Please read the full policy brief at this link: https://wiisglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2026-OSF-Private-Sector-Digital-Final.pdf
Please read the full policy brief at this link: https://wiisglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/Beyond-1325@25_WIIS-Policy-Brief-May-2026.pdf
Please read the full policy brief at this link: https://wiisglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/WIIS-Policy-Brief_WPS-Treaty_November-2025.pdf
Please read the full policy brief at this link: https://wiisglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/10-29-25-WIIS-Policy-Brief_Hannah-Neumann.pdf
NATO is committed to integrating Women, Peace, and Security
(WPS) across all its tasks in the 2022 Strategic Concept and the
revised NATO Policy on WPS endorsed by Heads of State at the
2024 NATO Summit in Washington, D.C. The NATO Strategic
Concept referenced the Women, Peace and Security (WPS)
agenda for the first time in 2022. This was a significant move
since it elevated a gender perspective from the margins to a more
central position in the Alliance’s agenda. The revised NATO
Policy on WPS endorsed by Heads of State in 2024 reinforces
this. The endorsement reflects the reality that the WPS agenda,
and a gender perspective, is all the more relevant as the Alliance
returns to a primary focus on deterrence and defense following
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.1
Russia
is indeed waging a deeply gendered war in terms of the use of
conflict-related sexual violence, but also in its broader attack on
NATO values, including gender equality, through the promotion
of “traditional” family values.
This Policy Brief looks ahead to consider the question of what
NATO’s commitment to WPS, as outlined in the Strategic
Concept and the revised NATO WPS Policy, would look like if
it were realized in practice, specifically through the NATO WPS
Action Plan due for renewal in 2025. To do so, it engages with
how WPS and a gender perspective have been institutionalized
in NATO, noting that advances in this agenda have often not
taken the “usual” or proscribed route within the Alliance.
It is, therefore, an area ripe for innovation in terms of its
implementation. The WPS agenda is now in a strong position
at NATO with buy-in from its Member States.2
The next step
is realizing the strategic vision for WPS’ implementation
set out in the revised NATO WPS Policy (2024) through the
development of the NATO Action Plan on WPS due in 2025.
Such an approach would drive the Alliance’s long-term WPS
priorities into the future and ensure WPS’ institutionalization
at all levels, political and, especially, military. It must rely on
gender-responsive leadership to strengthen existing gender
expertise across the Alliance and ensure accountability.
Realizing Women, Peace, and Security as
an Asset for Operational Effectiveness
The WPS agenda emerged from UN Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1325, adopted in 2000, and the nine follow-up
resolutions. It recognizes women’s agency and calls for women’s
participation in peace and security while acknowledging the
gendered impact of conflict, which often disproportionately
impacts women. These two aspects of the WPS agenda are
mutually reinforcing.3
The realization of UNSCR 1325 relied on
insiders and outsiders to the Security Council, including civil
society, which remain crucial knowledge brokers of WPS.4
NATO’s initial formal policy engagement with WPS in 2007
did not come with civil society involvement; rather, it built on a
concern related to the status of women in NATO forces on the
one hand and operational requirements vis-à-vis Afghanistan,
specifically counterinsurgency, on the other. This has set NATO
apart from the UN Security Council and other national and
regional level engagements with WPS that have been premised
on civil society consultation. It also demonstrates the nexus between WPS and a gender perspective in NATO’s approach.5
However, since 2014 the Alliance has consulted civil society
formally on its WPS policy, the first time it has done so on any
policy area.6
The Civil Society Advisory Panel (CSAP) on WPS
provides an important pool of expertise for NATO to draw on in
strengthening its approach to WPS.7
NATO’s engagement also did not come out of the blue. It
mapped onto decades of organizing within the Alliance to
strengthen the status of women in the armed forces of the
Alliance, including through the then Committee on Women in
NATO Forces (CWINF), which first met in 1961. It was through
CWINF that senior military women organized meetings in the
1960s on issues concerning the recruitment and retention of
women in the armed forces and successfully advocated for the
committee’s formal recognition in 1976. From 2002, CWINF led
on NATO’s WPS work, introducing the topic within the Alliance
and including the monitoring of the agenda’s implementation
among Allies. In 2009, CWINF became the NATO Committee
on Gender Perspectives (NCGP), recognizing its expanded
remit to monitor and support NATO’s implementation of WPS
by promoting the integration of a gender perspective into the
design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of policies,
programs, and military operations.
NATO’s engagement with WPS has relied upon decades of
military women’s advocacy within NATO and now benefits from
broader institutional buy-in, including from men. However, the
agenda has always gained traction when it has been perceived as
providing “added value” for the Alliance, including improving
operational effectiveness. For example, the Alliance would not
have engaged formally with the agenda when it did without its
involvement in Afghanistan through the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) from 2001-2014.8
Afghanistan saw
a “new” way of fighting with counterinsurgency operations
(COIN), given the reality that at the operational and tactical
levels there was a need to incorporate a gender perspective, as
the central focus of the campaign was the Afghan population.
This led to the deployment of Female Engagement Teams and
Cultural Support Teams, which instrumentalized gender as
a “new strategic asset,” demonstrating that the U.S. (and, by
extension, NATO) was “no longer fighting its battles with
outmoded methods.”9
In NATO’s current operations in Iraq,
Kosovo, and the Baltics, the military continues to have a key
role in implementing WPS, with states such as Canada driven
to lead on the agenda through Canada’s commitment to its own
Feminist Foreign Policy and because of the perceived added
value it provides to supporting operational effectiveness.10 This
is not to say there are no significant challenges to living up to
WPS in practice. For example, Canada was recently criticized for
not apologizing to an employee who had been sexually assaulted
by a NATO soldier while deployed as part of NATO’s Enhanced
Forward Presence in Latvia.11
WPS has also been seen as valuable to NATO in building
partnerships. A key example is NATO’s partnership with Sweden
before its bid for NATO membership. Sweden’s involvement
in ISAF helped shape NATO’s early views on WPS and gender
perspectives as operational assets.12 Despite Sweden’s nonalignment stance at the time, it deepened its partnership with
NATO through WPS, notably supporting gender integration in
Afghanistan and providing diplomatic backing for NATO’s WPS
efforts, such as at the 2012 Chicago Summit.13
However, Sweden’s case also reveals WPS’ vulnerability
within NATO. While WPS was central to the NATO-Sweden
partnership, any mention of it was omitted when Sweden began
formal NATO membership talks. This suggests that Sweden’s
Feminist Foreign Policy—an approach it pioneered and which
became a core aspect of its international stance, conflicted with
its NATO aspirations.14
Beyond Sweden, NATO partnerships have played an integral
role in the Alliance’s understanding of WPS, with initial NATO
WPS policies adopted jointly by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership
Council (EAPC).15 The agenda has thus provided “added value”
for NATO by providing a “safe” non-contentious issue and
diplomatic tool for NATO to build relationships with partners
whose interests might usually differ. For example, Austria proved
critical in supporting NATO’s adoption of a policy on WPS in
Japan, set geopolitically apart from NATO but increasingly
important for a potential pivot to the Indo-Pacific, initially built
its partnership with NATO on WPS, providing a Voluntary
National Contribution to NATO HQ to support NATO’s WPS
work in 2015 for two years.
Another area in which WPS has run counter to “business
as usual” at NATO, though again has added value, is with
respect to the role of civil society and promoting the Alliance’s
image in global politics. At a national level, and indeed at the
European Union level, civil society as knowledge brokers of
WPS have been heavily involved in developing WPS policies.
As a defense Alliance, such policy consultation requires a level
of transparency and openness that NATO did not engage in, in any policy area.16 Likewise, many civil society advocates of
WPS with roots in pacifism remained skeptical of NATO’s
engagement with WPS; consequently, there was no civil society
lobbying for NATO to engage with WPS at the time. Therefore,
NATO remained one of the exceptions among actors—states
and international organizations, implementing WPS only in
2014 and establishing a mechanism for formally consulting civil
society in the WPS policy-making process for the first time.
This has not been without challenges, but it represented a
significant commitment to open NATO’s WPS work to outside
scrutiny and a recognition that such consultation can strengthen
NATO’s policy.17
Institutional Drivers and Leadership on
WPS at NATO
On the political side, the creation of the Secretary General’s
Special Representative (SGSR) on the WPS position in 2012
has provided important impetus for NATO’s WPS work and has
been recognized by the UN as an example of best practices given
the high-level reporting of the role.18 Yet, the establishment of
the position was far from a done deal prior to the 2012 Chicago
Summit, and it took some NATO officials by surprise.19 Norway
offered to fill in the role from 2012-2014. At this time, institutional
challenges remained to fulfilling the SGSR’s mandate, including
the position within the NATO structure and rank. This was a
topic for discussion from 2014 to 2017, with the Netherlands
putting forward and sponsoring an ambassador for the position.
The high-level SGSR has successfully raised awareness of NATO’s
WPS work externally and taken the lead on WPS development
internally.20
The SGSR is now recruited via the regular NATO recruitment
process, which has meant bringing the funding for it “in-house”
from the civil budget. As part of the Office of the Secretary
General, this reflects progress on the WPS agenda at NATO.
The open competition also brings the process in line with the
recruitment for Assistant Secretary General positions, even if
certain Allies still dominate particular portfolios here, bringing
into question how “open” such competition is.21 In practice, most
Allies with a WPS National Action Plan have seen the benefit of
promoting the agenda as a foreign policy tool to support their
wider influence, including at NATO, so it remains a politically
lucrative position for Allies to secure.22
The SGSR on WPS remains the main point of accountability for
implementing WPS at NATO, as outlined in the current Action
Plan. However, the WPS agenda also spans across the areas of
responsibility of several Assistant Secretary Generals (ASGs),
from Innovation, Hybrid and Cyber to Defence Policy and
Planning and Operations and Public Diplomacy. Various WPSrelated initiatives have emerged from these ASGs, most recently,
a Public Diplomacy campaign to counter gender disinformation
on social media.23 That withstanding, to fully achieve the genderresponsive leadership committed to in NATO’s WPS Policy, and
to prevent the agenda from being siloed on the political side
or solely managed by the SGSR and their office, there is a need
for each ASG to have specific actions in the upcoming Action
Plan. In this way, each ASG will share accountability for the
implementation of the WPS agenda, even if the SGSR remains
the driver and a crucial guide for coherent WPS implementation
at NATO.
On the military side, the NATO Committee on Gender
Perspectives (NCGP) serves as a prime example of the critical
role institutional drivers play in successfully implementing the
WPS agenda within NATO. As an advisory body to the Military
Committee (MC), the NCGP has been at the forefront of
institutionalizing gender perspectives and operationalizing the
NATO WPS policies.24
It began back in the 1960s, exploring every avenue through
which women could make the fullest possible contribution to
NATO by serving in their national armed forces. Its efforts led to
the establishment of the International Military Staff (IMS) Office
of the Gender Advisor (GENAD) in 1998. Its role has expanded
in recent years and now also supports the implementation of
WPS and the integration of a gender perspective within the
IMS, marking a significant milestone in institutionalizing
gender perspectives.25 Since 2005, it has actively championed
the creation of a Military Committee policy document on
gender perspectives within NATO, a long-fought goal that was
realized in the adoption of the NATO WPS policy last year. This
achievement underscores decades of persistent advocacy to fully
integrate a gender perspective into NATO’s activities, missions,
and operations.
However, for the military, there are additional practical challenges
in implementing WPS and incorporating a gender perspective,
with the primary issue being inadequate resourcing. Gender
Advisors (GENADs) positioned throughout NATO, including
within the International Military Staff and Strategic Commands, are understaffed and, therefore, unable to fully meet the political
ambitions of the WPS agenda.
Putting WPS Into Practice Through the
Revised NATO Action Plan
WPS remained on the margins of NATO’s core business,
although, as demonstrated here, it has provided significant value
to the Alliance in several areas. Its elevation to a deliverable
of the Strategic Concept and the revised NATO WPS Policy
providing a strategic vision to the agenda indicates a novel phase
in NATO’s engagement and an attempt to make WPS part of the
Alliance’s core business.
The Strategic Concept states that NATO “will promote good
governance and integrate climate change, human security, and
the Women, Peace, and Security agenda across all our tasks. We
will continue to advance gender equality as a reflection of our
values.”26 While the inclusion of WPS is significant though not
guaranteed, how it has been framed in the Strategic Concept
affects how WPS will be understood within NATO moving
forward. So far, the implementation of the WPS agenda and a
gender perspective have added value to NATO, particularly by
improving operational effectiveness and supporting women in
NATO forces.27 As the Secretary General has stated, integrating a
gender perspective is “not only the right thing to do but the smart
thing to do.”28 The absence of WPS in the Strategic Concept’s
sections on Deterrence and Defence, as well as Crisis Prevention
and Management, is significant since the document guides the
entire Alliance. The updated NATO WPS Policy addresses this
gap by aligning it with NATO’s core tasks and the four pillars
of the WPS agenda. However, the Strategic Concept missed the
opportunity to include this directly, meaning those not fully
convinced of WPS’s importance would need to consult the WPS
Policy separately to understand its relevance.
Crucially, the NATO Policy on WPS introduces the concept
of gender-responsive leadership “to ensure NATO leaders
strengthen their gender expertise, work towards gender equality
and are accountable for the implementation of the WPS
Agenda.”29 Such an approach will be key to realizing an effective
WPS agenda at NATO and should be integrated into the Action
Plan. It should start from the top down, with the Secretary
General mainstreaming WPS into public-facing remarks as a
matter of course, not as an exception. In addition, and as outlined
earlier, clear lines of reporting on WPS should be identified for
all the Assistant Secretary Generals’ portfolios. This will help
address the weaknesses in WPS in the Strategic Concept and
draw attention to the importance of NATO’s revised WPS Policy,
which is by far the most comprehensive policy to date and sets an
ambitious agenda for the Alliance.
At present, there is value in ensuring the integration of a gender
perspective is reflective of NATO’s WPS priorities and moving
beyond the institutional siloing of this topic to ensure the whole
of NATO is committed to its implementation across political
and military structures. Establishing the SGSR WPS position
has been fundamental to moving this agenda forward, as well as
approving the latest NATO WPS Policy, which has provided an
overarching strategic vision. But now it needs to be translated
into practice via the Action Plan, and a crucial part of this will be
the actions of NATO leadership across the political and military
structures.
To summarize, advancements in the integration of a gender
perspective in NATO are tempered by remaining challenges. The
inclusion of WPS in the Strategic Concept is highly significant.
However, while it is referenced in relation to all of NATO’s tasks,
it is specifically mentioned only in the context of Cooperative
Security, with no direct mention in the sections of the other
core tasks (on Deterrence and Defence or Crisis Prevention and
Management). This deficiency should be addressed. Secondly,
as the revised NATO Policy on WPS (2024) draws attention to,
translating the policy commitment of WPS into practice must
emphasize WPS’ added value to NATO, including promoting
gender-responsive leadership by establishing clear accountability
for the Assistant Secretary Generals and their portfolios in
mainstreaming WPS across all NATO activities. Finally, it is
essential to draw on the expertise of the Civil Society Advisory
Panel (CSAP) on WPS and the NATO Committee on Gender
Perspectives (NCGP).
Futureproofing WPS at NATO
As NATO’s engagement with WPS to date has demonstrated, this
is a policy area ripe for innovation that adds considerable value
to the Alliance at all levels. The next step in supporting NATO’s
WPS commitments is to translate Strategic Concept statements
and NATO WPS policy commitments into practice through the
development of an effective WPS Action Plan. In this regard, four steps would contribute towards NATO’s
efforts to put WPS into practice in developing the new NATO
WPS Action Plan, which would center on the added value of
WPS for the Alliance.
The Secretary General and NATO’s senior leadership should
integrate WPS into their public-facing remarks as a matter of
routine, given the demonstrated applicability of the agenda to
all of NATO’s tasks.
Align efforts with the strategic vision that prioritizes
gender-responsive leadership and ensures accountability in
implementing WPS across NATO’s political and military
structures.
NATO’s political and military structures should better leverage
the expertise of the NATO Civil Society Advisory Panel on
WPS and NCGP, respectively, using it as a resource to support
gender-responsive leadership in their work.
Ensure that policy commitments are translated into concrete
actions by providing the NATO Military Authorities with
adequate resources—especially in terms of human resources
and dedicated gender structures—to implement these
initiatives effectively.
Marvin Dee Mathelier and Tahina Montoya
The Global Fragility Act (GFA) and its subsequent Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (SPCPS) constitute a fundamental shift in the way the U.S. government will act to address the root causes of violence in fragile states and stabilize conflict-affected areas. Given bipartisan support and congressionally mandated funding, the GFA is designed to produce a coordinated strategy that builds on lessons learned and prioritizes building partnerships with local communities and civil society actors. In terms of implementation, the GFA requires a whole-of-government approach and interagency process with regular reporting mechanisms applied to five high-priority countries over a ten-year period.
In Spring 2023, four years after the passing of the GFA, the U.S. State Department released a 10-Year Strategic Plan for four priority countries and one priority region. Haiti is one of the SPCPS-designated priority states, along with Libya, Mozambique, and Papua New Guinea, as is the region of Coastal Western Africa (which includes Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, and Togo). The SPCPS specifically links the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) to its work, recognizing that the root causes of violent extremism are gendered and thus intimately linked to structural inequalities and discriminations that must be addressed to reduce state fragility. Haiti’s own 10-Year Strategic Plan identifies severe gender inequality and Gender-Based Violence (GBV) as elements that undermine Haiti’s stability.
With the SPCPS specifically calling attention to drivers of conflict that are deeply gendered, this policy brief argues that country implementation plans must consider a whole-of-government (WOG) approach that integrates a gender perspective. Haiti’s implementation plan must also recognize Haiti’s complex history and how it has contributed to the gendered dimensions of Haiti’s current violence—political, economic, cultural, and structural—and integrate these factors into the tailored approach emphasized in the GFA’s strategic documents.
