By Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Kayla McGill and Zi Xue

UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) called for greater participation of women in peace and security decision-making processes and underscored the importance of incorporating a gender perspective when addressing international peace and security challenges. In November 2017, the US Congress adopted the Women, Peace and Security Act, which posited that “the United States should be a global leader in promoting the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention, management and resolution, and post-conflict relief and recovery efforts.”¹ While much progress has been made since 2000, the roles and numbers of women in foreign policy and security establishments remain underdeveloped, including in the United States.

In 2018, Women In International Security (WIIS)—as part of an effort to measure the gender disparities in the US foreign policy and security communities—surveyed 22 US foreign policy and international security think tanks.² This scorecard provides an update to that survey. This scorecard also spotlights the nuclear security community—both as a subset of the foreign policy and security community and as its own community.³

Foreign policy and international security experts in the United States have taken renewed interest in issues related to greatpower competition, including nuclear security, arms control and disarmament issues. In addition, at both international and national levels, policymakers and non-governmental actors have recognized the lack of women in nuclear security, arms control and disarmament issues. For example, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution in 2010 that urged UN member states to promote the equitable representation of women in the field of disarmament and to strengthen women’s effective participation.⁴ In 2018, the UN Secretary-General’s agenda for disarmament called for the full and equal participation of women in all decision-making processes related to disarmament and international security. The UN Secretary General also committed to gender parity on all panels, boards, expert groups and other bodies established under his auspices in the field of disarmament.⁵ These efforts are all part of the national and international commitments made under the WPS agenda.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have also undertaken a range of initiatives to raise awareness about the lack of women in the nuclear security, arms control and disarmament communities. For example, Article 36 (a UKbased NGO created in 2011) and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) have tracked women’s scant representation in multilateral disarmament fora.⁶ In November 2018, Laura Holgate, the former US ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), launched the Gender Champions in Nuclear Policy (GCNP) initiative to address gender imbalances in the field.⁷ As of July 2020, heads of 58 US and non-US organizations had committed to “breaking down barriers and making gender equity a working reality in their spheres of influence.”⁸ The International Gender Champions Disarmament Impact Group published a Gender and Disarmament Resource Pack in 2018 outlining what a gender perspective in arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament might look like.⁹ In 2019, New America examined the role of women in nuclear policy, including

how women navigated the nuclear security field and how gender diversity (or rather the lack thereof) affected US policymaking.¹⁰ The Ploughshares Fund committed $1 million to a Women’s Initiative Campaign in April 2019 to create greater gender diversity within the nuclear establishment.¹¹

There is thus progress in the advancement of the role of women in nuclear security. That said, there is very little data with respect to the representation of women in the nuclear security arena.

This WIIS Gender Scorecard seeks to fill this void.

To assess how well women are integrated into this community, we examined the number of women experts working on nuclear security issues in US think tanks. We also examined the number of women writing on arms control and nuclear security issues and being published in academic and specialized journals. Think tanks and journals play an important role in shaping foreign and defense policies, including nuclear security policies. Indeed, in the United States members of think tanks frequently move in and out of many critical positions in government. Together with their colleagues in academia, they also participate in policy debates in the media and in writing for specialized academic journals.

In sum, this scorecard does three main things:

Scoring the Tanks. We assess the gender distribution in 32 think tanks in the United States—22 foreign policy and international security think tanks and 10 think tanks and programs that are more specifically focused on arms control and nuclear security policy. We also examine the extent to which gender has been integrated into programming.¹²

*Table 1:* Washington, DC Think Tanks with Women at the Helm
Center for American Progress (CAP)	Ms. Neera Tanden, President and CEO	2011
German Marshall Fund (GMF)	Dr. Karen Donfried, President	2014
Heritage Foundation	Ms. Kay Coles James, President	2017
New America	Dr. Anne-Marie Slaugther, CEO	2013
Wilson Center for International Scholars	Ms. Jane Harman, President and CEO	2011
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control	Ms. Valerie Lincy, Executive Director	2012

Scoring the Journals. We review the gender distribution in 11 major international security journals and five major arms control and nuclear security journals. In addition, we examine to what extent gender perspectives are represented in the journals.
Bringing into Focus the Nuclear Security Community. We examine the gender distribution of nuclear security experts in 32 think tanks. In addition, we consider the gender distribution of articles on arms control and nuclear security issues in 11 major international security journals and 5 major arms control and nuclear security journals. We also examine to what extent gender perspectives are represented in arms control and nuclear security articles.

