By Kulani Abendroth-Dias and Carolin Kiefer

If World War III will be over in seconds, as one side takes control of the other’s systems, we’d better have

Data, the food of all algorithms, lie at the core of cohesive EU and NATO AI strategies. Such strategies must encompass the regulation of data in high- and low-risk technologies with

and Romania have tested and often deployed AI and ML facial recognition tools, many of which were developed in the United States and China, for predictive policing and border control.3 AI and ML systems aid in contact tracing and knowledge sharing to contain the COVID-19 virus.4 However, the civilian and military strategies that drive use of AI and ML for the collection and use of data diverge across the member states of the European Union and the North a greater understanding of how data feed AI and ML technologies and systems, the results they produce become skewed. For example, a facial analysis and recognition system insufficiently trained to analyze and recognize women or people of color will often misidentify people in these populations, which could lead to inaccurate criminal profiling and arrests.7 Machines don’t make errors, but humans do. Policymakers need to rapidly identify parameters and systems of governance for these technologies that

maximize their efficiency while protecting civilian rights.

Growth in the development of AI-driven technologies has been exponential, but strategies to regulate their implementation have yet to catch up. The European Union and NATO need to develop coordinated, comprehensive, and forward-looking strategies based on data protection protocols to regulate AI use and deployment to counter myriad threats. Such strategies will be critically important if the transatlantic alliance is to adapt a common defense system to evolving threats in the digital age. Beyond Definitions

AI and ML are changing the security landscape-for example, by the deployment of disinformation to undermine political participation or of unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs), which may or may not operate as lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). The states that are party to the Group of

Governmental Experts (GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapons

the smarter, faster, more resilient network. dual uses. They should guide policies governing predictive

or delivery within the European Union, Amazon policing, border surveillance, facial analysisand countering disinformation.6 and recognition now sells facial recognition cameras for door

locks, webcams, home security systems, and office To regulate data use effectively, policymakers need to attendance driven by artificial intelligence (AI) better understand the technical, political, economic and

and machine learning (ML)-powerful tools with civilian 2 social risks and biases in data collection methods. Without and military purposes. Germany, France, Spain, Denmark

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).5

(LAWS), which aligns its work with the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), have devoted considerable attention to defining autonomous weapons. Unfortunately, the group has not yet paid enough attention to the data. Prolonged focus on what constitutes LAWS rather than the data that drive them impedes the important investigation of how best to regulate the technologies’ rapid development and use for security and defense. Discussion of the types, limits, and biases of data that drive AI and ML is pertinent throughout the myriad sectors in which they find application.8

Recently, the GGE took steps to move the debate from definitions of autonomous systems to why data matter. In 2020, it decided that the 11 guiding principles that frame the development and use of LAWS needed no further expansion.9 The group agreed to give greater attention to how the principles can be unpacked. It decided to distinguish between high- and low-risk AI technologies and gain a better understanding of dual-use technologies.10 Differentiating between uses for civilian and military operations should focus on how data will be mined and drive algorithms at both levels.11 NATO and the European Union should lead in facilitating these discussions and regulations.

Data Governance

According to the European Commission’s February 2020 white paper on artificial intelligence, “Europe’s current and future sustainable economic growth and societal well-being increasingly draws on value created by data…. AI is one of the most important applications of the data economy.”12 However, the report concludes, for AI to “work for people and be a force for good in society” it must be trustworthy.13 It highlights “trustworthy AI” 27 times in its 26 pages.

Governance of data is key to this trust.14 The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was a step in the right direction, but it needs to be expanded to cover AI and ML data collection and use in national and international security contexts. Close consultation and data coordination between the European Union and NATO is integral in this regard.

An understanding of who drives the development of AIdriven technologies for European security and how they are funded can illuminate the political, technical, and social, and legal bottlenecks confronting EU and NATO data regulation, both in the member states and at a supranational level. While the defense sector has traditionally driven technology innovation, private companies have taken the lead in recent years. 15 According to the OECD, Google, Microsoft, Amazon, and Intel have spent more than $50 billion a year on digital innovation.16 This sum dwarfs the ‚Ç¨13 billion budgeted by the European Defense Fund (EDF) for 2021-27 – for defense spending in general, not solely for AI-driven technologies.17 NATO and the European Union should pay particular attention to these private-sector actors when developing policies for data protection and strategies to encourage US and European technological innovation. NATO and the European Union should work with the CCW GGE to determine clear operational distinctions between the commercial and military uses of data for AIdriven technologies.18 NATO and the European Union need comprehensive, legally enforceable AI strategies to regulate the use of data and the integrity of information networks to better protect their citizens while keeping the Alliance agile.

The Way Forward

In EU and NATO contexts, the development and implementation of dual-use technologies and cyberprotection policies remain fragmented. This fragmentation could undermine the ability to respond to evolving threats to European security and stability. Examples abound: Cambridge Analytica’s involvement in Britain’s Leave Campaign, radicalization via social media, the politicized use of data via hybrid-use platforms to influence behavior (from political participation to violent action), and targeted cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns in the Visegrad Four and the Baltic states.19 Therefore, coherent EU and NATO AI strategies require the regulation of the data that drive emerging technologies. Regulation to promote network integrity and protect data access must be key tenets of EU and NATO strategies to deploy AI that can react faster and more effectively in the face of new security threats.

AI and ML systems are valuable, as demonstrated by their use in contact tracing and knowledge sharing in the search for a cure during the Covid-19 pandemic.20 For the transatlantic relationship to thrive, NATO and the EU must work together to develop coordinated AI strategies that address appropriate use and misuse of data. As the EU and NATO develop these strategies, they should focus on five activities:

Govern the use of data in dual-use technologies.

While AI strategies may sound exciting and innovative to policymakers and the general public, responsible data use sounds less so. Yet it is essential. EU and NATO strategies need to distinguish between high- and low-risk technologies, dual- and hybrid-use platforms, and the types, limits, and mediums by which data can be collected and anonymized (or at least kept confidential) for civil and military uses. These limits need to be developed and regulated in discussions with civilian and military actors who are mining data across sectors, from the traditional security and military arena to healthcare, logistics, and entertainment companies. Discussions should include how the rights of citizens and those residing in NATO and EU countries-e.g., lawful migrants, asylum seekers, refugees-will be protected.

Acknowledge bias in datasets.

There should be a comprehensive discussion on how bias in datasets influences the training of algorithms, which in turn influences security targets and undermines the integrity of a system. Policymakers, human rights actors, and technology developers should be in the room for this discussion. An awareness of these biases within security forces can help them better evaluate the outcomes the algorithms produce, interpret targets with caution, avoid errors, and generate more effective responses.

Ensure purpose-limited data collection and sharing.

Personal data collected and tracked for specific purposes (e.g., contact tracing during a pandemic) should generally not be shared and used for other purposes. Where an overlap in data collection is deemed necessary for EU-NATO security purposes, tight regulations for civilian protection should spell out where, with whom, and for how long the data can be stored, with strong legal and operational deterrents for backdoor access to data. Private-sector companies should limit how data are used to influence behavior: Should they be used in political campaigns the same way that they are used to nudge consumer behaviors on what to buy? The European Union’s GDPR sets up important rules in this regard. It can be viewed as the cornerstone of an EU-NATO strategy for the development and regulation of AI for security and defense.

Adapt traditional defense and deterrence strategies to the digital age.

The evolving nature of security threats in the digital age calls into question traditional strategies of defense and deterrence. Collaboration between NATO, the European Commission, the European Defence Agency (EDA), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) and technology developers should focus on efficiency-trimming current weapons systems and technologies used by the European Union on the battlefield and in the cyber realm while using AI and ML to inform strategy. The weaponized use of social media data must be addressed, not solely via counternarratives but by working in concert with social media companies to develop AI and ML techniques to identify and shut down fake news at the source. The integrity of networks set up by actors outside of NATO member states needs to be raised as a security concern as well, including incentives to drive the local business development of such networks.

Build trust via counter-AI agencies to protect citizen rights and detect AI-driven forgeries.

