By Tanya Henderson, Amanda Domingues, and Ursala Knudsen-Latta

“It is the sense of Congress that—

• the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention and conflict resolution processes helps to promote more inclusive and democratic societies and is critical to the longterm stability of countries and regions;
• the political participation, and leadership of women in fragile environments, particularly during democratic transitions, is critical to sustaining lasting democratic institutions; and
• the United States should be a global leader in promoting the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and post-conflict relief and recovery efforts.”

                                                                                      —Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017

The Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) Act, which the US Congress passed in October 2017, recognizes that women’s political participation is essential to peace and security. The act mandates

a national strategy on WPS; training of relevant personnel at the Departments of State and Defense and at USAID; stakeholder consultation; and progress reporting. US support and commitment will be essential to overcome the serious barriers women around the world face as they seek increased political participation and leadership in peacebuilding processes.

Women can be powerful actors in achieving and sustaining peace in their communities and nations.¹ Advancing or transforming women’s empowerment and increasing gender equality are important levers to move a country forward democratically and have proven, long-lasting effects on countries’ democracy, stability, and peacefulness. A study of 40 peace processes in 35 countries showed that when women substantively influenced a peace process, an agreement was almost always reached, countries experienced higher rates of implementation, and peace was 35 percent more likely to last 15 years or more.³ Similarly, post-conflict peacebuilding has been more successful in societies where women are empowered.⁴ A cross-national study of postwar contexts with a high risk of conflict recurrence found that peacebuilding efforts are more successful in societies where women have relatively higher social status (box 1).⁵

An International Peace Institute study of 182 signed peace agreements between 1989 and 2011 found that there is a 35 percent increase in the probability that a peace agreement will last 15 years or more when women are effectively included.⁴⁴

Peace processes provide historic opportunities to promote women’s participation and high-level decision making and to embed gender equality goals in emerging political settlements.⁶ Women’s participation in politics tends to increase in post-conflict settings: Across Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia, the percentage of women in parliaments is significantly higher in post-conflict countries than in countries without conflict.⁷ Nonetheless, women  are frequently excluded from critical peace processes,  and as a result, women’s interests and political leadership  are not reflected in resulting agreements.⁸ For example, between 1992 and 2011, women made up just 2 percent of mediators and 9 percent of negotiators in 30 official peace talks.⁹ Accordingly, only 7 percent of agreements signed between 1990 and 2010 referenced gender equality or women’s rights.¹⁰

The Democratic Republic of Congo peace talks that were  held in Sun City, South Africa, in 2002 illustrated the relationship between women’s exclusion from peace  processes and their continued exclusion from political participation and leadership. The Congolese government  and other warring parties claimed, “Women did not have  any right to participate [in the peace process] because they were not fighters, nor had they enjoyed meaningful representation in national decision-making bodies before  the war.”¹¹ In essence, those who decide the former  continue to decide the latter.

Women in every part of the world continue to be largely marginalized from the political sphere.¹²Globally, just one  in five parliamentarians is female (23.5 percent), and there are 37 states in which women account for less than 10 percent of legislators in single or lower houses.¹³ Only 11 countries (out of 195) are led by female heads of state.¹⁴ Despite multiple international agreements, regional frameworks, and national laws recognizing and upholding women’s right to participate in politics and reach leadership positions, the widespread absence of women in political and decisionmaking bodies persists. Recent estimates from the World Economic Forum predict that gender parity in politics will not be achieved for another 99 years at the current pace of change (box 2).¹⁵

As of July 2017, women made up 23.5 percent of parliaments worldwide, varying widely by region. Nordic countries lead the rankings with 41.7 percent, followed by the Americas with 28.1 percent, Europe (excluding Nordic countries) with 26.5 percent,  Sub-Saharan Africa with 23.6 percent; Asia with 19.4 percent, and Arab States and the Pacific.⁴⁵ 

Even when women are elected or appointed to positions of political leadership, underlying inequality and discrimination limit their political power and influence. For example, female ministers hold 18 percent of cabinet-level positions globally but are disproportionately assigned portfolios such as social affairs, health, and education—roles traditionally considered “more fitting” for women—while men dominate defense and finance, portfolios with larger budgets and “hard” power.¹⁶

Nevertheless, growth in women’s political leadership is considered one of the most important trends of this century.¹⁷ Over the past two decades, women’s representation in national parliaments has doubled.¹⁸ Since 2000, the number of female heads of state or government has increased from 4.7 percent to 8.8 percent. In countries where legislated quotas are in place, women secured twice as many seats as countries without quotas (24 percent versus 12 percent). Even in countries with voluntary quotas, women still obtained 10 percent more seats.

Despite such progress, there is still a long road ahead to achieve gender equality in the political sphere. Structural barriers and socioeconomic inequities continue to hinder gender parity in national governments around the world.

Supporting and increasing women’s participation and political leadership is a well-established goal of US foreign policy. Post-conflict peacebuilding and state-building processes are strategic moments to dismantle the crosscutting structural inequalities, hierarchies, and systemic marginalization that undermine democratic integrity and hinder sustainability and resilience in the transition out of conflict. Executive Order 13595, which instituted the US National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security, along with the WPS Act of 2017 together outline the US commitment to promote the meaningful participation of women in peace processes and their political participation and leadership in fragile and transitional environments.¹⁹

Why Advancing Women Matters for  Peace and Security

A 40-year study on international crises found that a state is five times less likely to use violence when faced with an international crisis when the percentage of women in parliament increases by 5 percent.²⁰ Further, higher levels of female participation in parliament reduces a country’s risk of civil war, as well as the risk of relapse into conflict once war has ended.²¹ When 35 percent of a nation’s legislature is female, the risk of relapse into conflict is near zero (box 3).²²

