Advancing Gender Equality in the European Union

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Dr. Karin L. Johnston

Introduction

Achieving gender equality is central to the values and aims of the European Union (EU). Advancing human rights and preserving democracy and the rule of law is embedded in the EU’s foundational treaties and in subsequent conventions, strategies, and action plans. In 2019, the EU witnessed the election of its first female president, Ursula von der Leyen, who has made gender equality and gender mainstreaming a top priority. In 2020, the EU extended its institutional commitment to gender equality, via its first Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 and its external relations, through the EU’s third Gender Action Plan (GAP III), which embodies UNSCR 1325 and the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda to reduce violence against women and ensure women’s participation in peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts. Institutionally, the EU’s work on gender equality and women’s empowerment falls under the European Commission’s remit, while the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU’s diplomatic service, is tasked with implementing GAP III.

This policy brief examines these EU moves to carry out its Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025 and GAP III. It focuses on gender equality and gender mainstreaming in EU institutions and in the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). While the EU has made significant strides, its achievements have been unevenly distributed and implemented, both in terms of geographic distribution and in issue domains, particularly in the foreign and security policy arenas. The practical question is therefore what can be done to create greater momentum towards achieving greater gains in gender equality? The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic hardships have been devastating, especially for women, children, and other vulnerable populations. Leaders in all countries face difficult policy choices, and some countries have used the pandemic to reverse gains in human rights and gender equality. The EU is recognized and respected for its leadership and commitment to human rights and democracy, and so it is particularly important for the EU to continue its gender equality agenda both within and beyond its borders.

Gender Equality in the EU: Representation and Participation

Gender equality is enshrined in the EU’s foundational documents, whereby “In all its activities, the Union shall aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality between men and women.”1 Early efforts at gender equality targeted socio-economic inequalities such as “equal pay for equal work” and labor market access.2 It was a gradual and functionalist progression, from wages and employment to areas of social and economic policy and other areas of gender inequality.3 In the 1990s, the EU’s commitment to gender mainstreaming provided the drive to integrate gender into the development field and then into the EU’s external actions and its peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts.

Although the EU has shown strong commitment to gender equality, developments have been uneven across member states and issue domains. The EU’s European Institute for Gender Equality’s annual Gender Equality Index catalogues gender gaps over time using a scale of 1 (total inequality) to 100 (full equality) measured in six domains: work, money, knowledge, time, (political) power, and health.4 Accordingly, gender equality in the EU has reached 67.9 points, but progress across the EU has varied considerably, from Sweden (83.6) and Denmark (77.5) to Hungary (51.9) and Greece (51.2). Although the political power measurement has seen the most improvement since 2005, moving 11.6 points since 2020, its score remains the lowest overall (53.5 points) of the six domains.5 It is thus in the realm of representation and access to political power where gender inequalities are especially pronounced.6 More discouraging is the report’s observation that the level of power improvement drove the overall increase in the Index score—obscuring the absence of real gains in the other domains.

The World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report 2021 only reinforces the need to address the problem of representation. Of the four subindices the report uses to measure performance—health and survival, education, economic participation and opportunity, and political empowerment— the political empowerment subindex lags by an astonishing margin. The gender gap has nearly closed in health and survival (96%) and education (95%), while economic participation stands at 58%. However, political empowerment only reaches 22%—a drop of 2.4% from 2020. These sobering numbers show why efforts to increase women’s participation in the political field must be intensified.

The record isn’t much better in terms of women’s representation and participation in EU agencies. The numbers of women presidents and prime ministers among European countries remain disappointing. Though more women were elected heads of state between 2003 and 2018, the number never rose above 14%.7 Today, only four of the 27 heads of state or government are women, from Germany, Estonia, Denmark, and Finland—and soon to be three, since German Chancellor Angela Merkel will soon be replaced by the Social Democrat Olaf Scholz. Five EU member states have women defense ministers (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, and Spain), and in the 47 states represented in the Council of Europe, only nine women serve as foreign minister (Albania, Andorra, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Estonia, Lichtenstein, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom).

The most important change, however, has occurred within the EU at the highest level of leadership, where for the first time in its history a woman now serves as President of the European Commission. Having assumed her duties on December 1, 2019, Ursula von der Leyen leads the institutional body that exercises executive power in the EU and that represents the interests of the EU on the international stage. Von der Leyen announced that gender equality would be one of her top priorities, enshrined within the new EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025.8 She declared her intention to implement new anti-discrimination legislation, introduce pay transparency measures, establish quotas for gender balance on company boards, and achieve gender parity in EU institutions, starting with her own College of Commissioners.9 Von der

EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025
End gender-based violenceChallenge gender stereotypes Close inequalities in labor markets Achieve equal participation across economic sectors Address the gender pay and pension gaps Close the gender care gap Achieve gender balance in decision-making and  in politics

Leyen succeeded in her goal of a gender-balanced College of Commissioners, which is now made up of 13 women and 14 men, though many of the portfolios women hold are more traditionally “female.”10 In the Gender Equality Strategy, von der Leyen is committed to achieving more women in decisionmaking roles and to 50%-50% gender balance at all levels of EU management by 2024. The challenge is especially vital in the field of foreign and security policy: in an October 2020 statement, the European Parliament noted that women hold 40% of the positions in the Commission but only 31.3% of middle-management positions and 26% of senior management positions in the European External Action Service (EEAS), the diplomatic arm of the EU.11

One of the EU’s most powerful commissioners is Margrethe Vestager. As the EU’s commissioner for competition, she has taken on Silicon Valley’s biggest tech companies, such as Google, Apple, and Facebook. In September 2019, Vestager was elected to an unprecedented second term as the EU’s competition commissioner and, in President von der Leyen’s newly reorganized Commission, acquired a second portfolio as “Executive Vice President of the European Commission for a Europe Fit for the Digital Age.”12 Thus, not only will Vestager continue to oversee the EU’s competition rules, she will supervise the EU’s overarching cybersecurity, industrial, and big data policies, coordinate the EU’s position on the taxation of digital companies, and have a hand in shaping a White Paper on artificial intelligence, a data strategy, and a common position of the risks linked to 5G networks. This is a powerful platform for decisions that will have a significant impact in shaping regulatory, technological, and trade and market rules and regulations in Europe and across the globe.