The Headlines

Despite some progress, the national and international security field, including the nuclear security field, remains a maledominated field.

The percentage of women leading think tanks has declined, from 32 percent in 2018 to 19 percent in 2020.

(See Table 1)

The percentage of women on think tank governing boards has increased slightly, from 22 percent in 2018 to

25 percent in 2020. (See Figure 1)

The percentage of women experts working on foreign policy, national and international security issues has increased, from 27 percent in 2018 to 35 percent in 2020.¹³

(See Figure 2)

The nuclear security community is small. The majority of arms control and nuclear experts work in specialized think tanks and publish in specialized journals.

Of the foreign policy and international security think tanks surveyed, only 10 percent of experts (3 percent women and 7 percent men) focus entirely or in part on nuclear issues.¹⁴

(See Figure 3)

There are 162 nuclear experts working in the specialized arms control and nuclear security think tanks and programs—49 (30 percent) are women.¹⁵

Despite renewed interest in nuclear security issues, the percentage of articles devoted to these issues remains small, and few have women authors.

In the international security journals only 9 percent of articles published between 2015 and 2019 were devoted to nuclear security. Only 15 percent of those articles were written by women. (See Figure 6.)
In the arms control and nuclear security journals, women wrote 17 percent of the articles on nuclear security issues.

Gender perspectives remain largely ignored in the national and international security, including the nuclear security, community.

Only one out of 32 think tanks has integrated gender into its programming.
In the academic and specialized literature, most articles with a “gender” perspective focused on women in the field—very few articles examined how gender (and notions of masculinity and femininity) shapes thinking about national and international security, including about nuclear security.¹⁶

This scorecard shows that women in the international security field, including in the nuclear security field, remain severely underrepresented. The percentage of women experts and women authors remain well below the 60 percent of women enrolled for over a decade in graduate programs (master’s and doctoral programs) in the social and behavioral science (including political science and international relations); the over 55 percent of women students in the professional schools of international affairs; the 43 percent of women members of the International Studies Association (ISA); and the 38 percent of women members of the ISA’s International Security Studies Section (ISSS).¹⁷

While this scorecard does not incorporate any qualitative interviews in the community, there have been a number of studies that examine how women experience the international security and nuclear security field. A 2019 survey of the members of the International Security Studies Section (ISSS) of the International Studies Association (ISA) showed considerable problems within the international security community, of which the nuclear security community is a subset. The survey showed that women were more likely to report hostility and exclusion and to describe the section as “insular,” “clubby” and an “old boys’ network.”¹⁸ In her 2019 study of women in the nuclear arms control and nonproliferation field, Heather Hurlburt talked about the “gender tax” that women in nuclear policy face. She shows “how experiences of sexism, harassment, and gendered expectations translate into constant mental and emotional weight.”¹⁹ A 2019 report about the nuclear security field, even though not focused on gender, showed that early and midcareer women professionals found the field rife with

The lack of gender diversity (including ethnic and racial diversity) and the small number of women experts have serious implications not only for the field itself, but also for policy.²¹

One such implication is that a small group of mostly likeminded people monopolizes influence and shapes policies. The fact that the nuclear security field seems to live very much in its own bubble or ecosystem of think tanks and journals reinforces its insular nature. Only 10 percent of experts (7 percent men and 3 percent women) in the think tanks focus on nuclear security issues. Most of the knowledge production and action on nuclear security happens in the specialized institutes and journals. Carol Cohn has written about how language, particularly in the nuclear sphere, kept women and different perspectives out.²² Michèle Flournoy has talked about how women had to fit into a “consensual straitjacket” in the nuclear policy sphere.²³ Many early and midcareer professionals in this community defined the field as “old (in terms of both age and ideas) and static.”²⁴ “Most of the people who work in this field have been doing the same thing for 30 years, and their thinking has not evolved at all, especially in arms control. It’s the dogma. This community … hasn’t evolved with changes in the security environment.”²⁵

Scoring the Tanks

The scorecard reviews think tanks along five main axes:

Gender distribution of those who lead think tanks;
Gender distribution of governing boards of the think tanks;
Gender distribution of experts in the tanks’ foreign policy and international security programs;
Gender distribution of experts focusing on nuclear security issues;
Level of commitment to gender and/or women’s programming.