Conflict prevention efforts, including countering violent extremism are found to be more effective when women are involved. Women frequently have critical knowledge of impending conflicts that can help to prevent the escalation of violence before it begins. Interviews with 286 people in 30 countries across the Middle East, North Africa, and South Asia further suggest that women are the first in their communities to stand up against terrorism.⁴⁷ 

Countries with more women in government also enjoy better standards of living across multiple sectors of society, leading to increased peace and stability.²³ For example, in India, women political leaders tend to favor wealth redistribution, support child-related expenditures, and invest more than men in schools, female teachers, primary education, and beds in hospitals and dispensaries.²⁴ In West Bengal, villages with more women in political leadership saw an increase of investment in drinking water, and facilities and roads were almost twice as likely to be in good condition.²⁵ In ethnically diverse countries, “the presence of a female national leader is correlated with a 6.6 percent increase in GDP growth in comparison to having a male leader.”²⁶

When women are elected in sufficient numbers, they tend to introduce norms essential for good governance and progressive democracies.²⁷ A World Bank study of more than 100 countries showed that higher percentages of women in parliament correlated to decreased corruption in government.²⁸ In post-conflict or fragile states, women’s active inclusion in government strengthens transitions to democracy. As elected or appointed officials, they can increase the legitimacy of nascent institutions, broaden the political agenda, and promote consultative policymaking. In the Philippines, women with direct access to high-level peace talks between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front advocated for a more inclusive process and led national consultations across 13 regions to ensure that participants represented religious, indigenous, youth, and other groups.²⁹ More inclusive policymaking undergirds a “human security” approach to establishing sustainable peace and reframes security as an individual’s ability to live with dignity, free from fear and want, rather than as state protection (box 4).

In Northern Ireland, women leaders secured language in the Good Friday Agreement on victims’ rights, as well as provisions for reintegration of political prisoners, integrated education, and mixed housing. ⁴⁹  During the political transition in Afghanistan, women in the constitutional assembly that convened in 2003 and 2004 advocated for the rights of the disabled and supported the Uzbek minority’s efforts to gain official recognition for their language.⁵⁰  In South Africa, women leaders of all races played a key role in developing a new national security framework based on human security during the country’s transition from apartheid to political democracy.

Political bodies with more female legislators generally introduce a greater number of laws to promote human rights and advance the rights of women and girls. In Argentina, for example, female parliamentarians introduced 78 percent of the bills related to women’s rights.³⁰ After a parliamentary gender quota was introduced in Morocco in 2011, amendments to the Family Code, Penal Code, and labor and property laws substantially advanced women’s rights. In places as diverse as East Timor, Croatia, Rwanda, and South Africa, an increase in the number of female lawmakers is correlated with legislation related to antidiscrimination, domestic violence, family codes, inheritance, and child support and protection.³¹ While the causal connection is not yet clear, overwhelming evidence shows that when women are more empowered, “countries are less likely to go to war with their neighbors, to be in bad standing with the international community, or to be rife with crime and violence within their society.”³² Gender equality and women’s empowerment is proving to be a better indicator of a country’s peacefulness than commonly used metrics such as democracy, religion, and GDP (box 5).³³

Statistical analysis of data from a majority of countries between 1977 and 1996 shows that the higher the proportion of women in parliament, the lower the likelihood that the state carried out human rights abuses such as political imprisonments, torture, killings, and disappearances.⁵¹

Barriers to Women’s Increased  Political Participation

The disparity in women’s political representation is a result of social, cultural, and economic barriers. Violence, lack of funding, and corruption stand out as significant barriers  (box 6).

The Honorable Iyabo Obasanjo, former Nigerian senator (2007–11), stated, “As a senator in Nigeria, I experienced violence, media bias, and targeting by various groups, opposition parties and government operatives. My reaction, like that of many women, was to leave politics. In developing countries, women legislators are routinely targeted for intimidation, they are the last to enter politics and the first to leave.”⁵² 

Violence

Women political leaders and candidates face psychological, physical, and sexual violence. Women are often targets of intimidation and coercion specifically because they are women, with the goal of pressuring them to leave politics, resign as candidates or political officials, withdraw from their membership in political parties or other political institutions, or to otherwise remain silent on the political issues they care about.³⁴ This violence affects politically active women around the globe, regardless of their roles, whether as activists, civil society leaders, voters, candidates, or elected or appointed officials.

A 2016 Inter-Parliamentary Union global study found that more than 80 percent of the women surveyed experienced psychological violence; nearly 45 percent received threats of death, rape, beatings or abduction; and 20 percent of the women legislators had been physically attacked during their electoral term.³⁵ Similarly, in political party assessments by the National Democratic Institute, approximately 55 percent of women surveyed indicated that they had personally experienced violence while carrying out political party functions, with 48 percent saying that they had experienced psychological violence, which is the most widely reported type of violence against women in politics.³⁶ Bias and unequal access to the media further widen the gap between male and female candidates, where women candidates are at best underrepresented and marginalized, and at worst are targeted, ridiculed, and distorted.³⁷

Lack of Financial Resources

Lack of financial resources remains one of the most significant deterrents for women in politics, and women face unique economic and financial challenges in campaigns for political office.³⁸ These restrictions range from women’s exclusion from circles of power and moneyed networks to their often inferior economic status. Across Africa, Asia, and Latin America, women are reluctant to become political candidates for a variety of economic reasons: They do not feel they ought to invest family resources in political campaigns; they are unwilling to ask for credit or risk their own or their family’s capital; they are unable to pay for domestic and care work that they would no longer be able to do; and they are unwilling to leave their jobs to campaign and risk labor market uncertainty if they are not elected.³⁹ Not only do women struggle to raise funds to run a campaign, they often receive little or no financial assistance from their political parties.⁴⁰ Without means for securing the necessary funds, women candidates either choose not to run, run at significant disadvantages compared with male counterparts, or rely on external funding that may be tied to political favors or suspect agendas. Corruption and Conflict

In conflict-affected contexts and emerging democracies, these barriers to women’s political participation increase exponentially. Increased security concerns add significant physical, psychological, and financial burdens. Corruption widens the gender gap in politics. In post-conflict environments, the use of “black money”—earned during the war or through weapons sales—to fund political campaigns deepens the inequity between male and female candidates, where women generally have less access to such profits and a weak rule of law makes the enforcement of campaign finance regulations unlikely.