The policy brief begins with an assessment of current conditions in Haiti and then turns to the question of why current conditions are so intractable. Using Haiti as a case study, the policy brief shows how consideration of a country’s history and gender-specific issues are factors that must be considered when developing tangible solutions, as doing so is necessary to promote long-term stability. The policy brief then presents a set of recommendations that can strengthen the Haiti implementation plan and programmatic objectives in critical areas: formalize the informal sector workforce to empower women, reform education policy, increase support to the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, and mobilize the Haitian diaspora in support of U.S. assistance to Haiti.
Haiti: The Current Situation
In addition to the 2020 COVID pandemic, 2021 was a devastating year for Haiti. Multiple protests and demonstrations have since occurred in response to high inflation and rising food and gas prices. The poverty-stricken country also saw an alarming increase in criminal and gang activity, a sign of the weakening authority and the incapacity of the Haitian National Police to control the gangs. Tensions escalated when, on July 7, 2021, a group of 28 foreign mercenaries broke into the home of President Jovenel Moïse and assassinated him. Only five weeks later, on August 14, 2021, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake hit the southern claw of Haiti, causing billions of dollars worth of infrastructure damage and affecting the lives of over 1.2 million people.
In the wake of these political, economic, and social crises, human rights violations over the past two years have escalated and accelerated. Women and children are particularly vulnerable. The number of kidnappings and abductions has tripled since 2021 as gangs use women and children for financial gain or tactical advantage. Of the 5.2 million Haitians requiring humanitarian aid (nearly half the population), three million are children. Severe malnutrition and cholera outbreaks are overtaxing a failing healthcare system, and gender-based violence is rampant.
It is estimated that gangs control 90% of the capital, Port Au Prince, instilling fear through the use of violent tactics such as kidnapping, rape, and murder to control areas. Occasionally, to further aggravate the populace, and in an attempt to oust Prime Minister Ariel Henry from power, these gangs block off access to fuel and goods, preventing access to other parts of the country. This further exacerbates food shortages that, if left unchecked, can lead to a man-made famine. The international community’s hesitancy to get involved has left citizens with few choices, leaving many to combat gangs on their own. Some citizens have retaliated by taking extreme actions of their own, such as burning gang members in the road as a deterrent.
On October 23, 2023, after intense pressure from both the Haitian government and human rights organizations, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved a Kenyan-led security mission to help the Haitian National Police combat gang violence. However, on October 24, 2023, Kenya’s High Court blocked the deployment of Kenyan police to Haiti after a petition was filed challenging the government’s deployment decision, and Kenya’s parliament has yet to schedule a debate on the issue, a ruling the High Court is expected to make on November 9.
Roots of Systemic Failure
For Haiti, the current violence that handicaps efforts to stabilize the country and protect at-risk groups has roots in Haiti’s tumultuous history, which has been shaped by foreign intervention and occupation, crippling debts, weak governance structures, and devastating natural disasters.
Independence and Struggle: 1800-1900. Haiti became the first free Black republic on January 1, 1804, when a band of slaves raised an army to defeat France. To recoup and compensate for its economic losses, the French demanded reparations totaling 150 million francs ($20-30 billion in today’s currency). Debt payments consumed over 80% of Haiti’s revenues for the subsequent 122 years. The fear of political contagion from Haiti’s successful slave rebellion led countries, including the United States, to withhold recognition of Haiti’s sovereignty or offer any support for the young country.
U.S. Occupation: 1915-1934. The U.S. occupation of Haiti was designed to quell the political and economic turmoil plaguing Haiti and, through a campaign known as the Banana Wars, to protect U.S. financial assets and economic growth in the Western Hemisphere. Many atrocities and human rights violations, including torture, forced labor, and religious persecution against voodoo practitioners occurred during the U.S. occupation of Haiti. Additionally, under the guise of protecting Haiti’s financial assets, the U.S. took custody of over $500,000 from Haiti’s national bank, roughly equivalent to $15,351,300 billion in current dollars. The loss of these funds had significant impacts on the country’s economic development and stabilization, and especially on Haiti’s social fabric and education system.
Despite promoting the goal of creating 1,074 schools in Haiti, the U.S. built only 306, much lower in comparison to schools constructed by the U.S. in Cuba (2,600) and the Philippines (1,000). For children in those countries, this support resulted in a significant increase in access to both schools and education. Rather than develop schools to promote education for all Haitians, the U.S. provided agricultural training for predominantly black Haitians, while their mixed-race peers continued their education at the limited and exclusive French-based curriculum schools in Haiti. This specifically limited black Haitians’ ability to acquire critical skills and knowledge, further widening the education and socio-economic gaps for black Haitian children.
The Duvalier Regime: 1957-1986. The 30-year reign of terror of François and Jean-Claude Duvalier that led to the killing of over 50,000 men, women, and children contributed to a massive exodus of Haitian citizens. This “brain drain” of highly educated and skilled Haitians had a devastating effect on the country’s social and economic development and placed the country in a perpetual cycle of poverty. Haitian citizens continue to struggle while members of the Haitian diaspora secure more economic growth and send remittances back to Haiti, often the only income many families have. Women, in particular, were severely affected by the impacts of emigration and economic crises, as most were forced to work almost exclusively within the informal sector. Statistics show the staggering cost: in 2021, the World Bank reported that “vulnerable employment” among Haitian women had reached 83.5%.
2004 and Beyond: 2004 ushered in a crushing series of humanitarian, political, and economic crises that continued to disproportionately impact women and children in Haiti. This began with the second coup of Haitian President Bertrand Aristide on February 29, 2004, which in the wake of Aristide’s ouster led to the establishment of the UN peacekeeping mission Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti (MINUSTAH). Peacekeeping forces worked with the Haitian National Police to support police efforts to reduce violence. Unfortunately, trust in MINUSTAH evaporated as tensions grew. Corruption and GBV were endemic; serious incidents of sexual abuse by UN peacekeepers against local citizens occurred, but few were held accountable for their actions. A severe cholera outbreak traced back to a sewage leak from a MINUSTAH base resulted in the loss of over 10,000 lives, and the UN was slow to accept responsibility. The withdrawal of MINUSTAH troops in 2019 left much destruction, loss of life, and a glaring security gap, creating an opening for gangs to take control of the country.
Finally, with more than 96% of its population exposed to hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes, Haiti has become even more vulnerable to natural disasters. A 2010 earthquake killed 222,570 people, injured over 300,000, and displaced 3.5 million Haitians. In 2016, Hurricane Matthew killed around 250,000 people and wiped out 120% of its GDP. The destructive earthquake that hit Haiti on August 14, 2021, was followed two days later by Tropical Storm Grace, causing massive flooding and landslides and worsening the already desperate conditions on the ground.
All these systemic issues and intractable problems, combined with a lack of faith in the government, have forced Haitians to fend for themselves. For women, this meant relying increasingly on the informal sector, primarily selling goods on the street and making the hard decision to use their financial resources to feed their children, pay for medical bills, or decide which of their children was most eligible to go to private school. This overwhelming conundrum created a practice with serious repercussions for poorer Haitians. With little money to send their children to school, a legalized form of child labor or slavery called Restavèk developed. With the creation of this system, limited resources drove many families to send their children to other, presumably wealthier, families who had the relative means to provide education, shelter, and food in exchange for their children’s service.
Current Impact on Women and Children
Gender-Based Violence (GBV)
With the ongoing turmoil in Haiti, marginalized groups such as women and children continue to be disproportionally impacted. GBV and violence against women and children are used as a deterrent to control a community. A Health Policy Watch study that evaluated the use of rape as a weapon of war in Haiti stated that “80% of the women and girls who participated in this research had been victims of one or multiple forms of sexual violence by one or more perpetrators. In 33% of the cases, the assailants were described as bandits, gang members, or kidnappers. 14% of the victims were only 10 to 18 years old.”
Unemployment Rate & Informal Work Sector
Haiti’s unemployment rate is currently 15.73%. Women make up 62% of the labor force, and nearly half of the Haitian women are heads of households, but they do not work in the formal sector. Women constitute more than 75% of the informal economy in Haiti, where they sell produce and other items on roadsides to support their families with no benefits, health insurance, or other job protections.
Lack of Representation in Politics
Unsurprisingly, women’s political representation in Haiti is negligent. In 2019, women constituted only 2.54% of the Haitian parliament, though as of January 2023, there is no functioning parliament at all in the country. Haiti established a Gender Equality Policy in 2014 and the Haitian Ministry for the Status of Women and Women’s Rights (MCFDF) in 1994. Nevertheless, the plan has not been effectively implemented, and the MCFDF faces chronic underfunding (0.01—0.05% of the national budget), government and parliamentary hostility, and little political will to change the status quo.
Restavèk System
As noted, a modern version of child slavery known as Restavèk remains prevalent in Haiti. Studies have shown that male and female children who have been “restavèks” (more than half of whom are girls) likely never attended school and are more prone to experience sexual, physical, and emotional violence in childhood than non-restavèk children (See Figure 1). Some children do return home, but with few options available to them, many turn to prostitution, join gangs, or become beggars, which only continues the poverty-stricken cycle in Haiti. The Haitian government has attempted to crack down on this practice, but many families continue to resort to the only means they can afford to feed their children and families.
Figure 1: Restavèk vs Non-Restavèk Children
Access to Education
Education in Haiti is valued but not accessible to all since 85% of schools in Haiti are private schools. Families understand the power and opportunities an education can bring and, if they have the means, are willing to pay more than 40% of their income to send their children to school. In families with multiple children, children may skip a year to let their siblings go to school or, as is often the case, preference is given to boys under the assumption that it will be easier for them to find jobs. Parents often have no money to pay for their daughter’s education, and it has been known that some girls ask their male counterparts for money in exchange for sex in hopes they will make enough money to afford an education. Additionally, while the global average for “mean years of schooling” is 8.7 years, Haiti’s is a mere 5.6 years, placing it 124th out of 150 countries.
An Opportunity for Change: The Global Fragility Act
The U.S. 10-year Strategic Plan for Haiti identifies key factors that contribute to Haiti’s fragility (including the assassination of President Jovenel Moïse and increased criminal gang activity) and delves into gender-specific issues that continue to contribute to the countries’ instability, namely, GBV and gender inequality that disproportionately impacts women and girls. It specifically highlights the creation of a working group that consulted 230 individuals from different facets of the Haitian government and civil society. But gaps remain.
It is particularly important that a detailed implementation plan arising from interagency discussions successfully integrate a gender perspective. However, a growing list of documents referenced for GFA implementation (see Figure 3) has made an already complicated effort more onerous.
Figure 3: U.S. Government Documents: WPS and GFA
| December 2017 | The United States Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 |
| June 2019 | The United States Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security |
| December 2019 | Global Fragility Act |
| December 2020 | The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability |
| December 2020 | 2020-2024 The USAID Strategic Framework: Haiti |
| April 2022 | Announcement of GFA Priority Countries and Regions |
| March 2023 | U.S. Department of State Integrated Country Strategy |
| March 2023 | Publication of Country and Regional Plan Summaries |
Despite multiple failed attempts by Haiti and the international community to address existing complex conflict dynamics, the Global Fragility Act and its 10-Year Strategic Plan for Haiti offers an opportunity to course-correct if implemented with a gender-sensitive lens alongside the people of Haiti. We offer four tangible recommendations that help codify how gender-conscious GFA implementation could look like in Haiti. They provide a unique and crucial approach to stabilizing Haiti’s fragile situation through the lens of gender-centric solutions.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1: Increase Women’s Economic Agency in the Workforce
Through the support of the DoS, DoD, and USAID under the GFA, the Haitian government should create a joint coalition with the Haitian Ministry of the Economy, local government officials, and local NGOs to develop a pilot project for supporting the women-led informal sector. While most plans would center their efforts in the capital, specifically in Port-au-Prince, this plan is better suited for development and implementation in Cap Haitian, the second-largest city in the country. With over 190,000 people, Cap Haitian is in the northern tip of Haiti and has thus far been shielded from the violence currently engulfing key cities in Haiti. Through monitoring mechanisms and data collection, a pilot case will provide lessons learned for implementing programs tailored to support women’s agency in more fragile and conflict-ridden environments. This approach has positive multiple effects, and it will address the persistent insecurity women face socially and economically and help ensure they are in a space that enables economic growth for their families and encourages career development.
Recommendation 2: Enhance the Ministry of Women’s Affairs
While the Haitian government has established laws addressing gender equality, policymakers are noncompliant with the laws. Enhancing the capability of the Ministry of Women’s Affairs is needed to oversee and enforce these laws, though it is doubtful the Haitian government will extend the resources and staff to support the Ministry’s work. International assistance can provide financial support for the Ministry’s activities, such as developing education and gender awareness programs for men, women, and children or building women’s economic empowerment. Collaboration among diverse international stakeholders that provide training, business advice, and increased access to financial resources or that work to build women’s business leadership and ownership in emerging markets will strengthen the Ministry’s capacity to empower more women.
Recommendation 3: Education for Children
Education is the key driver to economic growth within a country. A highly educated and skilled labor force will increase the quality of work in all sectors and will contribute to increased income, tax revenue, and better-quality public education. To get there, with the help of GFA entities, Haiti should establish an education initiative similar to the approach conducted in the High Performing Asian Economies (HPAE) that includes Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China. Although different in culture, government structure, and region, these countries were able to shift from developing countries to leading economies within half a decade. With high rates of investment in education, the governments were able to reallocate funds towards human capital such as schools and other necessary training, which helped each respective economy grow. This is a challenge for Haiti–not just because of government instability and scarce resources for education, but because of structural inequalities in the education system itself that must be eliminated to spur greater economic growth in the country. Nevertheless, making progress towards quality universal education must be a political priority.
Recommendation 4: Mobilizing the Haitian Diaspora
Despite significant international assistance to Haiti–$13 billion between 2011 and 2022 alone–Haiti remains an impoverished failed state. Earlier efforts have failed for many reasons, among them, poorly managed projects, local capacity limitations, corruption, and a political and economic elite complicit in gang violence and unwilling to implement structural changes to address state instability. An approach that has not been optimized is leveraging the Haitian diaspora to advance develop-driven, long-term solutions for Haiti, with the diaspora working hand in hand with the U.S. government and Haitians on the ground. Outside of the Haitians on the ground, there is no other group that understands the complexity and issues within the island nation or that contributes more to Haiti’s GDP: around two-thirds of Haiti’s GDP comes from remittances, showing that the Haitian diaspora not only influences but drives and deeply cares about Haiti’s success.
The Global Fragility Act and the 10-year strategic plan for Haiti can lead to novel implementation approaches by incorporating members of the diaspora while engaging with Haitian civil society organizations, and do so with the intent to leverage Haitian diaspora expertise. This includes engaging with organizations like the U.S. National Haitian Elected Officials Network (NHEON), a U.S.-based organization of Haitian-American politicians who can be an additional voice and liaison between Haitian citizens and U.S. organizations working towards implementing the GFA. We also recommend exploring the opportunity to grant voting rights to Haitians living abroad. While Haitians living abroad are eligible for dual citizenship, they cannot currently vote in Haitian elections. Doing so would insert a diversity of views and weaken the ability of corrupt politicians to manipulate voters, in the hope that diaspora voters would help to push the Haitian government to be more accountable to its citizens.
Conclusion
While Haiti’s history has contributed greatly to its current situation, and prior policies (with the best of intentions) have failed to alter Haiti’s current state, the Global Fragility Act is, undoubtedly, currently the best option to address fragility in Haiti. Though a challenge, cooperation between U.S. government agencies working with Haiti’s citizens and the diaspora to develop and implement the above-listed recommendations would contribute to addressing key concerns of GBV, employment, education, and safety, all of which are discussed in the guiding frameworks that have been identified as key documents for GFA implementation in Haiti. Despite the delay in implementation, the GFA is a policy that provides a significant opportunity for change. If implemented alongside the people of Haiti in a gender-sensitive way, the GFA can address fragility in innovative ways that will work for Haiti and its people.
Joan Johnson-Freese, Susan Markham
INTRODUCTION
There are currently two main frameworks regarding gender equality and women’s participation in international policy and conflict resolution: the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) framework, codified in the landmark United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 in 2000, and the feminist foreign policy framework (FFP) that became prominent in 2014 when Sweden became the first government to formally adopt a feminist foreign policy. Over the past decade, a tension has existed between the civil society advocates who were/are involved in the development, passage, and implementation of UNSCR 1325 and those academics and practitioners who favor the newer, feminist framework. Surprisingly (or not), an unpublished mapping exercise in 2019 between the two groups found very few people who worked on both frameworks or who were using the WPS framework as a foundation for the newer FFP. What we argue here is that the goals of both frameworks—gender equality and peace—are the same, and that the tension largely rests on differences in approach. In this piece, we provide background on both frameworks, what they have in common, some critiques, how they might approach current events, and recommendations on a way forward. What we suggest is that while these differences in approach are not insignificant, both frameworks would benefit from greater acknowledgement of and closer coordination with the other, so that more progress can be made within the gender equality movement.
BACKGROUND
Women, Peace and Security
The opening for ratification of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), both in 1966, in many ways represented the heyday of human rights activity at the United Nations. Unfortunately, however, it was quickly realized that many of the countries that had voted in support of those treaties had not assumed and did not recognize that the treaty provisions would also apply to women. Human rights were not inherently considered women’s rights. The United Nations subsequently followed up with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1979. Though as of 2015, 189 countries have signed and ratified CEDAW (the United States signed but never ratified), many have done so with qualifications that render their commitments toothless. Hence when First Lady Hillary Clinton declared “women’s rights are human rights, and human rights are woman’s rights” at the 1995 Beijing Conference on Women, she was stating what many had thought obvious decades before but had since come to understand as a continuing battle.
Civil society groups continued to carry on the battle for gender equality through the United Nations, doing so not “just” as a matter of social justice, but as a security issue as well. An increasing amount of case study and empirically-based research demonstrated the multiple roles of women in security-related affairs, the gendered differentiated effects of conflict on men, women, boys and girls, and the linkage between gender equality, stability, and good governance. Regrettably, social justice issues are too often considered “desirable” though expendable issues on governmental agendas, or “just too hard.” Security issues, however, tend to resonate more strongly with decisionmakers. Ultimately, through the efforts of civil society groups, UNSCR 1325 was unanimously passed in 2000.