In the European Parliament, the record on gender equality is encouraging but, as in so many other issues, the devil is in the details. EU statistics show the number of women members of the European Parliament has risen from a low of 16.6% in 1979 to the current 38.9%—about the world average but still far from full equality. Once again, the differences are highly variable, by member state and party affiliation. The number of female members in the European Parliament by member state range from a high of 57.1% in Finland to 18.2% in Romania and no women at all for Cyprus.13 In terms of its parliamentary parties, gender equality is highest in the European centerleft, led by the Greens with 48.3% women, followed by other center-left political parties. Parties of the far-right lag far behind, ranging between 32.3 to 39.7%.14

The rise of right-wing populist parties that have weakened democratic institutions and governments across Europe has seen gender and women’s rights come under sustained attack, notably in Poland and Hungary.15 In November 2020, both states strongly objected to the GAP III draft promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment in EU foreign and security policy and to protecting LGBTQ+ rights, despite gender equality and human rights protections being enshrined in EU treaty and basic EU law. These two governments also targeted gender equality. In July 2021, they lobbied to remove the term “gender equality” from a draft declaration to improve social cohesion.16 That same month, the European Commission took legal action against Hungary and Poland for what it deemed were violations of EU laws regarding non-discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation—against Hungary for passing an anti-LGBTQ+ law and against some communities in Poland that declared themselves “LGTBQ-free” zones.17

Finally, women are underrepresented in EU parliamentary committees and in ministerial portfolios. Only 35.2% of women lead EU parliamentary committees, and the gap is particularly evident in committees responsible for external affairs. Revealingly, women tended not to receive the highprofile portfolios but the “softer issue” socio-cultural portfolios of education, family and children, and health. In parliamentary committees focused on external affairs, representation ranges from 46% in the areas of international trade and development to 31% in foreign affairs and only 20% in the security and defense field.18

Studies of the EU’s track record on gender equality point to longstanding institutional and socio-cultural obstacles that continue to impede advancement toward full gender equality: the ongoing struggle for gender equality in middle and senior management in EU institutions (“think leader, think male”); work-life balance; a closed system of advancement; lack of political leadership and political will; poor implementation and weak enforcement mechanisms on legislation; insufficient resources and staffing; and little support for gender mainstreaming across EU institutions and issue areas.19 More difficult to address are the differences among member states in social and cultural norms and attitudes about gender that contribute to an “adoption-implementation gap” on gender equality issues within the EU.20

European Court of Auditors: Gender
Mainstreaming Recommendations
Strengthen EU institutional frameworkConduct gender analysisCollect and analyze sex-aggregated dataUse gender-related objectives/indicatorsImprove reporting on gender equalityAssess and report on whether resilience and recovery plans contribute to gender equality.

Multiple studies have concluded that implementation of existing gender equality and gender mainstreaming legislation remains a core problem, and hence many recommendations have an institutional focus. To address gaps in representation, for example, observers call for the EU to ensure genderneutral job descriptions and revise family and leave policy to address work-life balance. Other recommendations point to the need for better monitoring and evaluation and assessment systems, gender-disaggregated data, and better training at managerial levels to accelerate shifts in institutionalized structures of implicit bias and bureaucratic cultures. Deficits in the EU budget process are problematic, too. A 2021 EU auditing report concluded the EU failed to incorporate gender mainstreaming into the EU budget across the seven budget headings and thus failed to “live up to its commitment.”21 It calls for the Commission itself to comply with directives to integrate gender mainstreaming into the budget process and commit funding for gender-based initiatives.

Gender Equality in CSDP: Representation and Participation

The commitment to gender mainstreaming in EU institutions in the 1990s also expanded into the EU’s external relations, first to development aid and then to foreign and security policy, with UNSCR 1325 and the international WPS agenda providing important points of reference. But efforts to formalize gender mainstreaming in the EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) were not immediately successful. The “watershed” moment for the integration of the WPS agenda into EU foreign and security policy occurred in 2008 with the adoption of the “Comprehensive Approach on Women, Peace and Security” for EU implementation of UNSCR 1325 and 1820.22 Starting in 2010, the EU introduced three successive gender action plans (GAP) that provide a framework for the European Commission and the EEAS to advance gender equality and empowerment in its external

policies.23

Value of Gender Equality Measurers in Missions
Effectiveness at the Tactical, Operational, and  Strategic Levels Secures access to groups and areas where male counterparts cannotEnhances situational awarenessCollects intelligence that helps challenge existing assumptionsHelps gain local trust in missionDemonstrates diversity benefits decision-making processesContributes to better work environment, more collaborative work dynamicsStrengthens credibility with host nationDemonstrated commitment strengthens EU legitimacyHelps overcome gender stereotypes within mission and outside mission.

Documents such as the 2015 Council Conclusion on CSDP and the EEAS EU Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) 2019-2024 continue to support the promotion of gender mainstreaming and a stronger role for women in peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts as well as all EU military and civilian missions.24 As of late 2021, the EU deployed seven military missions and 11 civilian missions in Europe, Africa, and Asia, with a combined strength of 5,000 personnel.25 Their stated objectives include conflict prevention, peacekeeping, strengthening international security and rule of law, and the prevention of human trafficking and piracy.26 Of the seven current military missions, four are training missions (Mali, Somalia, Central African Republic, and Mozambique) and three are military operations with an executive mandate (Bosnia-Herzegovina and two naval force operations off the Somali coast and in the Mediterranean).

