorship, professional networking, leadership training, scholarships, conferences, and research dissemination opportunities for students and early-career professionals. These initiatives strengthen workforce development while expanding pathways into cybersecurity leadership.

V. Policy Recommendations

1. Institutionalize Gender Requirements in Cyber Governance Structures

Governments should move beyond voluntary diversity commitments by establishing measurable gender representation goals for cybersecurity agencies, national cyber task forces, advisory boards, and senior leadership positions. While quotas may not be appropriate across every institution, agencies should publish annual workforce diversity reports, establish leadership benchmarks, and publicly report progress toward those objectives. Transparency and accountability mechanisms encourage sustained institutional change while allowing governments to evaluate whether diversity initiatives improve workforce development, innovation, and organizational performance.

2. Build Structured Cyber Workforce Pipelines

Governments, universities, and private-sector organizations should develop long-term workforce pipelines that encourage women’s participation from secondary education through executive leadership. These efforts should include cybersecurity scholarships, STEM outreach programs, paid internships within national cyber agencies such as CISA and the NSA, apprenticeships with private industry, and structured mentorship connecting students with experienced professionals. Retention must receive equal attention. Institutions should implement sponsorship programs, leadership training, flexible career pathways, returnship opportunities, and transparent promotion systems that reduce attrition and encourage long-term career advancement. Strengthening both recruitment and retention will help address the cybersecurity workforce shortage while expanding institutional capacity.

3. Institutionalize Gender Inclusion in Multilateral Cyber Governance

International institutions, including NATO, United Nations cyber working groups, regional organizations, and multilateral cyber diplomacy initiatives, should formalize gender-balanced participation within technical advisory bodies, cyber exercises, and policy development processes. Inclusion should extend beyond representation to meaningful decision-making authority in cyber norms development, attribution standards, crisis response planning, and international cyber capacity-building initiatives. Diverse participation strengthens both the legitimacy and effectiveness of collective cybersecurity governance.

4. Expand Local Cyber Capacity-Building with Gender-Responsive Funding

International development agencies should establish sustained funding mechanisms supporting women-led cybersecurity initiatives in developing economies. Funding should prioritize organizations that combine technical cybersecurity training with digital literacy, fraud prevention, financial inclusion, and critical infrastructure protection. Multi-year funding commitments are essential to ensure continuity, institutional capacity, and measurable long-term impact rather than short-term pilot programs.

5. Expand Research Access and Policy Publication Pathways

Academic institutions, governments, think tanks, and professional organizations should expand opportunities for women researchers to contribute to cybersecurity policy development. This includes funded fellowships, editorial mentorship, competitive research grants, conference participation, and publication pathways through organizations such as WIIS and WiCyS. Broadening participation in cybersecurity research strengthens the diversity of policy analysis while ensuring that future debates benefit from a wider range of expertise and professional experience.

VI. Conclusion

Building more resilient cybersecurity institutions requires more than technological innovation. It also requires expanding the talent pipeline, removing structural barriers to leadership, and ensuring that women are fully represented in the institutions responsible for shaping cyber policy. By embedding inclusion within workforce development, governance structures, and international cooperation, governments can strengthen the effectiveness, resilience, and legitimacy of cybersecurity systems in an increasingly contested digital environment.

Evidence from national security agencies, multilateral organizations, industry, and women-led cybersecurity initiatives demonstrates that expanding women’s participation strengthens cybersecurity governance by improving strategic foresight, enhancing cross-sector coordination, and fostering more comprehensive approaches to risk management. As cyber threats become increasingly complex and interconnected, governments can no longer afford to view inclusion solely as a workforce or equity issue. It is a strategic investment in national and international security.

Building more resilient cybersecurity institutions therefore requires more than technological innovation. It also requires expanding the talent pipeline, removing structural barriers to leadership, and ensuring that women are fully represented in the institutions responsible for shaping cyber policy. By embedding inclusion within workforce development, governance structures, and international cooperation, policymakers can strengthen both the effectiveness and legitimacy of cybersecurity systems in an increasingly digital world.

About the Author

Ayushi Chaudhary is a senior at Temple University studying International Business and Economics through the Fox Honors Program. Her research focuses on international security, emerging technology, and U.S. alliances. She spent the 2025–2026 academic year in Tokyo as a Boren Scholar, studying Japanese language and culture while exploring U.S.–Japan relations. She previously worked with the U.S. Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration and was a 2026 Hertog Political Studies Fellow in Washington, D.C. Her published research has examined international cybersecurity cooperation, artificial intelligence, and other global policy challenges. After graduation, she hopes to pursue a career at the intersection of U.S. foreign and national security policy, particularly work involving U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific.

Published August 19th, 2026. The opinions expressed here are solely the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Women In International Security or its affiliates. 

References

  1.  Council of the European Union. 2023. Cyber Diplomacy. Brussels: Council of the European Union. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cyber-issues/cyber-diplomacy/ 
  2. IBM Security. 2020. Women in Cybersecurity: The Evolution of the Security Workforce. Armonk, NY: IBM Security. https://www.ibm.com/security
  3. ISC2. 2024. 2024 Cybersecurity Workforce Study. Alexandria, VA: ISC2. https://www.isc2.org/research/workforce-study
  4. Leadership Conference Education Fund. 2023. “Maya Wiley.” Washington, DC. https://leadershipconferenceedfund.org 
  5. McKinsey & Company. 2020. Diversity Wins: How Inclusion Matters. May 19, 2020. https://www.mckinsey.com/capabilities/people-and-organizational-performance/our-insights/diversity-wins-how-inclusion-matters 
  6. National Security Agency. n.d. “Anne Neuberger.” https://www.nsa.gov/About/Leadership/Bio-Display/Article/2528237/anne-neuberger/ 
  7. Reynolds, Alison, and David Lewis. 2017. “Teams Solve Problems Faster When They’re More Cognitively Diverse.” Harvard Business Review, March 30, 2017. https://hbr.org/2017/03/teams-solve-problems-faster-when-theyre-more-cognitively-diverse
  8. United Nations Women. 2023. Women, Peace and Security and Digital Technologies. New York: UN Women. https://www.unwomen.org
  9. Women4Cyber Foundation. 2024. “About Women4Cyber.” Brussels: European Cyber Security Organisation. https://women4cyber.eu
  10. Women in CyberSecurity (WiCyS). 2024. “About WiCyS.” https://www.wicys.org
  11. Women In International Security (WIIS). 2024. “About WIIS.” Washington, DC. https://wiisglobal.org
  12. World Economic Forum. 2024. Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2024. Geneva: World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-cybersecurity-outlook-2024