Agencies that currently promote the responsible use of AI need to work in tandem with NATO and EU agencies to develop comprehensive AI strategies. The strategies should promote digital literacy, advance critical thinking through online modules, and publicize the precautions NATO and the European Union are taking to protect citizen data in order to build public trust. Partnerships between EU, NATO, and such agencies need to go beyond traditional NGO-security agency relationships to integrate AI protection mechanisms into security policy itself. Ideally, these organizations would work with NATO partner countries to better identify targets, weaknesses, and priorities to build resilient intelligence architectures.

Map the development and use of AI-driven technologies across EU and NATO member states.

NATO security operations are in place at member state borders. However, most of the AI technologies being developed, test, or adapted are deployed within France and Germany, key EU member states. AI-driven security threats differ across states, especially disinformation. For example, the content, medium, and speaker of disinformation shared in the Czech Republic may differ considerably from disinformation shared in Germany. Adapting traditional deterrence strategies to the digital age requires an understanding of the contextbased nature of these threats. It is therefore integral to include experts across the EU and NATO member states in the development and implementation of AI strategies. A comprehensive mapping of the security threats faced-and development and use of AI-driven technologies to combat such threats across EU and NATO member states-can help better train personnel and develop more targeted solutions and localized data protection policies.

Conclusion

The digital industry is already transforming the Alliance. NATO is essential to setting up a coordinated structure to develop and regulate AI- and ML-driven technologies for NATO members’ security and defense. While sociopolitical and economic priorities in the development and regulation of AI vary across sectors and countries, awareness of the use and misuse of data in driving AI-and ML-driven technologies is a common thread that binds these debates together. The use of data fed into a system run by AI and ML technology can have vast implications for the nature of future security threats and the development of technologies to combat them. Cohesive EU and NATO strategies for AI will determine how strong and agile the Alliance will become.

References

Pedro Domingos, The Master Algorithm: How the Quest for the Ultimate Learning Machine Will Remake Our World (New York: Basic Books, 2015).

See Daniel S. Hoadley and Nathan J. Lucas, Artificial Intelligence and National Security (Washington DC.: Congressional Research Service,

2018); Greg Allen and Taniel Chan, Artificial Intelligence and National Security (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2017). Artificial intelligence comprises a vast number of fields, including machine learning, natural language processing, robotics, computer vision, and knowledge representation and reasoning. In this policy brief, the authors largely refer to the use of AI- and ML- driven technologies for EU and NATO security and defense.

Steven Feldstein, The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, September 2019).

The Cybersecurity Strategy of the Visegrad Group Countries Coronavirus, Artificial Intelligence web page (April 12, 2020).

Raluca Csernatoni, An Ambitious Agenda or Big Words? Developing a

European Approach to AI, Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 117 (Brussels: Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, November 2019).

Michael Chui et al., Notes from the AI Frontier: Insights from Hundreds of Use Cases (New York: McKinsey Global Institute, 2018).

Philipp Gr√ºll, “Germany’s Plans for Automatic Facial Recognition Meet Fierce Criticism,” EURACTIV (January 10, 2020).

Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans and Avi Goldfarb, Prediction Machines: The Simple Economics of Artificial Intelligence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press, 2018).

See the UN’s 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

German Federal Foreign Office, Chair’s Summary: Berlin Forum for Supporting the 2020 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Berlin: German Federal Foreign Office, April 2020).

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, The Human Element in Decisions About the Use of Force (Geneva: UNIDIR, March 2020).

European Commission, On Artificial Intelligence: A European

Approach to Excellence and Trust, white paper, COM (2020) 65 final (Brussels: European Commission, February 19, 2020), p. 1. See also European Commission, A European Strategy for Data, COM (2020) 66 final (Brussels: European Commission, February 19, 2020).

EC, On Artificial Intelligence, p. 25.

Ibid.

Dieter Ernst, Competing in Artificial Intelligence Chips: China’s Challenge amid Technology War, Special Report (Center for International Governance Innovation, March 26, 2020).

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Private Equity Investment in Artificial Intelligence (Paris: OECD, December 2018).

European Commission, European Defence Fund (Brussels: European Commission: March 20, 2019). Arguably, Washington would do well not to view the EDF with suspicion and skepticism but rather as a vehicle to stimulate more transatlantic discussion on “home-grown” innovation and development.

Daniele Amoroso et al., “Autonomy in Weapon Systems: The Mili-tary Application of Artificial Intelligence as a Litmus Test for Germany’s New Foreign and Security Policy,” Democracy Vol. 49 (Heinrich B√∂ll Foundation, 2018).

Marek G√≥rka, “The Cybersecurity Strategy of the Visegrad Group

Countries,” Politics in Central Europe Vol .14, No. 2 (2018), pp. 75-98. See also Alistair Knott, “Uses and Abuses of AI in Election Campaigns,” presentation, N.d.

Council of Europe, AI and Control of Covid-19.

By Naďa Kovalčíková and Gabrielle Tarini

The rise of China poses a strategic challenge for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Alliance needs a comprehensive political, economic, and security strategy to deal with China’s growing

global power. The more assertive a role China plays in world affairs, the more it could undercut NATO’s cohesion and military advantages by translating commercial inroads in Europe into political influence, investing in strategically important sectors, and achieving major breakthroughs in advanced digital technologies.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has repeatedly emphasized the need for NATO allies to assess and better understand the implications of China’s increased presence and activity in the North Atlantic.¹ At their London meeting in December 2019, NATO leaders noted that “China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.”² At the 2020 Munich Security Conference in February 2020, China again featured prominently in the discussions. Plenary sessions and many of the side sessions focused on China, with US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Defense Secretary Mark Esper, and Stoltenberg all highlighting the role for transatlantic cooperation in addressing China’s rise.³

This policy brief examines the challenge that China presents for NATO and the importance of a common posture toward China. It also considers China’s perception of NATO as a stumbling block to its global ambitions, and it provides recommendations for how the Alliance should approach China moving forward.

China’s Rise and Its Implications for NATO

China has used its growing economic, political and military capabilities to pursue an increasingly assertive foreign policy, and NATO has rightly begun to assess the implications for the Alliance. As the secretary general remarked in December 2019, “This is not about moving NATO into the South China Sea, but it’s about taking into account that China’s coming closer to us, in the Arctic, in Africa, investing heavily in our infrastructure, in Europe, in cyberspace.”⁴

China’s increased involvement in European allies’ economies poses a challenge to NATO’s political cohesion. China’s annual foreign direct investment (FDI) in Europe has grown exponentially since 2008.⁵ Europe is also one of the most important destinations for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global development strategy initiated by China in 2013. Last spring, Italy became the first G7 country to join BRI, while Greece joined China’s “17+1 grouping,” an initiative aimed at enhancing ties between China and Central and Eastern Europe.⁶

Chinese commercial inroads today can lead to wider political influence tomorrow, which well may be China’s objective. An analysis from the Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies, for example, contends that China “incentivizes state-led Chinese banks as well as State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to fill financing or investment gaps in EU member states and accession countries in exchange for political support for Chinese positions, such as on territorial claims in the South China Sea or human rights.”⁷ Most recently, during the

COVID-19 pandemic, China has attempted to make political inroads in Europe through “mask diplomacy.”⁸ China is widely publicizing its provision of medical masks and critical health equipment to affected European states and promoted false narratives over Chinese state media Twitter accounts (such as claims that COVID-19 actually began outside of China).⁹ These actions have helped China deflect criticism of its initial response to the virus and elevate its image in Europe as a global humanitarian player.