Several studies on gender representation in EU military missions show there is a steep hill to climb. A 2018 SIPRI study of EU missions conducted between 2008 and 2017 noted that female personnel numbers varied considerably both in numbers and in missions, ranging between 5.3 to 8.4% for 2013-2017.27 Explaining such variation is difficult; some surmise it is related to the conflict intensity of the mission,28 but the lack of gender-disaggregated data seriously limits the conclusions that can be drawn with any degree of certainty.29 The proportion of female personnel did increase from 3.6% to 7.8%, but the available data lack sufficient detail to draw specific conclusions about gender and the impact of women on mission effectiveness.30

In response to the growing demand for more civilian mission capabilities, in November 2018 EU member states established the Civilian Common Security and Defense Policy Compact to strengthen civilian missions.31 Given this demand for civilian personnel, one might be tempted to assume that EU efforts at gender mainstreaming in civilian missions have advanced faster, but the EU’s record is mixed at best. The number of civilian women personnel (which includes uniformed police and non-uniformed civilian personnel) rose from 11.3% to 22.8% between 2008 and 2017. Within that number, researchers estimated that women police averaged around 10%.32 The numbers fluctuated significantly but they did increase in relative terms, though not in absolute terms, from 46 in 2008 to over 400 by mid-2010, before declining from 423 to 260 between 2013-2017. Although the data show the gender balance improving, they also show the number of male personnel falling sharply between 2011-2017, due mostly to scaling down of mission size. Thus, no actual increase in female personnel in civilian missions was observable.

Several factors influence the rate of female civilian personnel in EU missions. One is the CSDP recruitment system. Uniformed personnel, both military and civilian police, are deployed or seconded by member state governments, and governments also nominate the “seconded” civilian personnel. Not all governments are committed to full gender equality, and these attitudes impact on the number of qualified women who make it through the selection process. The remaining personnel are “international contracted” personnel recruited by the EEAS, an organization that itself has been criticized for its “add women and stir” approach to gender mainstreaming and poor hiring record, particularly in middle and top management positions.33 The SIPRI study also highlights one of the most consistent criticisms of military and civilian CSDP missions: the significant lack of EU gender-disaggregated data. For example, the authors reported that for the period 20062017, they were unable to find statistics on the representation of women in military operations.34

Despite some progress, the general conclusions of the 2017 parliamentary evaluation of women in CSDP missions remain valid today: “measuring the impact of women’s participation in CSDP missions and operations is challenging because of the relatively small number of women in CSDP and the overall lack of statistical data on their positions within the organizations.”35

As with gender equality generally, the reasons why so few women are deployed are familiar: attitudes and prejudices (soldiering is not a woman’s job, not physically capable), work-life balance, recruitment and retention policies, institutionalized constraints (gendered job descriptions), funding problems, under-representation, and lack of top leadership support.36 CSDP missions must also compete for personnel and funds against demands from other organizations, both internally

(FRONTEX, the EU’s border control agency) and externally (UN, OSCE, NATO). For military missions, inadequate training in gender mainstreaming can have deleterious effects: with training devoid of evidence of tangible strategic, tactical, and operational advantages of including women, planners may miss the relevance of gender mainstreaming and thus fail to utilize female personnel in ways that advance mission objectives. Especially relevant for CSDP missions and operations are calls for changes in the recruitment system, more deployed gender advisors, and the need for genderdisaggregated data collection.

Calls for institutional reform within the EEAS are also strong, including changing recruitment policies to address personnel deficits and promoting more women in middle and top management.37 The European Parliament’s report on gender equality in the EU’s foreign and defense policy was critical of the ongoing underperformance of the EEAS in meeting gender equality targets and, in particular, its inability to produce specific and measurable objectives to meet those targets, the lack of diversity, the lack of gender-responsive recruitment procedures, and absence of genuine genderresponsive leadership.38

Conclusion

The EU’s priorities in advancing gender equality have focused on helping close the gender pay gap and gaps in employment and pensions; expanding women’s representation and participation in decision-making; addressing gender-based violence; and promoting gender equality and women’s rights both within and outside of the EU. The EU’s Gender Equality Strategy, the Common Approach to WPS, and the new GAP III all demonstrate a strong institutional commitment to gender equality and gender mainstreaming.

The greatest obstacle, however, lies in the implementation of existing frameworks to realize their aims. A persistent gap exists between institutional statements and actual implementation of the EU’s framework for advancing gender equality and gender mainstreaming, which is still often seen as an “add-on” rather than a framework and guide for transformational change. Such change is required in the EU’s internal activities as well as its external foreign and security policies. Importantly, EU officials must also clearly convey to member states that gender equality and gender mainstreaming are core EU strategic aims. It is unclear where the EU’s recent legal actions against Poland and Hungary will lead, but such challenges to liberal democracy and the rule of law are also existential challenges for the EU and must be resolved in ways that uphold EU values, norms, laws, and way of life.

Fortunately, recommendations for implementing constructive reforms exist, which focus on concrete and binding objectives. Internally, the EU can:

  • Change institutional processes and policies such as promotion policies, job descriptions and requirements, and advancement opportunities;
  • Adjust training and curricula programs to maximize mainstreaming gender throughout the cycle of respective areas of competence;
  • Address work-life balance policies, taking onboard lessons learned during the COVID-19 pandemic;
  • Implement the recommendations made by the European Court of Auditors to incorporate gender mainstreaming into the EU budget—and evaluate and monitor the progress. Externally, the EU can address shortfalls in its gender equality strategy by acting to:
  • Improve the EEAS’ poor record on gender recruitment by altering job descriptions and promoting gender equality in institutions that serve as pool for candidates, e.g., border police, law enforcement, and ministries of justice, defense, and interior;
  • Increase retention by establishing gender-responsive recruitment procedures, making family policies gender sensitive, altering promotion procedures, eliminating the pay gap, and improving work-life balance;
  • Reinforce leadership’s commitment to gender equality by eliminating toxic masculine environments;
  • Mandate gender equality training for all middle and senior EEAS management, head of mission and commanders of CSDP missions and operations, and including female trainers in mixed training teams, as well as role modeling in training;
  • Collect comprehensive gender-aggregated data on CSDP missions to enable evidence-based assessments of the impact of gender inclusion for mission success;
  • Ensure all military CSDP missions include a gender advisor, as already occurs in civilian missions.

