On the Origins of Resolution 13251
A Unique Resolution
UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (“the Resolution”), adopted in 2000, was a unique, path-breaking resolution that gave women an active role with real agency in peace processes. In retrospect, the 1990s was a period of great leaps forward for women’s rights globally, and it is important to recall this from the perspective of the 2020s, when much of this progress is being challenged, threatened, and undermined. Resolution 1325 was a way to summarize the achievements of the 1990s and bring them firmly into the UN system. The number of peace processes going on in armed conflicts in the 1990s was high and impressive. Thus, it was timely to not only discuss how women were affected by the many wars, but also how to give them an independent voice as part of the processes that ended these conflicts.
By introducing measurable action points into the Resolution itself, it became possible for the UN to continuously return to the issues raised, at the highest level of the UN system: the UN Security Council. UNSCR 1325 remains one of the most well-known UN resolutions, although it was not taken under Chapter VII and thus, was not compulsory for the entire UN membership. Its links to women’s organizations and other civil society movements have contributed to making it relevant. The measurable actions included in the Resolution also make clear that progress was difficult, particularly in the 2020s, when peace processes have been stalled, abandoned, or replaced by further military action. Thus, “1325” remains a vision waiting to be fully implemented.
The Resolution built on a document called the Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action (“the Declaration”) (UN Document S/2000/693). This, in turn, was the outcome of a meeting in Namibia in May 2000 of a project initiated by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) Lesson Learned Unit, led by Dr. Leonard Kapungu. Dr. Kapungu, a long-time colleague and friend from our early studies of economic sanctions, approached me and the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University in Sweden for a study of gender mainstreaming in peacekeeping operations. As there were several gifted young scholars in the Department interested in this topic, we agreed to conduct the project2. By May 2000, we were ready to report our findings. This event did not turn out to be a regular scholarly seminar with standard academic reporting. Instead, its chair, Dame Margret Anstee, turned the meeting into a policy workshop. The result of this was the Windhoek Declaration, which then was taken to New York by some of the participants. There, it gradually worked its way into a full-fledged UN resolution, accepted during Namibia’s last day of chairing the Security Council on October 31, 2000.
Declaration vs. Resolution
It is possible to compare the more academic Declaration to the politically-based Resolution. In a way, it demonstrates how scholarly work can filter itself into policy. Resolution 1325 is very clear and specific–presumably an effect of the scholarly impact–but it is also more operative than the Declaration. Our project emphasized definitional issues, empirical observations, and generalizations. Not surprisingly, the Windhoek Declaration had many propositions for further research!
As is clear from the origins of this effort, the Windhoek Declaration focused on peacekeeping, while the Resolution is considerably wider in its ambition. The Declaration contained 38 specific proposals, the Resolution just 20, but often with a wider scope. The Resolution clearly benefited from the Declaration, but it also avoided some of the proposals from the Windhoek seminar.
The first line in the Declaration reads, “Equal access and participation by women and men should be ensured in the area of conflict at all levels and stages of the peace process.” It can be compared to the first lines in the operative section of Resolution 1325 where the Council “urges Member States to ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict” (italics in the original text). As can be seen, both documents underline the importance of “all levels.” The word “participation” was, however, replaced with “representation,” which–to this author–is somewhat weaker.
Resolution 1325 “urges the Secretary-General to appoint more women as Special Representatives and envoys to pursue good offices on his behalf” (italics in the original text). The Declaration said that “more determined efforts must be made to select and appoint female Special Representatives of the Secretary General and senior field staff for peace support operations.” Again, there is a strong parallel in the importance of changing the appointment procedures, but here the Resolution seems more straightforward than the original Declaration.
Resolution 1325 went on to tackle one of the most frequent counter-arguments to having more women in top positions–that there are no qualified female candidates available–by calling on “member states to provide candidates to the Secretary-General for inclusion in a regularly updated centralized roster.” This is a clear reflection of the corresponding statement in the Windhoek Declaration that “a comprehensive database with information specifically on female candidates with qualifications both military and civilian, should be maintained.”