Implementation of UNSCR 1325 was left to states, through National Action Plans (NAPs). As of 2021, 98 countries have adopted NAPs. Many of the early countries to adopt NAPs were Scandinavian countries already strong in gender equality. It took the United States 11 years to do so, finally accomplished while Hillary Clinton was Secretary of State. Of those countries with NAPs, only 36 percent have budgets attached, evidencing that the Women, Peace and Security framework has seen much more rhetorical than actual support in many countries.
The first iteration of the Women, Peace and Security Act in the United States was introduced in 2012. It was again initiated by a coalition of civil society organizations that championed the cause to bi-partisan congressional members and staffers. The Act was revised and reintroduced in both the 2013-2014 and 2015-2016 sessions of Congress, eventually gaining bi-partisan sponsorship in both the House and the Senate. In 2017, the U.S. Congress passed the Women, Peace and Security Act. It was signed by President Donald Trump, making it the law of the land. Passage of the Act in 2017 was symbolically important as it provided support for those in government seeking to take action regarding gender equality. It gave them a “hook” on which to hang actions. The Act also required the president to submit a government-wide implementation strategy to Congress. Initially, however, the Act was passed without funding attached. For a President who was confronted at the White House in 2017 by a crowd of protesting women estimated at three times the number who attended his inauguration, signing the Women, Peace and Security Act was a no-cost act of support for women.
After an implementation strategy for the Women, Peace and Security Act was delivered to Congress in 2019, the federal agencies charged with its execution (the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Homeland Security) began working on their individual implementation strategies. The Defense Department, for example, outlined three objectives: 1) to exemplify a diverse organization that allows for women’s meaningful participation across the development, management, and employment of the Joint Force; 2) that women in partner nations meaningfully participate and serve at all ranks and in all occupations in defense and security sectors; and 3) that partner nation defense and security sectors ensure women and girls are safe and secure and that their human rights are protected, especially during conflict and crisis.[1] Regrettably, in many instances support has been slow and often more rhetorical and performative than actual, as indicated by budgets, policies, and women’s representation in decision-making roles. In performative allyship, those with privilege and position profess solidarity with a cause or policy, often to distance themselves from potential scrutiny or to position themselves for praise. This vocalized support is disingenuous and potentially harmful to marginalized groups by signaling to subordinates that real action is neither needed nor sought and that no one will be held accountable for inaction. That makes active oversight by Congress imperative.
Feminist Foreign Policy
Feminist foreign policy theory was born of the academic ideas of ethical foreign policy and feminist international relations and became prominent in 2014 when the Swedish coalition government, led by Sweden’s Foreign Minister Margot Wallström, adopted a feminist foreign policy.[2] In this first practical application, feminist foreign policy is posited on the conviction that sustainable peace, security, and development cannot be achieved if women, who comprise half the world’s population, are excluded. As the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s website states, “The policy is a response to the discrimination and systematic subordination that still characterises everyday life for countless women and girls all over the world. Feminist foreign policy is an agenda for change to strengthen the rights, representation and resources of all women and girls.”[3] Regarding rights, the Swedish Foreign Service promotes all women’s and girls’ full enjoyment of human rights, which includes combating all forms of violence and discrimination that restrict freedom of action. Regarding representation, the Swedish Foreign Service promotes women’s participation and influence in decision-making processes at all levels and in all areas, and seeks dialogue with women representatives at all levels, including in civil society. With respect to resources, the Swedish Foreign Service works to ensure that government resources are allocated to promote gender equality and equal opportunities for all.[4] In the first three years of implementation, Sweden worked to raise the visibility of and combat destructive masculine norms and to strengthen countries’ capacities to prosecute perpetrators, assist crime victims, and reintegrate soldiers. Sweden also contributed to a growing body of knowledge about the link between the uncontrolled spread of weapons and sexual violence against women.[5]
Since 2014, several countries have announced different versions of a feminist foreign policy. Norway has developed both an Action Plan for Women’s Rights and Gender Equality in Foreign and Development Policy 2016-2020 and a National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security.[6]Canada’s feminist International Assistance Policy, announced in 2017, targets gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls at its core: “This is a matter of basic justice and also basic economics. We know that empowering women, overseas and here at home, makes families and countries more prosperous.”[7] The French government’s feminist foreign policy, adopted in 2019, says that gender equality should be considered in all issues, from poverty reduction to sustainable development, peace and security, defense and promotion of fundamental rights, and climate and economic issues.[8] Other countries have followed suit (Mexico in 2020, Luxembourg in 2021, Spain in 2021, and Germany in 2022).
In addition, there are discussions about incorporating a feminist approach to foreign policy taking place in the European Union, Chile, Denmark, Malaysia, Norway, New Zealand, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.[9]Governments, however, are many-armed creatures, sometimes with activities of one arm having no relation to another. Interest in or adoption of a feminist foreign policy does not inherently mean a gender-equal society, or even full government support of women. Mexico, for example, has expressed interest in a feminist foreign policy, though it has one of the highest global rates of violence against women.
The International Center for Research on Women (ICRW), a non-profit center headquartered in Washington, D.C., hosts both the Coalition for a Feminist Foreign Policy in the United States and the Global Partner Network, which consists of more than 30 governments and leading civil
society groups who are working to advance the field of feminist foreign policy. The working definition the Coalition for a Feminist Foreign Policy in the United States uses for feminist foreign policy: “Feminist foreign policy is the policy of a state that defines its interactions with other states, as well as movements and other non-state actors, in a manner that prioritizes peace, gender equality and environmental integrity; enshrines, promotes, and protects the human rights of all; seeks to disrupt colonial, racist, patriarchal and male-dominated power structures; and allocates significant resources, including research, to achieve that vision. Feminist foreign policy is coherent in its approach across all its levers of influence, anchored by the exercise of those values at home and co-created with feminist activists, groups, and movements, at home and abroad.”[10]
In 2020, ICRW separately released a global framework for feminist foreign policy that was developed following more than a year of research and global consultations with over 100 organizations in more than 40 countries. In order to inform the fledgling field of feminist foreign policy, this framework attempts to provide an outline, including five key ingredients necessary for countries considering a feminist foreign policy: the purpose of the policy within the government’s specific context; the definition of feminist foreign policy for the government; the scope or reach of the policy (what parts of the government will be impacted?); the intended outcomes of the policy and benchmarks to achieve over time; and a government plan to operationalize it.[11]
COMMONALITIES AND CRITIQUES
While there are differences in the WPS and FFP frameworks, both seek to expand global peace and security, increase women’s participation and leadership, integrate gender into humanitarian responses, and change the political and governance structures that reinforce gender inequality.
Peace and Security
One major commonality between the WPS and FFP frameworks is a redefinition of the concepts of peace and security. Norwegian peace activist Johan Galtung first differentiated negative peace and positive peace in the 1960’s. Negative peace is defined as the absence of violence but without a society’s tendencies toward harmony and stability, whereas positive peace is more lasting and built on sustainable investments in economic development and institutions and characterized by societal attitudes that foster peace.[12] WPS exemplifies positive peace through inclusiveness and consideration of gendered perspectives of policies and programs that lead to increased stability of all political orders. Yet a critique of the WPS framework is its focus on the protection of women and girls. The argument is that the WPS framework not only solidifies the militarized state but, in some cases, provides justification for conflict. The U.S.-led War on Terror, for example, was at least in part framed as a “fight for the rights and dignity of women.”[13] University of Sydney Professor Laura Shepherd argues that multiple logics behind the “prevention” pillar—a logic of peace, a logic of militarism, and a logic of security—creates a paradox that “collapses back into a logic of security”[14] contrary to the ultimate goal of peace. That is, in order to have peace, security must be obtained and retained through a heavy military presence and potentially military action, thus justifying such.
In a similar vein, feminist foreign policy seeks to change the very definition of “security” to go beyond the absence of armed conflict to include economic and political security, freedom from a fear of a global pandemic and climate change, and the feeling of safety within one’s own community and home. The “security” issues discussed in FPP would be broadened to include access to drinkable water, the ability to walk home at night safely, the number of weapons in a country outside of the military, and many others. Likewise, the solutions considered would be more diverse. Data used to make those decisions would include information about human rights abuses, rates of child marriage, levels of gender-based violence, and other issues that Texas A&M Professor Valerie Hudson and other scholars have pointed to in several publications that show the connection between gender equality and state stability.[15] Decisions made to protect the interests of a country would cover not only military personnel but civilians on all sides. The voices of those impacted by military activities, sanctions, or other actions would be included. In response, WPS advocates argue that working first on the protection of women, girls, and other vulnerable groups is a necessary precondition to inclusive gender equality and diversity. Women’s safety—the goal of protection—is necessary to ensure that women and girls have the ability to work toward other goals of economic and political power and can use their agency to shape their lives.
Women’s Representation
To reach the goals of gender equality and peace, both the WPS and FFP frameworks aim to increase the representation of women in country and global policy-making processes and activities. One of the four core pillars of the Women, Peace and Security framework focuses on the increased participation of women at all levels of decision-making in conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and in post-conflict relief and recovery efforts. But the WPS framework works within conventional peacemaking and post-conflict governance structures that accept conflict as inevitable. Subsequently, this framework has been criticized by Melbourne Law School Professor Dianne Otto, who argues that “the WPS agenda has served to refocus feminist attention from … making armed conflict impossible, to making armed conflict safer for women … as an end in itself.”[16]Thereby, WPS can be perceived as a more incremental approach to positive peace, whereas FFP is more transformational.
Like WPS, the goal of FFP is to increase the number of women serving in elected and non-elected political and government positions, in peace processes, in military and peacekeeping missions, and in development and humanitarian activities. FFP seeks to increase the number of feminist voices that will advocate for gender equality in all sectors, beyond peace and security, such as in the economy and climate adaptation, including a country’s own government as well as its government partners. A critique of this approach is that feminist foreign policy is too broad; it can’t just add more women and change everything all at one time – change requires incrementalism. The real-world implications of executing a feminist foreign policy are complicated. For instance, in Sweden, even with female leadership and a feminist foreign policy, the government has struggled to find a balance between human rights and its own arms industry.[17]
Post-conflict and Humanitarian Settings
UNSCR 1325 urges local actors, Member States, and UN agencies to adopt gendered perspectives in peace operations, negotiations, and agreements, in acknowledgement that policies and programs affect men, women, boys and girls differently, and to include women in the resolution and recovery phase of conflict. It identifies women as active agents rather than passive recipients. This is important because it identifies women’s participation as a right, not something that men are giving women out of goodwill, and as a post-conflict benefit to all parties. Research has shown that including women in peace negotiations increases the potential of peace agreement lasting two or more years by 20 percent, and increases by 35 percent the probability of peace agreements lasting 15 years or longer.[18] Additionally, including women starts to erode the idea of women as weak, meaning that the feminine will no longer be synonymous with weakness and fragility. The resolution empowers women and allows them to demand that they are heard and incorporated into processes at all levels.[19] The critique here is that the considerations of women and girls are rarely included in peace negotiations and simply haven’t been taken into account, and that there is no mechanism for holding countries or other implementing organizations accountable for including women and gendered perspectives in peace negotiations.
Similarly, the FFP framework calls for a feminist approach to humanitarian response that at its core centers the experience of women and people subjected to multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination. This focus highlights a wider array of concerns than considered in traditional paradigms, including the threat of gender-based violence, access to sexual and reproductive health, access to education, and the burden of unpaid care responsibilities in times of crisis. It urges the U.S. government to take steps to change its own humanitarian approach as well as pushing for change throughout the global humanitarian system.
Institutional Change
Both frameworks agree that reframing the discussion of peace and security involves shaking the very foundations of the patriarchy, a system that until recently was the exclusive purview of men and that deploys decision-making power through warlords, political elites, government security communities, and the intricately linked military-industrial machine. Within the WPS framework, protection does not inherently or exclusively refer to women being physically (or any other way) being protected by men. It does, however, recognize that there are individuals made vulnerable through cultural, political, legal, economic, gender-related and sexual-orientation structures. It creates agency because it is only through agency that women will have the opportunity to participate in the kind of preventive actions that can lead to positive peace.
In response, FFP would argue that this approach is too focused on the individual rather than the system. The FFP framework seeks to change the institutions and processes themselves. It wants to diversify more than just the voices in the room; it wants to expand the information collected, analysis conducted, and solutions considered to go beyond the traditional decision-making process. This strategy covers defense, development, and diplomacy programs conducted in other countries and how governments operate internally. Resources, both in terms of budget allocations and human investments, would be redistributed to reflect governments’ different priorities. Less would be spent on weapons and more would be spent on human infrastructure; more would go to multilateral organizations and those focused on global goals. WPS critics would say that even with provisions for structural agency, the entrenched nature of those in power through cultural norms and expectations forces a process of slower, more incremental change.
APPLYING WPS AND FPP TO CURRENT CHALLENGES
Democracy
In 2021, the annual Democracy Index found that less than ten percent of countries worldwide were considered “full democracies” and rated the United States a “flawed democracy” for the fifth year in a row. Though countries leaning toward populism and authoritarianism vary in many aspects, what they share are leaders who identify as rebels, bullies, and tough guys who flaunt authority, disregard civility, and encourage others to do so as well, such as Presidents Donald Trump, Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil, and Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines. Further, as American journalist Peter Beinart pointed out, authoritarian leaders “use gender to discredit one political order and validate another.”[20] Many have targeted women, individually or as a group, as their evil-elite punching bags.
To address this issue, the WPS framework would return to concepts within UNSCR 1325 that have been fleshed out through nine additional security council resolutions: participation of women in all levels of decision-making, protection from sexual and gender-based violence, prevention of violence, and advancement of relief and recovery measures. Within this context, FFP would go beyond a focus on increasing individual women’s political participation to disrupt the colonial, racist, patriarchal, and male-dominated power structures. It would support human rights activists and civil society organizations engaged in women’s rights movements globally, alter patriarchal political institutions, including parties and parliaments, and address issues such as violence against women in politics that serve as barriers to women serving in public life.
Reproductive Rights
The United States was considered a global leader in women’s reproductive rights five years ago, considered a critical aspect of women’s individual agency, but it became a global outliner with deep regression in that area during the Trump administration.[21] The Biden-Harris administration took several key actions to advance sexual and reproductive health and rights in its first year, trying to reverse the Trump Administration rollback. In his second week in office, President Biden issued an executive memorandum on women’s health at home and abroad which stated that it is the policy of the U.S. government to support sexual and reproductive health and rights. It rescinded the global gag rule, withdrew the United States from the so-called Geneva Consensus Declaration, and directed the U.S. Secretary of State to restore funding for United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).[22] But, based on the leaked Alito-authored draft court decision, Trump-appointed conservative Supreme Court justices appear ready to take American women’s reproductive rights back to the 1970’s by overturning Roe v Wade (1973). The implications are staggering, not just regarding reproductive rights, but as a further indication of the U.S. moving away from democratic rule to populist authoritarianism.[23]
The WPS framework does not address reproductive rights or abortion in UNSCR 1325 or in any of the subsequent resolutions, or in the U.S. Women, Peace and Security Act. Feminist Foreign Policy, on the other hand, includes bodily autonomy and freedom from discrimination, violence, coercion, exploitation, and abuse as a key tenet. And while the current U.S. administration has taken steps to stop or reverse U.S. government backsliding on the issue, including potentially after the judicial demise of Roe v Wade, FFP advocates continue to push for more, such as a permanent repeal of the global gag rule, also known as the Mexico City Policy.[24]
Afghanistan
The U.S. government’s withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 was an utter failure by most accounts. While 124,000 people were airlifted out of Afghanistan before the last troops flew out on August 30, 90 percent of the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) holders were left behind with their families. The number of Afghans who remain in danger because of their association with the 20-year American presence in their country must be counted in the hundreds of thousands.[25]Afghanistan is now facing one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. The Afghan economy has no cash to pay salaries or buy food. Western aid has been suspended because the Taliban government includes designated terrorists, and as a result, millions of Afghans face acute malnutrition and starvation in the coming months.[26]
In this case, within the WPS framework, the U.S. government would have included a push for women to be involved in the negotiations with the Taliban in 2019-2020. Many Afghan, global, and U.S. activists did make the case before and during the negotiation process, during which the Trump administration ignored implementing its own (bi-partisan, Trump-signed) WPS Act.[27] A Feminist Foreign Policy would have gone further. The scope of the issue would have been expanded from ending the war to ensuring strong Afghan institutions that serve its citizens and turning the country back over to its people. The balance of power and those engaged in the negotiation process would have been modified to include both the American and Afghan people rather than the U.S. military and the Taliban.
NEXT STEPS AND CONCLUSION
Five years after the passage of the WPS Act in the United States, with the subsequent government-wide 2019 strategy and departmental strategies now in place, incremental progress in implementing the WPS framework is evident. Funding is being approved and allocated, for example, to offer meetings, workshops, and courses on Women, Peace and Security to members of security communities from many other countries, both in the U.S. and abroad. Those who participate in these events (men and women) say that attendance, and the gender push for gender empowerment from U.S. organizations, including the military, is making a slow but positive difference in their militaries and countries. A Women, Peace and Security Congressional Caucus was formed in 2020. Its focus is “to ensure that progress towards women’s empowerment and inclusion is a strong priority of U.S. foreign policy.”[28] Efforts of the Caucus have included receiving briefs from various departments on their efforts to implement the Women, Peace and Security framework and expressing support for women in Afghanistan during the evacuation operations in 2021. Ensuring progress of the WPS Act, at home and abroad, requires proactive measures and holding those responsible for implementation accountable.
As this work continues, those pressing the U.S. government to adopt a feminist foreign policy need to acknowledge the work of those who developed and implemented the WPS Act. That legislation took more than a decade to be created and passed in a bi-partisan fashion. Newer actors in this space might benefit by engaging with the activists who started their work around the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing and then focused on the UN Security Council before turning to country-specific NAPs and legislation. There must be lessons learned about Hill staff and member relationships, allies in non-traditional departments and offices, messages that were effective, and budget strategies that have worked.