Heads of Think Tanks

Of the 32 think tanks surveyed, women lead only six (19 percent). (See Table 1)

Of the 22 foreign policy and international security think tanks, women lead only five (23 percent): The Center for American Progress (CAP), the German Marshall Fund (GMF), the

Heritage Foundation, New America, and the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. Compared with 2018, this is a decrease.²⁶

Of the 10 arms control and nuclear security think tanks and programs, a woman heads one: the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control.

sexism and gender discrimination.²⁰

Figure 1: Gender Ratio – Think Tank Governing Boards Governing Boards

2018 and 2020

The gender gap remains stark at the level of the governing ²⁰¹⁸ boards. The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies

^•• MENWOMEN is the only institution that has achieved parity on its governing board. It is followed by the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS),

which has 44 percent women on its governing board.

On average, the percentage of women members of the board of directors or trustees is 25 percent, compared with 23 percent in 2018. (See Figure 1) The specialized arms control and

nuclear institutes do a little better, with 31 percent of women

2020 on their boards.

• MEN

• ^WOMENExperts

Compared with 2018, the overall gender balance in the think tanks has improved, from 27 percent of women experts in 2018 to 35 percent in 2020. (See Figure 2)²⁷ That said, very few think tanks have achieved parity. There is also great variation among the think tanks. (See Table 2 and Figure 4. See also the

Appendix)

Figure 2: Gender Ratio – Foreign Policy and National and International Security Experts in Think Tanks 2018 and 2020 Nuclear Experts

2018

•• MENWOMEN Of the 20 foreign policy and international security think tanks 28

surveyed, only 10 percent of experts (3 percent women and

7 percent men) focus entirely or in part on nuclear issues. (See Figure 3)

The gender distribution within this group of nuclear experts is slightly lower than the overall gender balance of these institutes. Of the 185 nuclear experts, 55 (30 percent) are

2020 women and 130 (70 percent) are men. (See Figure 5) ^•• ^MEN_WOMENThat said, many arms control and nuclear experts work in

specialized think tanks. We surveyed 10 major think tanks and programs that focus exclusively on arms control and nuclear security issues. Together they comprise 175 experts—162 of which focus on nuclear security issues as defined in this scorecard.²⁹ The percentage of women experts working on nuclear security issues in these 10 think tanks and programs is 30 percent.

Figure 3: Percentage and Gender Ratio of Nuclear Experts

_{in Think Tanks} There is, of course, great variation among the think tanks.

Out of the 10 think tanks, only one has achieved parity—the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). (See Table 3 and Figure 5.

Substantive Focus

We also examined the substantive focus of those working on nuclear security issues to explore whether gender has an impact on the types of issues people study.³⁰ Our survey found that the majority of nuclear experts focus on issues related to deterrence, followed by arms control. From their bios, we found no notable differences in terms of substantive focus between men and women.

Gender and Women’s Programming

Programming on gender within the institutes has seen little change since 2018.³¹ Most DC think tanks do not consider the role of gender in national and international security. For many in the traditional security think tank community— men and women—gender is often equated with women or a “woman’s point of view.” This lack of understanding of gender as a multilevel social construct that governs relations between men and women within societal structures and institutions is widespread within the DC foreign policy and security, including in the nuclear security, think tank community.

Figure 4: Gender Ratio – Foreign Policy and International Security Experts in all Think Tanks _{Measure Names}

Figure 5: Gender Ratio – Nuclear Security Experts in all Think Tanks

Measure Names

Of the think tanks surveyed only one—the US Institute of Peace (USIP)—has recognized gender as an important component of its programming. Since 2016, USIP has had a director for gender policy and strategy that oversees and advises all programs on gender. The director sits in the Policy, Learning and Strategy Center, which reports directly to USIP’s president. In addition, USIP functions as the Secretariat for the US Civil Society Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (WPS).³²

Other think tanks have notable gender or women programs:

The Center for New America Security (CNAS) has a Women in National Security program.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) has a Smart Women, Smart Power Program and a Women’s Global Leadership Program.

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) has a Women and Foreign Policy Program and a Women and Foreign Policy Program Advisory Council.

The German Marshall Fund (GMF) since 2017 has organized an annual Women of Color in Transatlantic Leadership Forum. In June 2020, it surveyed the gender balance of European thinks tanks.³³

New America has a Gender and Security program housed in its Political Reform Program.