A well-known Afghan woman parliamentarian, the Honorable Shinkai Karokhail, shared an example of how inferior economic status, compounded by corrupt campaign practices and weak rule of law, can substantially hinder female candidates. During a campaign for parliament, her male challenger hosted a reception for their constituents on the same day (and same time) as her campaign event. Despite the illegality of “vote buying,” he provided lavish food for attendees and gave everyone new clothing and winter hats. Even though she was the incumbent, only 300 people attended her event while over 2,000 attended his. Karokhail said she could not compete because she did not have the same financial resources that he did.⁴¹

Recommendations

The WPS Act of 2017 commits the US government to support and increase women’s political participation as a core principle of its foreign policy. The WPS Act mandates a national WPS strategy that coordinates the efforts of the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security as well as USAID. This mandated strategy gives the current administration an opportunity to recommit to and update the principles of the 2016 NAP while increasing support for gender-primary programs that uphold women’s political participation as a catalyst for peace and stability.

Additionally, through the training mandated in the WPS Act, the administration can support staff across the Departments of State, Defense, and USAID by providing them with knowledge and best practices for addressing barriers to women’s political participation. Such training can truly provide value at all levels of the US government— from equipping USAID staff who design programs around women’s political movements, to State Department diplomats who work with women political leaders internationally, to those who reduce threats of violence against women in politics by providing security assistance. This whole-ofgovernment approach is critical to creating sustainable impact on such complex social and political issues.

Funding

Currently, only about 2 percent of American foreign aid dedicated to peace and security efforts goes to activities where gender equality or women’s empowerment is the principal objective.⁴² Additionally, while USAID supported women’s political leadership in 55 countries across five regions between 2008 and 2013, many of these programs were gender-integrated rather than gender-primary, and as a result the support for women’s political participation was merely a secondary objective in a larger democracy promotion effort.⁴³ During this period, funding for half of the gender-primary program was less than $150,000, and durations of all programs were usually three years or fewer. The current administration therefore can improve on previous administrations’ efforts by allocating more peace and security funding to gender equality or women’s empowerment programs, especially gender-primary programs. Additionally, the administration should prioritize gender-primary programs, or programs with the primary objective of transforming gender norms, in its WPS strategy and departmental implementation plans.

The United States should seize the opportunity that the WPS Act presents to strengthen its support of women globally and ultimately to ensure the security of its own citizens.

To take advantage of this opportunity, the US government should take the following actions:

1. Uphold the NAP, WPS Act, and national strategies to promote women’s increased political participation and leadership.

• Continue to implement the US National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security and conduct the planned review in 2020 in consultation with civil society.
• Mandate gender integration in US foreign policy initiatives related to women’s political participation and leadership.
• Provide training to relevant personnel at DOD, DOS, and USAID on the importance of promoting women’s political participation and decision making in line with the WPS Act, NAP, and other US foreign policy strategies.
• Continue to support the special envoy for global women’s issues.

2. Increase protection for women in politics and high-level decision making.

• Fund and mandate gender integration into electoral violence prevention efforts.
• Promote increased awareness of widespread gender-based political violence and preventative measures.
• Provide training to relevant personnel at DOD, DOS, and USAID on prevention and protection initiatives to reduce violence against women in politics.

3. Promote increased “upstream” support to increase

women’s political leadership (e.g., education, healthcare, economic empowerment)

• Continue to support women and girls’ education, access to health, and economic empowerment efforts.
• Increase funding for gender-primary programs that promote and strengthen women’s political participation, including grants to local civil-society organizations that support women’s leadership.
• Engage with traditionally marginalized women to build capacity and support networks to increase their access to political participation and leadership.
• Provide training and mentorship networks for newly elected female politicians.

4. Support women’s equal political participation and remove barriers that limit women’s access to political leadership.

• Pressure governments with weak or exclusionary election laws that limit women’s equal access to political participation.
• Support political party reform efforts that focus on reducing barriers to entry and participation by women, especially in party leadership roles.
• Challenge harmful gender norms and resulting discriminatory practices in all foreign assistance and policy.
• Pressure repressive governments to open civil society space to ensure women’s organizations can organize and build networks of support for women candidates.
• Support anticorruption initiatives and free and fair electoral processes in post-conflict countries and new and emerging democracies.
• Provide gender-sensitive training to relevant personnel at DOD, DOS, and USAID on advancing free and fair elections.

5. Increase US foreign aid funding for gender-primary peace and security initiatives.

• Increase funding allocations to activities that promote women’s equality and empowerment.
• Increase funding allocations to activities that promote women’s effective participation in peace and security processes.
• Increase funding allocations to activities that advance women’s equal political participation and leadership.

About the Authors

Tanya Henderson, Founder and Director, Mina’s List, a program of Peace is Loud. Tanya is an international human rights and gender lawyer whose work has focused on women’s rights and empowerment; the role of women in conflict resolution and peace-building; and women’s political participation through U.S. policy, international multi-lateral agencies and civil society, and coalition building among global women political leaders. She was a Policy Director for Women’s Action for New Directions (WAND), the US National Director for the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), a legal consultant for the Ministry of Social Affairs in Lebanon on issues of gender based violence and women’s political participation, and part of a research team in Ethiopia working with Harvard Medical School to research and draft policy on gender inequality, economic development, and health. Her work has been published in academic journals as well as various print and social media outlets. She holds a B.S. from the University of Massachusetts Boston, a J.D. from Suffolk University Law

School, and pursued an LL.M. in international law from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. She has also earned several certificates in mediation and conflict negotiation.