Moreover, the combined community can work together to increase women’s representation in U.S. foreign policy through the Leadership Council for Women in National Security (LCWINS), the Civil Society Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, or the Coalition for a Feminist Foreign Policy in the United States. Research and advocacy must continue to make the link between both frameworks and the promotion of democracy. And both WPS and FFP advocates can continue to push for the integration of the needs of women and girls in humanitarian and post-conflict settings and programs.
So far, however, Women, Peace and Security framework implementation seems to have remained focused on work done or to be done “over there,” wherever outside of the United States that happens to be, neglecting the important point that there are internal as well as external components to WPS. Similarly, one of the core principles of FFP is that there is coherence across all aspects of foreign policy that extends across domestic and foreign policy, with both realms embracing the same feminist values. That means structural and cultural constraints to gender empowerment within U.S. institutions must be addressed as well. For example, while women in the military are no longer denied access to combat positions, they still do not receive the same encouragement and support necessary for success to join those previously prohibited positions as men do.
While differences in approach for WPS and FFP are not insignificant, both frameworks would benefit from closer coordination with the other. There are many opportunities to support the work of the other, as much progress is still needed in the United States and globally to reach gender equality, women’s empowerment, and a safer world.
This publication was prepared by the authors in their personal capacity. The opinions expressed here are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the official views or policy of Women In International Security.
About the Authors
Joan Johnson-Freese is a Senior Fellow with Women in International Security, a University Professor at the Naval War College in Newport, RI and teaches Women, Peace & Security at Harvard University. She is the author of multiple articles on the topic, as well as Women, Peace & Security: An Introduction (2018) and Women vs Women: The Case for Cooperation (April 2022). The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not represent those of the U.S. government, Department of Defense or the Naval War College.
Susan Markham is a partner at Smash Strategies, a strategic advisory firm helping businesses, non-profit organizations, and philanthropists who want to leverage their commitment to empowering women and girls. She is the author of multiple articles on feminist foreign policy, gender equality, women’s political participation, and economic empowerment.
[1] Department of Defense, “Women, Peace & Security Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan,” June 2020, p. 7, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jun/11/2002314428/-1/-
1/1/WOMEN_PEACE_SECURITY_STRATEGIC_FRAMEWORK_IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.PDF.
[2] Karin Aggestam, Rosamond A. Bergman, Annica Kronsell, “Theorising Feminist Foreign Policy,” International Relations. 2019;33(1):23-39. doi: 10.1177/0047117818811892.
[3] Government of Sweden: https://www.government.se/government-policy/feminist-foreign-policy/
[4] “Handbook for Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy,”
https://www.government.se/492c36/contentassets/fc115607a4ad4bca913cd8d11c2339dc/handbook—swedensfeminist-foreign-policy—english.pdf.
[5] Government of Sweden: https://www.government.se/information-material/2017/10/swedens-feminist-foreignpolicy–examples-from-three-years-of-implementation/.
[6] Norway, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Women’s Rights and Gender Equality,” https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/the-un/innsikt/womens_rights/id439433/
[7] Government of Canada, “Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy,” https://www.international.gc.ca/world-monde/issues_development-enjeux_developpement/priorities-priorites/policy-politique.aspx?lang=eng.
[8] France, Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs, “Feminist Diplomacy,” https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreignpolicy/feminist-diplomacy/.
[9] Soto, Daniela Sepulveda. “The Pandemic Underscores the Need for Feminist Foreign Policy,” The Gender Policy Report, University of Minnesota, July 27, 2021, https://genderpolicyreport.umn.edu/thepandemic-underscores-the-need-for-feminist-foreign-policy/.
[10] Rachel Clement and Lyric Thompson. “Toward a Feminist Foreign Policy in the United States,” ICRW, https://www.icrw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/09/ICRW_FFPUSA_2021.pdf.
[11] “Feminist Foreign Policy: A Framework,” https://www.icrw.org/wpcontent/uploads/2021/07/FFP_Framework_EN_June2021update.pdf.
[12] “Our understanding of the term ‘peace’ has evolved significantly over the last 2,500 years,” https://positivepeace.org/what-is-positive-peace.
[13] “War on Terror as a “fight for the rights and dignity of women”: a discourse analysis of the U.S. ‘liberation’ campaign for Afghan women,” https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2100&context=etd.
[14] Laura J. Shepherd, “The paradox of prevention in the Women, Peace and Security agenda,” European Journal of International Security, September 30, 2020, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/european-journal-ofinternational-security/article/paradox-of-prevention-in-the-women-peace-and-securityagenda/5D47238B224CFD8BFEE1CEDD4A1E76CF.
[15] Books by Valerie Hudson and others include Sex & World Peace (2012) and The First Political Order: How Sex Shapes Governance and National Security Worldwide (2020).
[16] Dianne Otto, “Women, Peace & Security: A Critical Analysis of the Security Council’s Vision,” LSE blog, January 9, 2017, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2017/01/09/women-peace-and-security-a-critical-analysis-of-the-securitycouncils-vision/.
[17] “Major arms exporter Sweden to put human rights before weapon sales,” Reuters, June 26, 2015,
https://www.reuters.com/article/sweden-arms/major-arms-exporter-sweden-to-put-human-rights-beforeweapon-sales-idUSL8N0ZC12020150626.
[18] UN Women, “Women’s Engagement in Peace, Security and Recovery,”
https://www.unwomen.org/sites/default/files/Headquarters/Attachments/Sections/Library/Publications/2016/FPI %20Brief-Peace-security-recovery.pdf.
[19] UN RESOLUTION 1325: SIGNIFICANT BUT LACKING, http://peacewomen.org/resource/un-resolution-1325-significant-lacking.
[20] Peter Beinart, The Atlantic, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/authoritariansexism-trump-duterte/576382/.
[21] Martha F. Davis and Fiona de Londras, “Most democracies are expanding abortion access. The U.S. is retracting it,” WBUR, October 21, 2021, https://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2021/10/21/supreme-court-abortion-dobbstexas-martha-f-davis-fiona-de-londras.
[22] “Memorandum on Protecting Women’s Health at Home and Abroad,”
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/01/28/memorandum-on-protecting-womens-health-at-home-and-abroad/.
[23] Hanna Kozlowska, “Where Democracy Falters So Too Do Reproductive Rights,” Foreign Policy, March 16, 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/16/where-democracy-falters-so-do-reproductive-rights/.
[24] “46 Senators Wage Campaign to End “Global Gag Rule” Restricting Abortion Access,” https://truthout.org/articles/46-senators-wage-campaign-to-end-global-gag-rule-restricting-abortionaccess/?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=15622b45-d94e-4820-a28b-89c103fa98c5.
[25] “The Betrayal,” https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2022/03/biden-afghanistan-exit-american-allies-abandoned/621307/.
[26] United States institute of Peace, “Afghanistan,” https://www.usip.org/regions/asia/afghanistan#:~:text=Afghanistan%20is%20now%20facing%20one,starvation%2 0in%20the%20coming%20months.
[27] Melissa Deehring, “Lessons Learned from Afghanistan: The First Political Order,” The Washington Quarterly, 44, 4, 2022, 7-28.
[28] Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, “Goals of the New Women, Peace and Security Congressional Caucus,” April 29, 2020, https://giwps.georgetown.edu/goals-of-the-new-women-peace-and-security-congressional-caucus/.
Jessica Margolis and Tahina Montoya
Introduction
Over the past several decades, the United States (U.S.) has worked to develop conflict mitigation and prevention strategies in response to growing crises and poor governance in conflict-affected states. These stabilization missions have given significant attention and resources to women’s rights and gender programs, but U.S. gender policy has had varied and limited success.1 Well-intentioned programs were marred by poor coordination and expertise, as well as a lack of integration throughout all aspects of the stabilization process. The last twenty years of Afghanistan reconstruction offer numerous examples, and recent developments underscore an urgent need for the U.S. to review its approach to stabilization, especially when it comes to gender and women’s rights, and assess how to implement new strategies more effectively.
Fortunately, comprehensive bipartisan legislation that promises to serve as a mechanism for better stabilization programs is inching toward implementation. The Global Fragility Act (GFA) was signed into law in December 2019 and lays out a transformative and innovative approach for the U.S. government to prevent violent conflict and address the root causes of state fragility.2 Though lauded for its efforts to revise stabilization, the GFA reflects old thinking regarding gender relations. The Act ignores countless studies that prove the vital role gender sensitivity can and should play in successful peace processes and stabilization programs, as well as the importance of gender inclusion for conflict prevention.
Gender-sensitivity attempts to understand how the social hierarchies attached to stereotypes of gender exclude or endanger certain groups. This includes an analysis of how gender intersects with inequalities stemming from other socio-economic factors (intersectionality). Applying a gendersensitive lens to GFA implementation will put gender issues at the forefront of the policy-making process and enhance U.S. stabilization programs. This is more than just an opportunity to make more durable gains for women’s rights; it is essential to achieving the U.S. government’s overall stabilization goals, including a secure environment, a stable economy, general social well-being, and the rule of law. It will also allow the U.S. to re-establish its credibility and commitment to stabilization.
GFA implementation strategies are still being crafted, hence action now will enable a gender-sensitive approach to shape both the beginning of the bureaucratic process and the tenyear period allotted for GFA goals. In addition to improving gender outcomes for future stabilization operations, a gendersensitive GFA will enable the U.S. to redefine its international image and lead the development of a feminist approach to international development.3
This policy brief analyzes the shortcomings in the GFA process and policies regarding gender with specific reference to previous stabilization efforts, before outlining how a gendersensitive GFA can improve future U.S. stabilization and reconstruction programs. Gender issues are, of course, broader than just the experiences of women and girls; however, this brief focuses primarily on women because most U.S. “gender” programs are designed for women and girls. The GFA itself also specifically singles out women as a marginalized group to support because violence is so often perpetrated against women in fragile contexts. It is our hope that enhanced programming for women and girls spurs more support for other underrepresented gender groups. Our analysis and recommendations emphasize actionable next steps for gendersensitive implementation, ensuring the GFA is effective and transformative. These recommendations include using gender-focused indices to identify GFA priority countries and analysis; enhancing coordination and gender integration through an interagency task force; applying intersectional analysis to ensure diverse civil society engagement; leveraging existing policies; and employing gender-inclusive language.
The GFA: Opportunity for Change
U.S. foreign policy has relied on a disparate, reactionary approach to assistance rather than a coordinated and proactive strategy that addresses the underpinnings of armed conflict. Short-term incentives have outweighed long-term goals. The difficulties experienced in countries like Afghanistan forced a revaluation of U.S. stabilization strategies in fragile and conflict-ridden countries. A new approach was needed.
Seventeen years after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S. government formally recognized that past stabilization efforts were limited by a “lack of strategic clarity, organizational discipline, and unity of effort.”4
The Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR), approved by the State Department (DOS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Defense Department (DOD) in 2018, was the government’s first joint step to reconsider stabilization and move towards a whole of government approach. The SAR defines stabilization as “a political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence.”5 This was followed by the GFA’s passage as part of the 2020 Consolidated Appropriations Act, signed into law by President Trump on December 20, 2019.6 As novel legislation that prioritized long-term strategy over short-term solutions, the Act sought to improve global, regional, and local coordination of multilateral development; expand and enhance the effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance programs; support research efforts; and improve the tools for proper assessment and monitoring and evaluation (M&E).7
The Act mandates the U.S. government select at least three countries or regions for stabilization and three countries or regions for conflict prevention, guided by data in existing global fragility indices and U.S. watch lists.8 These sources address specific categories and levels of violence, including violence committed by state actors and extremist organizations, as well as violence committed against children and youth.9 The GFA also requires interagency coordination to streamline government efforts to stabilize conflict-affected areas and prevent violence and fragility globally.10 Lastly, the Act earmarks $230 million annually for five fiscal years to fund these efforts.11
Enacted in December 2019, the GFA was to be implemented along three key deadlines, all of which have been missed, postponing overall implementation.12 First, within 270 days after the GFA was enacted, in September 2020, lead organizations were to submit: a detailed strategy with department and staff roles and responsibilities; the identification of authorities, organizational steps, and processes; and a list of priority countries.13 Second, within one year after the establishment of the Act, in December 2020, the executive branch was required to submit to Congress a report detailing a ten-year plan for each country selected, along with updated conflict analyses and interagency plans, policies, and tools to implement the GFA.14 Third, within two years after submission of the ten-year plan, in December 2022, and every two years thereafter (for ten years), the president is to submit a biennial, unclassified report on progress and lessons learned with assessments to the Government Accountability Office for review.15
Excluding Gender: The Crucial Flaw
While the GFA is innovative in driving interagency coordination and requiring transparent reviews and reporting, it has one major flaw: it largely overlooks gender. The Act only mentions women once, when listing violence against women and girls as an area of concern in fragile countries, and never mentions the concept of gender more broadly. Box 1 provides an example of poorly coordinated gender programming during stabilization to contextualize the following discussion of how GFA implementation has fallen short on gender.
The September Report and Global Fragility Strategy
The GFA strategy documents offer some improvements from the Act regarding women and girls but neglect to consider their rights in a way that will catalyze durable change. Furthermore, implementation of the GFA has been slow, and priority countries are yet to be identified.
| Box 1: Afghanistan’s Troubled Gender Policy |
| Afghanistan offers many lessons for why gender— specifically the experiences of women and girls—needs to be better integrated into U.S. stabilization policy and practice. The reconstruction and stabilization process in Afghanistan was well-funded, extensive, and explicitly mandated to incorporate gender mainstreaming, though almost all its gender programs were built for women and girls. This led to some achievements in education, employment, and health. Women were able to attend universities and girls’ access to education expanded, with a 23% increase in the number of girls enrolled in primary school between 2003 and 2017.16 By 2019, 25% of civil service jobs were held by women, and maternal mortality had declined significantly, moving from 1,100 to 396 per 100,000 live births between 2000 and 2015.17 However, despite the attention and resources, U.S. government gender policy in Afghanistan had limited success overall. Reports from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reveal that the U.S. lacked a comprehensive and coordinated gender strategy as well as staff with gender expertise. It took more than ten years for the U.S. Embassy in Kabul to create the first mission-wide gender policy and a unified understanding of gender priorities.18 Along with poor coordination was a shortage of gender expertise. USAID only required that gender be addressed in its programs in 2008, and “it was not until 2014 that USAID placed staff with gender expertise in each of the agency’s technical offices in Kabul.”19 This meant that gender analysis was often delayed or ineffective.20 Conditions improved with the creation of an Afghanistan Gender Task Force in Washington, D.C. and a Gender Working Group in Kabul, but the utility of this system was impaired by inconsistent support from senior leadership.21 U.S. officials often failed to understand and address the underlying social and cultural context that fueled gender inequality in Afghanistan, consequently designing programs that did not reach a diversity of women.22 Gains were primarily felt by women in elite urban areas, while many women in conservative, rural, and ethnic minority communities continued to live with genderbased restrictions that limited their access to services.23 Furthermore, Afghan women were often excluded from leadership or decision-making roles, especially at the local level where decisions can have a more immediate impact on daily life. Analysts sometimes highlight women’s participation in Loya Jirgas (“grand council”) meetings of the country’s regional leaders and the national parliament as evidence that they held positions of power.24 However, even when women were in decision-making positions, they comprised a significant minority and had difficulty gaining respect or garnering support for their ideas.25 |
To comply with the GFA, the “Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 504(c) of the Global Fragility Act” (hereafter referred to as the September Report) was sent to Congress on September 17, 2020.26 The September Report was supposed to present a comprehensive strategy but, on many levels, failed to do so.27 Only five pages long, it briefly summarized the 2017 National Security Strategy and identified four goals—prevention, stabilization, burden-sharing (multilateral coordination), and management (internal coordination)—but did not provide details on how to achieve these goals.28 Additionally, while the September Report mentions both “women” and “gender,” it does so in a cursory, and arguably performative, manner.
A second document, “The U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability,” also known as the Global Fragility Strategy (GFS), was released on December 18, 2020. This marked “the first time that the U.S. has had a strategy, an enduring—a 10-year strategy—to address conflict prevention and stabilization.”29 This unique strategy was intended to address fragility at its core and encourage the development of strong and secure countries that could be U.S. partners.30 The GFS elaborates on the four goals mentioned in the September Report by committing to developing new partnerships with civil society, the private sector, regional partners, and bilateral and multilateral contributors, with an emphasis on “supporting locally driven political solutions.”31 Though it still does not widely address gender, the GFS specifically highlights the need to meaningfully engage women and girls and promote their rights, which is more detail than contained in the GFA and September Report. It also describes the need to strengthen local civil society organizations that are inclusive of women, address the WPS strategy, and consider the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Gender Inequality
Index.32
Here, the GFS provides needed details on, for example, the creation of a working-level secretariat and a senior-level GFA Steering Committee composed of USAID, DOS, DOD, the Department of Treasury, and the Office of Management and Budget, convened by the National Security Council. Additionally, it identifies the Chief of Mission as the lead for field-level planning and declares U.S. embassies responsible for coordination of national government counterparts and local civil society organizations.33 Finally, the GFS highlights “compact-style country and regional partnerships” to promote mutual accountability and the facilitation of political dialogue.34
As a stabilization document, the GFS is far more promising in bringing women and gender to the forefront. However, a strategy is meant to have implementation guidance, and despite a greater emphasis on gender, the GFS fails to address how the GFA will integrate gender throughout its activities.
Gender-Sensitive Implementation Can Close the Current GFA Gap
The gender gaps in the GFA and GFS include using genderblind language, confusing gender-based terminology, and using indices that do not measure gender. As a starting point, using language that acknowledges different gender groups and their needs when implementing the GFA will prove critical for the legislation’s success, because fragility and conflict affect women and girls differently than men and boys.35 Failure to deliberately consider the needs of women specifically will stymie intended change. Researching the lived experiences of underserved groups helps “fill a gap in the understanding of conflict and instability and improve[s] conflict-sensitivity of policies and programs.”36 This type of analysis is necessary to understand the consequences of outside intervention on stopping or changing an ongoing conflict, which is vital to the GFA’s goals.37 Paired with gender, this will reveal how “women’s everyday experiences with broader regional and global political processes and structures inform violence.”38
As a final example of how the GFA overlooks gender, countries or regions for GFA implementation are to be selected based upon several sources, including U.S. government conflict and atrocity early warning lists, levels of in-country violence, and five indices (see Box 2), referred to as “recognized global fragility lists.”39 A careful review of these five indices reveals that while some of them mention gender-related information, none of them use gender-related indicators to determine their country rankings. For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) States of Fragility Report cites gender statistics for fragile states, like maternal mortality ratios, in its infographics, but it sources this information from other databases and does not actually gather its own data on gender.40 More specifically, none of these indices directly measure gender equality or genderbased violence (GBV).41 The Fund for Peace’s Fragile States Index mentions countering GBV as one of its organizational missions, but the index itself does not include data or GBV as an indicator.