The RAND Corporation has a web page called “RAND Women to Watch,” on which it addresses “Gender Equity in the Workplace” and “Gender Integration in the Military,” including issues related to women and transgender military personnel. In its work on female populations, RAND addresses issues faced by women and girls, including women refugees, migrants and gender-based and intimate partner violence.

In 2020, the Woodrow Wilson Center appointed a gender advisor. In addition, the center has a Middle East Women’s initiative, a Maternal Health Initiative and a Global Women’s Leadership initiative.

The other think tanks have occasional events and publications on gender and security and the WPS agenda. They may also have one or two individuals working on gender and security issues.³⁴

The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) houses the Gender Champions in Nuclear Policy initiative. All the heads of the 10 specialized arms control and nuclear security think tanks have signed on as Gender Champions. The heads of the Carnegie Endowment, Third Way and the Stimson

Center have also signed onto the Gender Champion in

Nuclear Policy Pledge.³⁵

Scoring the Journals

The influence of women in the national and international security field, including in the nuclear security field, can also be measured by how well they are represented in academic and professional journals.³⁶

We examined articles in 11 major peer reviewed international security journals, as well as articles in 5 major journals exclusively focused on arms control and nuclear security issues.

Women wrote 23 percent of the articles in the international security journals versus 64 percent written by men and 13 percent written by mixed gender teams.

That said, there is great variation amongst the journals. Critical Studies on Security is close to parity, with 45 percent of articles written by women versus 48 percent of articles written by men and 8 percent of articles written by mixed gender teams. Security Dialogue has 42 percent of articles written by women versus 47 percent written by men and 11 percent written by mixed gender teams. The Journal of Conflict Resolution is an outlier in the sense that it has the highest percentage of articles written by mixed gender teams—namely, 30 percent versus a 13 percent average. The Journal of Strategic Studies and Survival have the least amount of articles written by women. (See Table 4 and the Appendix.)

Articles on Arms Control and

Nuclear Security Issues

Our survey found that the majority of articles on nuclear security are published in specialized journals.³⁷ In the 11 international security studies journals surveyed, the percentage of articles that focused on nuclear security issues was only 9 percent. (See Figure 6 and Table 4. See also the Appendix) Of those articles, 15 percent were written by women.³⁸When we broaden our category and include other weapon and arms control issues, the percentage of articles rises to 16 percent, of which women wrote less than a quarter (21 percent).³⁹

In the arms control–specific journals, the percentage of articles on nuclear security issues written by women was even lower—17 percent.⁴⁰ If we broaden our category and include other weapon and arms control issues, the percentage

increased slightly, to 19 percent.⁴¹ (See Table 5 and the

Appendix)

That said, there is quite a bit of variation amongst the arms control journals. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists scores above the average, with 22 percent of articles written by women. At the other end, the Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament had only 11 percent of articles written by women.

Our analysis also confirms earlier studies that found that women coauthor less than men, and when they do coauthor, they are more likely to coauthor with men than with other women.⁴²

Figure 6: Percentage of Nuclear Security Articles in International

Security Journals – 2015-2019

Gender Perspectives

Of the 3,068 articles surveyed in the 16 journals, we found a mere 91 articles (3 percent) with a gender perspective. This number dropped to 2 percent when we considered only articles that focus on arms control and nuclear issues.

*Table 4:* Percentage of Articles written by Women in International Security Journals – January 2014-December 2019
Rank	Journal	% of Articles by Women
1	Critical Studies on Security	45%
2	Security Dialogue	42%
3	Cooperation and Conflict	30%
4	European Journal of International Security	27%
5	Journal of Global Security Studies	26%
6	International Security	23%
7	Security Studies	22%
8	Contemporary Security Policy	16%
9	Journal of Conflict Resolution	15%
10	Survival	14%
11	Journal of Strategic Studies	11%

The majority (71 percent) of the gender articles were penned by women. In the general security studies journals, women wrote 73 percent of those articles. In the arms control and nuclear security journals, they wrote 65 percent of genderfocused articles.

However, most of the articles with a gender perspective focused on the gender balance within the international security and arms control community and how to increase the number of women in the field. Very few examined how gender (and notions of masculinity and femininity) affects thinking about international security, including nuclear security issues.