Walk the Talk: Why the UN Needs a Woman as New Secretary-General

By Contributor Martina Croce

Abstract

This author argues that the 2026 United Nations Secretary General selection represents a pivotal opportunity for meaningful institutional reform through the election of the first woman to lead the organization. While calls for UN reform are widespread, structural transformation cannot occur without breaking the institution’s highest and most symbolic glass ceiling. By looking at past UN leaders, previous election data, and the current candidates and Security Council politics, this paper shows that women are just as qualified, and often even more qualified, than men, but are still held back by political barriers built into the selection process. The article further assesses the likelihoods of a woman’s election in 2026 and outlines strategic considerations for tackling veto politics. Ultimately, the author argues that appointing a feminist woman Secretary General would serve as a catalyst for broader reforms in peace and security, global governance partnerships, and cross-generational leadership, signaling that the UN is prepared to align its practice with its principles.

Introduction

Amidst talks of reform, systemic challenges, and accusations of lacking authority and influence in this new decade, 2026 represents a key year in UN history. No one questions that the UN needs reform. The real battle is over how to make it happen: in what ways should the UN reinvent itself, its bureaucracy, procedures, agencies, and, most importantly, its leadership? This article argues that the UN cannot reform itself with yesterday’s leaders: men. The UN needs to break its glass ceiling and, for the first time in 80 years, elect a woman as Secretary General. With the 2026 elections officially kicking off in January, this year ought to be the one we finally see a woman appointed as head of the United Nations.1

Despite decades of rhetorical commitment to gender equality and the presence of highly qualified women, including seven alone in the 2016 race, the UN has failed to translate principle into practice, keeping its highest office firmly in male hands.2 Choosing a woman Secretary General is not only symbolic, but also politically necessary. By selecting a woman, the UN will send a strong message to the global community, underlining that women are equally capable and qualified to hold the highest executive positions in international governance. Such a decision will also have the power to spark normative and structural reforms, both within the UN and other multinational organizations, opening more opportunities of meaningful participation for women. While many governments and institutions have increased women’s participation, such participation has not always been meaningful. Indeed, even when women reach leadership positions, they are disproportionately assigned portfolios such as education, health, or social affairs, whereas areas traditionally associated with political power, including foreign policy, national security, defense, and finance, remain overwhelmingly male-dominated. Meaningful participation extends beyond women’s presence at the decision-making table: it requires that women hold positions with genuine authority, enabling them to influence outcomes and implement change across all areas of governance.3

Starting with a brief overview of past leadership at the United Nations and an analysis of the Secretary General selection process, this paper will present arguments in support of the election of a woman as Secretary General. An assessment of the likelihood of the victory of a woman based on current candidacies will also be provided, together with policy recommendations for the future Madame Secretary General.

Women’s Leadership at the United Nations

Looking at the historical record of UN leadership, the common trait is, not surprisingly, that it has been male. In its 80 years of history, the UN has appointed nine men as Secretary General. Zero women. This undeniably reflects the patriarchal nature of society, persistent also at the heart of the organization that proudly claims to be the ultimate global human rights and gender equality leader. This contradicting record represents a worrying discrepancy between rhetoric and practice.4

In 2000, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1325, a milestone in the fight for women’s representation in peace and security.5 Norms and goals were established and, after decades of historical indifference, gender mainstreaming policies finally started to enter both national and international organizations, increasing representation of women on the political stage.6 Nonetheless, despite undeniable progress, women continue to be underrepresented in global governance. In 2024, women made up only seven per cent of negotiators on average worldwide, with nine out of ten negotiation tracks including no women negotiators at all. Two thirds of mediation efforts still do not include women.7 Within the UN, women continue to be underrepresented, especially when it comes to field service and mission staff. As of February 2026, the overall balance for international UN field staff counted only 36% of women.8 This is far from reaching the goal. Feminist advocates hoped the UN would lead by example, setting the standard for gender equality in international and national organizations. Instead, progress has remained partial and symbolic, especially at the highest levels of leadership. The 2026 selection process could be transformational: by appointing a woman as Secretary General, the UN could finally signal its commitment and match its words with actions.9

2026 is not the first year characterized by a strong advocacy for the appointment of a woman as UN Secretary General. Back in 2016, the race for Secretary General saw seven female nominees. Out of the seven, only two made it to the final top five shortlist of straw polls in the UN Security Council: Irina Bokova of Bulgaria, and Helen Clark from New Zealand.10 One might assume that their eventual exclusion reflected weaker qualifications and that António Guterres was simply more experienced than them. Data, however, says otherwise. A career-path reconstruction study conducted by PassBlue shows that the 2016 women candidates were just as experienced as their male counterparts and, in many cases, possessed even broader experience in international organizations, civil society, and the private sector.11 On average, women accumulated 16.57 years in government leadership positions, similar to 16.67 years averaged by men, and had more experience in international organizations, averaging 7.86 years compared to 4.08 years for previous Secretary Generals and 3.94 years for 2016 male candidates. Women’s length of time in civil society was higher as well: 7.29 years, surpassing the 5.83 and 5.25 years recorded for previous Secretaries General and 2016 male candidates respectively. Even in the private sector, women had more experience, averaging 3.29 years compared to 1.17 for men.12