Effective implementation of these recommendations requires the EU to “lead by example.” Strong leadership, in turn, depends on finding the political will to transform the EU’s culture and institutional structures that impede gender mainstreaming. One of the many challenges EU President von der Leyen faces is obtaining broader support among EU member states to prioritize policies that encourage gender mainstreaming in EU institutions and policies. This is a difficult task, especially in the security and defense arena, and while the current COVID-19 crisis and economic recession have put considerable pressure on EU resources. But these constraints do not justify rejecting these recommendations for gender equality, most of which can be enacted without significant expenditure. Indeed, times of crisis are the best time to lead by example.


References

  1. See Articles 8 and 19 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2016, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/ legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF n/?uri=CELEX:12012E/TXT&from=EN; Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty on the European Union (1992) (principle of equality between men and women), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource. html?uri=cellar:2bf140bf-a3f8-4ab2-b506-fd71826e6da6.0023.02/ DOC_1&format=PDF; and Article 23 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000) (wages and work), https://www. europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/text_en.pdf
  2. Article 119 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome—the foundational document of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union—established the principle of equal pay for equal work for the sexes. See “Promoting equality between men and women,” European Parliamentary Research Service, June 2019, p. 2, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ BRIE/2018/628272/EPRS_BRI(2018)628272_EN.pdf
  3. Maria Villellas, Pamela Urrutia, Ana Villellas, and Vincenc Fisas, Gender in EU Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Policy and Practice

(WOSCAP, 2016), p. 5, https://www.gppac.net/files/2018-11/Scoping%20 Study%20-%20Gender.pdf

Data/etudes/BRIE/2021/689345/EPRS_BRI(2021)689345_EN.pdf

  1. “Fostering gender equality in the EU’s foreign and security policy,” European Parliament press release, October 23 2020, https://www. europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20201016IPR89563/fostering-gender-equality-in-the-eu-s-foreign-and-security-policy. Individual country data for 40 countries in the Women in Diplomacy Index 2021 show wide variations, but Sweden tops the list with 48.1% women ambassadors. The Nordic countries as a group also lead in the sample, with 40.6%. For the EU, however, the number of women ambassadors is only 23.4%, while the number for Europe as a whole is 27.2%. See Women in Diplomacy Index 2021 (Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy, March 2021), pp. 1, 3, https://www.agda.ac.ae/docs/default-source/Publications/agda-women-in-diplomacy-mar-2021.pdf?sfvrsn=4
  2. “Margrethe Vestager gets second term in EU competition job,” The Guardian, September 10, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2019/sep/10/margrethe-vestager-gets-second-term-in-eu-competition-job
  3. “Women in politics in the EU,” p. 2.
  4. “Women are doing better in European politics, but still not well enough,” Euractiv, December 2, 2019, https://www.euractiv.com/section/ middle-ground-politics/news/women-are-doing-better-in-europeanpolitics-but-still-not-well-enough/; see also “Women in parliaments” at a glance infographic, European Parliament, February 2020, https:// www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2020/646189/EPRS_ ATA(2020)646189_EN.pdf
  5. Hans von der Burchard, “EU’s foreign policy gender plan faces resistance from Poland and Hungary,” Politico, November 25, 2020, https:// www.politico.eu/article/eus-gender-equality-push-for-external-relations-faces-trouble-from-the-inside/
  6. Gabriela Baczynska, “Poland, Hungary push against ‘gender equality’ at EU social summit,” Reuters, May 7, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/ world/europe/poland-hungary-push-against-gender-equality-eu-social-summit-2021-05-07/
  7. “EU sues Hungary and Poland over LGBTQ discrimination,” Deutsche Welle, July 15, 2021, https://www.dw.com/en/eu-sues-hungary-and-poland-over-lgbtq-discrimination/a-58272160
  8. “Women in politics in the EU,” p. 3; “Women are doing better;” and “Promoting Equality in Decision-Making,” 2019 Report on equality between women and men in the EU (European Commission, 2019), pp. 27-43. For further discussion see “Which European country has the most female politicians?” The Economist, May 3, 2019, https://www.economist.com/ graphic-detail/2019/05/03/which-european-country-has-the-most-female-politicians; “These countries have the most women in parliament,” World Economic Forum, February 12, 2019, https://www.weforum.org/ agenda/2019/02/chart-of-the-day-these-countries-have-the-most-women-in-parliament/
  9. For example, the Gender Equality Strategy 2020 introduces a new initiative to address pay transparency but elsewhere addresses older, outstanding issues, such as ensuring 40% female representation on corporate boards (a pledge made in 2012) and pressuring the six member states that have refused to ratify the 2017 Istanbul Convention to prevent and combat violence against women. See “EU sets out plans for gender equality, Politico, March 5, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/verajourova-eu-sets-out-plans-for-gender-equality-pay-gap/; “Promoting equality among men and women;” and Gender Equality in Europe: what progress in 2019? (Fondation Robert Schuman, Policy Paper No. 505, March 2019). For an assessment of the lack of gender equality initiatives in the EU budget, see “Gender mainstreaming in the EU budget: time to turn words into action,” European Court of Auditors, May 2021, https:// www.eca.europa.eu/Lists/ECADocuments/SR21_10/SR_Gender_mainstreaming_EN.pdf
  10. Ekaterina R. Rashkova, “Talking the talk, but not walking the walk: gender equality in Eastern Europe,” East European Politics, 33:2 (2017), pp. 309-315.
  11. “Gender mainstreaming in the EU budget,” p. 5; “An EU budget that works for women’s rights and equality between women and men,” European Women’s Lobby, 2019, p. 1, https://www.womenlobby.org/IMG/pdf/ ewl_an_eu_budget_that_works_for_women_s_rights_and_equality_between_women_and_men_-_november_2019.pdf
  12. Heidi Riley, “Towards inclusivity in the EU’s approach to women, peace, and security,” GLOBUS, May 11, 2020, https://www.globus.uio.no/ news/2020/eu-women-peace-security-riley.html; Jutta Joachim, Andrea Schneiker, Anne Jenichen, “External Networks and institutional idiosyncrasies: the Common Security and Defence Policy and UNSCR 1325 on women, peace and security,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 30:1 (2017), p. 111.
  13. Hannah Neumann, “More Women, More Peace: Opportunities at the EU level,” Peacelab.blog, April 22, 2020, https://peacelab.blog/2020/04/ more-women-more-peace-opportunities-at-the-eu-level
  14. “Council Conclusions on CSDP,” European Council, 2015, https:// www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/05/18/council-conclusions-csdp/#; Annual report on the implementation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (European Parliament, January 20,