NATO allies also face pressure to address Chinese companies’ investments in Europe’s strategic sectors such as telecommunications, energy, transportation and ports. Chinese investments in these sectors have direct security implications for the Alliance, as it depends on national critical infrastructure to execute its activities and missions. For example, national telecommunication networks that are hacked or disrupted by foreign governments could threaten NATO networks such as the Federated Mission Network that are critical to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and allied decisionmaking.¹⁰ 5G equipment made by companies with obscure ownership structures and close ties to the Chinese Communist Party “could use wellconcealed kill switches to cripple Western telecom systems” during conflict, or even during peacetime.¹¹ Moreover, the protection and integrity of digital information is also critical to secure force mobilization and plans for reinforcement. Civilian roads, ports and rails are an integral part of NATO’s plans for military mobilization. Chinese investments in European ports and rail could complicate NATO’s ability to reinforce and resupply Europe in a warfighting scenario. Currently, Chinese SOEs have invested in 12 ports in seven NATO countries that are key for military mobility planning in the east, south and southeast of NATO.¹²

Finally, China’s advances in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) threaten to undermine NATO’s current military and intelligence advantages. China’s “New Generation AI Development Plan” calls for China to “catch up on AI technology and applications by 2020, achieve major breakthroughs by 2025, and become a global leader in AI by 2030.”¹³ China sees AI as a way to leapfrog—in other words, skip—a generation of military technology.¹⁴

NATO relies on individual members to incorporate AI into their national defense capabilities. However, if all do not master and integrate this technology at the same pace, it may erode decades of work to strengthen interoperability. Moreover, European technologies to run AI operations— including robotics and efficient electronic chips such as

Dutch ASML semiconductors—are in high demand in China. If foreign state-backed companies were to acquire this technology, with its dual commercial and military applications, it would cause serious security concerns for the

Alliance.¹⁵

China’s Perception of NATO

Generally, Beijing views NATO as a stumbling block to its global ambitions. As Adam Liff’s work on China and the U.S. alliance system has shown, Beijing expresses “deepening frustration towards, and even open opposition to” America’s alliances.¹⁶ China has not yet publicly expressed its vision of an alternative international system—and indeed scholars vigorously debate China’s long-term strategic objectives—but it is clear that China believes it can exercise greater influence on the world stage if power is more broadly diffused.¹⁷

China’s efforts to date seem to have focused largely on driving a wedge in U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific, but China would undoubtedly welcome a fractured transatlantic relationship, where US and European threat perceptions and policy priorities increasingly diverge.¹⁸ As a recent analysis of China-Europe relations noted, China wants to “weaken Western unity, both within Europe and across the Atlantic.”¹⁹ Consequently, it prefers to deal with European states individually rather than through the European Union’s collective leadership. Thus President Xi Jinping was likely displeased when French President Emmanuel Macron unexpectedly invited German Chancellor Angela Merkel and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker to join his bilateral meeting with China in March 2019.²⁰ China also seeks to fragment EU unity on economic issues and trade, criticizing it for “politicizing” economic and trade issues in its Policy Paper on the European Union.²¹ China knows that NATO has neither robust tools nor a legacy of regulating political economy issues. China’s use of this narrative contributes to internal tension within the Alliance between those who guard against NATO’s involvement in these areas, especially since 21 EU members are also NATO allies.²²

In sum, a united NATO and a cohesive transatlantic relationship thwart China’s desire to increase multipolarity in the international system, while a fractured NATO enables China to play Europe off America and Europe off itself.

Recommendations

Developing a united stance toward China will require NATO to synchronize regional priorities. It will also need to strengthen partnerships with other institutions and countries, given that much of what needs to be done currently falls outside NATO’s core competencies. NATO could strive for greater cohesion toward China in three areas: politics, military and technology.

Political Recommendations

To date, there is little evidence that NATO allies are coming closer to a solid political consensus on how to address China’s rise.²³ In order to operationalize allies’ views in the London Declaration on the “opportunities and challenges”²⁴ that China’s growing influence presents and limit its ability to undermine transatlantic cohesion or make further political inroads in Europe, NATO should do the following:

Consistently coordinate allied efforts to ensure that Chinese initiatives, such as the BRI or the 17+1 grouping with Central and Eastern European countries, do not allow Beijing to gain political support for Chinese positions, such as on human rights or territorial claims, and drive wedges between allies.
Increase cooperation with the EU on screening and assessing Chinese FDI in allied critical infrastructure and advanced technologies, which rely heavily on sensitive data. NATO should contribute to defining key criteria on FDI in domains with dual civilian-military applications.
Encourage allies to make full use of their existing screening mechanisms for foreign investment and encourage those that do not have one to set it up.²⁵ NATO’s EU allies should also systematically implement the EU’s foreign investment screening mechanism in order to mitigate the risks of foreign investors acquiring control over critical technologies, infrastructure, or sensitive information with potential security implications to all NATO allies. Increased transparency about Chinese FDI in critical infrastructure across NATO would help to mitigate the potential impact on NATO’s overall political cohesion.

engagement and expertise. Such partnerships could inaugurate a new consultative body, which could pave the way for more coordinated planning and intelligence sharing.²⁷

•

NATO should coordinate its efforts with the European Union in this domain, as AI and other advanced technologies are developed primarily in the private sector and can have both civilian and military applications. EU-NATO collaboration may be hampered by the fact

Enhance NATO’s political partnerships with IndoPacific countries, especially with Australia (within the “Enhanced Opportunities Partner” framework²⁶ or other tailored platforms) and Japan to strengthen interregional Military Recommendations

It would be difficult and inadvisable to reposture the Alliance toward a hypothetical contingency with China: NATO members already have varied preferences over which region should receive priority focus and, with the exception of the United States, do not have the expeditionary capabilities to project power into the Indo-Pacific region. Nevertheless, there are four areas where NATO could improve its posture vis-à-vis China:

Increased Chinese naval activity in the Mediterranean Sea, Baltic Sea, and the High North, often in collaboration with Russia, is a direct concern for NATO.²⁸ NATO need not make plans to fight China in the North Atlantic. However, as a noted NATO and maritime affairs expert argues, allies must be prepared to “monitor and interact with another growing naval power operating in waters of key interest to the transatlantic alliance.”²⁹
NATO should step up its existing military partnerships with Indo-Pacific countries, in particular in NATO exercises, the Partnership Interoperability Platform, and other capacity building programs.³⁰
Working with the EU, NATO tabletop exercises should focus on enhancing military mobility in Europe to mitigate against the effects of rising, potentially coercive Chinese investments and to secure a more robust, integrated civilian-military infrastructure.
NATO allies should continuously assess and avoid investment in Chinese military equipment that would plug into NATO’s command and control system.³¹

Technological Recommendations

NATO allies should coordinate efforts to incorporate AI-based military technologies into their national capabilities in order to avoid duplication and economize.
The roadmap on disruptive technologies adopted by NATO’s Allied Command Transformation in 2018 should guide allies toward increased and better tailored investments in military technology powered by AI, biotechnology and cyber and quantum computing. NATO should also continue to adapt its Defense Planning Process to account for rapid, fundamental technological evolution.³²

that not all EU member states or NATO allies have written national AI strategies, and as one analyst notes, “Europe’s political and strategic debate on AI-enabled military technology is underdeveloped.”³³ NATO should encourage all allies to develop their respective AI strategies, while the European Union can guide them by collecting and publishing best practices and encouraging countries to limit potentially burdensome regulations on AI before it is applied. The European Union in collaboration with NATO may also consider establishing an AI Center of Excellence.³⁴

Cybersecurity in 5G networks is another area where

NATO should coordinate its efforts with the European Union. Because this issue concerns mostly civilian networks, NATO does not have robust tools to tackle this problem alone. Thus the European Union and the European Commission in particular should lead in coordinating and implementing action. In its new “toolbox,” rolled out in January 2020, the European Union recommended measures to mitigate the cybersecurity risks of 5G.³⁵ The plan, which could ban suppliers from core parts of telecoms networks if they are identified as “high-risk” vendors, could allow European countries to limit Chinese tech giant Huawei’s role in Europe in the future. NATO allies should not only consider the EU measures when appropriate but also push for more transparency into foreign companies’ ownership structures and state influence. In general, each NATO member should strengthen oversight of telecom network security by creating mechanisms to review contracts between operators and suppliers and conducting national-level audits of the security practices of 5G companies.

In sum, NATO must strive to maintain transatlantic unity in the face of a rapidly evolving technology and global security landscape. As China seeks to divide allied democracies, it is critical for NATO allies, in coordination with the EU and other partners, to address a widening array of emerging economic, political, societal and technological challenges to the Alliance.