The question then remains: if the UN truly prioritizes merit, skills, and experience, why have men succeeded in securing jobs over female candidates who were more qualified than them? Why are women still not good enough? While the answer to this question has many layers, the central explanation lies at the heart of the politicized selection process itself. The very qualities the role of Secretary General demands, independence, proven leadership, the courage to confront entrenched power inequalities, are seen as liabilities by the UN Security Council, specifically Permanent Five (P5) members.13 While this is true for both male and female candidates, it represents a bigger challenge for women. A man can be strong without being threatening, but a woman who demonstrates the same strength is perceived as destabilizing and risky. The more power a woman has wielded and the more she has proven that she cannot be pushed around, the “less safe” she appears to be.14 A woman Secretary General would symbolize structural change in an institution that has been male-dominated since 1945. This symbolic weight makes female candidacy feel more transformative and therefore more uncomfortable for those who want to maintain the entrenched power imbalances of patriarchy.15

The Challenges of the Selection Process

The UN Charter says very little about the selection process of Secretary Generals and does not provide any guidelines on desirable qualifications or experience. It simply states: “the Secretary General shall be appointed by the General Assembly (GA) upon recommendation of the Security Council.”16 With no specific criteria to follow, the current selection process is based on a framework created by member states nearly eighty years ago, an arcane system that may have worked in the past but that clearly raises concerns in the present.17

The selection process formally begins with a joint letter from the Presidents of the General Assembly and Security Council inviting member states to submit nominations. To be officially part of the race, all candidates must be nominated by at least one member state, and no state can nominate more than one individual.18 After being nominated, candidates engage in informal dialogues with the General Assembly, in which they present their vision statement, disclose campaign financing, and answer questions from member states. This measure, officially adopted in September 2025, was introduced by Resolution 79/327 with the goal to achieve more transparency and enhance the role of the General Assembly in the selection process.19

By the end of July 2026, the Security Council will begin the widely known “straw polls” rounds. These informal ballots are used to measure levels of support for each candidate and, crucially, to detect potential vetoes from the P5. Council members indicate whether they “encourage,” “discourage,” or express “no opinion” on each nominee. In later rounds, the ballots of the P5 are marked in red, making it easier to identify whether a “discourage” vote signals a likely veto.20 This outdated system is highly criticized because it lacks transparency and distorts fair competition by hiding political calculations from the Council. The 2016 selection process offers a compelling example. During the race, candidate Helen Clark and her staff were unable to understand which member states were discouraging her candidacy because of the secrecy of the straw poll system. According to accounts from her campaign, after a round of straw polls, New Zealand’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Gerard van Bohemen, was privately told by four Council members that they had cast “no opinion” votes. Yet the straw poll results indicated that Clark had received only one “no opinion” vote, suggesting that some members had not been transparent about their positions.21

There is no predetermined number of straw poll rounds, therefore voting continues until the 15 members of the Security Council come to an agreement on a single candidate. Once a nominee emerges without any “discourage” votes from the P5 and gains sufficient overall support, the Council proceeds to a formal vote to recommend that candidate to the General Assembly.22 The Security Council is expected to make its recommendation in the second half of 2026. After that, attention shifts to the General Assembly which formally makes the final appointment. The GA has the authority to review the Council’s recommendation and, if it is not satisfied with the choice made, it can send it back and ask to reconsider. This, however, has never happened in practice.23

Importantly, within the Security Council, the Elected Ten members (E10) play an important balancing role to the P5. Indeed, for a candidate to be recommended, the Council must approve them with at least nine votes out of fifteen, with no P5 using their veto. This means that, even if all five permanent members agree on a candidate, that person would still need at least four additional votes from the E10 to succeed. If the E10 refuse to align with the P5’s choice, the candidate will not be able to move forward. The E10 thus hold collective leverage: should seven of them unite behind one single candidate, they could deny support to others, thus blocking any nominee from securing the necessary nine vote majority.24 With this in mind, the E10 could play a pivotal role in this year’s selection of a woman as Secretary General. To this day, E10 members are split: Colombia, Pakistan, Panama, Somalia, and the DRC have offered indirect support for the election of a woman through joint statements, while Bahrain, Greece, Liberia, Denmark, and Latvia have voiced stronger backing, with Denmark and Latvia notably proposing concrete measures to help ensure a woman is selected. If the bloc led by Denmark and Latvia manages to carry over two more countries, the E10 would reach the seven-vote threshold needed to collectively block any candidate they oppose, significantly raising pressure on the P5 to accept a woman as the next Secretary General.

It Takes More Than a Woman – It Takes a Feminist

For the first time in history, the joint letter issued by the presidents of the Security Council and General Assembly calling for nominations, specifically encouraged countries “to strongly consider nominating women as candidates.”25 As of mid-November 2025, a total of 145 countries has, in one way or another, raised concerns about the lack of gender balance in UN leadership.26 These numbers show the increasing realization that it is finally time for a woman to lead.

At a time when many people are losing faith in multilateral institutions and calls for reform are growing louder, choosing a woman as Secretary General would carry both symbolic and practical significance.27 In a period marked by weakened global cooperation, a strong woman leader could help renew trust in diplomacy and encourage more effective collective action. Her appointment would signal that the UN is serious about change, strengthening its credibility and reaffirming its commitment to gender equality. A woman Secretary General would also better reflect the diversity of the world’s population, introduce new ways of thinking about global problem-solving, and offer a different approach to overcoming institutional barriers.28

Yet one crucial distinction must be made: the United Nations does not simply need a woman, it needs a feminist. The mere appointment of a woman as Secretary General would not, on its own, ensure the meaningful integration of gender perspectives into UN governance or produce a more gender-equal institution.29 In this circumstance, it is important to avoid essentialist assumptions that equate a woman’s presence in power with automatic progress on gender equality. What would be transformative is the appointment of a feminist Secretary General who can stay loyal to her feminist foundations and will challenge structural inequalities. A feminist Secretary General would place equality at the center of governance, bringing inclusion, representation, and meaningful participation. A feminist framework would be presented as a promoter of gender equality and consequently of peace, wealth, and overall national security.30