2021), paragraph 60, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/

TA-9-2021-0012_EN.pdf; EU Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) 2019-2024 (Council of the European Union, July 5, 2019), https:// data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11031-2019-INIT/en/pdf

December                   2017),       https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ STUD/2017/603855/EXPO_STU(2017)603855_EN.pdf

2018), https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Brief%20 9__Civilian%20CSDP.pdf

  • Smit and Tidblad-Lundholm, Trends in Women’s Participation, p. 3.
  • Corinna Hörst, “A credible and accountable EU foreign service? Not yet,” EU Observer, March 11, 2020, https://euobserver.com/opinion/147671; Laura Chappell and Roberta Guerrina, “Understanding the gender regime in the European External Action Service,” Cooperation and Conflict, 55:2 (2020), pp.261-280.
  • Chappell and Guerrina, “Understanding the gender regime,” p. 268.
  • “Women in CSDP Missions,” Directorate-General for External Policies, European Parliament, December 2017, p. 22, https://www. europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/603855/EXPO_ STU(2017)603855_EN.pdf
  • Irina Bratosin D’Almeida, Rebekka Haffner, Corinna Hörst, “Women in the CSDP: strengthening the EU’s effectiveness as an international player,” European View, 16 (2017), pp. 313-324.
  • For a study of the EEAS’ problems with institutionalized power structures and resistance to gender mainstreaming, see Chappell and Guerrina, “Understanding the gender regime.”
  • Report on Gender Equality in EU’s foreign and security policy (European Parliament, Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, August 3, 2020), p. 22, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/A-9-2020-0145_EN.html. The report provides a comprehensive assessment and recommendations for the EU. For a criticism of the EEAS under Josep Borrell, see Hannah Neumann, “Borrell’s boys’ club dominates EU foreign policy,” Politico Europe, March 8, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/ article/europe-diplomacy-gender-equality/

By Daniela Philipson García and Ana Velasco Ugalde

On January 11, 2021, the Mexican government presented its first National Action Plan (NAP) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS).1 The NAP is part of Mexico’s feminist foreign policy, launched

in January 2020, and it is a joint effort of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, the Secretariat of Defense (which encompasses the Army and the Air Force), the Secretariat of the Navy, the Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection and the National Institute for Women (INMUJERES). An interagency group is responsible for coordination, monitoring and evaluation of the NAP, which is subject to an overall review in 2024.

In this policy brief, we analyze Mexico’s NAP and make three arguments. First, NAPs are not only relevant for a country’s foreign policy and international engagements but are also significant for a country’s domestic security. Unfortunately, Mexico’s NAP is almost exclusively outward focused and does little to address Mexico’s own security challenges and their impact on women, LGBTQ and nonbinary persons. Second, we argue that the NAP’s outward-facing objectives are limited to a Western format that overlooks local contexts. Third, the most effective NAPs are those that have active civil society engagement. We therefore advocate for a formal, institutionalized and expanded role for Mexican civil society organizations. We conclude with recommendations for the Mexican government and civil society organizations and sketch what a more innovative and inclusive NAP could look like.

The NAP’s first three sections introduce the WPS agenda and Mexico’s interests within it. A fourth is devoted to the four pillars of prevention, participation, protection and relief and recovery. The NAP concludes with a section on coordination and monitoring and one on financing. A detailed implementation plan in an annex describes 10 strategic objectives, 16 lines of action and 23 indicators.2 

The NAP links to the broader national and international public policy frameworks “aimed at guaranteeing gender equality and accelerating women’s empowerment in all areas.” For example, at the national level it mentions the country’s

Spotlight Initiative for the Elimination of Violence against

Women and the National Program for Equality between Women and Men (2018–2024). At the international level, it mentions the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform of Action and the recommendations from the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, in particular the one referring to women’s participation in security tasks. 3

“[F]or Mexico, gender equality and the human rights of women and girls are essential conditions,” the NAP states, “not only for the achievement of international peace and security, but also for sustainable development and peace.”  It also says UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, which launched the WPS agenda, is not restricted to conflict or postconflict situations but is also relevant in times of peace.4

At first glance, Mexico’s NAP seems to take an expansive view of the WPS agenda, covering domestic and international issues. However, when it comes to the operational part of the NAP, the main focus is on Mexico’s international efforts— particularly its participation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKO). For Mexico, the expansion of the presence of women in peace operations is one of the main objectives of the WPS agenda.

We believe the NAP missed a great opportunity to address the security challenges facing Mexico.5 Its high rate of homicide affects women, men, LGBTQ and nonbinary people differently and undermines gender equity and equal access to justice.6 As a public policy tool to address gender inequalities and security, the NAP ought to leverage both domestic and foreign policies to address the root causes of violence and its intersections with gender. Given the context of citizen insecurity in Latin America in general, these root causes are particularly relevant.7 Moreover, the NAP seems to contradict itself, suggesting that Mexico is “at peace” while emphasizing its support for Mexico’s “women peacebuilders” working within its borders.