Authors

Naďa Kovalčíková is a Program Manager and Fellow at the Alliance for Securing Democracy at the German Marshal Fund of the United States.

Gabrielle Tarini is a Policy Analyst at the non-profit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.

References

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, opening remarks at the

Munich Security Conference, February 15, 2020, at the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE), January 21, 2020, and doorstep statement ahead of the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of State and/or Government , December 4, 2019.

NATO, London Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and

Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London 3-4, December 2019 (Brussels: NATO, December 4, 2019).

Daniel W. Drezner, “What I Learned at the Munich Security Conference,” commentary, Washington Post (February 17, 2020).
NATO, “Questions and Answers by NATO Secretary General

Jens Stoltenberg at the ‘‘NATO Engages: Innovating the Alliance’ Conference,” transcript (London: NATO, December 3, 2019).

Thilo Hanemann, Mikko Huotari and Agatha Kratz, Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 Trends and Impact of New Screening Policies, MERICS Papers on China (Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies, June 3, 2019).
Federiga Bindi, Why Did Italy Embrace the Belt and Road Initiative? commentary (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 19, 2020); Jonathan E. Hillman and Masea McCalpin, Will China’s ‘16+1’ Format Divide Europe? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 11, 2019).
Thorsten Benner et al., Authoritarian Advance: Responding to China’s Growing Political Influence in Europe, report (Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies, February 2018), p. 106, p. 15.
AFP News, “Mask Diplomacy: China Tries to Rewrite Virus Narrative,” France 24 (March 20, 2020).
Matt Schrader, Analyzing China’s Propaganda Messaging in Europe

(Alliance for Securing Democracy, March 20, 2020). See also Elizabeth Braw, “Beware of Bad Samaritans,” Foreign Policy (March 30, 2020).

Kadri Kaska, Henrik Beckvard and Tomáš Minárik, Huawei, 5G and China as a Security Threat, report (Brussels: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2019).
Lindsay Gorman, “5G Is Where China and the West Finally Diverge,” The Atlantic (January 4, 2020).
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Turkey. See also Ian Anthony, Jiayi Zhou and Fei Su, EU Security Perspectives in an Era of Connectivity: Implications for Relations with China, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, No. 2020/3 (Stockholm: SIPRI, February 2020), p.14.
Graham Webster et al., China’s Plan to ‘Lead’ in AI: Purpose,

Prospects, and Problems, blog post (Washington, DC: New America, August 1, 2017); Ryan Hass and Zach Balin, US-China Relations in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, report (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, January 10, 2019).

Gregory Allen, Understanding China’s AI Strategy: Clues to Chinese

Strategic Thinking on Artificial Intelligence and National Security, report (Washington, D.C., The Center for a New American Security,February 6, 2019), p. 8.

Alexandra Alper, Toby Sterling and Stephen Nellis, “Trump Administration Pressed Dutch Hard to Cancel China Chip-Equipment Sale: Sources,” Reuters (January 6, 2020).
Adam Liff, “China and the US Alliance System,” The China Quarterly Vol. 233 (March 2018).
Nadège Rolland, China’s Vision for a New World Order, NBR Special Report No. 83 (Washington, D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, January 2020).
Scott Harold, Chinese Views on European Defense Integration, MERICS China Monitor (Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies, December 19, 2018).
Thomas Wright and Thorsten Benner, testimony to U.S. China

Economic and Security Review Commission, hearing on “China’s Relations with U.S. Allies and Partners in Europe and the Asia Pacific,” April 5, 2018.

Keegan Elmer, “France’s Emmanuel Macron Asks Angela Merkel and Jean-Claude Juncker to Join Meeting with Xi Jinping in Paris,” South China Morning Post (March 22, 2019).
Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, China’s Policy Paper on the European Union (Brussels: Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, December 2018).
Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning, “China Brought NATO Closer Together,” War On the Rocks (February 5, 2020).
23 Noah Barkin, “The U.S. and Europe Are Speaking a Different Language on China,” Foreign Policy (February 16, 2020).
NATO, “London Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London, 3-4 December 2019” (December 4, 2019).
European Commission, Guidance to the Member States Concerning Foreign Direct Investment (FDI Screening Regulation)” (Brussels: EC, March 25, 2020).
NATO, Partnership Interoperability Initiative (Brussels: NATO, March 24, 2020).
Fabrice Pothier, How Should NATO Respond to China’s Growing Power? analysis (London: IISS, September 12, 2019).
Mercy A. Kuo, “NATO-China Council: Now Is the Time: Insights from Ian Brzezinski,” The Diplomat (October 15, 2019).
Magnus F. Nordenman, “Five Questions NATO Must Answer in the North Atlantic,” Proceedings Vol. 145, no. 3 (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, March 2019).
Ibid.
Turkey, for example, was interested in buying China’s HQ-9 missile systems in 2013 but ultimately abandoned their bid after significant pressure from other NATO allies. See Denise Der, “Why Turkey May Not Buy Chinese Missile Systems After All,” The Diplomat (May 7, 2014).
Nicholas Burns and Douglas Lute, NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis, report (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2019).
Ulrike Franke and Paola Sartori, Machine Politics: Europe and the AI Revolution, Policy Brief (Berlin: European Council on Foreign Relations, July 11, 2019).
Wendy R. Anderson and Jim Townsend, “As AI Begins to Reshape

Defense, Here’s How Europe Can Keep Up,” Defense One (May 18, 2018); Institute for Security Studies, The EU, NATO and Artificial Intelligence: New Possibilities for Cooperation? report (Paris: ISS, 2019).

EU Commission, Cybersecurity of 5G Networks – EU Toolbox of Risk Mitigating Measures (Brussels: EU, January 29, 2020).

This publication is the result of a joint WIIS DC, WIIS Brussels, WIIS France, and WIIS UK project focused on new challenges for the NATO alliance and showcasing the expertise of the Next Generation women defense experts. Through a competitive selection process six Next Generation experts were invited to participate in programs on the sidelines of the 2019 December NATO Leaders meeting. We would like to thank our six experts for their thoughtful contributions to this initiative, WIIS Global for publishing their research and the US Mission to NATO for providing the generous grant without which this project would not have been possible. With this support, we were able to turn an idea to promote greater cooperation among our affiliates and cities into a reality.

We hope this project encourages more collaboration across borders and helps bolster the overall WIIS mission of supporting women in the international security field.

The NATO Consortium Team: Michelle Shevin-Coetzee, WIIS-DC; Armida van Rij, WIIS UK; Florence Fernando and Pauline Massart, WIIS Brussels; Ottavia Ampuero

Written by Roxana Allen

It took thirty years, two generations, fifteen prime ministers, and numerous elections to appoint the first woman Prime Minister in Romania. With the introduction of the Membership Action Plan twenty years ago, NATO requested that Romania implement a 25 percent quota for women in Parliament and public service. Consequently, there are many women in leadership today. Prime Minister Viorica Dancila leads in a world confronted with violent extremism, terrorism, cyber security, and hybrid threats. While strategists have continually resigned NATO to the dustbin of history, with its original rationale of defending Europe from the Soviet Union, NATO’s membership policies have been a symbol of hope but also despair since the 1989 Revolution in Eastern Europe. NATO’s commitment to inclusion launched an enlargement process that empowered women, changed societies, and expanded peace and stability. While the “carrot” of NATO membership spurred liberal reforms, it also produced complacency and a nationalist backlash.

After its 1989 Revolution, Romania found itself without the strong cosmopolitan leadership ready to take power or embrace the West that blessed other Eastern European states—cosmopolitanism meaning those who support civil society, tolerance, human rights, rule of law, and democracy. The Czechs had Václav Havel. The Poles had Adam Michnik. The Hungarians had Miklos Haraszti. The success of these cosmopolitans and their revolutions seemed to prove Francis Fukuyama’s argument that with the end of the Cold War, liberal democracy, civil society, free markets, and the rule of law would eventually prevail in all states. As a consequence of the Stalinist nature of the Ceausescu regime, Romania did not have any outspoken cosmopolitan leadership. The West’s seemingly disorganized engagement, which did not embrace the Romanian intellectuals, allowed for the growth of nationalism in Romania á la Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations.” In his vision of competing civilizations, “the fundamental source of conflict…in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic…its center-piece becomes the interaction between the West and non-Western civilizations and among non-Western civilizations.” This interaction was best demonstrated in Romania in 1991 when coal miners smashed their way into Bucharest, attacking students, intellectuals, and Westerners. Raised in the Stalinism of Ceausescu, then fed by nationalism, the lumpenproletariat continually tried to destroy Western norms.