Amanda Domingues, Program Officer, NDI. Amanda

Domingues is a Program Officer at National Democratic

Institute. While at NDI she has worked both on the Gender, Women and Democracy (GWD) team and the Southern and East Africa team. In her role on the GWD team she served as the lead on work pertaining to Peace, Security, and Democratic Resilience and violence against women in political parties. In her current position on the Southern and East Africa team she works to support NDI’s electoral programs in the region, focusing on gender inclusive elections. Prior to joining NDI, Ms. Domingues attended graduate school at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), where she focused on inclusive peace processes and constitutional reform. While at UCLA, Ms. Domingues was an African Studies Department Fellow and also worked as a Graduate Student Researcher for the Center for the Study of Women.

Ursala Knudsen-Latta, Research and Policy Officer,

Saferworld. Ursala Knudsen-Latta is a Research and Policy

Officer based in Washington DC. Prior to joining Saferworld,

Ursala worked at Alliance for Peacebuilding (AfP) and

Women in International Security. Ursala works on Saferworld US’ advocacy team and focuses on issues of violent extremism, gender and conflict, and SDG16. Ursala studied Religions and Theology at the University of Manchester, where her research focused on religion and conflict in South Asia. She worked with the Anchorage Interfaith Council, and the North American Interfaith Network before graduating with a Masters International Peace and Conflict Resolution from American University.

References

1.  Valerie Hudson et al., Sex and World Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).

• Marie O’Reilly, Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, and Thania Paffenholz, “Reimagining Peacemaking: Women’s Roles in Peace Processes” (New York: International Peace Institute, 2015).
• Marie O’Reilly, “Why Women? Inclusive Security and Peaceful Societies” (Washington, DC: Inclusive Security, 2015), 10. 5.  O’Reilly et al., “Reimagining Peacemaking.”
• O’Reilly, “Why Women?,” 9, citing Pilar Domingo et al.,

“Assessment of the Evidence of Links between Gender Equality,

Peacebuilding, and Statebuilding” (London: Overseas Development

Institute, December 2013), 16; Aili Mari Tripp, “Women’ s Political

Empowerment in Statebuilding and Peacebuilding : A Baseline Study” (London: Department for International Development, August 2012), cited in Domingo et al., “Assessment of the Evidence,” 19.

• O’Reilly, “Why Women?”, 9.
• UN Women, “UN Women Highlights the Voices of Women Building Sustainable Peace and Mobilizing for Justice and Equality” media advisory, New York City, October 23, 2017, http://www. unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2017/10/media-advisory-unwomen-at-open-debate-on-security-council-resolution-1325.
• UN Women, “Women’s Participation in Peace Negotiations: Connections between Presence and Influence” (New York: October 2012), 3.
• O’Reilly et al., “Reimagining Peacemaking,” citing Christine Bell and Catherine O’Rourke, “Peace Agreements or ‘Pieces of Paper’? The Impact of UNSC Resolution 1325 on Peace Processes and their Agreements,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 59, no. 4 (2010): 941–80.
• Malathi de Alwis, Julie Mertus, and Tazreena Sajjad, “Women and Peace Processes,” in Carol Cohn, ed., Women and Wars (Cambridge, UK: Wiley, 2013), 174.
• United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/66/130, Women and Political Participation (2012).
• Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in National Parliaments,” webpage, situation as of Dec. 20th, 2017, i.e., 23.5 percent of all national parliamentarians are women.
• UN Women, “Facts and Figures: Women’s Political Leadership” webpage, (July 2017), http://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ leadership-and-political-participation/facts-and-figures. Calculation is based on information provided by Permanent Missions to the United Nations. Some leaders hold positions of both head of government and head of state.
• “The Global Gender Gap Report 2017” (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2017).
• Eva Barboni, “Getting Impatient: Overcoming Barriers to

Women’s Political Leadership and Accelerating Progress towards Equality” (Atalanta, 2017), 9, https://static1.squarespace.com/ static/595411f346c3c48fe75fd39c/t/5a198d188165f542d67

9b618/1511623962875/Getting-Impatient-Atalanta-Report_FINAL. pdf, citing Katherine Kidder et al., “From College to Cabinet: Women in National Security. Military, Veterans & Society” (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, 2017).

1. Pamela Paxton and Melanie Hughes, Women, Politics and Power: A Global Perspective (Washington, DC: Sage Publications, 2017).
2. Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Women in Parliament: 20 Years in Review,” (Geneva: IPU, 2015), http://archive.ipu.org/pdf/publications/ WIP20Y-en.pdf.
3. The White House, “Executive Order: Instituting a National

Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security,” press release, December 19, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2011/12/19/executive-order-instituting-national-actionplan-women-peace-and-securit.

• Mary Caprioli and Mark Boyer, “Gender, Violence, and International Crisis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (2001): 514.
• Erik Melander, “Gender Equality and Intrastate Armed Conflict,” International Studies International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 4 (2005): 695–714.
• Jacqueline Demeritt et al., “Female Participation and Civil War Relapse,” Civil Wars 16, no. 3 (2014): 362.
• Susan Markham, “Strengthening Women’s Roles in Parliament,” Oxford Journal of Parliamentary Affairs (2012), doi:10.1093/pa/ gss024.
• Irma Clots-Figueras, “Women in Politics: Evidence from the Indian States,” Journal of Public Economics 95, nos.7–8 (2011): 664–90.
• Lori Beaman et al., “Women Politicians, Gender Bias, and

Policy-making in Rural India,” Background Paper for UNICEF, “The State of the World’s Children Report 2007,” p. 11, 15 and 16.