Nonetheless, it is impossible to ignore the enormous discomfort, some might even say fear, revolving around the term “feminist.” Diplomats struggle with this word because it challenges the old established patriarchal order and calls for its complete reconstruction.31 Advancing a feminist agenda within the UN is particularly difficult in a political environment shaped by autocratic governments and states that openly resist progressive reforms. Many of these governments oppose initiatives that would broaden participation or introduce new voices into decision-making spaces. Some of these same states hold permanent seats on the Security Council, and therefore play a decisive role in the selection of the Secretary General.32 The reality is that an openly feminist candidate would likely face significant resistance in the race for Secretary General, particularly if that candidate is also a woman. Then how should the current women and feminist nominees play their cards in this race?

A practical strategy is to present gender equality as a driver of global stability, development, and peace rather than as an independent ideological agenda. This means showing that supporting women’s participation in decision-making helps create more effective conflict prevention, better humanitarian responses, and stronger institutions.33 Candidates should avoid being seen only as representatives of women’s issues, since that can limit support from countries who are resisting gender inclusive discourse. Instead, they should demonstrate strong competence in areas such as diplomacy and international security, showing that gender expertise enhances traditional leadership skills. Rather than using an “activist” approach, it may be more effective to promote feminist principles through practical policy actions, such as improving workplace equality and integrating gender perspectives into programs. This approach would allow candidates to advocate for gender progress while still appealing to a wide range of member states and political interests.34

Building coalitions is also crucial. In this scenario, member states that support the appointment of a woman as Secretary General need to build alliances early in the process and signal their preferences before the decisive straw polls take place. A viable option to ensure they can have an influence in the process would be to hold informal votes in the General Assembly early in the race. By publicly expressing its preferred candidate in advance, the GA could have a chance to influence the Security Council before it makes its final recommendation.35

The Contenders for the Post

If the unwritten tradition of rotating the post among the UN’s five regional blocs continues, the next Secretary General would probably be chosen from Latin America and the Caribbean. To date, five candidates from the region have emerged: Michelle Bachelet of Chile, Rebeca Grynspan of Costa Rica, María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés of Ecuador, Carolyn Rodrigues Birkett of Guyana, and Rafael Grossi of Argentina.36 The only other candidate, Macky Sall, is from Senegal.

Michelle Bachelet, former president of Chile, has been nominated by Brazil, and Mexico. While also being nominated by her home country at first, the current change of leadership brought a backlash against gender equality, which resulted in Bachelet losing her government’s support. Prior to her presidency, she served as United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights as well as the first Executive Director of UN Women, where she expanded the agency’s work on women’s participation in peace processes, protection from gender-based violence, and access to leadership roles. In her vision statement to the UN General Assembly, Bachelet explicitly addressed persistent gender imbalances within global governance and decision-making structures. She emphasized that gender equality is not only a matter of justice but also essential for effective multilateralism, peace, and sustainable development. Her candidacy highlights the need to correct structural inequalities within international institutions and to ensure that women are fully represented at all levels of leadership. Gender equality would be a central pillar of her approach to leading the United Nations.37

Nominated by her homeland, the second woman in the race is Rebeca Grynspan, Vice President of Costa Rica, who currently covers the role of Secretary General of UN Trade and Development in Geneva. Grynspan argues that while the UN remains essential, it must adapt to today’s realities. In particular, she has emphasized the growing influence of civil society organizations and private businesses and the need to better engage them into the UN. On peace and security, Grynspan highlighted prevention, economic development, and mediation as priorities, underlining the need to make the institution more responsive to address rapidly evolving crises. Rebuilding trust among member states is another central goal of her platform, as she has stressed the importance of countries seeing the UN as an effective system for delivering real solutions once again. Importantly enough, Grynspan has downplayed gender as her defining qualification: “I seek no special treatment. Fair competition without prejudice will decide this,” Grynspan affirmed.38 This approach might take her far, especially when it comes to gaining the favor of member states that are reluctant to appoint a woman whose gender goals are seen as destabilizing.

María Fernanda Espinosa entered the race on May 11, after being nominated by Antigua and Barbuda. She began her career working with Indigenous communities in the Ecuadorian Amazon, later served as Ecuador’s foreign minister twice, defense minister once, and was elected President of the UN General Assembly in 2018, being the first Latin American woman to hold the position. Espinosa centers her vision on institutional credibility, arguing that the distance between the UN’s promises and its actual delivery has grown too wide, and criticizing the organization as often slow, fragmented, and overly procedural when it should instead be decisive and purposeful.39 Concretely, she’s proposed a Prevention and Early Action Hub reporting directly to the Secretary-General, paired with a local- first approach to implementation, arguing that the UN should be supporting countries to build their own capacities and access to resources and technology.40 While she does not make mention of gender in any part of her vision statement, it is nonetheless shaped by a career-long commitment to sustainable development, human rights, and the WPS Agenda. Development appears as one of her five official pillars, where she describes the Sustainable Development Goals as “a historic convergence of ambition,”41 while also pointing out that better implementation is needed to meet such goals. Human and gender rights run through her broader record, particularly highlighted by her current work at Global Women Leaders for Change and Inclusion.42