The cosmopolitans of Bucharest, Cluj, and Timisoara needed help to establish Western norms in all of Romania, as Dr. Adrian Nastase stated: “The Balkans zone needs not only financial support, but also an outspoken desire from the part of the developed states to offer the former room for integration in their community…Establishment of democracy in the former communist countries needs an economic support and a political one as well.” After the creation of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program, the Western desire to support democracy and integration was affirmed. Enforcing the Dayton Agreement and peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in 1995, NATO became the primary Western means of implementing cosmopolitan intervention. Cosmopolitans, as Mary Kaldor describes in New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, are buttressed by Western armed forces. The perceived NATO commitment to Romania’s and the Balkan’s efforts to establish Western norms led to the election of new democratic leadership under President Emil Constantinescu in 1996.

The successful NATO intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina had emboldened NATO’s leadership to redefine the Alliance’s mission and attempt to provide a “carpet of stability” in Europe through enlargement. This carpet, intended to support those cosmopolitans who led their nations to freedom in 1989 and faced growing domestic intolerance, soon developed holes. Referring to the enlargement of NATO in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, Charles Gati explains that “the post-communist success stories that most people expected to write themselves after 1989 have turned into tales with rather mixed plot lines.” As NATO stumbled, so did the establishment of Western norms in Romania. Constantinescu’s corrupt and divisive government was not that different from the previous one. By 1998, during NATO’s war in Kosovo, Western norms were openly challenged in Romania. Once again, the dangers to democracy began to reveal themselves in Romania.

The introduction of the Membership Action Plan (MAP) at the Washington NATO Summit in 1999 provided guidelines for NATO membership and strengthened Western norms in Romania. NATO membership was the main plank of Adrian Nastase’s election bid in 2000. With the new elections and with MAP as a guide, Prime Minister Nastase instituted the National Action Plan for NATO. Aside from military issues, this plan led to more progress in the reform of laws, regional cooperation, disarmament, protection of the national minorities and human rights, a 25 percent quota of women in Parliament and public service, combating organized crime and international terrorism, and fighting and eradicating corruption. Although NATO and EU memberships were obvious benchmarks for the Action Plan, the real goals were to reinforce Western norms in Romania – in effect, to change Romanian society.

NATO enlargement as a defender of cosmopolitan values became internalized, changing domestic politics. As NATO enlargement became more dynamic, so did the entrenchment of democracy in Romania. As enlargement waned, so did freedom in Romania. NATO became the force maintaining and expanding political stability from the Atlantic to Urals. NATO membership became more than a destination; it was the only tool the leaders could use to instill Western norms in their country. Their real goals, like those of the early Western European cosmopolitan leaders, were to create and reinforce Western norms in Europe, in effect, to make their countries “normal.” Fifteen years ago in 2004, Romania joined NATO after the Prague Summit in November 2002. NATO enlargement converted a totalitarian Romania into a free democracy and made Romania a better place. Better, however, does not mean perfect or even just.

NATO could use lessons learned to expand peace and stability to other regions beyond Europe, though as the example of states that emerged from totalitarianism show—Romania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Georgia—the process will be painful. Paul Wolfowitz stated, “If you think where Romania started from at the end of the Ceausescu era, it has come a terrifically long way. If you think about some of the problems that remain, then obviously the transition still has some work to do. What I think is impressive is, considering how embedded old totalitarian system was here, Romanians are an inspiring example to people in Iraq and elsewhere in the world in what you can achieve with freedom.” Under continued Western engagement, Iraq and other countries could be like Romania and most of Eastern Europe today, an imperfect but progressing democracy.

In a paradigm shift, Secretary General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg and Deputy Secretary General of NATO Rose Gottemoeller placed women’s empowerment at the center of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda by recognizing the impact conflict has on women and girls: “Empowering women is not just the right thing to do, it’s the smart thing to do: it makes countries safer and more stable. NATO is determined to make a difference, including through our training and operations – for example, by deploying gender advisers to local communities in Afghanistan. We also aim to raise the profile of women at all levels within the Alliance. We still need to do more, but for NATO, peace and security are not just a man’s world.” In January 2018, to support full and equal participation of women at all levels of conflict prevention to post-war reconstruction, and protection of women and girls from sexual violence in conflict, Mr. Stoltenberg appointed a NATO Secretary General’s Special Representative. Clare Hutchinson is the high-level focal point for the NATO Women, Peace and Security Agenda. As a provider of peace and security assistance and capacity building, NATO is reforming itself into a human-centric organization by empowering women as agents of change, implementing innovative programs in collective defense, crisis management, and security cooperation to contribute to a modern, ready and responsive NATO in a changing world. Gender becomes the driving force and advances NATO’s cooperation with other international organizations such as the African Union (AU), the European Union (EU), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations (UN) and grass-roots civil society. Moreover, the newly created NATO’s Civil Society Advisory Panel provides a safe space for all women to engage with NATO on security cooperation and defense. Addressing women’s empowerment from all dimensions, including equal participation of women at all levels of conflict prevention, post-war reconstruction of governments and implementation of the 25 percent quota of women in Parliament and public service will lead to more changes from the inside. More women in leadership will expand peace and stability beyond Romania and Europe in a rapidly globalized world.

_____________________________

Roxana Allen is the Deputy Vice President at IIA NOVA, SAIS Johns Hopkins Alumna and a WIIS member. Ms. Allen was a Personal Adviser to the Prime Minister of Romania during Romania’s accession to NATO and the Head of Field Office Trebinje with OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina during NATO’s intervention in Kosovo.

By Ashley Bandura and Mercedes Blackwood

Women continue to be sidelined in ongoing efforts to end the Syrian civil war, which so far has cost more than 400,000 lives and displaced as many as 13 million people.¹Yet they share fully in the suffering: Syrian women have been targeted for kidnapping, arbitrary arrests, and sexual violence, and they are often used as collateral for negotiations and extortion. The group Raqqa Is Being Slaughtered Silently has documented hundreds of cases of women being forced into marriage with ISIS fighters, with about a third of them under age 18.²The issues Syrian women face cannot be separated from the considerable challenge of resolving the Syrian conflict.

Since 2012, attempts at peace talks have failed to achieve meaningful ceasefires or deescalate the conflict. Ensuring women’s meaningful participation in stabilization and peace efforts in Syria is thus a strategic security imperative. Such participation will promote a more inclusive, enduring, and stable democratic society. Women’s participation in peace agreements has been shown to critically affect their sustainability, with 64 percent of agreements being less likely to fail if women are at the negotiating table. Additionally, agreements such as ceasefires are 35 percent more likely to last at least 15 years if women participate in their negotiation.³

Female leaders have been consistently underrepresented in Syrian delegations to high-level international meetings and ceasefire negotiations.⁴Peace talks in Geneva and the initial round in Astana lacked women’s participation entirely (box 1). The failure of these talks resulted from many factors: competing global interests, geopolitical maneuvering, regional instability, and obstruction by parties to the negotiations. But the absence of women is surely an important factor as well.

In early 2017, Syrian civil society organizations called upon the Syrian opposition and the international community to ensure that the delegation to any future talks include at least 30 percent women.⁵In the last round of Astana talks in October 2017, women made up 16 percent of the negotiators. They raised critical issues in areas where women have been at the forefront of action on the ground. Syrian women have negotiated local ceasefires, deescalated fighting so aid could pass through, organized nonviolent protests, monitored and documented war crimes, led humanitarian efforts for displaced Syrians, and worked in schools and hospitals while the conflict raged.⁶ By finding consensus on controversial issues related to aid delivery and the release of detainees, for example, the Women’s Advisory Board has demonstrated what women can do.⁷

This policy brief outlines barriers to women’s participation in Syrian peace and stabilization, major challenges they face regarding protection in the war, the lack of aid and resources for recovery, and steps the United States can take to ensure they are included in future efforts.