• Barboni, “Getting Impatient,” p.17.
• Markham, “Women’s Roles in Parliament.”
• Susan Perkins et al., “Ethnic Diversity, Gender, and National Leaders,” Journal for International Affairs 67, no. 1 (2017): 85–103.
• Patty Chang et al., “Women Leading Peace” (Washington, DC: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace, and Security, 2015), 109–13.
• Mark Jones, “Legislator Gender and Legislator Policy Priorities in the Argentine Chamber of Deputies and the United States House of Representatives,” Policy Studies Journal 25 (1997): 618.
• National Democratic Institute, “Why Women in Politics?” Gender, Women & Politics webpage, Washington, DC.
• O’Reilly, “Why Women?”
• Ibid.
• National Democratic Institute, “#NotTheCost: Stopping Violence against Women in Politics: A Call to Action,” (Washington, DC: NDI, 2016); Gabrielle Bardall, “Breaking the Mold: Understanding Gender and Electoral Violence,” white paper series (Washington, DC: IFES, December 2011).
• Inter-Parliamentary Union, “Sexism, Harassment and Violence against Women Parliamentarians” issues brief (Geneva: IPU, October 2016), http://archive.ipu.org/pdf/publications/issuesbrief-e.pdf.
• National Democratic Institute, “No Party to Violence: Analyzing Violence against Women in Political Parties: Preliminary Findings from Pilots in Cote d’Ivoire, Honduras, Tanzania, and Tunisia” (Washington, DC: NDI, 2018), https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/ files/NDI_No_Party_to_Violence_ReportFinal.pdf.
• Diana B. Carlin and Kelly L. Winfrey, “Have You Come a Long Way, Baby? Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, and Sexism in 2008

Campaign Coverage,” Communication Studies 60, no. 4 (2009): 326–43.

• “Women Candidates and Campaign Finance” (New York:

Women’s Environment and Development Organization, December 2007), http://www.wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/womencandidates-and-campaign-finance-report-final.pdf.

• Julie Ballington, “Empowering Women for Stronger Political

Parties: A Good Practices Guide to Promote Women’s Political

Participation” (New York and Washington, DC: United Nations Development Programme and National Democratic Institute, 2011), http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/gender/ gender%20and%20governance/EmpoweringWomenFor%20

StrongerPoliticalParties.pdf; see also “Women Candidates and

Campaign Finance.”

• NDI, “No Party to Violence.”
• Sana Johnson, “Listening Session for the Afghan Pilot Project,” Peace Is Loud blog (New York: Mina’s List, June 24, 2015).
• Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,

DAC Network on Gender Equality, “Aid Projects Targeting Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (CRS),” OECD.Stat dataset, http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=GENDER.

• USAID, “Women’s Leadership as a Route to Greater

Empowerment: Desktop Study” (Arlington, VA: Management Systems International, 2014), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/ pa00k87m.pdf.

• O’Reilly et al., “Reimagining Peacemaking,” 12–13.
• Barboni, “Getting Impatient.”

47.  Karima Bennoune, “Your Fatwa Does Not Apply Here: Untold

Stories from the Fight Against Muslim Fundamentalism (New York: 

W. W. Norton & Company, 2014); see also “Bennoune: Support

Muslims Resisting Fundamentalism,” International Peace Institute, October 2, 2013, http://www.ipinst.org/events/ speakers/details/486benn.

• Chang et al., “Women Leading Peace,” 46–47.
• Tobie Whitman and Jessica Gomez, “Strategies for

Policymakers: Bringing Women into Government” (Washington, DC: The Institute for Inclusive Security, March 2009).

• Erik Melander, “Political Gender Equality and State Human Rights Abuse,” Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 2 (March 2005): 149-166.
• Obasanjo was quoted in a 2017 prospectus of nonprofit Mina’s List.

By Angelic Young

Passage of the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 represents an important opportunity for the United States to make Women, Peace, and Security a vital part of its foreign policy strategy. The act mandates creation

of a government wide strategy to increase participation of women in U.S. peacekeeping and security operations, within one year of the enactment of the law.  A key part of these operations are programs to train foreign military and other security forces in law enforcement, rule of law, and professional military education. Most of these programs are considered security assistance.

U.S. security assistance, which includes military aid, amounts to nearly $17 billion annually. This constitutes approximately one-third of the total U.S. foreign assistance budget, which constitutes about 1.3 percent of the overall budget.¹The Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (DOS) share responsibility for security assistance through a complex web of authorities and associated accounts that cover training and equipping foreign militaries, conducting counterterrorism and counter-narcotics operations, and strengthening the capacity of foreign law enforcement agencies to provide internal security and combat crime.

Over the last 17 years, the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda emerged out of a series of UN Security Council resolutions, beginning with UNSCR 1325. This landmark resolution marked the first time the Security Council recognized that women and men experience conflict differently and that women have an integral role to play in conflict prevention, resolution, and recovery. It urged international actors to increase women’s participation in peace and

security processes and incorporate gender perspectives into all conflict-related efforts. Nearly 70 countries have adopted national strategies to implement UNSCR 1325 and subsequent resolutions considered to be part of the WPS “suite”. Despite progress, however, governments have devoted scant resources to the WPS agenda, including in the United States.

This policy brief examines U.S. security assistance accounts aimed at security sector capacity building in order to determine whether the current U.S. strategy for security assistance aligns with U.S. obligations outlined in its National Action Plan for Women, Peace, and Security (U.S. NAP).² It finds that the biggest gaps the U.S. faces in meeting its obligations under the NAP occur in countries receiving the largest amounts of security assistance.