Lastly, we examined whether men and women wrote about the same topics in the nuclear and arms control field. While we did not see a marked difference in our think tank analysis between the topics men and women studied, in the journals we did see some differences. Women were more likely to write about drones and unmanned aerial vehicles, chemical and biological weapons and nuclear energy and climate. Men were more likely to write about outer space, proliferation (including nonproliferation) and nuclear deterrence issues.

Concluding Thoughts

The nuclear security community is a subset of the national and international security community. Both communities are deeply entrenched male-dominated communities, in which “old-boy networks” continue to thrive. While we have seen the number of women experts in the think tanks increase from 27 percent to 35 percent, no progress was made in terms of governing boards, and the number of women heading think tanks has regressed. Both communities continue to struggle with the integration of women. It is also striking that while it is recognized by many in the international security, including the nuclear security, community that new approaches and new thinking are necessary, gender as a lens through which to analyze international, including nuclear, security challenges is not on think tank agendas. Too little thought is given in either the think tanks or the journals to how gender and notions of masculinity and femininity influence understanding of international and national security challenges, including challenges related to nuclear security policies.

Table 5: Percentage of Articles written by Women in Arms Control Journals – January 2014-December 2019 Rank Journal % of Women 1 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 22% 2 International Journal of Nuclear Studies 20% 3 Arms Control Today 19% 4 Nonproliferation Review 17% 5 Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 11%

While patriarchal structures are difficult to take down, in recent years we have seen some progress in the amount of efforts to break down these structures.

First, the number of women interested in international security issues is increasing. Their enrollment in international affairs schools continues to surpass that of men. Second, a number of people and organizations, including funding organizations, have realized that the changed strategic landscape requires new approaches and new people. This need is apparent for the international security community and particularly for the small, somewhat atrophied nuclear security community. The Nsquare initiative, the Gender Champions in Nuclear Policy, and the Ploughshares Fund’s women initiative are explicitly geared toward creating a more diverse and open community. These efforts have also been supported by major funders of this community such as Carnegie Corporation New York and the MacArthur Foundation. Third, after the killing of George Floyd in the summer of 2020, organizations including foreign policy and international security think tanks expressed renewed commitment to building a more diverse workforce. Many think tanks in the international security and nuclear security have signed on to the Organizations in Solidarity initiative of WCAPS.⁴³

It is important to hold organizations accountable and to make sure that progress is measured not just in declaratory statements but also in actions. This scorecard provides numerical baselines.

Our analysis of the journals, even though it encompasses a broader group of experts, reinforces conclusions from the think tank analysis. Women authors remain grossly underrepresented. Journals, like think tanks, suffer from gender gaps.

Many of our 2018 recommendations still hold. Four stand out:

Thinks tanks should periodically carry out a gender analysis of their institutions. An inward gender analysis should be intersectional and must include collection and analysis of data related to gender, race, ethnic background, sexual orientation, age and disability. It must focus on knowledge production as well as recruitment, retention and promotion processes. It must also examine policies and practices related to issues such as remuneration, remote work, family leave and sexual harassment. Finally, the think tanks should make deliberate efforts to diversify their governing boards.
Think tanks should carry out an analysis of their partnerships and knowledge dissemination. Such an outward gender analysis should focus on whom they partner with and how content is disseminated. Among the questions one should ask: What type of publications are produced, what type of events are organized, who participates and attends these events, who is tapped for media appearances?
Think tanks should consider appointing a gender advisor and locate these advisors not in the human resource office but in the front offices with direct access to the leadership.
Journals continue to have gender gaps. One is expressed in terms of women authors published in the journals; the other is represented in the lack of gender perspectives. Editors and editorial boards should resort to periodic gender audits of their journals. Such audits would include issues related to the gender balances and substantive background of editorial staff, editorial boards and outside reviewers. It should also include an analysis of the readership—many of whom are also potential authors.

References

US Congress, Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017, Public Law No. 115-68 (10/06/2017). In accordance with the law, the White House published its WPS Strategy in June 2019. See White House, United States Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security (Washington, DC: White House, June 2019).
See Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Soraya Kamali-Nafar, The WIIS Gender Scorecard: Washington, DC Think Tanks – 2018, WIIS Policy Brief (Washington, DC: WIIS, September 2018-1).
This scorecard was supported by a grant from the Ploughshares Fund.
See UN General Assembly A/Res/65/69 (2010). See also UN General

Assembly resolutions A/Res/67/48 (2012); A/Res/68/33 (2013); A/ Res/69/61 (2014); and A/Res/71/56 (2016). In addition, the Genevabased Conference on Disarmament held its first informal meeting on gender and disarmament in August 2015. In May 2016, it held a second informal plenary on Women and Disarmament, in which delegations restated their support to increase the role of women in the disarmament field.