The most recent entrant as of mid-June is Carolyn Rodrigues Birkett, an Indigenous woman from the small village of Moruca Santa Rosa who rose to become Guyana’s first Indigenous Minister of Foreign Affairs and later its Permanent Representative to the UN. Powerfully, in her vision statement she purposefully refers to the future Secretary General as a “she,” signaling a strong will to see systemic change from within the institution. She indeed presented herself as the potential first “she” Secretary General, saying “she must be an administrator, peacemaker, mediator, broker, negotiator, convener and spokesperson.”43 Her platform centers on the UN’s three traditional pillars of peace and security, development, and human rights, plus the UN80 reform agenda, with a people-centered approach. She celebrates the institution’s track record, noting that the UN has grown from 51 member states at its founding to 193 today, and identifies the deficit in advancing the development agenda as one of implementation rather than ambition, pointing to persistent poverty, food insecurity, climate impacts, and unsustainable debt as ongoing drivers of inequality. On prevention specifically, her approach is cautious and deferential: she sees her job as giving member states the facts, not telling them what to do. However, she also presents herself as a leader capable of stepping in and acting directly if a crisis unfolds, saying she would personally call the parties involved at the first sign of trouble. Fundamentally, on representation, she has made concrete commitments to build a leadership team reflecting both geographic diversity and gender balance.44

As of now, the only male candidate from the region is Rafael Grossi, current Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, nominated by Argentina. With a background in nuclear diplomacy and nonproliferation, his professional profile closely aligns with security governance, multilateral negotiations, and conflict management. In his vision statement, Grossi stressed the need for institutional renewal as well as the importance of building stronger partnerships between international actors to improve the effectiveness of multilateral cooperation. He also argued that global institutions need to regain the trust and confidence of member states and the international community. Worryingly, while he referenced human rights as a foundational principle of the United Nations, his statement did not explicitly mention gender equality or gender-based disparities. His platform did not frame neither gender nor its dimension within development, security, or governance.45

The only other male candidate, and the only one not from Latin America and the Caribbean, is former Senegal’s president Macky Sall, who runs on a nomination from Burundi. On substance, his vision statement calls for reforming, streamlining, and modernizing the UN, with a strong emphasis on trust between member states and UN leadership. He has promised to strengthen Security Council Resolution 2719, which boosts funding for African peace missions, and to have the UN work more closely with regional blocs to be more efficient and cost-effective. Just like Grossi, he makes no mention of gender or human rights in his document. Sall has tried to present himself as neutral and above regional politics.46 However, his candidacy comes with baggage as he faces accusations tied to the violent crackdown on 2021 protests during his presidency in Senegal. His path to the post has been further complicated by his own region, after Burundi’s attempt to formally secure full African Union’s endorsement on his behalf failed. 20 of the AU’s 55 member states pushed back his endorsement or asked for more time, with major players, including South Africa, Algeria, Rwanda, Liberia, and even Senegal itself, fully rejecting his bid. As a result, Sall stands out as the only candidate whose legitimacy is being openly challenged by his own home region.47

Assessing Likelihoods

Using the following matrix, the author illustrates how much diplomatic risk each candidate faces when dealing with the five permanent members of the Security Council. Large red circles represent P5’s veto authority, while colored circles denote candidates. Proximity or overlap between a candidate’s position and a P5 circle indicates higher likelihood of political resistance or veto risk.

For Michelle Bachelet, the main uncertainty is political pushback due to her gender advocacy. The strongest potential resistance is from Russia, which has shown opposition to framing UN leadership selection around gender or human-rights activism.48 The United States, which under the Trump administration has rolled back on gender, may also be cautious depending on how her platform is presented, especially if it strongly emphasizes gender equality or feminist diplomacy.49 China could also pose a challenge for Bachelet since, in the final days of her role as UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2022, she authorized the publication of a landmark UN report concluding that abuses against Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang constitute crimes against humanity. The report was released just minutes before her mandate ended, despite intense lobbying by China to prevent its publication.50 This precedent might create opposition towards her candidacy. In contrast, France, and the United Kingdom, are less likely to block her if she focuses on multilateral cooperation, and on building a leadership that advances compromise and stability. Overall, her risk is tied more to policy framing than to personal qualifications.

Rebeca Grynspan is generally viewed as the candidate with the lowest ideological controversy. Because she is mainly associated with economic development, institutional modernization, and international cooperation rather than gender and human rights debates, she is less likely to trigger strong ideological opposition. Potential uncertainty still exists with Russia and, to a smaller extent, the United States, but a veto would be unlikely if her campaign emphasizes reform in UN management, development cooperation, and diplomacy. Support or neutral acceptance from China, France, and the United Kingdom would be more likely under such framing as well.

Espinosa’s main vulnerability is tied to two concrete episodes in her record. Firstly, As Ecuador’s UN representative and later foreign minister, she personally defended Assange’s asylum before the UN Human Rights Council and was later revealed to have arranged the fast-tracking of his Ecuadorian citizenship, a history that could specifically unsettle the UK, which spent years pursuing his extradition, and the US, which sought to prosecute him over the WikiLeaks disclosures.51 Secondly, her decade of service as foreign minister and defense minister under leftist Rafael Correa, whose government was marked by authoritarian tendencies particularly in media laws, may also make Washington cautious given her role as one of his most visible allies.52 Neither Russia nor China has an obvious reason to oppose her on these grounds, since her platform avoids the gender and human-rights framing that has made them cautious with other candidates.

Birkett carries the lowest visible P5 friction of the six candidates, largely because her late entry into the race has not given any permanent member reason to react to her specifically. The closest risk factor is her Council record: as Guyana’s representative, she abstained on a 2024 US-sponsored Gaza ceasefire resolution, arguing it should have called for an immediate ceasefire, a position closer to China and Russia than Washington, which could make the US slightly more cautious.53 Russia, however, together with the US might push back against her direct framing of the future Secretary General as a “she.” Her deeper challenge, though, is not P5 opposition but insufficient P5 attention altogether, since she lacks a visible regional coalition or clear signals of acceptability from any of the five.