National Action Plan Commitments

The U.S. NAP commits the U.S. government, including DOS and DOD, to more than a dozen distinct strategic- and operational-level actions intended to promote the inclusion of women in U.S. foreign policy, security, and military programs.³

This brief looks at four (emphasis added)⁴:

1. Assist partner governments in improving the recruitment and retention of women, including minorities and other historically marginalized women, into government ministries and the incorporation of women’s perspectives in peace and security policy.
2. Provide common guidelines and training to help partner nations integrate women and their perspectives into the security sectors and increase partner nation women’s participation in U.S.-funded training programs.
3. Assist partner nations in building capacity to develop, implement, and enforce policies and military justice systems that promote and protect women’s rights.
4. Support women’s participation in efforts to deradicalize men and women who have supported violent extremism, promote tolerance and pluralism in their communities, and advance stabilization and reconstruction activities.

Security Assistance and Cooperation

Although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, security assistance and security cooperation are not the same thing. Typically, security cooperation refers to all DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments (such as the Afghanistan Ministry of Defense) aimed at building relationships to promote U.S. interests, develop partner capacity, and increase U.S. ties to its allies.⁵ Generally speaking, DOD considers all activities listed under Title 10 of the U.S.

Code to be security cooperation. The Congressional Research Service estimates that DOD has more than 80 authorities to engage in security cooperation.⁶

Security assistance refers to a specific set of programs, some of which are appropriated to DOD, some to DOS, and both play roles administering:⁷ such as the following⁸:

• Through the International Military Education and

Training program (IMET), DOD provides professional education to foreign officials (typically military, but sometimes other security officials).

• Because peacekeeping operations (PKO) are provided as voluntary support for peacekeeping activities, they are considered as separate and distinct from regular U.S. contributions to the United Nations. Funds for PKO are used for security, though not necessarily for military purposes. For example, DOS has deployed police advisors to the UN Mission in South Sudan to support training  and advisory operations.
• DOS uses International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Control (INCLE) to build the capacity of foreign law enforcement organizations.
• The 1206 Global Train and Equip fund is a relatively new account, established in the aftermath of the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to build partner capacity for timesensitive “new and emerging” counterterrorist operations or to enable partners to support military and stability operations in which U.S. armed forces are a participant.
• Special military authorities include the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), Iraq Security Forces

Fund (ISFF), Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF), and other country-specific train and equip authorities. These funds convey broad powers to DOD to build the capacity of nonmilitary security entities such as the Afghanistan Ministry of Interior, which includes the Afghanistan National Police.⁹

Security Assistance and the WPS Agenda

Evidence tells us that women can prevent violence, provide security, moderate extremism, bridge divides, strengthen peacekeeping, broaden societal participation, promote dialogue, and build trust.¹⁰ Gender equality is a better indicator of a state’s peacefulness than democracy, religion, or GDP.¹¹ As the percentage of women in parliament increases, a state becomes less likely to use violence when faced with an international crisis.¹² A peace agreement is 35 percent more likely to last at least 15 years if women participate in its creation.¹³ WPS is not only an agenda—Women, Peace, and Security are inextricably linked.

Excluding women, ethnic or religious minorities, and other disadvantaged groups from access and providing input to the security sector creates distance between security actors and local populations. But where women, ethnic or religious minorities, and other disadvantaged groups do have access and do provide input to the security sector, countries can strengthen relationships within communities that are vital to the long-term success of peace and stability operations. 

Establishing a more inclusive security sector breaks down into three objectives:

1. Increasing the number of women participating directly (e.g., overcoming recruitment, selection, and advancement biases in security institutions);
2. Expanding women’s access to mechanisms through which they can provide meaningful input to security sector decisions (e.g., overcoming barriers to access and combatting actual or perceived bias in the value of information provided by women); and
3. Increasing the responsiveness of the security sector to women (e.g., ensuring security actors meet the needs of women by overcoming gaps in awareness, information,  and training).

Security assistance–related programs provide significant opportunities to engage women more fully. For example, capacity-building programs can overcome barriers to recruitment, selection, and advancement for women in security institutions. Professional training (e.g., advanced military education) can overcome actual or perceived biases about the value and contributions of women or the lack of information and awareness about the needs of women.  Broader reform programs can be leveraged to expand and improve mechanisms that would give women (and other disadvantaged populations) access and input to decisions  about security in their communities. Relationships can be leveraged to promote the inclusion of women.

Security assistance is a substantial component of the foreign aid the U.S. government provides and an essential element of influence in its relationships with many countries around the world. It is thus a vital tool for strategically advancing the women, peace, and security agenda.

Gaps in Women’s Participation

Security Assistance by Account (in billions)

ASFF 3.4

CSF 1.4

••••••• •       FMF 5.7

INCLE 1.1

CTP 1.4 $1

CN (DOD) $1

Iraq T&E $0.63

NADR $0.67

Security Assistance by Country (in billions)

••••••      Afghanistan $3.0

Iraq $0.8

Pakistan $0.3

Syria $0.3

Colombia $0.2

Lebanon $0.1

Most of the money the U.S. government spends on security assistance goes to just six countries: Afghanistan, Iraq,

Pakistan, Syria, Colombia, and Lebanon. ¹⁴ 

Unfortunately, there is little data publicly available on the degree to which IMET, PKO, 1206 Global Train and Equip, or other security assistance programs support women’s participation in the security sector. Nor is there genderdisaggregated data to show how many of these programs’ beneficiaries are male versus female. None of the publicly available reports on 1206 Global Train and Equip, for example, even mention women or gender.

Afghanistan is the one significant exception: The ASFF supports U.S. NAP objectives. Both the FY2016 and 2017 National Defense Authorization Acts included up to $25 million to be used to support the recruitment, integration, retention, training, and fair treatment of women in the Afghan national defense and security forces. Further, DOD states that “the development of credible, legitimate, and professional Afghan security forces requires the promotion and implementation of equal human rights for men and women.”¹⁵

In contrast, there is no indication that U.S. programs in Iraq, Pakistan, Syria, or Colombia targeted women’s participation in the security sector in the last three fiscal years. In Lebanon, just three activities in 2015 and one in 2014 supported women’s participation.¹⁶ In fact, aside from Afghanistan and Lebanon, there are only a handful of countries where more than three WPS activities took place in the last three years: Brazil, Bulgaria, Kenya, Mozambique, and South Sudan.