Barriers to Women’s Participation

Despite the efforts of the Syrian Women’s Network and the Women’s Advisory Board, Syrian women remain largely absent from the negotiating table. Even when women have been part of high-level peace talks, they are silenced or pushed into supporting roles.

Timeline of Negotiations

Geneva I Conference, June 2012 – US and Russian officials, and other major powers met to agree on a road map for peace. No women present at the peace table or on the margins of talks. Geneva II Conference, January 2014 – The UN fails to break deadlock between opposition and the government and blames the Syrian government’s refusal to entertain the opposition’s demands. Few women, with limited roles at the negotiating table. Vienna Process, 2015 – All 20 members of the International Syria Support Group met to outline a transitional plan and timetable for formal talks. No women were involved. Geneva III, January 2016 – The Syrian government and opposition refused to sit in the same room, talks were suspended. No women were involved.

Their absence from high-level talks belies the realities on the ground, where many women have taken on informal leadership roles in the wake Syrian Arab Spring in 2011 and subsequently because of the absence of men.⁸ Eightyfive percent of those killed inside Syria have been men.⁹ According to reports by CARE International, females head 12 to 17 percent of households in Syria and up to one-third of households in refugee-hosting countries.¹⁰ With high rates of male casualties, women must be breadwinners and caregivers in a broken system that is ill equipped to provide basic services they need for survival.

Although women have additional responsibilities, cultural, physical, and structural barriers often prevent them from assuming formal leadership roles. These include social stigma, lack of education or specialized training, economic deficiencies, safety hazards, and limited mobility. Culturally, most Syrian women are raised with stereotypical gender roles and expectations. They thus may be apprehensive of leadership roles that have traditionally belonged to men. According to a 2017 study by Bareeq Education and Development, 81 percent of women surveyed said that “the social norms in Syria truly impede women’s success.”¹¹

They may also find it difficult to obtain work that does not jeopardize their safety or their sense of what is honorable for a woman.¹² Syrian women living outside the country— particularly Turkey, Lebanon, or Jordan—may not have the right to work in their host country.¹³ With the added economic pressure for both men and women, many women face increased stress.¹⁴ In cases where female heads of households find jobs, their income is less than that of male heads of households. Dedicated resources for services, protection, security, and training for women inside and outside Syria are critical, given the new roles, dearth of job opportunities, and safety hazards they face.

Timeline of Women’s Participation

Syrian Women’s Network, May 2013 – 200 individuals and 29 NGO’s formed the Network to develop a new Syrian constitution and a set of laws with full equality of women. Syrian Women’s Initiative for Peace, 2013 – 50 women representing civil society, including 8 members of the Syrian Women’s Network established the Initiative to promote the peace process, and bring women directly into the negotiations. They demanded a 30% quota of female participants in the Geneva II Sessions. Syrian Women’s Advisory Board, February 2016 – Politically unaffiliated group of 12 women. The Board does not participate directly in talks, but advises mediators on proceedings. SWN withdrew based on critiques of transparency. Syrian Women Peacemakers Conference, May 2016 – 130 Syrian women met in Beirut, Lebanon and forged a statement of unity to further the work of Syrian women.

Their lack of physical security and restricted mobility also keep women from engaging meaningfully in political roles. The destruction of infrastructure and the economy have constrained women’s ability to move freely, and heightened security concerns make travel dangerous for them. Cultural limitations for women’s travel alone outside the home exacerbate the mobility and security barriers. Limited movement makes it more difficult for women to participate in local initiatives and heightens economic barriers.

Structural barriers include economic, legal, and educational limitations. Discriminatory laws and lack of education or skills discourage women from standing for elected office or other leadership positions.¹⁵ The selection process for local councilors highlights these structural challenges. Local councils are often not elected but rather selected based on familial ties or community standing, which women have not had the opportunity to develop.

Shifting governance structures in a fragile environment also make it difficult for women to grasp or maintain a foothold for meaningful change and to realize their full potential. Where councils are elected, they are often limited in capacity and plagued by turnover. Active women would therefore rather get involved in civil society than government, which they may see as lacking legitimacy and effectiveness. When women are elected to government positions, it is often for superficial roles. In government-controlled areas women are included to showcase modernization; in opposition-controlled areas they are included to attract attention from international donors.¹⁶ Despite public support for quotas for women in public administration, women thus remain underutilized, as real power stays in the hands of a few male elites.

According to the UN special envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, the next priority should be a political process for Syria that includes drafting a new constitution as well as developing an election process.¹⁷ Thus women’s role in peacebuilding must go beyond peace negotiations. Women should be involved in all political decision making. The international community should continue to provide tools and training for women so that they can meaningfully engage in elections and constitution building when the time comes. Conflicts can sometimes provide an opportunity to fast track progress for women in political spheres. Opening formal and informal channels for women’s participation that were previously restricted to Syrian men would be one way for such progress to emerge out of the Syrian conflict.

UN and international organizations’ efforts to boost women’s collective voice have created demands and opportunities for women’s inclusion that could contribute meaningfully to Syria’s transition to peace. Their local successes demonstrate the value and credibility they can bring to the negotiating table and in reconstruction.

Protection from Harm and Abuse

Women are particularly vulnerable to harm and abuse. An understanding of preconflict gender dynamics in Syria is essential for assessing how the conflict has increased the vulnerability of Syrian women. Including women in negotiations to end the conflict will enable them to advocate for women and to prioritize solutions to harms and abuses that disproportionally affect women. Many of these are related to forced migration and decreased security: genderbased violence, abuse by security forces, and economic marginalization.

More than five million refugees have fled Syria, 48.4 percent of whom are female.¹⁸ They are increasingly vulnerable to assault, kidnapping, and gender-based violence. On some routes, as many as half of women surveyed reported experiencing sexual assault during their journey, and many take birth control to avoid getting pregnant from rape.¹⁹ An initial assessment report conducted in 2015 revealed that women were sometimes forced to engage in transactional sex as to pay for travel.²⁰

The lack of security and the breakdown of the rule of law make women targets. Terrorist groups, security forces, and border guards alike harass and assault them. These abuses increase distrust of state security providers and force women to rely on informal or extralegal familial and communal ties for protection.²¹ Yet even these networks are failing them as their communities are shattered and they lose male allies.

Armed groups kidnap women in transit and use them as hostages in prisoner exchanges.²² Reuter’s news service has documented how ISIS kidnapped women refugees in transit to Europe to provide their fighters with sex slaves.²³ CNN reported that women in ISIS-held territory in Syria were forced into marriage with fighters.²⁴ Women refugees who manage to arrive in camps find that they are often unsecured and poorly resourced.²⁵

Lack of Resources for Relief and Recovery

As the conflict endures, women have gained a measure of agency as they undertake relief and recovery efforts. Despite the overwhelming challenges, Syrian women are filling gaps in society and providing basic needs to their families and communities. As women play a larger role in relief and recovery, it is fundamental that they be included in strategies for peacebuilding and long-term stability. Otherwise, transitions to democracy and peace will not be successful.

Relief efforts in Syria continue regardless of the status of humanitarian assistance from abroad. Women in traditional roles such as health professionals, educators, and mothers are well placed to rebuild, educate, and sustain their communities postconflict. Where health and rehabilitation services are no longer available, women step in to care for the elderly, injured, and others in need of specialized care. Where schools have closed, it is often mothers who fill the void and educate children.²⁶ In refugee camps, women have started to engage in home-based entrepreneurial activities. As women take on these roles, they will need specialized training to carry them out more effectively.

Recovery efforts are not waiting for the resolution of the conflict either, and women are central. Syrian women’s involvement can help close strategic gaps in the fight against ISIS. But for recovery efforts to move forward, women’s substantive roles must be recognized and their needs must be addressed.