Improving on the GFA, the GFS adds seven additional indices to be referenced when selecting countries (see Box 2).42 However, while these indices consider women’s wellbeing in their mission statements or vision, none of them gather detailed gender-disaggregated data on women’s safety. Further, the GFS document does not highlight rates of GBV as indicators of violence, meaning GBV may not be meaningfully integrated into implementation strategies. Reliance on indices that do not measure GBV or violence against children means that these forms of violence will not substantially influence country selection.
| Box 2: Recognized Global Fragility Lists |
| GFA Listed Indices: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development States of Fragility ReportFund for Peace Fragile States IndexThe World Bank Harmonized List of Fragile SituationsThe Institute for Economic and Peace Global Peace IndexThe U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Early Warning Project Risk Assessment GFS Listed Indices: The Armed Conflict and Location Event Data ProjectFund for Peace Fragile States IndexFreedom House Freedom in the World IndexLegatum Institute’s Prosperity IndexThe U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Early Warning Project Risk AssessmentVarieties of Democracy ProjectUNDP’s Gender Inequality IndexWorld Bank’s Worldwide Governance IndicatorsWorld Justice Project Rule of Law Index |
Why Focus on Women?
Put bluntly, gender does not equal women. However, policymakers often focus on women as victims during stabilization and reconstruction, instead of also considering their contributions to peace negotiations or the duration of peace settlements. In fact, data show a positive link between women’s activities and conflict stabilization:43
- Peace Negotiations Succeed More Often. Peace deals that include women in negotiations have higher chances of success and are more likely to bring armed groups to the negotiating table. An Inclusive Peace & Transition Initiative study of 40 peace deals since 1990 has shown that parties were significantly more likely to reach an agreement when women’s groups had strong influence on the negotiation process.44
- Peace Settlements Last Longer. Women’s participation had a statistically significant and positive impact on the duration of peace.45 After analyzing 181 peace agreements signed since 1989, researchers found that agreements resulting from negotiations that directly included women were 35% more likely to last beyond 15 years.46 This is because women who are actively involved in negotiations often have decision-making authority or access to those involved in peace implementation.47
- Women’s Advocacy Yields Direct Benefits for All. Women advocate for specific provisions or work that addresses the roots of conflict or builds programs for other social groups in need. This is because, in addition to advocating for women’s rights, women also advocate for measures that help prevent relapse into violence, contributing to a broader change in power relations and benefiting the broader community.48 As an example, “in Burundi women succeeded in inserting into the peace agreement provisions on freedom of marriage and the right to choose one’s partner [regardless of gender].”49
The active participation of women in all aspects of stability and development increases the likelihood of positive change. Therefore, it is imperative to recognize that there are societalbased differences in gender, reflected in practices, customs, and law that have important political consequences for nation-states.50 The U.S. will not succeed in achieving basic stabilization goals if its implementation strategy does not integrate critical gender components.
Policy Recommendations
Integrating a gender-sensitive approach into GFA implementation will improve conflict prevention and stabilization and set ground-breaking precedent for future missions. The ten-year plans presented to Congress for each selected country should integrate the following recommendations, taking care to customize them to each country’s cultural context rather than apply a one size fits all approach.
1. Use Gender-focused Indices to Identify GFA Priority Countries and Inform Analysis
A gender-focused index with gender-disaggregated data should be used in identifying priority regions and countries for GFA implementation. None of the country selection indices listed in the GFA or GFS account for rates of GBV or violence against women (VAW) and do not present genderdisaggregated data.51 Relying solely on the existing indices will make it impossible for analysts to gain a comprehensive picture of the status of women in different countries, especially in relation to conflict and violence. Fortunately, the GFS leaves an opening for other “third-party data sources and indicators to help inform selection of priority countries and/or regions and monitor overall progress.”52
We recommend including the WomenStats Database, the Women Peace and Security Index, and the World Bank Gender Data Portal. The WomenStats Database assesses the relationship between security, stability, and gender and proves it is possible to predict organized violence based on the mistreatment of women.53 Vetted at the UN, the DOD, and Congress, with over 350 indicators for 176 countries, the WomanStats Database is “the largest cross-national compilation of data, statistics, and maps on the status of women worldwide.”54 The Women Peace and Security Index, maintained by the Georgetown Institute of Women Peace and Security and the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Centre for Gender Peace and Security, measures inclusion, justice, and security for women using 11 indicators for 170 countries.55 This index is unique in that it offers a snapshot of women’s status in a country based on numerous social realities and could directly inform progress on WPS commitments made by the U.S. and partner countries. A third option is the World Bank Gender Data Portal, which is the World Bank Group’s most comprehensive source for “sex-disaggregated data and gender statistics covering demography, education, health, access to economic opportunities, public life, and decision-making and agency.”56 Mandating the inclusion of one or more gender-specific indices will ensure that gender programming is informed by a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between women and country-specific violence.
In addition to using the indices listed in the GFA, researchers at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs suggest establishing “critical criteria” to guide country selection.57 Establishing critical criteria that are deliberately gender-inclusive (like rates of GBV) would take analysis one step further by ensuring that the treatment of all gender identities, not just women, are included in GFA decisions.
- Enhance Coordination and Gender Integration Through a New Interagency Task Force
The GFA requires robust interagency coordination, and the GFS outlines a senior-level steering committee for oversight, the creation of a working-level secretariat—managed by DOS with members from relevant implementing agencies—and one in-country designee for field-level planning, nominated by the chief of mission.58 However, this plan needs details on tactical and operational level personnel, and on the type of expertise the in-country designee should have. It also neglects to address gender training. To enhance interagency coordination and efficiency, the secretariat should also establish an interagency task force composed of teams both in Washington, D.C. and in each chosen country. In addition to adding gender and M&E leads, task force teams should include leads from the three primary implementing departments.
Under the staffing structure currently proposed in the GFS, personnel would undertake GFA activities as additional or collateral duties. In contrast, task force personnel will be dedicated to GFA activity, serving as full-time staff focused on overall implementation that are independent from individual programs. This will empower a centralized group to gather best practices and guarantee more continuity of bandwidth and institutional knowledge throughout the ten-year duration of GFA. It will also prevent the shortage of coordination, gender expertise, and M&E resources that has plagued gender programs in stabilization missions, such as Afghanistan. Together a steering committee, secretariat, and interagency task force will fulfill strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions of implementation.
- Apply Intersectional Analysis to Ensure Diverse Civil Society Engagement
The GFA and GFS require engagement and consultations with civil society in the development of in-country programming, offering the chance to amplify intersectionality along with gender-inclusivity. The GFA and GFS specifically acknowledge the need to work with civil society and local groups led by underserved populations, like women and youth, to advance inclusive peace and women’s leadership “in all aspects of conflict prevention, stabilization and peacebuilding.”59 This is important, but the ten-year plans should mandate that consultations be held with intersectional groups made up of diverse women of various races, ethnicities, religions, classes, and sexual orientations.60 Utilizing intersectionality in this way will meaningfully incorporate different perspectives in the design of programming, ultimately enabling programs to reach and benefit women from more backgrounds, an achievement missing from past conflict and stabilization efforts but crucial for the future. It will also create space for more women to influence decision-making at the local level.
In order to do this correctly, U.S. personnel should hire local representatives who understand the intersecting identities within the communities where programming is conducted. Local consultants will be able to provide crucial background knowledge on community identities and more easily secure participation from targeted groups than foreign officials. The GFA provides for this in its calls for future strategies to identify the “authorities, staffing, and other resources” needed to effectively implement the GFS.61
- Leverage and Connect Existing PoliciesStrategically and efficiently, the GFS asserts it will draw on existing U.S. legislation and directives throughout its programming process, which creates a chance to streamline gender agendas across government entities and policy topics. The GFS already mentions the 2019 U.S. Women, Peace and Security (WPS) strategy, which is a great start.62 The process would also benefit from including the comprehensive WPS implementation plans that the USAID, DOS, and DOD each created in response to the passage of the WPS Act of 2017. The DOS plan, for example, sets clear objectives for increasing women and girls’ safety and participation in peace efforts and lays out M&E metrics to achieve these objectives.63 Thus far, GFA implementation strategies do not include this degree of specificity; they lack clear objectives or indicators for women’s rights, empowerment or safety, and details on how these will be measured to determine GFA programming success. Relying on existing policies that have already been integrated into the three primary implementing departments would be a tactical way to take a more gender-sensitive approach.64
The GFA should also build upon the recently released National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality, drawing on the White House, its resources, and the attention of the current administration to advance gender equality. This first-of-itskind gender strategy also emphasizes a whole of government approach, stating: “in order to mainstream gender equity and equality across our domestic and foreign policy, we will elevate gender in strategic planning and budgeting, policy development, management and training, and monitoring and evaluation efforts.”65 The strategy is especially forwardthinking in that it promotes a focus on intersectional identities, something currently lacking from the GFA, and interprets them broadly to include sexual orientation.66 In fact, one of the strategy’s objectives—to elevate gender equality in security and humanitarian relief—is already poised to correct a GFA gap by committing to using diplomatic fora and resources to support the leadership of local civil society groups led by women.67 Building on this strategy, a stated priority of the Biden administration, will make for more harmonious domestic and foreign policy.
- Employ Gender-inclusive Language in Future Strategy Documents and Reports
This brief has largely focused on women because U.S. gender policies usually target women’s issues. However, GFA strategy documents, including revisions made to the GFS, country plans, or biennial reports, should use language that serves people belonging to all marginalized gender identities. For example, the Act should have stated that it serves to empower “groups underserved for their gender” rather than just “women” in GFA programming implementation.68 More inclusive language will encourage gender programming to be designed for any group that may need protection or empowerment because of its gender identity or expression. Additionally, to prevent GBV from being conflated with VAW and to acknowledge that all genders can experience violence, future documents should define each term and use them deliberately.
Lastly, language that essentializes groups, such as use of the word “vulnerable,” should be left out of future documents.69 Using the word “underserved,” for example, instead of “vulnerable” better showcases that certain groups face difficult circumstances not because of their own actions but because a system or society has failed to adequately support them. This kind of language underscores a structural problem that needs to be fixed, rather than a group that needs to be saved.
Conclusion
U.S. efforts to integrate and implement gender programming in conflict settings need a new approach to improve the lives of women and other marginalized gender groups. The GFA is an innovative policy with a progressive approach to solving violent conflict, but thus far the implementation process is predominantly gender blind. A course correction is still possible. The GFA’s ability to drive change will be determined by its implementation, and country strategies that incorporate intersectional and gender-sensitive lenses will strengthen the Act’s efficacy and better serve groups in need. This unique lens will also promote more accurate conflict analysis because women are important contributors to conflict resolution, despite also being targets of violence. If implemented properly, a gender-sensitive GFA promises a fresh start for stabilization efforts and, hopefully, human rights on the ground.
This policy brief was prepared by the authors in their personal capacity. The opinions expressed here are the authors’ own and do not necessarily reflect the official views or policy of WIIS or the Embassy of Liechtenstein.
References
- This report employs the World Health Organization’s (WHO) definition of gender as “the characteristics of women, men, girls and boys that are socially constructed […] gender interacts with but is different from sex, which refers to the different biological and physiological characteristics of females, males and intersex persons.” See “Gender and Health,” World Health Organization, 2021, https://www.who.int/health-topics/ gender#tab=tab_1.
- Addressed hereafter as GFA or The Act.
- This also coincides with Biden-Harris Administration’s immediate priorities, which include COVID-19, climate, racial equity, economy, health care, immigration, and restoring America’s global standing. See “The Biden-Harris Administration Immediate Priorities,” The White House, n.d., https://www.whitehouse.gov/priorities/.
- A Framework for Maximizing the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas (U.S. Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development, and U.S. Department of Defense, 2018), p. 1, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/SARFinal.pdf.
- Framework for Maximizing Effectiveness, p. 4.
- Pascrell, Bill Jr., Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116–94, § 502, 1321 (2019), STAT. 3060, https://www.congress.gov/ bill/116th-congress/house-bill/1865/text.
- Ibid.
- Pascrell, STAT. 3064.
- Pascrell, STAT. 3063.
- Pascrell, STAT. 3064.
- Pascrell, STAT. 3066.
- Pascrell, STAT. 3065-3066.
- Ibid.14. Ibid.
- Ibid.
- Deniz Kandiyoti, “Between the Hammer and the Anvil: Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Islam and Women’s Rights,” Third World Quarterly, 28:3 (2007): 503-517, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436590701192603.
- John R. Allen and Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Fate of Women’s Rights in Afghanistan,” Brookings Institution, September 16, 2020, https://www. brookings.edu/essay/the-fate-of-womens-rights-in-afghanistan/.
- Bateman, Kate, Samantha Hay, Mariam Jalalzada, Matthew Rubin, and Sarah Rababy, Support for Gender Equality: Lessons Learned from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan Lessons Learned Reports. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), February 2021, p. xxii; Haque, Tobias, Afghanistan’s Development Gains: Progress and Challenges, The World Bank, Washington, DC, 2020, p. 10, https:// openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33209.
- Bateman et. al., p. 28.
- Ibid; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), What We Need to Learn: Lessons from Twenty Years of Afghanistan Reconstruction, August 2021, p. 79, https://www.sigar.mil/ pdf/lessonslearned/SIGAR-21-46-LL.pdf.
- Ibid.
- Bateman et. al, p. 29.
- SIGAR, What We Need to Learn, p. 79.
- Allen and Felbab-Brown. “The Fate of Women in Afghanistan.”
- Greg Myre, “Everything You Wanted To Know About An Afghan Loya Jirga,” National Public Radio (NPR), November 21, 2013, https:// www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2013/11/21/246536898/everythingyou-wanted-to-know-about-an-afghan-loya-jirga.
- Cheryl Benard et. al., Women and Nation-Building (RAND Cooperation, 2008), p. 120, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/ pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG579.pdf.
- U.S. Department of State, Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 504(c) of the Global Fragility Act (September 15, 2020), p. 1, https://www. state.gov/report-to-congress-pursuant-to-section-504c-of-the-globalfragility-act/.
- Alliance for Peacebuilding, No Time to Waste to Implement the Global Fragility Act, September 16, 2020, https://afpeacebuilding.medium.com/ no-time-to-waste-to-implement-the-global-fragility-act-b3c79f7bceae.
- Teresa Welsh, “U.S. State Department Releases Global Fragility Strategy,” Devex, December 19, 2020, https://www.devex.com/news/usstate-department-releases-global-fragility-strategy-98823.
- U.S. Department of State, United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, December 18, 2020, pp. 1-2, https://www.state. gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/us-strategy-to-prevent-conflict-andpromote-stability.pdf.
- Ibid., p. 3.
- The WPS Strategy emphasizes proactively integrating the needs and perspectives of women and ensuring their participation in the prevention and resolution of conflict.
- Ibid., p. 15.
- Ibid., p.14.
- Christine Pedersen, How to Center Women in the Global Fragility Act (Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security, March 13, 2020), https://giwps.georgetown.edu/how-to-center-women-in-the-globalfragility-act/.
- Ibid.
- “Fact Sheet Conflict Sensitivity,” Center for Peacebuilding (Swiss Peace, 2004), pp. 2-3, https://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/ pdf/KOFF/KOFF_Documents/KOFF_Factsheet_Conflictsensitivity.pdf.
- Heidi Hudson Source.
- Pascrell, STAT. 3063.
- The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, States of Fragility 2020 (OECD), September 17, 2020), https://www.oecdilibrary.org/sites/ba7c22e7-en/index.html?itemId=/content/publication/ ba7c22e7-en.
- Gender-based violence (GBV) is “violence that is directed at an individual based on his or her biological sex or gender identity. It includes physical, sexual, verbal, emotional, and psychological abuse, threats, coercion, and economic or educational deprivation, whether occurring in public or private life.” See Women for Women International, What Does That Mean? Gender-Based Violence, June 4, 2021, https://www. womenforwomen.org/blogs/series-what-does-mean-gender-basedviolence.
- U.S. Department of State, United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict,
p. 13.
- Valerie M. Hudson et. al., “The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States,” International Security, 33:3 (2008): p. 12, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2009.33.3.7.
- Hannah Beswick, Increasing the Participation of Women in Peace Processes: Reaching a Sustainable Durable Peace (EastWest Institute, June 20, 2018), https://www.eastwest.ngo/idea/increasing-participationwomen-peace-processes-reaching-sustainable-durable-peace.
- Marie O’Reilly, Andrea O Suilleabhain, and Thania Paffenholz, Reimagining Peacemaking: Women’s Roles in Peace Processes International Peace Institute, March 2014, p. 12, https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/ uploads/2015/06/IPI-E-pub-Reimagining-Peacemaking.pdf.
- “Women’s Participation and a Better Understanding of the Political,” in Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace, UN Global Study on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, 2015), https://wps.unwomen.org/participation/.
- Council on Foreign Relations, Women’s Participation in Peace Processes: Why It Matters. (n.d.)., accessed December 11, 2020, https:// www.cfr.org/womens-participation-in-peace-processes/.
- O’Reilly, et. al., p. 11.
- Ibid.
- Hudson et. al., p. 12.
- The United Nations recognizes violence against women (VAW) as “any act of gender-based violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.” It is important to understand the difference between VAW and GBV; the former refers to violence committed against individuals that identify with the specific gender group “women,” while the latter includes violence committed against any individuals because of their gender identity or expression, not just women. See United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (OHCHR), “Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Again Women,” December 20, 1993, https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/ pages/violenceagainstwomen.aspx.
- U.S. Department of State, United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict,
p. 13.
- WomenStats, “WomenStats Project,” accessed December 2021, https://www.womanstats.org/.