Thematic Areas and Objectives

The core operational part of the NAP is composed of four pillars: prevention, participation, protection and relief and recovery. The bulk of the objectives and lines of action fall under the first two pillars.

Prevention

The NAP’s primary prevention objectives are to “promote gender mainstreaming among institutions responsible for peacekeeping and security” and “raise awareness among military and police personnel” about the role of women in conflict prevention and peace processes. The specific lines of action and indicators to achieve these objectives rely heavily on training and awareness campaigns.

Yet the effectiveness of these training efforts is uncertain. A 2020 report by civil society organizations in Mexico found that neither the Army, Navy nor the National Guard were able to evaluate the content or impact of their human rights training.8 The authors of the report called for reassessing training as the sole strategy to guarantee and protect human rights. They argued that training is not a substitute for establishing clear, written policies and limits on the use of force. Training on gender perspectives for all Federal Public Administration personnel has been part of the equality plans coordinated by INMUJERES for several years, but this training appears to have yielded little, as judged by the increasing gender-based violence and femicides.9

The proposal for creation of a specialized police body to prevent, investigate and prosecute gender-based violence within municipal police departments is in this regard more promising. For example, in Chihuahua, the capital city of a northern state of the same name, the police’s specialized gender unit has had some success when it comes to investigating and prosecuting specific crimes that target women and girls. The unit has also had some success dealing with the problems of impunity and corruption in local law enforcement agencies.10 The one obstacle to the creation of specialized bodies is that the federal government has limited power to impose such changes on local police forces. For this to become a reality, the federal government would need to launch a major political strategy of cooperation with each of the 32 states. No such strategy is mentioned in the NAP.

Participation

The NAP’s main goal is “to promote the substantive participation of women as real and effective actors to prevent conflict at all levels.” It goes on to say that it will deploy more female personnel to UN peacekeeping operations. 

Two things limit the proposed action. First, Mexico’s participation in peacekeeping is modest.11 Increasing the number of women without significantly augmenting the overall personnel contribution will have minimal impact. In addition, the action does not commit to increasing women’s participation in national security forces. The implementation plan includes only two indicators to measure the number of Mexican women involved in security operations: the number of Mexican women nominated and those deployed to UN peacekeeping operations missions. There is no mention of recruitment, hiring or promotion of women or LGBTQ people in the National Guard or the military.

Other participation indicators are vague and difficult to assess. For example, “number of networks of women peacebuilders formed,” “exchanges of experiences” and “number of uniformed women who participated in specialized language courses” can be quantitatively measured but are hard to assess in qualitative terms. Comprehensive indicators for the Mexican context could have included, for example, the extent to which violations of women’s and girls’ human rights are reported, referred and investigated by human rights bodies and the extent to which measures to protect women’s and girls’ human rights are included in national security policy frameworks. Making women’s and girl’s human rights violations visible is crucial to eradicating barriers to participation.

Civil society is mentioned only once. Under the participation pillar, the Mexican government commits itself to hold multilateral forums and meetings attended by women officials, experts or civil society representatives. However, there is no mechanism to ensure civil society’s consultation or substantive participation and monitoring.

In sum, the NAP focuses on enhancing women’s visibility in some spaces from which they have been traditionally excluded without altering the underlying power structures that sustain that discrimination. Women’s participation ought to be understood as a means for achieving gender equality and eliminating gender-based violence, not as an end in itself. It is not enough to “just add women and stir.”12 It is about transforming power structures to be more inclusive and attractive for women and LGBTQ people.13 That is, it requires organizational reforms that allow groups that have traditionally been discriminated against to hold positions of power and make policy decisions.

Protection

The protection objectives focus on protection of women and girls in peace operations and promotion of the UN’s zerotolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse by PKO staff. The indicators used to measure the implementation of these goals rely almost exclusively on training: “number of staff trained”; “academic programs of police institutions that incorporate issues related to the Women, Peace and Security Agenda”; “number of female instructors” and “number of trainings imparted.”

The objectives and actions stand out for their narrow focus and lack of ambition. This is disappointing for two reasons. First, many experts and stakeholders have developed the WPS agenda over more than 20 years. They have proposed many ways to protect women in conflict and post-conflict situations and guarantee and protect women’s economic, social and physical safety: for example, an inclusive design process and an established coordination system for implementation with civil society. None of these proposals are included in Mexico’s NAP. Without such inclusion, the NAP becomes an intragovernmental process that promises little meaningful change outside bureaucracy.14

Second, Mexico’s feminist foreign policy promises to advance the human rights of women and girls across several issues, and the government placed particular emphasis on these commitments during the Generation Equality Forum in March 2021.15 Thus, limiting government efforts to implementing training (whose impact is difficult to evaluate) and promoting a zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse (without monitoring mechanisms) come across as the bare minimum.

Authorities cannot protect potential victims of genderbased violence if they are not able to accurately and timely diagnose and measure the drivers of this violence. At a minimum, Mexico should prioritize enhancing and improving data-gathering mechanisms concerning genderbased violence and homicides. For example, to identify one of the characteristics of a femicide in mortality data, records in Mexico specifically seek information about the nature of the relationship between the victim and perpetrator of a homicide. However, the information is left blank 95 and 97.5 percent of the time for women and men, respectively.16

Mexico also should have committed to complying with the Bogota Protocol on gathering quality data on homicides in

Latin America and the Caribbean.17

Relief and Recovery

The relief and recovery objective is “to support gender mainstreaming in aid and humanitarian assistance efforts, as well as in post-conflict peacebuilding.” Implementation of this goal is to be measured by the number of initiatives promoted by Mexico at the United Nations and other multilateral forums. The types of initiatives are unspecified. More appropriate indicators would assess the financial, legal and psychological services provided to survivors of genderbased violence and the families of victims of femicide.