Recommendations

The development and security sectors should continue to address barriers that hinder women’s participation in peacebuilding efforts. Likewise, it is important to keep studying the conditions that facilitate women’s involvement so that these conditions can be leveraged to increase women’s roles and representation in peacebuilding.

As part of the implementation of the Women, Peace, and

Security (WPS) Act, which was signed into law in October 2017, the U.S. government will develop a governmentwide strategy to integrate gender perspectives across its diplomatic, development, and defense-related work in conflict-affected environments. The U.S. national strategy required by the WPS Act must emphasize the importance of understanding the barriers and facilitating conditions for women’s representation in mediation, negotiation, humanitarian efforts, and political development.

Applying this strategy to Syrian women will enable the U.S. government to meet the goal, articulated in January 2017 by the secretary of state, of a stable, unified, and independent Syria, free of terrorist threats and free of weapons of mass destruction.²⁷ Implementing this plan with Syrian women is in the best economic and security interest of the entire region, as the Syrian conflict continues to overwhelm neighboring countries. As negotiations begin and recovery efforts ensue, it is imperative that the inclusion of women in decision making is a top priority for achieving and then maintaining peace.

As the U.S. government engages, the following recommendations should inform an inclusive Syrian peace process:

Breaking down Barriers for Leadership and Participation

Promote women in negotiations and build their credibility as essential partners at the negotiating table. Increasing awareness of the importance of women in peacebuilding and encouraging their participation are important. However, it must be clear what the women who are brought to the table are there to represent. Women cannot be brought to the negotiating table just to represent women but must be credible leaders for their causes, whether it be a political party or an organization representing a certain sector of civil society. Women’s participation at the negotiating table must be mainstreamed from the grassroots level for women to be viewed as credible actors once they are appointed to participate in negotiations or peacebuilding efforts. Training for women on building coalitions and on mediation and negotiation skills can boost women’s credibility.
Support activities that provide women with the necessary tools and training they need to increase their political participation. As women’s roles continue to evolve amid the Syrian conflict, programming supported by the international community will need to enhance women leaders’ capacity for governing, as the UN and other external actors will focus on a political solution and Syrian opposition will need to be ready to work toward a solid democratic framework.
Connect politically active women outside the country with women who are formal or informal leaders inside Syria, and build upon existing networks. By strengthening the work of existing networks through better coordination, the efforts of these women can be enhanced and used to highlight examples for other reconstruction and reconciliation efforts. The Women’s Advisory Board should play a larger role in coordinating efforts internally with negotiations and advocacy externally. When women leaders work together, regardless of their roles or stances, they can serve as unified advocates for more inclusive institutions as Syria rebuilds.
Use the negotiation process to develop more inclusive governing institutions in Syria. The trauma and destruction created by conflicts seems insurmountable at times, yet transitions can also provide unique opportunities for change. The parties to negotiations should recognize this and push for more inclusive policies that will govern the Syrian elections and the writing of a new constitution. Any outcomes of negotiations should take advantage of the opening to facilitate a new culture of citizenship.

Protection from Harm

Examine preconflict gender dynamics, and collect disaggregated data on the standards, issues, and roles that women live with as a result of the turmoil in Syria. A thorough understanding of Syrian women’s historical and traditional roles is required to fully appreciate how women have been affected by war. Disaggregated data on within-country and refugee conditions can provide implementing organizations with key information needed to design responsive interventions. It is important to consistently track and measure gender and diversity dynamics throughout the conflict in order to draw key lessons for the diplomatic and humanitarian communities.
Provide resources and support to protect women from harm. Including more women in security forces and creating a more responsive security sector can empower women and ensure that law enforcement considers female perspectives. This is important for police, military, and peacekeeping forces inside Syria and in refugee hosting countries. By training more women to contribute to security and policing, women’s perspectives can be incorporated and unique challenges can be given the attention they need. Women trained to serve in the security sector may be more receptive to claims of genderbased violence and other gender-specific problems. Women may also be more inclined to report offenses such as assault to female security agents than to male counterparts.
Increase awareness of the unique issues women face in conflict and their unique roles in mitigating difficulties and reconciling conflicts. The barriers to political participation and safety that women face globally are exacerbated in conflict. By spreading awareness, the security and humanitarian sectors can provide more targeted support to address the challenges women face in conflict zones. The media can play an important role in building this awareness and in showcasing women’s resilience and strength in overcoming challenges, thus increasing the recognition they deserve as powerful forces for change.

Resources for Relief and Recovery

Provide technical and career training for Syrian women so that they can build skills that will allow them to obtain work and contribute to rebuilding the economy. It is imperative to equip Syrian women with skills they can use long term in conjunction with financial resources. Training on topics such as business development, financial management, and negotiation should be included to ensure that women can effectively fill the gaps in the economy that typically result from high numbers of male casualties during the war.
Include more women in strategic planning for rehabilitating infrastructure now rather than waiting until the conflict is resolved. This will prepare women to move recovery efforts forward when opportunities are presented. It will also allow women to develop realistic expectations and knowledge on how to troubleshoot issues when the time comes for reconstruction efforts.
Increase educational opportunities for specialized skills. As women continue to serve informally in relief roles such as medical and special care, the international donor community can build on their skills by providing them opportunities to gain formal education in these roles. Such opportunities could take the form of scholarships for technical schooling or educational exchange programs.

About the Authors

Ashley Bandura works as a Governance Specialist at the International Republican Institute’s Center for Global Impact. Ashley joined IRI in 2016 where she has focused on citizen-centered governance, electoral transitions, political party capacity building, and conflict management. She has conducted trainings and managed programs with elected officials in MENA, Asia, Latin America, and Africa. She holds a Master’s of Arts in International Development from The George Washington University.

Mercedes Blackwood has been working at the International Republican Institute (IRI) since June of 2016 where she is a

Senior Program Associate in the Women’s Democracy Network (WDN.) Currently, she is working alongside IRI’s Syria team to support moderate, democratic activists standing in opposition to both the Assad regime and Islamist extremists. Mercedes also oversees WDN’s Women, Peace, and Security programming, which focuses on women’s political inclusion during conflict, transition of power, and reconciliation efforts and the Arab Women’s Leadership Institute. Previously, Mercedes worked for

U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham and for the Republican National Committee on several state and federal level campaigns. Prior to these positions, Mercedes was an athlete for the U.S.A. Bobsled and Skeleton team where she was training for the 2018 winter Olympics. She received her Bachelors in Political Science from the University of Idaho.

References

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “About the Crisis.”
Arwa Damon and Gul Tuysuz, “Syrian Woman: I Had to Marry an ISIS Police Chief to Save My Father’s Life,” CNN (February 4, 2015).
Michelle Barsa et al., “Inclusive Ceasefires: Women, Gender, and a Sustainable End to Violence,” (Washington, DC: Inclusive Security, March 2016).
Women’s participation is often measured by how many women are included as mediators and negotiators. Mediators are defined as third-party affiliates who work with belligerent parties to regulate negotiations, while negotiators are considered individuals directly participating in Track 1 negotiations.
Council on Foreign Relations, “Syrian Women at the Table,” Case Studyies:Syria, web page, https://www.cfr.org/interactive/womensparticipation-in-peace-processes/syria.
Rafif Jouejati, “Women Are Invisible at the Syria Peace Talks,” PassBlue (February 23, 2017).
CFR, “Syrian Women at the Table.”
Daniel Hilton, “Syrian Women at Risk of Losing New Economic Power to Tradition,” Worldcrunch (January 23, 2018).
Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Updated Statistical Analysis of Documentation of Killings in the Syrian Arab Republic, (OHCHR, 2014).