It is not a matter of finding space within a country budget. Bulgaria and Kenya receive less than $10 million in security assistance; Brazil and Mozambique receive less than $1 million. Only South Sudan, which receives $40 million, even comes close to the level of security assistance provided to the top six countries listed above. The United States has clearly managed to prioritize WPS within relatively small budgets.¹⁷

What the existing data reveal is that in countries where the U.S. government spends the most on security assistance it spends the least on training and capacity building to promote the participation of women or the integration of gender perspectives into security sector institutions (excepting Afghanistan and Lebanon).

Five out of six of the countries that receive the most U.S. security assistance have some of the world’s worst gender gaps. The World Economic Forum’s annual gender gap report ranks Pakistan and Syria as the second and third most unequal countries in the world, with Lebanon trailing not far behind.¹⁸ The OECD Social and Gender Institutions Index lists Afghanistan and Iraq as high offenders (on a scale of very low to very high) in gender-based social discrimination. All six countries suffer from a lack of women’s participation in the security sector. Women constitute less than 1 percent of security forces (military and police) in each country save Colombia, where women constitute 9 percent of the military and only 1 percent of police.

Often, the argument is made that it is too difficult to implement programs in places where the gender gap is so large. Yet successes in Lebanon and Afghanistan demonstrate the contrary. It is hard, but not impossible, and the significant progress made in both countries exemplifies the impact that the United States could make globally.

What Leadership in WPS Requires

The United States has tremendous leverage to bring to bear in raising the profile of women in security decisions and activities. When it fails to implement the NAP in countries at the forefront of its national security agenda, it signals to the world that it is not truly committed to the WPS agenda.

The U.S. is missing an enormous opportunity. Taking its obligations under the NAP and the WPS Act seriously and integrating its objectives in all aspects of its security assistance will not necessarily require more funding, but it does require making wiser use of existing resources and the leverage they buy.

Addressing ongoing challenges with data collection—or lack thereof—is a key part of the wise use of security assistance dollars. The website Foreignassistance.gov is meant to be a repository of budget and performance for all agencies that implement foreign aid. Unfortunately, the vast majority of gender-disaggregated indicators were added only in the last two years, so data on these activities are not yet available. Better tracking of performance data will help us better understand the actual depth of the gap and how best to address it. There may be hidden successes—or additional challenges that analysts have yet to uncover.

For example, there are known activities related to WPS that have taken place but are not yet tracked in the database. Of these, the most promising is the Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity catalog, which lists available courses on topics related to various aspects of Women, Peace, and Security—meaning they could be part of an IMET, PKO, or another similar program. For example:

• The “Women’s Integration in the Armed Forces” course was delivered in Lebanon in 2015 and 2016. The catalog says the course aims to “assist countries all over the world to develop and implement gender policies, in particular, policies aimed at improving or enhancing the representation of and the prospects for women in the military—including women in defense, women in uniform, women in combat.”¹⁹
• PKO funds were used to provide gender protection courses at the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units in FY2015. DOS’s Political-Military Bureau highlighted women, peace, and security as an essential component of their Global Peace Operations Initiative, which has trained more than 6,500 female peacekeepers and resulted in increasing deployment of female military peacekeepers by

62 percent and police peacekeepers by 75 percent.²⁰

• In Lebanon, DOS’s Bureau of International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement provides basic and specialized training for the Lebanese internal security forces, supporting an increase in the number of women on the force from 2 to 610.

Nonetheless, it is clear that for countries receiving the bulk of U.S. security assistance, few if any such activities exist.

Recommendations

How can the United States close the gap between what the NAP and the WPS Act promise and what actual spending and programming say about U.S. priorities?

1. Data: Improve data collection and information sharing. It should be easier than it currently is to determine the number of women who have received U.S.-funded training or other assistance. Otherwise, a goal to “increase the number of women” means little. Gender-disaggregated data should be available, at a minimum, for all courses conducted using IMET, PKO, INCLE, and train and equip (e.g., ASFF, ISFF) funds. That data would help further shape the following recommendations.
2. Strategy: Include language illustrating direct connections between security assistance and U.S. NAP goals in all strategic planning documents, including the following:
3. Integrated country strategies connect U.S. foreign assistance activities for individual partner nations to U.S. national security priorities and security sector assistance objectives.²¹ These strategy documents already include language on gender considerations as a matter of practice. But they should also include specific references to U.S. NAP objectives and targets as they relate to country priorities.
4. The Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s strategic plans

(currently Vision 2020), as well as its Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM), guides DOD components on how to implement security cooperation programs. The SAMM should explicitly reference the U.S. NAP and guide users through conducting a gender analysis before implementing a security cooperation program.

• Such an analysis need not be complicated. It can be as simple as asking whether there are women in the security forces, how the security of local women could be affected positively or negatively by the assistance, and whether the country would benefit from a targeted gender initiative.
• Theater Security Cooperation Plans and Country Security Cooperation Plans, when developed by geographic combatant commanders should be in consultation with the State Department’s country teams and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency Strategic Planning and Integration Division.
  • Together with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, the Joint Staff should review commanders’ campaign plans to ensure security cooperation planning guidance on women’s integration has been followed.
• All strategic planning documents (including but not limited to those referenced above) should emphasize consulting women in the target countries—particularly those in civil society organizations—to ensure that activities reflect unique priorities, are not duplicative, and are optimally designed so they may be implemented effectively.