- Ibid.
- Summary: Women, Peace and Security Index 2021/22, PRIO Centre on Gender, Peace and Security and GIWPS, 2021, https://giwps.georgetown. edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/WPS-Index-2021-Summary.pdf.
- The World Bank Group, “Gender Data Portal,” accessed December 2021, https://www.worldbank.org/en/data/datatopics/gender.
- Erin Gregor et. al., Implementing the Global Fragility Act: Policy Analysis Exercise (Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Center Paper, July 2021), p. 2, https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/ publication/Implementing%20the%20Global%20Fragility%20Act%20 -%20Gregor%2C%20Haider%2C%20Pringle%2C%20Sielaff.pdf.
- U.S. Department of State, United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict,
p. 12.
- Ibid., p. 7.
- Civil society engagement is essential to equitable GFA implementation, but care should be taken not to further endanger underserved groups with overtly public consultations. Consideration of the health and safety of local groups should drive methods of engagement.
- Pascrell, STAT. 3062.
- U.S. Department of State, United States Strategy to Prevent Conflict,
p. 20.
- U.S. Department of State, The Department of State’s Plan to Implement the U.S. Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security, 2020-2023, https://www. state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/20-01943-SGWI_v11_forWeb_ Bookmarks508.pdf.
- Amanda Long and Kathleen Kuehnast, “America Can Build Peace Better-If It Includes Women,” United States Institute of Peace, August 19, 2020, https://www.usip.org/publications/2020/08/america-can-buildpeace-better-if-it-includes-women.
- The White House, National Strategy on Gender Equity and Equality, October 22, 2021, p. 8, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/ uploads/2021/10/National-Strategy-on-Gender-Equity-and-Equality. pdf.
- Ibid., pp. 8-9.
- Ibid., p. 27.
- Pascrell, STAT. 3061.
- See Pascrell, p.1323, where the GFA refers to “vulnerable communities.”
Dr. Karin L. Johnston
Introduction
Achieving gender equality is central to the values and aims of the European Union (EU). Advancing human rights and preserving democracy and the rule of law is embedded in the EU’s foundational treaties and in subsequent conventions, strategies, and action plans. In 2019, the EU witnessed the election of its first female president, Ursula von der Leyen, who has made gender equality and gender mainstreaming a top priority. In 2020, the EU extended its institutional commitment to gender equality, via its first Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 and its external relations, through the EU’s third Gender Action Plan (GAP III), which embodies UNSCR 1325 and the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda to reduce violence against women and ensure women’s participation in peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts. Institutionally, the EU’s work on gender equality and women’s empowerment falls under the European Commission’s remit, while the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU’s diplomatic service, is tasked with implementing GAP III.
This policy brief examines these EU moves to carry out its Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 and GAP III. It focuses on gender equality and gender mainstreaming in EU institutions and in the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). While the EU has made significant strides, its achievements have been unevenly distributed and implemented, both in terms of geographic distribution and in issue domains, particularly in the foreign and security policy arenas. The practical question is therefore what can be done to create greater momentum towards achieving greater gains in gender equality? The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic hardships have been devastating, especially for women, children, and other vulnerable populations. Leaders in all countries face difficult policy choices, and some countries have used the pandemic to reverse gains in human rights and gender equality. The EU is recognized and respected for its leadership and commitment to human rights and democracy, and so it is particularly important for the EU to continue its gender equality agenda both within and beyond its borders.
Gender Equality in the EU: Representation and Participation
Gender equality is enshrined in the EU’s foundational documents, whereby “In all its activities, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality between men and women.”1 Early efforts at gender equality targeted socio-economic inequalities such as “equal pay for equal work” and labor market access.2 It was a gradual and functionalist progression, from wages and employment to areas of social and economic policy and other areas of gender inequality.3 In the 1990s, the EU’s commitment to gender mainstreaming provided the drive to integrate gender into the development field and then into the EU’s external actions and its peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts.
Although the EU has shown strong commitment to gender equality, developments have been uneven across member states and issue domains. The EU’s European Institute for Gender Equality’s annual Gender Equality Index catalogues gender gaps over time using a scale of 1 (total inequality) to 100 (full equality) measured in six domains: work, money, knowledge, time, (political) power, and health.4 Accordingly, gender equality in the EU has reached 67.9 points, but progress across the EU has varied considerably, from Sweden (83.6) and Denmark (77.5) to Hungary (51.9) and Greece (51.2). Although the political power measurement has seen the most improvement since 2005, moving 11.6 points since 2020, its score remains the lowest overall (53.5 points) of the six domains.5 It is thus in the realm of representation and access to political power where gender inequalities are especially pronounced.6 More discouraging is the report’s observation that the level of power improvement drove the overall increase in the Index score—obscuring the absence of real gains in the other domains.
The World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2021 only reinforces the need to address the problem of representation. Of the four subindices the report uses to measure performance—health and survival, education, economic participation and opportunity, and political empowerment— the political empowerment subindex lags by an astonishing margin. The gender gap has nearly closed in health and survival (96%) and education (95%), while economic participation stands at 58%. However, political empowerment only reaches 22%—a drop of 2.4% from 2020. These sobering numbers show why efforts to increase women’s participation in the political field must be intensified.
The record isn’t much better in terms of women’s representation and participation in EU agencies. The numbers of women presidents and prime ministers among European countries remain disappointing. Though more women were elected heads of state between 2003 and 2018, the number never rose above 14%.7 Today, only four of the 27 heads of state or government are women, from Germany, Estonia, Denmark, and Finland—and soon to be three, since German Chancellor Angela Merkel will soon be replaced by the Social Democrat Olaf Scholz. Five EU member states have women defense ministers (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and Spain), and in the 47 states represented in the Council of Europe, only nine women serve as foreign minister (Albania, Andorra, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Lichtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).
The most important change, however, has occurred within the EU at the highest level of leadership, where for the first time in its history a woman now serves as President of the European Commission. Having assumed her duties on December 1, 2019, Ursula von der Leyen leads the institutional body that exercises executive power in the EU and that represents the interests of the EU on the international stage. Von der Leyen announced that gender equality would be one of her top priorities, enshrined within the new EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025.8 She declared her intention to implement new anti-discrimination legislation, introduce pay transparency measures, establish quotas for gender balance on company boards, and achieve gender parity in EU institutions, starting with her own College of Commissioners.9 Von der
| EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 |
| End gender-based violenceChallenge gender stereotypes Close inequalities in labor markets Achieve equal participation across economic sectors Address the gender pay and pension gaps Close the gender care gap Achieve gender balance in decision-making and in politics |
Leyen succeeded in her goal of a gender-balanced College of Commissioners, which is now made up of 13 women and 14 men, though many of the portfolios women hold are more traditionally “female.”10 In the Gender Equality Strategy, von der Leyen is committed to achieving more women in decisionmaking roles and to 50%-50% gender balance at all levels of EU management by 2024. The challenge is especially vital in the field of foreign and security policy: in an October 2020 statement, the European Parliament noted that women hold 40% of the positions in the Commission but only 31.3% of middle-management positions and 26% of senior management positions in the European External Action Service (EEAS), the diplomatic arm of the EU.11
One of the EU’s most powerful commissioners is Margrethe Vestager. As the EU’s commissioner for competition, she has taken on Silicon Valley’s biggest tech companies, such as Google, Apple, and Facebook. In September 2019, Vestager was elected to an unprecedented second term as the EU’s competition commissioner and, in President von der Leyen’s newly reorganized Commission, acquired a second portfolio as “Executive Vice President of the European Commission for a Europe Fit for the Digital Age.”12 Thus, not only will Vestager continue to oversee the EU’s competition rules, she will supervise the EU’s overarching cybersecurity, industrial, and big data policies, coordinate the EU’s position on the taxation of digital companies, and have a hand in shaping a White Paper on artificial intelligence, a data strategy, and a common position of the risks linked to 5G networks. This is a powerful platform for decisions that will have a significant impact in shaping regulatory, technological, and trade and market rules and regulations in Europe and across the globe.
In the European Parliament, the record on gender equality is encouraging but, as in so many other issues, the devil is in the details. EU statistics show the number of women members of the European Parliament has risen from a low of 16.6% in 1979 to the current 38.9%—about the world average but still far from full equality. Once again, the differences are highly variable, by member state and party affiliation. The number of female members in the European Parliament by member state range from a high of 57.1% in Finland to 18.2% in Romania and no women at all for Cyprus.13 In terms of its parliamentary parties, gender equality is highest in the European centerleft, led by the Greens with 48.3% women, followed by other center-left political parties. Parties of the far-right lag far behind, ranging between 32.3 to 39.7%.14
The rise of right-wing populist parties that have weakened democratic institutions and governments across Europe has seen gender and women’s rights come under sustained attack, notably in Poland and Hungary.15 In November 2020, both states strongly objected to the GAP III draft promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment in EU foreign and security policy and to protecting LGBTQ+ rights, despite gender equality and human rights protections being enshrined in EU treaty and basic EU law. These two governments also targeted gender equality. In July 2021, they lobbied to remove the term “gender equality” from a draft declaration to improve social cohesion.16 That same month, the European Commission took legal action against Hungary and Poland for what it deemed were violations of EU laws regarding non-discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation—against Hungary for passing an anti-LGBTQ+ law and against some communities in Poland that declared themselves “LGTBQ-free” zones.17
Finally, women are underrepresented in EU parliamentary committees and in ministerial portfolios. Only 35.2% of women lead EU parliamentary committees, and the gap is particularly evident in committees responsible for external affairs. Revealingly, women tended not to receive the highprofile portfolios but the “softer issue” socio-cultural portfolios of education, family and children, and health. In parliamentary committees focused on external affairs, representation ranges from 46% in the areas of international trade and development to 31% in foreign affairs and only 20% in the security and defense field.18
Studies of the EU’s track record on gender equality point to longstanding institutional and socio-cultural obstacles that continue to impede advancement toward full gender equality: the ongoing struggle for gender equality in middle and senior management in EU institutions (“think leader, think male”); work-life balance; a closed system of advancement; lack of political leadership and political will; poor implementation and weak enforcement mechanisms on legislation; insufficient resources and staffing; and little support for gender mainstreaming across EU institutions and issue areas.19 More difficult to address are the differences among member states in social and cultural norms and attitudes about gender that contribute to an “adoption-implementation gap” on gender equality issues within the EU.20
| European Court of Auditors: Gender |
| Mainstreaming Recommendations |
| Strengthen EU institutional frameworkConduct gender analysisCollect and analyze sex-aggregated dataUse gender-related objectives/indicatorsImprove reporting on gender equalityAssess and report on whether resilience and recovery plans contribute to gender equality. |
Multiple studies have concluded that implementation of existing gender equality and gender mainstreaming legislation remains a core problem, and hence many recommendations have an institutional focus. To address gaps in representation, for example, observers call for the EU to ensure genderneutral job descriptions and revise family and leave policy to address work-life balance. Other recommendations point to the need for better monitoring and evaluation and assessment systems, gender-disaggregated data, and better training at managerial levels to accelerate shifts in institutionalized structures of implicit bias and bureaucratic cultures. Deficits in the EU budget process are problematic, too. A 2021 EU auditing report concluded the EU failed to incorporate gender mainstreaming into the EU budget across the seven budget headings and thus failed to “live up to its commitment.”21 It calls for the Commission itself to comply with directives to integrate gender mainstreaming into the budget process and commit funding for gender-based initiatives.
Gender Equality in CSDP: Representation and Participation
The commitment to gender mainstreaming in EU institutions in the 1990s also expanded into the EU’s external relations, first to development aid and then to foreign and security policy, with UNSCR 1325 and the international WPS agenda providing important points of reference. But efforts to formalize gender mainstreaming in the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) were not immediately successful. The “watershed” moment for the integration of the WPS agenda into EU foreign and security policy occurred in 2008 with the adoption of the “Comprehensive Approach on Women, Peace and Security” for EU implementation of UNSCR 1325 and 1820.22 Starting in 2010, the EU introduced three successive gender action plans (GAP) that provide a framework for the European Commission and the EEAS to advance gender equality and empowerment in its external
policies.23
| Value of Gender Equality Measurers in Missions |
| Effectiveness at the Tactical, Operational, and Strategic Levels Secures access to groups and areas where male counterparts cannotEnhances situational awarenessCollects intelligence that helps challenge existing assumptionsHelps gain local trust in missionDemonstrates diversity benefits decision-making processesContributes to better work environment, more collaborative work dynamicsStrengthens credibility with host nationDemonstrated commitment strengthens EU legitimacyHelps overcome gender stereotypes within mission and outside mission. |
Documents such as the 2015 Council Conclusion on CSDP and the EEAS EU Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) 2019-2024 continue to support the promotion of gender mainstreaming and a stronger role for women in peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts as well as all EU military and civilian missions.24 As of late 2021, the EU deployed seven military missions and 11 civilian missions in Europe, Africa, and Asia, with a combined strength of 5,000 personnel.25 Their stated objectives include conflict prevention, peacekeeping, strengthening international security and rule of law, and the prevention of human trafficking and piracy.26 Of the seven current military missions, four are training missions (Mali, Somalia, Central African Republic, and Mozambique) and three are military operations with an executive mandate (Bosnia-Herzegovina and two naval force operations off the Somali coast and in the Mediterranean).
Several studies on gender representation in EU military missions show there is a steep hill to climb. A 2018 SIPRI study of EU missions conducted between 2008 and 2017 noted that female personnel numbers varied considerably both in numbers and in missions, ranging between 5.3 to 8.4% for 2013-2017.27 Explaining such variation is difficult; some surmise it is related to the conflict intensity of the mission,28 but the lack of gender-disaggregated data seriously limits the conclusions that can be drawn with any degree of certainty.29 The proportion of female personnel did increase from 3.6% to 7.8%, but the available data lack sufficient detail to draw specific conclusions about gender and the impact of women on mission effectiveness.30
In response to the growing demand for more civilian mission capabilities, in November 2018 EU member states established the Civilian Common Security and Defense Policy Compact to strengthen civilian missions.31 Given this demand for civilian personnel, one might be tempted to assume that EU efforts at gender mainstreaming in civilian missions have advanced faster, but the EU’s record is mixed at best. The number of civilian women personnel (which includes uniformed police and non-uniformed civilian personnel) rose from 11.3% to 22.8% between 2008 and 2017. Within that number, researchers estimated that women police averaged around 10%.32 The numbers fluctuated significantly but they did increase in relative terms, though not in absolute terms, from 46 in 2008 to over 400 by mid-2010, before declining from 423 to 260 between 2013-2017. Although the data show the gender balance improving, they also show the number of male personnel falling sharply between 2011-2017, due mostly to scaling down of mission size. Thus, no actual increase in female personnel in civilian missions was observable.
Several factors influence the rate of female civilian personnel in EU missions. One is the CSDP recruitment system. Uniformed personnel, both military and civilian police, are deployed or seconded by member state governments, and governments also nominate the “seconded” civilian personnel. Not all governments are committed to full gender equality, and these attitudes impact on the number of qualified women who make it through the selection process. The remaining personnel are “international contracted” personnel recruited by the EEAS, an organization that itself has been criticized for its “add women and stir” approach to gender mainstreaming and poor hiring record, particularly in middle and top management positions.33 The SIPRI study also highlights one of the most consistent criticisms of military and civilian CSDP missions: the significant lack of EU gender-disaggregated data. For example, the authors reported that for the period 20062017, they were unable to find statistics on the representation of women in military operations.34
Despite some progress, the general conclusions of the 2017 parliamentary evaluation of women in CSDP missions remain valid today: “measuring the impact of women’s participation in CSDP missions and operations is challenging because of the relatively small number of women in CSDP and the overall lack of statistical data on their positions within the organizations.”35
As with gender equality generally, the reasons why so few women are deployed are familiar: attitudes and prejudices (soldiering is not a woman’s job, not physically capable), work-life balance, recruitment and retention policies, institutionalized constraints (gendered job descriptions), funding problems, under-representation, and lack of top leadership support.36 CSDP missions must also compete for personnel and funds against demands from other organizations, both internally
(FRONTEX, the EU’s border control agency) and externally (UN, OSCE, NATO). For military missions, inadequate training in gender mainstreaming can have deleterious effects: with training devoid of evidence of tangible strategic, tactical, and operational advantages of including women, planners may miss the relevance of gender mainstreaming and thus fail to utilize female personnel in ways that advance mission objectives. Especially relevant for CSDP missions and operations are calls for changes in the recruitment system, more deployed gender advisors, and the need for genderdisaggregated data collection.
Calls for institutional reform within the EEAS are also strong, including changing recruitment policies to address personnel deficits and promoting more women in middle and top management.37 The European Parliament’s report on gender equality in the EU’s foreign and defense policy was critical of the ongoing underperformance of the EEAS in meeting gender equality targets and, in particular, its inability to produce specific and measurable objectives to meet those targets, the lack of diversity, the lack of gender-responsive recruitment procedures, and absence of genuine genderresponsive leadership.38
Conclusion
The EU’s priorities in advancing gender equality have focused on helping close the gender pay gap and gaps in employment and pensions; expanding women’s representation and participation in decision-making; addressing gender-based violence; and promoting gender equality and women’s rights both within and outside of the EU. The EU’s Gender Equality Strategy, the Common Approach to WPS, and the new GAP III all demonstrate a strong institutional commitment to gender equality and gender mainstreaming.
The greatest obstacle, however, lies in the implementation of existing frameworks to realize their aims. A persistent gap exists between institutional statements and actual implementation of the EU’s framework for advancing gender equality and gender mainstreaming, which is still often seen as an “add-on” rather than a framework and guide for transformational change. Such change is required in the EU’s internal activities as well as its external foreign and security policies. Importantly, EU officials must also clearly convey to member states that gender equality and gender mainstreaming are core EU strategic aims. It is unclear where the EU’s recent legal actions against Poland and Hungary will lead, but such challenges to liberal democracy and the rule of law are also existential challenges for the EU and must be resolved in ways that uphold EU values, norms, laws, and way of life.