See UN Secretary-General, Securing Our Common Future: An Agenda for Disarmament (New York: United Nations, October 2018).
See Renata Hessmann Dalaqua, Kjolv Egeland and Torbjorn Graff Hugo, Still Behind the Curve: Gender Balance in Arms Control, NonProliferation and Disarmament Diplomacy (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2019).
See GCNP website at gcnuclearpolicy.org. See also Pamela Hamamoto and Laura Holgate, “Gender Champions,” in Tom Z. Collina and Cara Marie Wagner, eds., A New Vision: Gender, Justice, National Security (Washington, DC: Ploughshares Fund, April 2019), pp. 40-45.
See GCNP website and GCNP, Gender Champions in Nuclear Policy, Impact Report 2019 (Washington, DC: NTI, May 2020), p. 2.
International Gender Champions Disarmament, Gender and Disarmament Resource Pack (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2018 and updated in January 2020).
See Heather Hurlburt et al., The Consensual Straitjacket: Four Decades of Women in Nuclear Security (Washington, DC: New America, March 2019).
SeeTom Z. Colinna and Cara Marie Wagner, eds., A New Vision: Gender, Justice, National Security (Washington, DC: Ploughshares Fund, April 2019).
While gender is generally defined and discussed as meaning more than just whether one is a man or a woman, this scorecard takes the binary approach. We identified experts and authors as either women or men by examining their bios, photographs and use of pronouns.
This scorecard tallies national and international security experts, including foreign policy and international affairs experts. Definitions of national and international security differ from institution to institution, some use an expanded definition of security, including human security, others have a narrow definition of security. For more on who is included within each of the think tanks see the methodology section on p.15.
This corresponds to 185 experts (55 women and 130 men) out of a total of 1,931 experts.
These institutes employ a total of 175 experts, but only 162 (113 men and 49 women) work on nuclear security issues.
For more on gender and security, see Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Michael E. Brown, eds., The Gender and Security Agenda: Strategies for the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2020).
See Hironao Okahana and Enyu Zhou, Graduate Enrollment and Degrees: 2006-2016 (Washington, DC: Council of Graduate Schools,

2017); website of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA); and the website of the International Studies Association (ISA).

Maria Rost Rublee et al., “Do You Feel Welcome? Gendered Experiences in International Security Studies,” Journal of Global Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2020), pp. 216-226.
Hurlburt et al., Consensual Straitjacket, pp. 6 and 18-28.
See Nsquare, Greater Than: Nuclear Threat Professionals Reimagine Their Field (Washington, DC: NSquare, December 2019). See also Bonnie Jenkins, “Diversity Makes Better Policy,” in Tom Z. Collina and Cara Marie Wagner, eds., A New Vision: Gender, Justice, National Security (Washington, DC: Ploughshares Fund, April 2019), pp. 34-39.
This scorecard focuses on gender. That said, the lack of gender diversity often goes hand in hand with discrimination on other identity markers, such as race, ethnic background, sexual orientation and age. After the killing of George Floyd in summer 2020, Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation (WCAPS) launched the Organizations in Solidarity project to root out institutional racism. Many organizations and think tanks, including in the nuclear security arena, (and those surveyed in this scorecard) signed on to the project.
Carol Cohn, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense

Intellectuals,” Signs, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1987), pp. 687-718; Carol Cohn and

Sara Ruddick, “ A Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Steven Lee and Sohail Hashmi, eds., Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 405-435; Carol Cohn, “The Perils of Mixing Masculinity and Missiles,” The New York Times (January 5, 2018).

Cited in Hurlburt et al., Consensual Straitjacket.
See Nsquare, Greater Than, p. 14.
Ibid., p. 15. See also note 17.
In 2018, 32 percent of think tanks were headed by women. The reins of the Center for a New American Security passed from a woman to a man, and leadership position of the US Institute of Peace is vacant as of the summer of 2020 with the departure in August 2020 of Nancy Lindborg, who had been president and CEO since 2015.
This number also does not include information with regard to the German Marshall Fund (GMF). At the time of our survey no data was available on the website regarding experts at GMF. In addition, at the time of our survey the Bipartisan Policy Centre had no longer a foreign policy international security program.
Amongst the nuclear programs in the Foreign Policy and

International Security think tanks mention should be made of the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI), a program, housed at CSIS, that is geared towards the next generation of professionals in the nuclear security field. In addition, the Carnegie Endowment hosts every two years an international non-proliferation conference attracting hundreds of experts, officials and journalists from around the world.