Rafael Grossi’s risks revolve around his association with global security politics rather than his ideology. His experience leading nuclear institutions makes him a good candidate to states prioritizing non-proliferation but also creates sensitivity with Russia because of nuclear inspection and reporting during the Ukraine conflict.54 The risk of veto from the United States, China, France, and United Kingdom appears relatively low since his profile aligns with traditional security and leadership expectations. His overall success depends mainly on whether Moscow views him as sufficiently neutral in nuclear diplomacy.55

Sall carries the highest combined P5 risk of the six candidates, rooted in his contested democratic legacy, an election-delay crisis, opposition-repression allegations, protest deaths, and a hidden-debt scandal. These reasons might give any P5 member, most plausibly the US, UK, or France, grounds for a “discourage” vote on human-rights terms. Russia and China have little ideological reason to oppose him and might even see him as a useful non-Western figure, but the unresolved AU dispute gives any P5 member a ready-made procedural justification for a veto without needing to state an ideological reason at all.56

All things considered, the chances of women in the running will depend heavily on the veto power of the United States and Russia who could block their appointment. To avoid that risk, potential candidates need to show that their agenda is broad, focused on strengthening the UN and promoting global stability, rather than centered mainly on gender issues, which some governments might view as destabilizing. France and the United Kingdom have openly supported the idea of a woman serving as Secretary General. China has also indicated that it would welcome female candidates put forward by member states. As stated above, support varies in strength among the E10. Colombia, Pakistan, Panama, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo have joined statements that signal indirect support for a woman Secretary General. Meanwhile, Bahrain, Greece, Liberia, Denmark, and Latvia have backed statements expressing strong support.57 Altogether, this demonstrates that substantial backing is in place, making the election of a woman a realistic possibility.

Recommendations for Future Madame Secretary General

Hoping to see a woman finally stepping up to the Secretary General post, this paper offers her three recommendations. First, is to put gender equal participation and women’s leadership at the center of peace and security work. Instead of focusing mainly on protection, more investment needs to be placed on meaningful participation. Women must become key players in peace and security settings and have stronger roles in diplomacy, peace missions, special envoy appointments, and post-conflict recovery processes.58

Second is the need to reorganize global decision-making and create stronger partnerships instead of keeping power and authority concentrated in one place. The UN should work more closely with regional organizations, national and local governments, civil society groups, and the private sector. This would allow governance to be more inclusive, ensuring that women and marginalized communities are represented not only in discussions but also in real decision-making spaces. Additionally, in a climate where the UN is being accused of losing its relevance, the future Madame Secretary General must have the courage to be bold and take the lead in crises, be it humanitarian disasters, wars, famines, or health emergencies. Member states need a leader who can guide and act when it matters most.59 

Finally, the UN must build a cross-generational system. Young women and men should not only be beneficiaries of UN programs but also participants in shaping them. This includes creating pathways for youth leadership, especially for young women, in global diplomacy and policy reform discussions. Most importantly, bringing young men into spaces that lead the global conversation on gender equality can play a powerful role in shaping future attitudes and social norms. When they witness first-hand how gender equality strengthens communities, and economies, they are more likely to become long-term supporters of inclusive societies. Educating young men to support their female counterparts is a fundamental step in the restructuring of society and in finally exiting the patriarchal frameworks that were imposed on us.60

The election of a woman as Secretary General would be a historic milestone as well as a test of whether the United Nations is capable of real change. A women in this role must move beyond representation and reshape how power works within the system. That means putting women at the center of peace and security, not as protected victims but as leaders shaping decisions. It means breaking up concentrated power and focusing on cooperation so that decisions reflect the voices of those too often left out. And it means creating a system that empowers both young women and men, teaching the next generation to value equality, inclusion, and shared leadership. The question is not whether the UN can handle a woman Secretary General, but whether the UN is ready for the transformation she would demand. The support is there. What is needed now is the courage to step beyond old frameworks, to redefine leadership, and to prove that the most important international institution can finally “walk the talk.” If the UN acts, it can show the world that real change is possible and that leadership, at last, can be truly inclusive.

Published July 15, 2026. The opinions expressed here are solely the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the opinions and beliefs of Women In International Security or its affiliates. 

About the Author

Martina Croce is a graduate student in International Affairs and Global Governance at The George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs specializing in Global Governance. She holds a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science, summa cum laude, from Georgian Court University. Martina is particularly passionate about humanitarian action, emergency response, and gender equality, with academic training in gender studies and hands-on training is survivor support for victims of sexual violence through the DC Rape Crisis Center. Through academic research, grassroots community engagement, and professional experience across organizations including Habitat for Humanity, she has developed skills in policy analysis, stakeholder engagement, humanitarian coordination, advocacy, program administration, and communications. As a current Fellow with UNICEF’s Public Partnerships Division in Washington, D.C., she supports reporting, donor engagement, and congressional portfolio analysis related to a U.S. government-funded humanitarian programs. She is a native Italian speaker with high proficiency in Spanish and working proficiency in German.