Beatrix Buecher and James Rwampigi Aniyamuzaala, “Women, Work & War: Syrian Women and the Struggle to Survive Five Years of Conflict,” (Amman: CARE International, 2016).
“Syrian Women’s Perceptions of Women’s Rights, Work, Education, and Vocational Skills, Bareeq Education and Development,” (Amman: Bareeq Education and Development, May 2017), http://bareeqeducation.org/wp-content/uploads/syrian_women_survey_2017.pdf. 12. Buecher and Aniyamuzaala, “Women, Work & War.”
1. Anthony Tirado Chase, Routledge Handbook on Human Rights and the Middle East and North Africa (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2016), p. 202.
1. Buecher and Aniyamuzaala, “Women, Work & War.”
1. Razan Ghazzawi et al., “Peacebuilding Defines Our Future Now: A Study of Women’s Peace Activism in Syria” (Istanbul: Badael Foundation, 2015), http://www.badael.org/wp-content/ uploads/2015/10/Syria_october22.pdf.
1. Rana Khalaf et al., “Women Participation in Syrian Cities Today,” Euro-Mediterranean Women’s Foundation, 2017, https://docs.

euromedwomen.foundation/files/ermwf-documents/7096_3.180.wome npartcipationinsyriancitiestoday-emergingrolesandopportunities.pdf.

Ibid.
1. UNHCR, “Registered Syrian Refugees,” interagency information sharing portal, last updated 19 April 2018, 2017, http://data.unhcr.org/ syrianrefugees/regional.php.

Anja Parish, “Gender-Based Violence against Women: Both Cause for Migration and Risk along the Journey” (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2017).
1. Rebecca Eapen et al., “Initial Assessment Report: Protection

Risks for Women and Girls in the European Refugee and Migrant Crisis” (Washington, DC: UNHCR, UNFPA, Women’s Refugee Commission, 2015).

Joshua Rogers et al., “Security Barriers to Women’s Public Participation in the Middle East,” (London: Saferworld, November 11, 2013).
- OHCHR, “Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic,” (n.d.), retrieved November 8, 2017, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/ IndependentInternationalCommission.aspx.
- “Dozens of Eritrean and Nigerian for Islamic State Captives Freed in Libya,” Reuters (April 5, 2017).
- Damon, “I Had to Marry an ISIS Police Chief.”
- OHCHR, “Independent International Commission of Inquiry.”
- Buecher and Aniyamuzaala, “Women, Work & War.”
- Rex Tillerson, “Remarks for the Way Forward for the United States Regarding Syria,” US State Department, January 17, 2018.

By Linda Staheli

When one thinks of diplomatic engagement with North Korea – officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) – what comes to mind are countless official and unofficial dialogues and negotiations regarding its nuclear capabilities peppered with various incentives, typically in the form of food, fertilizer, and energy assistance. At this particularly unsettling time in relations with the DPRK, where key official communication avenues are increasingly limited, it is more important than ever to open new channels of engagement. Non-official exchanges, involving non-governmental organizations (NGOs), universities, and private companies, can and do play a critical role. These must be expanded, however, as citizens often have the potential to do what governments cannot. Fortunately, such citizento-citizen engagements generally have been encouraged by both governments: in recent years, the DPRK has sent economic, medical, and sports related delegations to the United States; and a number of official and unofficial U.S. delegations have traveled to the DPRK, including the New York Philharmonic, former President Jimmy Carter, former Governor Bill Richardson, Google Executive Chairman Eric Schmidt, and most recently, retired basketball star Dennis Rodman.

Among the many avenues for engagement, science diplomacy deserves special recognition. Scientists, engineers, and innovators are problem solvers who speak a common global language and value transparency, fairness, logic, reasoning, and questioning. While cultural diplomacy such as music and sports can be a source of entertainment and enrichment, science diplomacy via research partnerships in such areas as agriculture, health, or environmental sciences can help – albeit over a long time period – give a country the ability to prosper, grow, and deepen practical ties. Over the past 20 years, I’ve had the privilege of witnessing the multitude of benefits of engaging globally to tackle challenging issues by implementing science and innovation engagements with Japan, South Korea, Russia, South Africa, Mexico, and various European countries.

CRDF Global Charles Dunlap presents on Virtual Science Library (VSL) to the President of Kim Chaek University, at Syracuse University in 2010 ©Linda Stahelil

CRDF Global , an NGO created by the U.S. Congress that specializes in building global science engagements, helped to found the U.S.-DPRK Scientific Engagement Consortium with colleagues from Syracuse University, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the Pacific Century Institute (PCI), and the DPRK State Academy of Sciences (SAOS). We spent two years building understanding and trust with our DPRK colleagues – on a foundation established by Syracuse University, by meeting with senior leadership of the DPRK United Nations Mission (the only official representative in the U.S.), and bringing these officials to AAAS annual meetings in Boston, Chicago, and San Diego. In 2009, we were the first U.S. science delegation hosted by the SAOS in Pyongyang, where we visited scientific institutes, met with students, gave and listened to lectures, and signed an agreement that resulted in a DPRK delegation traveling to Atlanta, GA in 2011. During that exchange we continued to build our understanding of how best to establish U.S.-DPRK partnerships in non-sensitive but critical areas of research. This involved scientists and officials from other organizations and universities, including the Carter Center, Emory University, Georgia Institute of Technology, Johns Hopkins University, Stanford University, University of Georgia, and the University of Missouri.

Following these reciprocal delegation visits and with the support of the Henry Luce Foundation, we then launched a number of capacity-building efforts outlined in our joint agreements, including training DPRK scientists in the English language and enabling internet access to global publications via a virtual science library. The next step is to identify one of a number of proposals the DPRK presented at a workshop CRDF Global organized on behalf of the Consortium in 2012 at the Rockefeller Foundation’s Bellagio Center in Italy, aimed at building possible collaborations in non-sensitive areas of research, such as watershed management, deforestation, biodiversity, salmon hatcheries, and ecology restoration. Projects like these have the potential to address critical issues of environmental insecurity in the DPRK and make a tangible impact on the quality of lives of its citizens.

While our DPRK counterparts have had limited funding, they have been incredibly responsive, knowledgeable, resourceful, hospitable, and shown a deep interest and commitment to our joint collaboration. Science diplomacy has ambitious objectives, but its ability to bring people together, irrespective of geopolitical factors, is remarkable. Our informal interactions have included playing ping pong in Pyongyang‘s Koryo Hotel, sharing stories of our children, singing songs in an Atlanta brew house, and listening to “American Pie” by Madonna in the Grand People’s Study House. We watched as our Nobel Laureate delegation leader sang the periodic table in his toast at the welcome dinner, and later presented as a farewell gift the tie that he wore when he received the Nobel Prize in Chemistry. Through many conversations and engagements, we have come to learn that our science colleagues in the DPRK are not so different from us. They want peace and prosperity, respect, and the ability to solve their own challenges. Despite this desire, the DPRK’s isolation means that it lacks the ability to transform its economy without outside assistance. Development aid, such as fertilizer or food, has an important humanitarian function and can support relations during negotiations, but collaboration with scientists and engineers is fundamentally necessary to support the long-term development of the state.

Engagement on technical issues is thus an essential requirement for future transformation of the DPRK.

In sum, while science engagement is not a panacea for the tensions that have recurred between the U.S. and the DPRK, it has the potential over the long term to significantly boost joint objectives in understanding critical scientific challenges, while helping the DPRK move into the global science community. At the same time, it gives the U.S. a window into a country that we need to better understand, in the hopes that over time we can build a stronger foundation and move together toward a more hopeful, secure and amicable future.

CRDF Global specializes in building global science engagements, particularly in challenging environments. Starting with the states of Eurasia then branching out to Iraq, other Middle Eastern countries, and now globally, CRDF Global works in over 40 countries to build capacity, research exchanges, and innovation engagements that give hope to countries seeking to build peace and prosperity. For more information on science diplomacy click here. The Consortium website can be found by clicking here.

Artificial Intelligence Is Already Transforming the Alliance: It’s Time for NATO and the EU to Catch Up

China’s Rise and Its Implications for NATO

China’s Perception of NATO

Recommendations

Political Recommendations

Technological Recommendations

Authors

References

Barriers to Women’s Participation

Protection from Harm and Abuse

Lack of Resources for Relief and Recovery

Recommendations

Breaking down Barriers for Leadership and Participation

Protection from Harm

Resources for Relief and Recovery

About the Authors

References