Nuclear experts are defined as experts and analysts who study topics related to nuclear deterrence, weapons of mass destruction, nuclear policy, general nuclear issues, nuclear security (nuclear materials, fuel cycle, nuclear energy, radiological security), arms control and disarmament, nuclear technologies, defense strategy with a nuclear focus, regional studies with nuclear focus (North Korea, China, Iran, Asia-Pacific, Korea, Middle East). See also the methodology section in this scorecard.
Within our overall nuclear security category, we defined nine subtopics: nuclear deterrence, weapons of mass destruction, nuclear policy, nuclear security (nuclear materials, fuel cycle, nuclear energy, radiological security), arms control and disarmament, nuclear technologies, defense strategy with a nuclear focus, regional studies with nuclear focus (North Korea, China, Iran, Asia-Pacific, Korea, Middle East) and miscellaneous nuclear issues.
See de Jonge Oudraat and Kamali-Nafar, WIIS Gender Scorecard 2018.
TheU.S. Civil Society Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (U.S. CSWG)brings together over 40 organizations and civil society groups working on women’s issues, gender and the WPS agenda. While many of these groups are active in advocacy and operational work, many will also conduct research and produce policy papers. See https://www.usip.org/programs/advancing-women-peace-and-security.
See Rosa Balfour, Corinna Hörst, Pia Hüsch, Sofia Shevchuk and Eleonora del Vecchio, Absent Influencers? Women in European Think Tanks, Policy Paper No. 5 (Brussels, Paris, Washington, DC: GMF, June 2020).
For example, Lisa Aronsson at the Atlantic Council, Saskia Brechenmacher at the Carnegie Endowment or Mackenzie Eaglen at the American Enterprise Institute.
All gender champions adopt a panel parity pledge. See GCNP website.
For more on the representation of women in journals, see Nadia

Crevecoeur, Kayla McGill and Maya Whitney, The Gender Balance in 11 Security Journals, A review of the literature and PowerPoint analysis of women authors in security journals, draft manuscript (Washington, DC:

WIIS, 2020).

Nuclear security issues were determined by title keyword searches. The following keywords were used: weapons—nuclear, hypersonic, missiles (ICBMs, etc.), missile defense, nuclear technology in weapons, cleanup from nuclear accidents, nuclear energy, IAEA, nuclear terrorism, deterrence, nonproliferation. Treaties: disarmament and arms control, nuclear disarmament, NPT, CTBT, INF, nuclear export control, fissile materials negotiations. We also added a country level: USA, China, Russia, France, UK, NATO/Europe, Iran, India/Pakistan, Middle East, North Korea. Arms control issues were broadly defined and determined by the following title keyword searches: weapons—nuclear, hypersonic, missiles (ICBMs, etc.), drones, biological weapons, chemical weapons, missile defense, technology in weapons (very specific, not just technological advances in general but focused on weapons), cybersecurity/cyber war. General themes: geoengineering and climate change, medical/radio isotopes, cleanup from nuclear accidents, nuclear energy, IAEA, nuclear terrorism, space, materials. Treaties: disarmament and arms control, nuclear disarmament, NPT, CTBT, INF, export control, biological and chemical weapons control, fissile materials negotiations, arms trade, general. We also added a country level: USA, China, Russia, France, UK, NATO/Europe, Iran, India/Pakistan, Middle East, North Korea.
The overall number of articles in the 11 security journals was

2,147, of which 194 were devoted to nuclear security issues. There were 29 (15%) written by women, 149 (77%) by men, and 16 (8%) by mixed gender teams. When we expand our focus and include other weapons and arms control issues, the total number of articles was 338.