3. Training and Education: Expand the use of training programs that provide “how to” guidance on recruiting, retaining, and integrating women into government ministries and incorporating women’s perspectives in peace and security policy. Specifically, DOS and DOD should work together on the following:

• Take stock of existing security assistance training and education curriculum, and evaluate successful interventions to develop or refine courses on women’s integration.
• Compile a list of best practices, lessons learned, and resources for implementers/practitioners. Include contributions from civil society.
• Require any partner nation that receives U.S. security assistance (including but not limited to IMET, PKO, INCLE, ASFF, and 1206) to participate in at least one course on women’s integration into security policy and sectors. (Level and type of participation matters. These courses should be delivered to entry-, mid-, and senior-level staff—and not solely to representatives of units explicitly focused on  gender issues.)
• Require the composition of partner nation training delegations to reflect, at a minimum, the gender balance of the partner nation’s security force. Given that the objective of the U.S. NAP is to increase women’s participation, this requirement should be clearly treated as a minimum. For example, if women constitute 7 percent of police in one country, they should constitute at least 7 percent of all  U.S.-sponsored police trainings, conferences, or workshops. If women constitute 9 percent of military forces, they should make up at least 9 percent of all beneficiaries of military training. If a partner nation nominates an all-male delegation, the operating guidance should be to reject the nomination.
• Elucidate commitments to increasing women’s participation in formal agreements with partner nations, such as letters of agreements, memorandums of understanding, or similar mechanisms. Handbooks including guidelines for the use of foreign assistance or DOD counterparts (e.g., the Defense Security Cooperation Agency manual series, for example) should explicitly reference the U.S. NAP and make clear that security assistance can and should be used to fulfill those commitments.

4. Authorization bill language and funding: Collaborate to develop integrated language in the appropriations bills for State, Foreign Operations, and Regulated Programs (SFOPS) and DOD that explicitly describes how NAP commitments will be resourced and implemented in key programs:

• FMF, IMET, and PKO;
• INCLE, NADR and ESF;
• Global train and equip; and
• Programs that fall under defense trade and arms transfers; humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and mine action; international education and training, and defense institution building.

References

1. Curt Tarnoff and Marian L. Lawson, Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, June 17, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/ R40213.pdf.
2. Rather than on accounts primarily for equipment and services. For example, the U.S. provides Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to partner nations as a grant (non-repayable) or direct loan (repayable) to purchase U.S. manufactured goods and services—this brief will not explore FMF.
3. The first action is to integrate NAP objectives into appropriate strategic guidance and planning documents and to provide training for its US government personnel on WPS issues. This policy brief does not address the integration of NAP objectives since DOD is currently creating (or updating, where appropriate) DOD-specific guidance. (And DOS and USAID have already taken steps to fulfill this obligation.)
4. This is not to suggest that any lines of action not covered in this brief are of lesser importance. There is a significant need for additional research and reporting on activities related to the provision of disaster relief and other humanitarian services, for example, but one policy brief cannot cover the breadth of all activities related to U.S. security assistance.
5. DOD Directive 5132.03.
6. Nina Serafino, Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 23, 2016), https://fas. org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44444.pdf.
7. For a more detailed discussion of the difference between security cooperation and assistance, see Management of Security Cooperation, chapter 1 (Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 2017), http://www.iscs. dsca.mil/documents/greenbook/01_Chapter.pdf. 
8. This is not an exhaustive list of authorities related to security assistance. See also Serafino, “Security Assistance and Cooperation.”
9. DOD has on occasion transferred ASFF, ISFF and PCCF to DOS to enable DOS to implement specific activities.
10. Marie O’Reilly, Why Women? Inclusive Security and Peaceful Society (Washington, DC: the Institute for Inclusive Security, October 2015).
11. Valerie Hudson et al., Sex and World Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012); Mary Caprioli, “Gendered Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 37, no. 1 (2000): 53–68; Mary Caprioli and Mark Boyer, “Gender, Violence, and International Crisis,” Journal of

Conflict Resolution 45 (August 2001): 503–18; Patrick M. Regan and

Aida Paskeviciute, “Women’s Access to Politics and Peaceful States,” Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 3 (2003): 287–302, cited in O’Reilly, Why Women? Inclusive Security and Peaceful Society, 4.

1. Caprioli and Boyer, “Gender, Violence, and International Crisis,” 514, cited in O’Reilly, Why Women?, Inclusive Security and Peaceful Society, 4.
2. Statistical analysis by Laurel Stone, in Marie O’Reilly, Andrea Ó Súilleabháin, and Thania Paffenholz, Reimagining Peacemaking:

Women’s Roles in Peace Processes, (New York: International Peace Institute, 2015,), 12–13, cited in O’Reilly, Why Women?, Inclusive Security and Peaceful Society, 6.

1. This excludes countries that receive mostly or solely FMF.  Egypt, Israel, and Jordan all receive large amounts of support exclusively through FMF (though Jordan has historically received other kinds of support). Since FMF is used mostly to purchase equipment and services such as logistical support, it has been omitted from this brief.
2. Unclassified Justification for FY2017 Overseas Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security Sector Forces Fund, http:// comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/45/Documents/defbudget/fy2017/ FY17_J-Book.
3. The indicators now being tracked on Foreignassistance.gov related to women, peace, and security are relatively new. It is possible that additional activities have taken place but have not been tracked or have yet to be reported. Comprehensive monitoring and evaluation of NAP implementation and results is one of the gaps that still needs to address, though the addition of WPS-specific indicators, as well as several vital gender-disaggregated indicators, is a welcome signal of progress.
4. More than half of the countries where the U.S. emphasizes women’s inclusion have a smaller gender gap than the U.S. does, and all except Lebanon rank in the middle or top third of countries. Women constitute 7 percent of police in Brazil, 6 percent in Bulgaria, 8 percent in Kenya, and 5 percent in Mozambique. Although there is insufficient evidence to establish a causal link between