Fortunately, recommendations for implementing constructive reforms exist, which focus on concrete and binding objectives. Internally, the EU can:
- Change institutional processes and policies such as promotion policies, job descriptions and requirements, and advancement opportunities;
- Adjust training and curricula programs to maximize mainstreaming gender throughout the cycle of respective areas of competence;
- Address work-life balance policies, taking onboard lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic;
- Implement the recommendations made by the European Court of Auditors to incorporate gender mainstreaming into the EU budget—and evaluate and monitor the progress. Externally, the EU can address shortfalls in its gender equality strategy by acting to:
- Improve the EEAS’ poor record on gender recruitment by altering job descriptions and promoting gender equality in institutions that serve as pool for candidates, e.g., border police, law enforcement, and ministries of justice, defense, and interior;
- Increase retention by establishing gender-responsive recruitment procedures, making family policies gender sensitive, altering promotion procedures, eliminating the pay gap, and improving work-life balance;
- Reinforce leadership’s commitment to gender equality by eliminating toxic masculine environments;
- Mandate gender equality training for all middle and senior EEAS management, head of mission and commanders of CSDP missions and operations, and including female trainers in mixed training teams, as well as role modeling in training;
- Collect comprehensive gender-aggregated data on CSDP missions to enable evidence-based assessments of the impact of gender inclusion for mission success;
- Ensure all military CSDP missions include a gender advisor, as already occurs in civilian missions.
Effective implementation of these recommendations requires the EU to “lead by example.” Strong leadership, in turn, depends on finding the political will to transform the EU’s culture and institutional structures that impede gender mainstreaming. One of the many challenges EU President von der Leyen faces is obtaining broader support among EU member states to prioritize policies that encourage gender mainstreaming in EU institutions and policies. This is a difficult task, especially in the security and defense arena, and while the current COVID-19 crisis and economic recession have put considerable pressure on EU resources. But these constraints do not justify rejecting these recommendations for gender equality, most of which can be enacted without significant expenditure. Indeed, times of crisis are the best time to lead by example.
References
- See Articles 8 and 19 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2016, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF n/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN; Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on the European Union (1992) (principle of equality between men and women), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource. html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/ DOC_1&format=PDF; and Article 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) (wages and work), https://www. europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf
- Article 119 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome—the foundational document of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union—established the principle of equal pay for equal work for the sexes. See “Promoting equality between men and women,” European Parliamentary Research Service, June 2019, p. 2, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ BRIE/2018/628272/EPRS_BRI(2018)628272_EN.pdf
- Maria Villellas, Pamela Urrutia, Ana Villellas, and Vincenc Fisas, Gender in EU Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Policy and Practice
(WOSCAP, 2016), p. 5, https://www.gppac.net/files/2018-11/Scoping%20 Study%20-%20Gender.pdf
- “Gender Equality Index 2019 in brief: Still far from the finish line,” European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE), pp. 1, 3, https://eige.europa.eu/ publications/gender-equality-index-2019-brief-still-far-finish-line.
- Gender Equality Index 2020: Key findings for the EU (EIGE, 2020), https://eige.europa.eu/publications/gender-equality-index-2020-key-findings-eu#:~:text=With%2067.9%20out%20of%20100,and%200.5%20 points%20since%202017
- Global Gender Gap Report 2021 (World Economic Forum, 2021), p. 5, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf. For another comprehensive report, see The #Shecurity Index 2021, https://shecurity. info/
- “Women in EU parliament and governments,” Eurostat, 2019, https:// ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-eurostat-news/-/EDN-20190306-2
- The key actions the Gender Equality Strategy sets out are: addressing gender-based violence and stereotypes; building equal participation and opportunities in the labor market; and ensuring gender balance in decision-making and politics. See “Gender Equality Strategy: Striving for a Union of equality,” European Commission press release, March 5, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_358
- Ursula von der Leyen, “A Union that strives for more: My agenda for Europe, By candidate for President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen,” 2019, p. 11, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/political-guidelines-next-commission_en.pdf
- “Women in politics in the EU: State of play,” European Parliamentary Research Service, March 2021, p. 3, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/Reg-
Data/etudes/BRIE/2021/689345/EPRS_BRI(2021)689345_EN.pdf
- “Fostering gender equality in the EU’s foreign and security policy,” European Parliament press release, October 23 2020, https://www. europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20201016IPR89563/fostering-gender-equality-in-the-eu-s-foreign-and-security-policy. Individual country data for 40 countries in the Women in Diplomacy Index 2021 show wide variations, but Sweden tops the list with 48.1% women ambassadors. The Nordic countries as a group also lead in the sample, with 40.6%. For the EU, however, the number of women ambassadors is only 23.4%, while the number for Europe as a whole is 27.2%. See Women in Diplomacy Index 2021 (Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy, March 2021), pp. 1, 3, https://www.agda.ac.ae/docs/default-source/Publications/agda-women-in-diplomacy-mar-2021.pdf?sfvrsn=4
- “Margrethe Vestager gets second term in EU competition job,” The Guardian, September 10, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2019/sep/10/margrethe-vestager-gets-second-term-in-eu-competition-job
- “Women in politics in the EU,” p. 2.
- “Women are doing better in European politics, but still not well enough,” Euractiv, December 2, 2019, https://www.euractiv.com/section/ middle-ground-politics/news/women-are-doing-better-in-europeanpolitics-but-still-not-well-enough/; see also “Women in parliaments” at a glance infographic, European Parliament, February 2020, https:// www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2020/646189/EPRS_ ATA(2020)646189_EN.pdf
- Hans von der Burchard, “EU’s foreign policy gender plan faces resistance from Poland and Hungary,” Politico, November 25, 2020, https:// www.politico.eu/article/eus-gender-equality-push-for-external-relations-faces-trouble-from-the-inside/
- Gabriela Baczynska, “Poland, Hungary push against ‘gender equality’ at EU social summit,” Reuters, May 7, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/ world/europe/poland-hungary-push-against-gender-equality-eu-social-summit-2021-05-07/
- “EU sues Hungary and Poland over LGBTQ discrimination,” Deutsche Welle, July 15, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/eu-sues-hungary-and-poland-over-lgbtq-discrimination/a-58272160
- “Women in politics in the EU,” p. 3; “Women are doing better;” and “Promoting Equality in Decision-Making,” 2019 Report on equality between women and men in the EU (European Commission, 2019), pp. 27-43. For further discussion see “Which European country has the most female politicians?” The Economist, May 3, 2019, https://www.economist.com/ graphic-detail/2019/05/03/which-european-country-has-the-most-female-politicians; “These countries have the most women in parliament,” World Economic Forum, February 12, 2019, https://www.weforum.org/ agenda/2019/02/chart-of-the-day-these-countries-have-the-most-women-in-parliament/
- For example, the Gender Equality Strategy 2020 introduces a new initiative to address pay transparency but elsewhere addresses older, outstanding issues, such as ensuring 40% female representation on corporate boards (a pledge made in 2012) and pressuring the six member states that have refused to ratify the 2017 Istanbul Convention to prevent and combat violence against women. See “EU sets out plans for gender equality, Politico, March 5, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/verajourova-eu-sets-out-plans-for-gender-equality-pay-gap/; “Promoting equality among men and women;” and Gender Equality in Europe: what progress in 2019? (Fondation Robert Schuman, Policy Paper No. 505, March 2019). For an assessment of the lack of gender equality initiatives in the EU budget, see “Gender mainstreaming in the EU budget: time to turn words into action,” European Court of Auditors, May 2021, https:// www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR21_10/SR_Gender_mainstreaming_EN.pdf
- Ekaterina R. Rashkova, “Talking the talk, but not walking the walk: gender equality in Eastern Europe,” East European Politics, 33:2 (2017), pp. 309-315.
- “Gender mainstreaming in the EU budget,” p. 5; “An EU budget that works for women’s rights and equality between women and men,” European Women’s Lobby, 2019, p. 1, https://www.womenlobby.org/IMG/pdf/ ewl_an_eu_budget_that_works_for_women_s_rights_and_equality_between_women_and_men_-_november_2019.pdf
- Heidi Riley, “Towards inclusivity in the EU’s approach to women, peace, and security,” GLOBUS, May 11, 2020, https://www.globus.uio.no/ news/2020/eu-women-peace-security-riley.html; Jutta Joachim, Andrea Schneiker, Anne Jenichen, “External Networks and institutional idiosyncrasies: the Common Security and Defence Policy and UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 30:1 (2017), p. 111.
- Hannah Neumann, “More Women, More Peace: Opportunities at the EU level,” Peacelab.blog, April 22, 2020, https://peacelab.blog/2020/04/ more-women-more-peace-opportunities-at-the-eu-level
- “Council Conclusions on CSDP,” European Council, 2015, https:// www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/05/18/council-conclusions-csdp/#; Annual report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (European Parliament, January 20,
2021), paragraph 60, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/
TA-9-2021-0012_EN.pdf; EU Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) 2019-2024 (Council of the European Union, July 5, 2019), https:// data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11031-2019-INIT/en/pdf
- Military and civilian missions and operations, European Union, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en
- See European Union data, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/ headquarters-homepage/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en
Timo Smit and Kajsa Tidblad-Lundholm, Trends in Women’s Participation in UN, EU, and OSCE Peace Operations (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), October 2018), p. vii, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-10/sipripp47_pko_gender_data.pdf. The authors note that complete data was not available for earlier years. See also Timo Smit, “Towards a More Capable European Union CSDP,” SIPRI Policy Brief, November 2019, https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/ sipri-policy-briefs/towards-more-capable-european-union-civilian-csdp#:~:text=To%20deliver%20on%20the%20commitment,addition%20 to%20more%20operational%20personnel- Maline Meiske, “Gender balancing in CSDP missions,” European Union Institute for Security Studies, November 15, https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert_51_Gender_in_CSDP.pdf
- Smit and Tidblad-Lundholm, Trends in Women’s Participation, p. vii.
- Smit and Tidblad-Lundholm, Trends in Women’s Participation, pp. 13-15. See also “Women in CSDP missions,” (European Parliament,
December 2017), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ STUD/2017/603855/EXPO_STU(2017)603855_EN.pdf
- European Council, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/ press-releases/2019/12/09/civilian-csdp-compact-council-adopts-conclusions/. For an analysis of the Civilian CSDP, see Nicoletta Pirozzi, The Civilian CSDP Compact: A success story for the EU’s crisis management, Cinderella? (European Union Institute for Security Studies, October
2018), https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%20 9__Civilian%20CSDP.pdf
- Smit and Tidblad-Lundholm, Trends in Women’s Participation, p. 3.
- Corinna Hörst, “A credible and accountable EU foreign service? Not yet,” EU Observer, March 11, 2020, https://euobserver.com/opinion/147671; Laura Chappell and Roberta Guerrina, “Understanding the gender regime in the European External Action Service,” Cooperation and Conflict, 55:2 (2020), pp.261-280.
- Chappell and Guerrina, “Understanding the gender regime,” p. 268.
- “Women in CSDP Missions,” Directorate-General for External Policies, European Parliament, December 2017, p. 22, https://www. europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603855/EXPO_ STU(2017)603855_EN.pdf
- Irina Bratosin D’Almeida, Rebekka Haffner, Corinna Hörst, “Women in the CSDP: strengthening the EU’s effectiveness as an international player,” European View, 16 (2017), pp. 313-324.
- For a study of the EEAS’ problems with institutionalized power structures and resistance to gender mainstreaming, see Chappell and Guerrina, “Understanding the gender regime.”
- Report on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy (European Parliament, Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, August 3, 2020), p. 22, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2020-0145_EN.html. The report provides a comprehensive assessment and recommendations for the EU. For a criticism of the EEAS under Josep Borrell, see Hannah Neumann, “Borrell’s boys’ club dominates EU foreign policy,” Politico Europe, March 8, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/ article/europe-diplomacy-gender-equality/
By Daniela Philipson García and Ana Velasco Ugalde
On January 11, 2021, the Mexican government presented its first National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS).1 The NAP is part of Mexico’s feminist foreign policy, launched
in January 2020, and it is a joint effort of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, the Secretariat of Defense (which encompasses the Army and the Air Force), the Secretariat of the Navy, the Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection and the National Institute for Women (INMUJERES). An interagency group is responsible for coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the NAP, which is subject to an overall review in 2024.
In this policy brief, we analyze Mexico’s NAP and make three arguments. First, NAPs are not only relevant for a country’s foreign policy and international engagements but are also significant for a country’s domestic security. Unfortunately, Mexico’s NAP is almost exclusively outward focused and does little to address Mexico’s own security challenges and their impact on women, LGBTQ and nonbinary persons. Second, we argue that the NAP’s outward-facing objectives are limited to a Western format that overlooks local contexts. Third, the most effective NAPs are those that have active civil society engagement. We therefore advocate for a formal, institutionalized and expanded role for Mexican civil society organizations. We conclude with recommendations for the Mexican government and civil society organizations and sketch what a more innovative and inclusive NAP could look like.
The NAP’s first three sections introduce the WPS agenda and Mexico’s interests within it. A fourth is devoted to the four pillars of prevention, participation, protection and relief and recovery. The NAP concludes with a section on coordination and monitoring and one on financing. A detailed implementation plan in an annex describes 10 strategic objectives, 16 lines of action and 23 indicators.2
The NAP links to the broader national and international public policy frameworks “aimed at guaranteeing gender equality and accelerating women’s empowerment in all areas.” For example, at the national level it mentions the country’s
Spotlight Initiative for the Elimination of Violence against
Women and the National Program for Equality between Women and Men (2018–2024). At the international level, it mentions the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action and the recommendations from the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, in particular the one referring to women’s participation in security tasks. 3
“[F]or Mexico, gender equality and the human rights of women and girls are essential conditions,” the NAP states, “not only for the achievement of international peace and security, but also for sustainable development and peace.” It also says UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, which launched the WPS agenda, is not restricted to conflict or postconflict situations but is also relevant in times of peace.4
At first glance, Mexico’s NAP seems to take an expansive view of the WPS agenda, covering domestic and international issues. However, when it comes to the operational part of the NAP, the main focus is on Mexico’s international efforts— particularly its participation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO). For Mexico, the expansion of the presence of women in peace operations is one of the main objectives of the WPS agenda.
We believe the NAP missed a great opportunity to address the security challenges facing Mexico.5 Its high rate of homicide affects women, men, LGBTQ and nonbinary people differently and undermines gender equity and equal access to justice.6 As a public policy tool to address gender inequalities and security, the NAP ought to leverage both domestic and foreign policies to address the root causes of violence and its intersections with gender. Given the context of citizen insecurity in Latin America in general, these root causes are particularly relevant.7 Moreover, the NAP seems to contradict itself, suggesting that Mexico is “at peace” while emphasizing its support for Mexico’s “women peacebuilders” working within its borders.
Thematic Areas and Objectives
The core operational part of the NAP is composed of four pillars: prevention, participation, protection and relief and recovery. The bulk of the objectives and lines of action fall under the first two pillars.
Prevention
The NAP’s primary prevention objectives are to “promote gender mainstreaming among institutions responsible for peacekeeping and security” and “raise awareness among military and police personnel” about the role of women in conflict prevention and peace processes. The specific lines of action and indicators to achieve these objectives rely heavily on training and awareness campaigns.
Yet the effectiveness of these training efforts is uncertain. A 2020 report by civil society organizations in Mexico found that neither the Army, Navy nor the National Guard were able to evaluate the content or impact of their human rights training.8 The authors of the report called for reassessing training as the sole strategy to guarantee and protect human rights. They argued that training is not a substitute for establishing clear, written policies and limits on the use of force. Training on gender perspectives for all Federal Public Administration personnel has been part of the equality plans coordinated by INMUJERES for several years, but this training appears to have yielded little, as judged by the increasing gender-based violence and femicides.9
The proposal for creation of a specialized police body to prevent, investigate and prosecute gender-based violence within municipal police departments is in this regard more promising. For example, in Chihuahua, the capital city of a northern state of the same name, the police’s specialized gender unit has had some success when it comes to investigating and prosecuting specific crimes that target women and girls. The unit has also had some success dealing with the problems of impunity and corruption in local law enforcement agencies.10 The one obstacle to the creation of specialized bodies is that the federal government has limited power to impose such changes on local police forces. For this to become a reality, the federal government would need to launch a major political strategy of cooperation with each of the 32 states. No such strategy is mentioned in the NAP.
Participation
The NAP’s main goal is “to promote the substantive participation of women as real and effective actors to prevent conflict at all levels.” It goes on to say that it will deploy more female personnel to UN peacekeeping operations.
Two things limit the proposed action. First, Mexico’s participation in peacekeeping is modest.11 Increasing the number of women without significantly augmenting the overall personnel contribution will have minimal impact. In addition, the action does not commit to increasing women’s participation in national security forces. The implementation plan includes only two indicators to measure the number of Mexican women involved in security operations: the number of Mexican women nominated and those deployed to UN peacekeeping operations missions. There is no mention of recruitment, hiring or promotion of women or LGBTQ people in the National Guard or the military.
Other participation indicators are vague and difficult to assess. For example, “number of networks of women peacebuilders formed,” “exchanges of experiences” and “number of uniformed women who participated in specialized language courses” can be quantitatively measured but are hard to assess in qualitative terms. Comprehensive indicators for the Mexican context could have included, for example, the extent to which violations of women’s and girls’ human rights are reported, referred and investigated by human rights bodies and the extent to which measures to protect women’s and girls’ human rights are included in national security policy frameworks. Making women’s and girl’s human rights violations visible is crucial to eradicating barriers to participation.
Civil society is mentioned only once. Under the participation pillar, the Mexican government commits itself to hold multilateral forums and meetings attended by women officials, experts or civil society representatives. However, there is no mechanism to ensure civil society’s consultation or substantive participation and monitoring.
In sum, the NAP focuses on enhancing women’s visibility in some spaces from which they have been traditionally excluded without altering the underlying power structures that sustain that discrimination. Women’s participation ought to be understood as a means for achieving gender equality and eliminating gender-based violence, not as an end in itself. It is not enough to “just add women and stir.”12 It is about transforming power structures to be more inclusive and attractive for women and LGBTQ people.13 That is, it requires organizational reforms that allow groups that have traditionally been discriminated against to hold positions of power and make policy decisions.