Monitoring, Evaluation and Financing

Effective implementation of NAPs rests on robust monitoring and evaluation and sufficient financing. In terms of monitoring and evaluation, Mexico’s NAP creates an interagency group comprising the Foreign Affairs Ministry, the Navy, the Army, the Citizen Security and Protection Ministry and the Ministry for Women’s Affairs. Although international civil society organizations championed UNSCR 1325 and were part of the Working Group on WPS, Mexico’s interministry group excludes them. Civil society’s involvement is necessary for accountability and supervision of the government’s performance, so this is a serious cause for concern. In El Salvador, the Executive Council within the UNSCR 1325 Implementation Committee includes nongovernmental organizations and academic institutions.18 This policy is considered a best practice in the region, and Mexico should replicate it.

For the financing portion of the NAP, Mexican authorities did not commit to any concrete figures for its implementation. Instead, the document suggests that each coordinating institution carry out the tasks described using their own human capital and budgets.  Given the severe federal budget cuts to policies related to gender issues during the current administration, this is also cause for concern.19 In this instance, the Mexican government should look to Canada’s budgeting commitments, which include specific budgeting targets over a five-year period.20

Opportunities for Progress

The NAP’s external focus means there are many missed opportunities for enhancing gender equality in security at home. Many observers have criticized Western NAPs for an overwhelmingly outward focus that insists on “rescuing” women in the Global South while ignoring major issues in their own countries.21 Mexico’s NAP seems to replicate these NAPs.

Many NAPs in Latin America copy and paste the Western format and thus miss an opportunity to use the NAP within their local contexts.22 The substantive focus of the WPS agenda has shifted over the years from traditional approaches to conflict to other challenges, such as climate change, migration and violent extremism. The Mexican NAP explicitly recognizes that the agenda is not restricted to conflict or post-conflict situations, yet the proposed actions focus solely on conflict and post-conflict situations. They do not address transnational security challenges such as immigration, violent extremism and ethnic minorities rights.

Immigration

Mexico has been dealing with a transnational immigration crisis for many years. Migrants, half of whom are women,23 are increasingly traveling to the United States, through Mexico, to seek refuge from harrowing gender-based violence.24 The perilous journey is particularly dangerous for women, who are most likely to fall prey to sexual violence and human trafficking.25 Migrant women in Mexico frequently see their wages and travel documentation retained by security authorities such as the National Guard, which adds to their precarious situation.26 The recent murder of Victoria Salazar at the hands of the Tulum police is just one example of the disproportionate state and police violence inflicted on immigrant women.27 In terms of public health, UN Women statistics also show that 60 percent of preventable pregnancy-related deaths occur in humanitarian settings and are caused by internal displacement and migration.28

Mexico’s NAP could have sought to increase relief measures for migrant women and establish cooperation mechanisms for the investigation and international prosecution of human trafficking and sexual exploitation, as well as strengthen existing mechanisms. One example of such mechanisms is the memorandum between the Mexican and Guatemalan authorities pertaining to the protection of women and children victims of human trafficking via the Mexico-

Guatemala border, signed in 2004.29

On a similar note, the WPS agenda in Mexico could have promoted further cooperation with Central American countries to address the underlying causes of forced displacement in the region—gang violence and gender-based violence.30 This would be particularly appropriate given that Guatemala and El Salvador have themselves adopted NAPs. Regional cooperation in this realm could incentivize other countries to get on board with the WPS agenda.31

Far-Right Extremism and Disinformation

Far-right extremism is closely linked to sexist, homophobic, white supremacist and militaristic notions that undermine democratic values, human rights and gender equality and hinder peacebuilding.32 For example, in Colombia, the 2016 Peace Accords faced a substantial setback when Colombia rejected the deal in a national plebiscite after a conservative campaign against “gender ideology”—a term conservatives used to undermine LGBTQ and women’s rights.33 These campaigns and narratives have become particularly salient in Latin America, and Mexico is no exception. At the start of the pandemic, some religious groups blamed the surge of COVID-19 on feminism and queer people, and they have also actively halted the efforts of the reproductive rights movement in local legislation.34

Disinformation is also closely linked to far-right groups and conspiracy theories that are hostile toward women, particularly women in leadership positions and women of color.35 While Mexico’s diplomatic efforts (i.e., co-hosting the Generation Equality Forum) are certainly relevant to counteracting far-right agendas internationally, the threat is also brewing domestically. Mexico’s NAP could have addressed far-right extremism and disinformation head on by promoting and protecting local journalists covering WPSrelated issues.

Indigenous and Afro-Mexican Rights

The Foreign Affairs Ministry has repeatedly stated its intention of leading a feminist foreign policy anchored in an intersectional lens.36 According to Kimberle Crenshaw, who first coined the term, intersectionality denotes the combination of multiple forms of discrimination, such as racism, homophobia, ableism and sexism to analyze and understand the specific experiences of black, transgender or Indigenous women, for example.37 However, Mexico’s NAP makes no reference whatsoever to intersectionality. The document also lacks public policy proposals that recognize and address the overlap of forms of discrimination and state violence against Indigenous and Afro-Mexican women. Neither does it acknowledge the legacy of Afro-Mexican and Indigenous women as peacebuilders in Mexico. The NAP could have seized the opportunity to condemn and urge the cessation of low-intensity warfare against the Zapatistas while referencing and remembering the Acteal massacre of 1997, where the principal victims were women and children.38

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Recommendations

Our analysis of Mexico’s NAP leads us to make the following recommendations:

  1. Include the active participation of civil society organizations. The coordination, implementation and evaluation mechanisms of the NAP should include civil society organizations as observers and agents responsible for demanding accountability and measuring and monitoring the NAP’s impact. Three feminist civil society organizations with in-depth knowledge of the impacts of militarism, international relations and gender-based violence in Mexico are Data Civica, Intersecta and Justicia Transicional MX; they should be invited to join coordination, implementation and evaluation bodies.39
  2. Move beyond training. To implement the WPS agenda, the Mexican government ought to go beyond simply training. Clear, well-defined rules, limits and sanctions must be established to govern the use of force by security forces. Moreover, the substantive participation of women should involve reforms to make national defense and security bodies more inclusive and attractive for women and LGBTQ people.