These parallels make it interesting to also observe discrepancies. At the deliberations in the project and in the workshop in Windhoek, there were obvious fears, based on research that gender issues would not be taken seriously unless there was a particular unit assigned to this task. Resolution 1325 addressed this by saying that the Council is willing “to incorporate a gender perspective into peacekeeping operations, and urges the Secretary-General to ensure that, where appropriate, field operations include a gender component.”
This was an issue discussed extensively in the project. There was agreement on the need for such a unit, but there were also concerns it could easily be marginalized within any organization or operation. Thus, the Declaration had stronger language in this regard: “A gender affairs unit is crucial for effective gender mainstreaming and should be a standard component of all missions. It should be adequately funded and staffed at appropriate levels and should have direct access to senior decision-makers” (italics added by the author).
Clearly, the penholders formulating Resolution 1325 retreated from the Declaration’s tougher language and instead expressed a “willingness” to incorporate a gender perspective, stretching itself only to establishing a “gender component” and then only “where appropriate.” The UN was not ready for a separate, authoritative, and competent UN Women’s unit in 2000. Ten years later, times would change.
Beyond “1325”
The Declaration and the work behind it clearly informed the UN Security Council on what would be required to pursue a purposeful policy of gender mainstreaming. Research and practice had an impact. The resulting Resolution was a historical contribution: It moved the issue of gender equality in peacemaking forward and continues to be important, yet it is not fully implemented. The resolution did not go as far as researchers and practitioners would have wanted it to.
It is tempting to ask: “What research today should have guided a Security Council resolution on this issue?” For example, there are now more findings on the close connection between gender and peace in terms of more gender-equal societies having fewer wars, armed conflicts, and human right violations. This would have to be included if the Resolution is to be consistent with current research3. There is also an increasing scholarly basis for challenging traditional understandings of masculinity4. This would also be appropriate to incorporate in a follow-up resolution. Thus, research moves deeper into the questions of gender and war. But, the political winds are going in the entirely opposite direction, at least for the time being. Possibly one could hope for Resolution 1325 2.0, but today it might result in a reversal and an abandonment of this perspective. But times will change, again, making progress possible by, say, 2030?
Notes
[1] This essay builds on my chapter: Peter Wallensteen, “Resolution 1325 (2000): A Note on its Background and Formulation,” in Peter Wallensteen: A Pioneer in Making Peace Researchable (Springer, 2021): https://www.springer.com/gp/book/9783030628475.
[2] For an account of this see Louise Olsson et al., “Preparatory Workshop on Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations” (Executive Summary), Uppsala University: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 1999.
[3] See for instance Elin Bjarnegård et al., “Gender, Peace and Armed Conflict,” in SIPRI Yearbook 2015 (Oxford University Press, 2015). This includes work by Mary Caprioli (see Mary Caprioli, “Gendered Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 1 (2000): 53-68) and Erik Melander (see Erik Melander, “Political Gender Equality and State Human Rights Abuse,” Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 2 (2005): 149-166). An early work on the gender-peace nexus is Ann Tickner, Gender in International Relations: A Feminist Perspective on Achieving Global Security (New York, NY: Colombia University Press, 1992).
[4] Indeed, these discussions have also led to new datasets, e.g., D.K. Cohen and R. Nordås, “Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: Introducing the SVAC Dataset, 1989-2009,” Journal of Peace Research 51, no. 3 (2014): 418-428. On masculinity see for instance Elin Bjarnegård et al., “Armed Violence and Patriarchal Values: A Survey of Young Men in Thailand and their Military Experiences,” American Political Science Review 117, no. 2 (2023): 439-453.
About the Author
Dr. Peter Wallensteen is a Senior Professor of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University in Sweden, where he formerly directed the Uppsala Conflict Data program, and the Richard G. Starmann Sr. Research Professor of Peace Studies at the Kroc Institute, University of Notre Dame. Dr. Wallensteen was also the first holder of the Dag Hammarskjöld Chair in Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala (1985–2012). He is additionally affiliated with the Nordic Africa Institute, the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation, and several advisory councils, including for the Folke Bernadotte Academy. He is the author of multiple influential works such as Understanding Conflict Resolution: Peace, War, and the Global System—published in multiple languages—and Peace Research: Theory and Practice.
Image Courtesy of Uppsala University.