Protection
The protection objectives focus on protection of women and girls in peace operations and promotion of the UN’s zerotolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse by PKO staff. The indicators used to measure the implementation of these goals rely almost exclusively on training: “number of staff trained”; “academic programs of police institutions that incorporate issues related to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda”; “number of female instructors” and “number of trainings imparted.”
The objectives and actions stand out for their narrow focus and lack of ambition. This is disappointing for two reasons. First, many experts and stakeholders have developed the WPS agenda over more than 20 years. They have proposed many ways to protect women in conflict and post-conflict situations and guarantee and protect women’s economic, social and physical safety: for example, an inclusive design process and an established coordination system for implementation with civil society. None of these proposals are included in Mexico’s NAP. Without such inclusion, the NAP becomes an intragovernmental process that promises little meaningful change outside bureaucracy.14
Second, Mexico’s feminist foreign policy promises to advance the human rights of women and girls across several issues, and the government placed particular emphasis on these commitments during the Generation Equality Forum in March 2021.15 Thus, limiting government efforts to implementing training (whose impact is difficult to evaluate) and promoting a zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse (without monitoring mechanisms) come across as the bare minimum.
Authorities cannot protect potential victims of genderbased violence if they are not able to accurately and timely diagnose and measure the drivers of this violence. At a minimum, Mexico should prioritize enhancing and improving data-gathering mechanisms concerning genderbased violence and homicides. For example, to identify one of the characteristics of a femicide in mortality data, records in Mexico specifically seek information about the nature of the relationship between the victim and perpetrator of a homicide. However, the information is left blank 95 and 97.5 percent of the time for women and men, respectively.16
Mexico also should have committed to complying with the Bogota Protocol on gathering quality data on homicides in
Latin America and the Caribbean.17
Relief and Recovery
The relief and recovery objective is “to support gender mainstreaming in aid and humanitarian assistance efforts, as well as in post-conflict peacebuilding.” Implementation of this goal is to be measured by the number of initiatives promoted by Mexico at the United Nations and other multilateral forums. The types of initiatives are unspecified. More appropriate indicators would assess the financial, legal and psychological services provided to survivors of genderbased violence and the families of victims of femicide.
Monitoring, Evaluation and Financing
Effective implementation of NAPs rests on robust monitoring and evaluation and sufficient financing. In terms of monitoring and evaluation, Mexico’s NAP creates an interagency group comprising the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Navy, the Army, the Citizen Security and Protection Ministry and the Ministry for Women’s Affairs. Although international civil society organizations championed UNSCR 1325 and were part of the Working Group on WPS, Mexico’s interministry group excludes them. Civil society’s involvement is necessary for accountability and supervision of the government’s performance, so this is a serious cause for concern. In El Salvador, the Executive Council within the UNSCR 1325 Implementation Committee includes nongovernmental organizations and academic institutions.18 This policy is considered a best practice in the region, and Mexico should replicate it.
For the financing portion of the NAP, Mexican authorities did not commit to any concrete figures for its implementation. Instead, the document suggests that each coordinating institution carry out the tasks described using their own human capital and budgets. Given the severe federal budget cuts to policies related to gender issues during the current administration, this is also cause for concern.19 In this instance, the Mexican government should look to Canada’s budgeting commitments, which include specific budgeting targets over a five-year period.20
Opportunities for Progress
The NAP’s external focus means there are many missed opportunities for enhancing gender equality in security at home. Many observers have criticized Western NAPs for an overwhelmingly outward focus that insists on “rescuing” women in the Global South while ignoring major issues in their own countries.21 Mexico’s NAP seems to replicate these NAPs.
Many NAPs in Latin America copy and paste the Western format and thus miss an opportunity to use the NAP within their local contexts.22 The substantive focus of the WPS agenda has shifted over the years from traditional approaches to conflict to other challenges, such as climate change, migration and violent extremism. The Mexican NAP explicitly recognizes that the agenda is not restricted to conflict or post-conflict situations, yet the proposed actions focus solely on conflict and post-conflict situations. They do not address transnational security challenges such as immigration, violent extremism and ethnic minorities rights.
Immigration
Mexico has been dealing with a transnational immigration crisis for many years. Migrants, half of whom are women,23 are increasingly traveling to the United States, through Mexico, to seek refuge from harrowing gender-based violence.24 The perilous journey is particularly dangerous for women, who are most likely to fall prey to sexual violence and human trafficking.25 Migrant women in Mexico frequently see their wages and travel documentation retained by security authorities such as the National Guard, which adds to their precarious situation.26 The recent murder of Victoria Salazar at the hands of the Tulum police is just one example of the disproportionate state and police violence inflicted on immigrant women.27 In terms of public health, UN Women statistics also show that 60 percent of preventable pregnancy-related deaths occur in humanitarian settings and are caused by internal displacement and migration.28
Mexico’s NAP could have sought to increase relief measures for migrant women and establish cooperation mechanisms for the investigation and international prosecution of human trafficking and sexual exploitation, as well as strengthen existing mechanisms. One example of such mechanisms is the memorandum between the Mexican and Guatemalan authorities pertaining to the protection of women and children victims of human trafficking via the Mexico-
Guatemala border, signed in 2004.29
On a similar note, the WPS agenda in Mexico could have promoted further cooperation with Central American countries to address the underlying causes of forced displacement in the region—gang violence and gender-based violence.30 This would be particularly appropriate given that Guatemala and El Salvador have themselves adopted NAPs. Regional cooperation in this realm could incentivize other countries to get on board with the WPS agenda.31
Far-Right Extremism and Disinformation
Far-right extremism is closely linked to sexist, homophobic, white supremacist and militaristic notions that undermine democratic values, human rights and gender equality and hinder peacebuilding.32 For example, in Colombia, the 2016 Peace Accords faced a substantial setback when Colombia rejected the deal in a national plebiscite after a conservative campaign against “gender ideology”—a term conservatives used to undermine LGBTQ and women’s rights.33 These campaigns and narratives have become particularly salient in Latin America, and Mexico is no exception. At the start of the pandemic, some religious groups blamed the surge of COVID-19 on feminism and queer people, and they have also actively halted the efforts of the reproductive rights movement in local legislation.34
Disinformation is also closely linked to far-right groups and conspiracy theories that are hostile toward women, particularly women in leadership positions and women of color.35 While Mexico’s diplomatic efforts (i.e., co-hosting the Generation Equality Forum) are certainly relevant to counteracting far-right agendas internationally, the threat is also brewing domestically. Mexico’s NAP could have addressed far-right extremism and disinformation head on by promoting and protecting local journalists covering WPSrelated issues.
Indigenous and Afro-Mexican Rights
The Foreign Affairs Ministry has repeatedly stated its intention of leading a feminist foreign policy anchored in an intersectional lens.36 According to Kimberle Crenshaw, who first coined the term, intersectionality denotes the combination of multiple forms of discrimination, such as racism, homophobia, ableism and sexism to analyze and understand the specific experiences of black, transgender or Indigenous women, for example.37 However, Mexico’s NAP makes no reference whatsoever to intersectionality. The document also lacks public policy proposals that recognize and address the overlap of forms of discrimination and state violence against Indigenous and Afro-Mexican women. Neither does it acknowledge the legacy of Afro-Mexican and Indigenous women as peacebuilders in Mexico. The NAP could have seized the opportunity to condemn and urge the cessation of low-intensity warfare against the Zapatistas while referencing and remembering the Acteal massacre of 1997, where the principal victims were women and children.38
WIIS policybrief June, 2021 4
Recommendations
Our analysis of Mexico’s NAP leads us to make the following recommendations:
- Include the active participation of civil society organizations. The coordination, implementation and evaluation mechanisms of the NAP should include civil society organizations as observers and agents responsible for demanding accountability and measuring and monitoring the NAP’s impact. Three feminist civil society organizations with in-depth knowledge of the impacts of militarism, international relations and gender-based violence in Mexico are Data Civica, Intersecta and Justicia Transicional MX; they should be invited to join coordination, implementation and evaluation bodies.39
- Move beyond training. To implement the WPS agenda, the Mexican government ought to go beyond simply training. Clear, well-defined rules, limits and sanctions must be established to govern the use of force by security forces. Moreover, the substantive participation of women should involve reforms to make national defense and security bodies more inclusive and attractive for women and LGBTQ people.
Budget realistic, sufficient expenditures for implementation. For the WPS agenda’s goals to become a reality in Mexico, financial planning and budgeting are a prerequisite. As with any public policy agenda, resources are required to carry out actionable items, measure their impact and, if successful, expand them.
References
- The NAP is available in Spanish and English. Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection, Plan Nacional de Acción para el Seguimiento de la Resolución 1325 2000 del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU sobre Mujeres, Paz y Seguridad, (Mexico City, January 11, 2021), https://www. gob.mx/sspc/documentos/plan-nacional-de-accion-para-el-seguimiento-de-la-resolucion-1325-2000-del-consejo-de-seguridad-sobre-mujeres-paz-y-seguridad.
- Ibid. Two annexes also list the national and international regulatory frameworks by which Mexico is bound.
- Ibid. See also UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,” web page, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cedaw/pages/cedawindex.aspx
- Ibid. p. 3 and p. 4.
- See also the letter to the international feminist NGO community regarding Mexico’s incoherent feminist foreign policy (New York: March 18, 2021), https://docs.google.com/document/d/1rqmASf6SHNBCsu-PPZodTp41PZbpYXEoK8aapuuZGMQ/edit?usp=sharing
- Data Civica, Claves para Entender y Prevenir los Asesinatos de Mujeres en México (Mexico City: May 2019) https://datacivica.org/assets/pdf/ claves-para-entender-y-prevenir-los-asesinatos-de-mujeres-en-mexico. pdf.
4. Adopt policies that address WPS-related issues in the domestic and regional spheres. Mexico should seize the opportunity to propose new, innovative WPS-related policies that address the violence spreading within its borders and in the region. We have suggested addressing the immigration crisis, the spread of disinformation and threats on journalism and incorporating an intersectional perspective that aligns with its stated feminist foreign policy. Other issues may include LGBTQ rights, disarmament and illicit arms flows across the US-Mexico border.
Overall, Mexico’s first NAP is a positive step and answers the call by Mexican civil society to work on issues related to the women, peace and security agenda. The NAP provides a formal framework to hold the government accountable. And yet, we underscore the inconsistencies between the government’s positions in the international arena and the ones it presents to its citizens.40 We hope that the publication of Mexico’s NAP will start a conversation not only with the government but also with practitioners and researchers around the world. To advance the WPS agenda, it is critically important to share experiences and best practices, particularly among Mexico’s neighbors, the United States included.
- UN Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Study on Homicides 2019 (Vienna: July 2019) https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/ global-study-on-homicide.html.
- The National Guard is a hybrid security body composed of members of the military and the now-defunct civilian Federal Police. Intersecta, Falsas Salvaguardas: Las Capacitaciones de las Fuerzas Armadas en Derechos Humanos y Género (2010–2019) (Mexico City, December 2020), https://www.intersecta.org/falsas-salvaguardas/.
- Marcia Pacheco Alberto and Ruslan Posadas Velázquez, “La Administración Pública Federal Frente a la Violencia de Género,” Revista Buen Gobierno Vol. 28 (January-June), pp. 90–107 (2020), https://doi. org/10.35247/buengob_28_04.
- Lilian Chapa Koloffon, “Ella También es la Policía,” Gatopardo (Mexico City: November 26, 2020), https://gatopardo.com/opinion/ella-tambien-es-la-policia-mujer-policia-chihuahua-ministerio-publico/.
- See UN Peacekeeping, “Troop and Police Contributors,” web page, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors.
- Sahana Dharmapuri, “Just Add Women and Stir?” Parameters Vol. 41, no. 1 (2011), pp. 56–70.
WIIS policybrief June, 2021 5
Karolin Tuncel, “20 Years of Women, Peace and Security: How We
Argue for Participation Matters,” LSE Women, Peace and Security blog
(London: London School of Economics Centre for Women, Peace and Security, January 21, 2021), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2021/01/21/20years-of-women-peace-and-security-how-we-argue-for-participationmatters/.
- Miki Jacevic, “What Makes for an Effective WPS National Action Plan?” The Strategist blog (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 25, 2019), https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/what-makesfor-an-effective-wps-national-action-plan/.
- Ann Deslandes, “Checking In on Mexico’s Feminist Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy (December 30, 2020), https://foreignpolicy. com/2020/12/30/mexico-feminist-foreign-policy-one-year-in/
- Data Cívica, Los Asesinatos de Mujeres.
- Bogotá Chamber of Commerce, “Protocolo de Bogotá sobre Calidad de los Datos de Homicidios en América Latina y el Caribe,” web page (Bogotá: September 2015), https://www.ccb.org.co/Sala-de-prensa/ Noticias-CCB/2015/Noviembre-2015/Protocolo-de-Bogota-sobre-calidad-de-los-datos-de-homicidios-en-America-Latina-y-el-Caribe.
- Ministry of Foreign Relations El Salvador, Plan de Acción Nacional, “Mujeres, Paz y Seguridad” 2017–2022 (San Salvador: 2017), http://www. peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/PLAN-DE-ACCION-NACIONAL-2017-2-022.pdf.
- The armed forces, particularly the Secretariat of Defense, have been excluded from these austerity policies. Yet there are no public data on how any of this budget is being spent on achieving the NAP’s objectives. See Karla Sánchez, “No se Puede Proteger Más a las Mujeres con Menos Dinero,” Letras Libres (July 22, 2020), https://www.letraslibres.com/ mexico/politica/no-se-puede-proteger-mas-las-mujeres-menos-dinero; Georgina Zerega, “Las Cuentas Ocultas del Ejército: 25.000 Millones de Pesos Gastados en 2020 sin Dejar un Registro Público,” El País (February 24, 2021), https://elpais.com/mexico/2021-02-24/las-cuentasocultas-del-ejercito-25000-millones-de-pesos-gastados-en-2020-sin-dejar-un-registro-publico.html.
- Government of Canada, National Action Plan Canada, 2017 (Ottawa: Global Affairs Canada), http://1325naps.peacewomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Canadas-National-Action-Plan-2017-2022.pdf.
- Swati Parashar, “The WPS Agenda: A Postcolonial Critique,” in
Sarah E. Davies and Jaqui True, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace and Security (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 829–38.
- Paula Drumond and Tamya Rebelo, “Global Pathways or Local Spins? National Action Plans in South America,” International Feminist Journal of Politics Vol. 22, no. 4 (2020), pp. 462–84.
- Anjali Fleury, “The Overlooked: Migrant Women Working in Mexico” (Tokyo: United Nations University, May 6, 2016), https://unu.edu/ publications/articles/the-overlooked-migrant-women-working-in-mexico.html.
- Azam Ahmed, “Women Are Fleeing Death at Home, the US Wants to Keep Them Out,” New York Times, August 18, 2019.
- Julia Westbrook, “How Mexico and Central America’s Femicide Epidemic Drives and Complicated the Migrant Crisis,” The New Humanitarian, February 27, 2020, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/ news-feature/2020/02/27/Femicide-migration-Central-America-Mexico-US-Mexico-women-violence.
- Fleury, “The Overlooked.”
- Gema Kloppe-Santamaría, “Impunity and Police Brutality Characterize Rise in Femicides in Mexico,” Global Observatory (International Peace Institute, April 7, 2021), https://theglobalobservatory.org/2021/04/ impunity-police-brutality-femicides-mexico/.
- UN Women, “Women Refugees and Migrants,” https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/in-focus/women-refugees-and-migrants.
- Chamber of Deputies of the United Mexican States, Compendio de Instrumentos Internacionales Relativos a la Trata de Personas (Mexico City: August 2006), http://www.diputados.gob.mx/sedia/sia/spe/SPEISS-08-06.pdf.
- Ahmed, “Women Are Fleeing Death at Home.”
- This is also a missed opportunity for cooperation with the United States, considering the current importance of the topic in bilateral relations. See Anne Gearan and Mary Beth Sheridan, “Harris Urges Cooperation to Stem the Tide of Migrants in Meeting with Mexico’s López Obrador,” The Washington Post, May 7, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/harris-lopez-obrador/2021/05/07/dcdc3f48-af4011eb-acd3-24b44a57093a_story.html.
- Ana Cristina González and Laura Castro, “Origen y Contenidos del Discurso sobre la Ideología de Género,” La Diaria, March 11, 2019, https://ladiaria.com.uy/articulo/2019/3/origen-y-contenidos-del-discurso-sobre-la-ideologia-de-genero/#fnref:1.
- Roxane Krystalli and Kimberly Theidon, “Here’s How Attention to
Gender Affected Colombia’s Peace Process,” Monkey Cage blog, The Washington Post, October 9, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/09/heres-how-attention-to-gender-affected-colombias-peace-process/.
- Government of Mexico, “Conferencia 17 de mayo”, (Mexico City: May 17 2020), https://coronavirus.gob.mx/2020/05/17/conferencia-17-de-mayo-2/
- Nina Jankowicz et al., Malign Creativity: How Gender, Sex and Lies Are Weaponized against Women Online (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, January 2021), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/malign-creativity-how-gender-sex-and-lies-are-weaponized-against-women-online.
- Secretariat of Foreign Relations, “México Anuncia la Adopción de su Política Exterior Feminista” Comunicao No. 015 (México City: Government of Mexico, January 9, 2020), https://www.gob.mx/sre/prensa/ mexico-anuncia-la-adopcion-de-su-politica-exterior-feminista.
- Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review 43, no. 6 (1991), pp. 1241–99.
- Aida Hernández Castillo, “Contra la Violencia, Acordamos Vivir,” opinion, La Jornada, November 23, 2020, https://www.jornada.com. mx/2020/11/23/opinion/026a1pol.
- Data Civica, web page, https://datacivica.org/; Intersecta, web page, https://www.intersecta.org/; Justicia Transicional MX, web page, https:// jtmexico.org/.
- Cecilia Farfán Méndez, “United Nations Mexico vs. Domestic Mexico,” opinion, Mexico Today, April 16, 2021, https://mexicotoday. com/2021/04/16/opinion-united-nations-mexico-vs-domestic-mexico/.