References

  1.  Jody Williams & Mavic Cabrera-Balleza, “Who’s Afraid of the F-Word? The Next UN Leader Must Be a Woman and a Feminist.” PassBlue Official Website. January 27, 2026.
  2.  Tamao Chika & Jennifer Hernandez, “When Will Women Be Considered Good Enough? The Race to Lead the UN.” PassBlue Official Website. February 10, 2026.
  3.  Jody Williams & Mavic Cabrera-Balleza, “Who’s Afraid of the F-Word? The Next UN Leader Must Be a Woman and a Feminist.”
  4.  Nicole Crawford & Rebecca Snyder, “The United Nations Is in Its Eightieth Year. Will Women Lead It?” The Henry L. Stimson Center Official Website. December 19, 2025.
  5.  Chantal de Jonge Oudraat & Michael E. Brown, The Gender and Security Agenda: Strategies for the 21st Century (C. de Jonge Oudraat & M. E. Brown, Eds.; 1st ed.). Routledge, 2020, pp. 5-6.
  6.  Ibid.
  7.  United Nations Peacekeeping, “Women Still Largely Excluded from Peace Processes.” United Nations Peacekeeping Official Website. October 20, 2025.
  8.  United Nations, “UN Secretariat Gender Parity Dashboard.” United Nations Official Website.
  9.  Natalie Samarasinghe, “Appointing Madame Secretary-General – A Legal Obligation?” 1 for 8 Billion Official Website. February 7, 2025.
  10.  Tamao Chika & Jennifer Hernandez, “When Will Women Be Considered Good Enough? The Race to Lead the UN.”
  11.  Ibid.
  12.  Tamao Chika & Jennifer Hernandez, “When Will Women Be Considered Good Enough? The Race to Lead the UN.”
  13.  Gaylene Preston dir. My Year With Helen. 2017; Gaylene Preston Productions and Demand. Tubitv, 54 min.
  14.  Ibid.
  15. Ibid.
  16. United Nations, “United Nations Charter, Chapter XV: The Secretariat.” United Nations
  17. Official Website.
  18. 17 Adama Balde et al., “As the U.N. Seeks Its Next Secretary-General, a Growing Number of
  19. Countries Favor a Woman for the Post.” Just Security Official Website. December 12, 2025.
  20. 18 United Nations, “Selection and Appointment Process.” United Nations Official Website.
  21. 19 Ibid., and Thibault Camelli, “Selecting the Next UN Secretary-General: The Ultimate Test for
  22. Multilateralism.” New York University Center on International Cooperation Official Website.
  23. November 26, 2025.
  24. 20 Adama Balde et al., “As the U.N. Seeks Its Next Secretary-General, a Growing Number of
  25. Countries Favor a Woman for the Post.”
  26. 21 Gaylene Preston dir. My Year With Helen. 01:02:00 min.
  27. 22 Eugene Chen, “Predictions for the Secretary-General Selection Process.” Blue Helmets, Red
  28. Tape. December 18, 2025.
  29. 23 United Nations, “Selection and Appointment Process.” United Nations Official Website.
  30. 24 Adama Balde et al., “As the U.N. Seeks Its Next Secretary-General, a Growing Number of
  31. Countries Favor a Woman for the Post.”
  32. 25 Adama Balde et al., “As the U.N. Seeks Its Next Secretary-General, a Growing Number of
  33. Countries Favor a Woman for the Post.”
  34. 26 Ibid.
  35. 27 Ibid.
  36. 28 Nicole Crawford & Rebecca Snyder, “The United Nations Is in Its Eightieth Year. Will
  37. Women Lead It?”
  38. 29 Jody Williams & Mavic Cabrera-Balleza, “Who’s Afraid of the F-Word? The Next UN Leader
  39. Must Be a Woman and a Feminist.”
  40. 30 Ibid.
  41. 31 Ibid.
  42. 32 Ibid.
  43. 33 Eugene Chen, “Predictions for the Secretary-General Selection Process.”
  44. 34 Ibid.
  45. 35 Better World Campaign, “Becoming Secretary-General: How the World’s Top Diplomat Gets
  46. the Job.” Better World Campaign Official Website. April 11, 2025.
  47. 36 Nicole Crawford & Rebecca Snyder, “The United Nations Is in Its Eightieth Year. Will
  48. Women Lead It?”
  49. 37 Michelle Bachelet, Vision Statement. February 3, 2026, pp. 1-6.
  50. 38 The Tico Times, “Former Costa Rican VP Grynspan Campaigns for UN Top Post.” The Tico
  51. Times Official Website. February 28, 2026
  52. 39 María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, Vision Statement. May 11, 2026, pp. 1-10.
  53. 40 PassBlue, “María Fernanda Espinosa Faces the General Assembly.” PassBlue Official Website.
  54. June 30, 2026.
  55. 41 María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, Vision Statement, p. 3.
  56. 42 María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés, Vision Statement, pp. 1-10
  57. 43 Carolyn Rodrigues Birkett, Vision Statement. June 15, 2026, p. 1.
  58. 44 Ibid., pp. 1-7.
  59. 45 Rafael Grossi, Vision Statement. December 1, 2025, pp. 1-4.
  60. 46 Macky Sall, Vision Statement. March 2, 2026, pp. 1-5.
  61. 47 Damilola Banjo, “Why Macky Sall Can’t Count on Africa in His Bid to Lead the UN.”
  62. PassBlue Official Website. April 20, 2026.
  63. 48 Adama Balde et al., “As the U.N. Seeks Its Next Secretary-General, a Growing Number of
  64. Countries Favor a Woman for the Post.”
  65. 49 Ibid.
  66. 50 Julian Borger, “China’s Treatment of Uyghurs May Be Crime Against Humanity, Says UN
  67. Human Rights Chief.” The Guardian Official Website. September 1, 2022.
  68. 51 Ana Melgar et al., “WikiLeaks Founder Julian Assange Granted Ecuadorian Citizenship.” CNN
  69. Official Website. January 11, 2018.
  70. 52 N.a., “Rafael Correa.” Britannica. May 13, 2026.
  71. 53 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Cooperative Republic of Guyana,
  72. Explanation of Position by Her Excellency Carolyn Rodrigues-Birkett, Permanent
  73. Representative of Guyana to the United Nations, Delivered at the UNSC Meeting on the
  74. Situation in the Middle East, Including the Palestinian Question. March 22, 2024.
  75. 54 Will Pavia, “UN’s Next Leader Was Meant to Be a Woman. But Trump May ‘Insist on a
  76. Man.’” The Times Official Website. January 2, 2026.
  77. 55 Ibid.
  78. 56 Damilola Banjo, “Why Macky Sall Can’t Count on Africa in His Bid to Lead the UN.”
  79. 57 Adama Balde et al., “As the U.N. Seeks Its Next Secretary-General, a Growing Number of
  80. Countries Favor a Woman for the Post.”
  81. 58 GWL Voices, “Women Leading the UN of the 21 st Century; The Decalogue for Action.” GWL
  82. Voices Official Website. January 30, 2026, p. 2.
  83. 59 Ibid.
  84. 60 Ibid., p. 4.