  3. Budget realistic, sufficient expenditures for implementation. For the WPS agenda’s goals to become a reality in Mexico, financial planning and budgeting are a prerequisite. As with any public policy agenda, resources are required to carry out actionable items, measure their impact and, if successful, expand them.

References

  1. The NAP is available in Spanish and English. Secretariat of Security and Citizen Protection, Plan Nacional de Acción para el Seguimiento de la Resolución 1325 2000 del Consejo de Seguridad de la ONU sobre Mujeres, Paz y Seguridad, (Mexico City, January 11, 2021), https://www. gob.mx/sspc/documentos/plan-nacional-de-accion-para-el-seguimiento-de-la-resolucion-1325-2000-del-consejo-de-seguridad-sobre-mujeres-paz-y-seguridad.
  2. Ibid. Two annexes also list the national and international regulatory frameworks by which Mexico is bound.
  3. Ibid. See also UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, “Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,” web page, https://www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/cedaw/pages/cedawindex.aspx
  4. Ibid. p. 3 and p. 4.
  5. See also the letter to the international feminist NGO community regarding Mexico’s incoherent feminist foreign policy (New York: March 18, 2021), https://docs.google.com/document/d/1rqmASf6SHNBCsu-PPZodTp41PZbpYXEoK8aapuuZGMQ/edit?usp=sharing
  6. Data Civica, Claves para Entender y Prevenir los Asesinatos de Mujeres en México (Mexico City: May 2019) https://datacivica.org/assets/pdf/ claves-para-entender-y-prevenir-los-asesinatos-de-mujeres-en-mexico. pdf.

4.  Adopt policies that address WPS-related issues in the domestic and regional spheres. Mexico should seize the opportunity to propose new, innovative WPS-related policies that address the violence spreading within its borders and in the region. We have suggested addressing the immigration crisis, the spread of disinformation and threats on journalism and incorporating an intersectional perspective that aligns with its stated feminist foreign policy. Other issues may include LGBTQ rights, disarmament and illicit arms flows across the US-Mexico border.

Overall, Mexico’s first NAP is a positive step and answers the call by Mexican civil society to work on issues related to the women, peace and security agenda. The NAP provides a formal framework to hold the government accountable. And yet, we underscore the inconsistencies between the government’s positions in the international arena and the ones it presents to its citizens.40 We hope that the publication of Mexico’s NAP will start a conversation not only with the government but also with practitioners and researchers around the world. To advance the WPS agenda, it is critically important to share experiences and best practices, particularly among Mexico’s neighbors, the United States included.

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  1. Karolin Tuncel, “20 Years of Women, Peace and Security: How We

Argue for Participation Matters,” LSE Women, Peace and Security blog

(London: London School of Economics Centre for Women, Peace and Security, January 21, 2021), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2021/01/21/20years-of-women-peace-and-security-how-we-argue-for-participationmatters/.

  1. Miki Jacevic, “What Makes for an Effective WPS National Action Plan?” The Strategist blog (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute, March 25, 2019),  https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/what-makesfor-an-effective-wps-national-action-plan/.
  2. Ann Deslandes, “Checking In on Mexico’s Feminist Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy (December 30, 2020), https://foreignpolicy. com/2020/12/30/mexico-feminist-foreign-policy-one-year-in/
  3. Data Cívica, Los Asesinatos de Mujeres.
  4. Bogotá Chamber of Commerce, “Protocolo de Bogotá sobre Calidad de los Datos de Homicidios en América Latina y el Caribe,” web page (Bogotá: September 2015), https://www.ccb.org.co/Sala-de-prensa/ Noticias-CCB/2015/Noviembre-2015/Protocolo-de-Bogota-sobre-calidad-de-los-datos-de-homicidios-en-America-Latina-y-el-Caribe.
  5. Ministry of Foreign Relations El Salvador, Plan de Acción Nacional, “Mujeres, Paz y Seguridad” 2017–2022 (San Salvador: 2017), http://www. peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/PLAN-DE-ACCION-NACIONAL-2017-2-022.pdf.
  6. The armed forces, particularly the Secretariat of Defense, have been excluded from these austerity policies. Yet there are no public data on how any of this budget is being spent on achieving the NAP’s objectives. See Karla Sánchez, “No se Puede Proteger Más a las Mujeres con Menos Dinero,” Letras Libres (July 22, 2020), https://www.letraslibres.com/ mexico/politica/no-se-puede-proteger-mas-las-mujeres-menos-dinero; Georgina Zerega, “Las Cuentas Ocultas del Ejército: 25.000 Millones de Pesos Gastados en 2020 sin Dejar un Registro Público,” El País (February 24, 2021), https://elpais.com/mexico/2021-02-24/las-cuentasocultas-del-ejercito-25000-millones-de-pesos-gastados-en-2020-sin-dejar-un-registro-publico.html.
  7. Government of Canada, National Action Plan Canada, 2017 (Ottawa: Global Affairs Canada), http://1325naps.peacewomen.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Canadas-National-Action-Plan-2017-2022.pdf.
  8. Swati Parashar, “The WPS Agenda: A Postcolonial Critique,” in

Sarah E. Davies and Jaqui True, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Women, Peace and Security (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. 829–38.

Gender Affected Colombia’s Peace Process,” Monkey Cage blog, The Washington Post, October 9, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/ news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/09/heres-how-attention-to-gender-affected-colombias-peace-process/.