Society as the Battlefield: Reframing Women, Peace and Security in an Era of Hybrid Threats

by Dr. Lauren Van Metre | President & CEO, Women In International Security (WIIS)

The global security environment is undergoing rapid and dangerous transformation. Militarization is accelerating. Hybrid warfare is reshaping conflict. Authoritarianism is rising. At the same time, the institutions that have guided the international order for eighty years are straining under the weight of these new realities. The world is in a liminal moment—an in-between space where the old order is breaking down and the contours of the new one remain uncertain.

The Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda itself was born in a similar moment of upheaval. As the Cold War ended, dissolving norms and institutions gave rise to civil wars, ethnic violence, and violent extremism. WPS emerged from women’s cross-border solidarity—women who refused to be silent and demanded representation. They insisted that their experience – and their leadership –  shape the future of peace and security.

That same audacity today to adapt WPS to a new constellation of threats. While we celebrate the achievements of WPS, we must prepare for a profoundly different future – a  threat environment defined not only by armed conflict, but by hybrid warfare, democratic erosion, and authoritarian resurgence.

Two Strategic Certainties

For all the uncertainty of this moment, two realities are unmistakably clear: militarization is accelerating, and authoritarianism is rising. Hybrid warfare sits at the center of both. And, in a world engaged increasingly in hybrid warfare, WPS must operate not only as a peacebuilding framework, but as a strategic security doctrine.

Authoritarian powers now use disinformation, cyber operations, election interference, economic coercion, and social manipulation not merely to confuse democracies, but to break them from within. These strategies spread fear, divide societies, distort public trust, justify executive overreach, and undermine electoral integrity. Central to this approach is the manipulation of gender itself—weaponizing misogyny, restricting women’s rights, and suppressing women’s political participation as a means for eroding democracy itself. Gender is a powerful lever for authoritarian consolidation.

Western security institutions increasingly recognize that if societies are the battlefield, then citizens are the frontline of defense. NATO and other security bodies now emphasize societal resilience as a form of strategic deterrence. Yet resilience is still frequently framed as requiring only a “gender lens” or perspective. That framing is no longer sufficient.  If gender is a terrain of modern, hybrid warfare, then WPS must be a strategic countermeasure, not a simple add-on.

If adapted to hybrid warfare, the WPS pillars become a framework for societal resilience and a strategy of deterrence and prevention:

  • Prevention requires interrupting the disinformation-to-mobilization pipelines that fuel gender-based violence, political intimidation, and the suppression of women’s leadership.
  • Participation demands that women lead within security institutions as societies militarize—ensuring that necessary defense efforts do not erode democratic norms from within.
  • Protection must now include digital, political, and physical protection networks for women political leaders, journalists, activists, and movements targeted by authoritarian actors.
  • Relief and Recovery must prepare women to lead the restoration of social cohesion and democratic order when societies recoil from authoritarian capture as we have seen in November’s U.S. electoral outcomes in Virginia and New Jersey.

In an era when hybrid threats aim to fracture society itself, WPS is not a complement to security strategy—it is a security strategy. It reinforces civic fabric, strengthens democratic resilience,, and provides deterrence rooted not only in military capability, but in societal resilience.

WPS as a Political Strategy for Democratic Renewal

Recalibrating the security dimension of WPS (the “S”)  is necessary—but insufficient. We must develop a political strategy and reframe WPS as a political movement—not merely a normative framework.

According to Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), roughly 70 percent of the world’s population now lives under authoritarian or oligarchic rule. The WPS agenda—with its core demands for participation, accountability, and inclusion—is fundamentally a democratization movement. In much of the world today, and increasingly within multilateral institutions themselves, WPS functions not as a consensus framework, but as an opposition movement.

That reality has strategic implications. Successful democratic opposition movements share several core traits—and WPS must increasingly adopt them.

First, successful movements build coalitions of coalitions. WPS cannot stand alone. It must link arms with labor, youth, faith communities, and environmental movements whose aspirations overlap with its own. That also means standing in strong solidarity with movements that have popular momentum, if they advance WPS goals.  Leaders within the WPS ecosystem must be equipped not only with policy expertise, but with the political skills needed to build, sustain, and activate broad-based alliances. 

Second, successful movements control the narrative. Fear is the fuel of authoritarianism. Hope is its antidote—and one of the most powerful political tools available. The WPS agenda must move away from narratives of  “backlash” and “erosion” and instead tell a compelling story of what is possible: the clarity and the vision of the WPS agenda.

Third, successful movements shift the arena of contestation. When governments close institutional doors, movements carry their struggle to the public. When formal processes stall, pressure is built from outside them. WPS must increasingly draw strength from civic mobilization, grassroots leadership, and public-facing advocacy, not only from technocratic processes within multilateral institutions.

By building broad coalitions, shaping narratives grounded in democratic possibility, and shifting political struggle into arenas where public voice is strongest, WPS becomes not only a policy framework but an engine of democratic renewal.  This is how movements win. And this is how WPS must now move: not as a siloed agenda tucked inside institutions, but as a bold, collective political force capable of reshaping them.

The Strategic Imperative Ahead

If fully activated—strategically, politically, and collectively—the Women, Peace and Security agenda offers not only protection for women, but a pathway toward more resilient, inclusive, and democratic societies. In a world where the frontline increasingly runs through information systems, civic trust, political participation, and social cohesion, WPS is not simply about women’s inclusion in security. It is about the future of security itself.

The above remarks were delivered by Dr. Van Metre as part of WIIS’ 1325@25 Conference, “The Future of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda: Advancing Innovation, Resilience, and Collective Action,” on November 12th, 2025.

About the Author

Dr. Lauren Van Metre is the President & CEO of WIIS, bringing over two decades of experience as a leading expert in peace and security. Her distinguished career includes key roles at the U.S. Department of Defense, the State Department, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and the National Democratic Institute, where she contributed to major conflict resolution and prevention initiatives. Her leadership has provided an invaluable contribution to policy and programming in some of the world’s most fragile and conflict-affected regions. Read her full bio here.