Of those 338 articles, 72 (21%) were written by women, 232 (69%) by men and 34 (10%) by mixed gender teams. The overall percentage of articles written by women is 23 percent.
Of the 921 articles, 683 focused on nuclear security issues. There were 115 (17%) written by women, 512 (75%) by men; and 56 (8%) by mixed gender teams.
Of the 921 articles in the five arms control and nuclear security journals, 178 (19%) were written by women, 661 (72%) by men, and 82 (9%) by mixed gender teams.
See Crevecoeur, McGill and Whitney, Gender Balance in 11 Security Journals.
See the WCAPS website.

*Appendix:* Think Tanks
Foreign Policy and International Security Think Tanks American Enterprise Institute (AEI) Head: Robert Doar (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 29 – 6 (F) + 23 (M) 21% female 2020 Total: 31 – 8 (F) + 23 (M) 26% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 2 – 0(F) + 2 (M) 0% female Governing Board: 2018 Total: 27 – 0 (F) + 27 (M) – 0% female 2020 Total: 27 – 1 (F) + 26 (M) – 4% female Atlantic Council Head: Frederick Kempe (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 227 – 66 (F) + 161 (M) – 29% female 2020 Total: 327 – 102(F) + 225 (M) – 31% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 12 – 1 (F) + 11 (M) – 8% female Governing Board: 2018 Total: 200 – 39 (F) + 161 (M) – 20% female 2020 Total: 199 – 41 (F) + 158 (M) – 21% female Aspen Institute Head: Dan Porterfield (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 10 – 2 (F) + 8 (M) – 20% female 2020 Total: 8 – 4 (F) + 4 (M) – 50% female Nuclear Experts: None Governing Board: 2018 Total: 77 – 26 (F) + 51 (M) – 34% female 2020 Total: 81 – 28 (F) + 53 (M) – 35% female Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) Head: Jason Grumet (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 17 – 4 (F) + 13 (M) – 24% female 2020 Not Available Governing Board: 2018 Total: 17 – 5 (F) + 12 (M) – 29% female 2020 Total: 14 – 5 (F) + 9 (M) – 36% female Brookings Institution Head: John R. Allen (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 109 – 28 (F) + 81 (M) – 26% female 2020 Total: 117 – 30 (F) + 87 (M) – 26% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 13 – 3 (F) + 10 (M) – 23% female Governing Board: 2018 Total: 89 – 19 (F) + 70 (M) – 21% female 2020 Total: 86 – 19 (F) + 67 (M) – 22% female Cato Institute Head: Peter N. Goettler (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 11 – 3 (F) + 8 (M) – 27% female 2020 Total: 9 – 1 (F) + 8 (M) – 11% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 1 – 0 (F) + 1(M) – 0% female Governing Board: 2018 Total: 19 – 2 (F) + 17 (M) – 11% female 2020 Total: 18 – 2 (F) + 16 (M) – 11% female	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) Head: William J. Burns (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 32 – 10 (F) + 22 (M) – 31% female 2020 Total: 27 – 7 (F) + 20 (M) – 26% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 5 – 1 (F) + 4 (M) – 20% female Governing Board: 2018 Total: 31 – 7 (F) + 24 (M) – 23% female 2020 Total: 31 – 8 (F) + 23 (M) – 26% female Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) Head: Thomas G. Mahnken (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 32 – 4 (F) + 28 (M) – 13% female 2020 Total: 30 – 3 (F) + 27 (M) – 10% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 15 – 6 (F) + 9 (M) – 40% female Governing Board: 2018 Total: 8 – 2 (F) + 6 (M) – 25% female 2020 Total: 9 – 3 (F) + 6 (M) – 33% female Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Head: John J. Hamre (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 108 – 32 (F) + 76 (M) – 30% female 2020 Total: 118 – 37 (F) + 81 (M) – 31% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 12 – 6 (F) + 6 (M) – 50% Governing Board: 2018 Total: 44 – 5 (F) + 39 (M) – 11% female 2020 Total: 44 – 5 (F) + 39 (M) – 11% female Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Head: Richard N. Haass (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 75 – 22 (F) + 53 (M) – 29% female 2020 Total: 85 – 23 (F) + 62 (M) – 27% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 7 – 3 (F) + 4 (M) – 43% female Governing Board: 2018 Total: 36 – 11 (F) + 25 (M) – 31% female 2020 Total: 36 – 11 (F) + 25 (M) – 31% female Center for a New American Security (CNAS) Head: Richard Fontaine (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 78 – 29 (F) + 49 (M) – 37% female 2020 Total: 73 – 22 (F) + 51 (M) – 30 % female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 9 – 2 (F) + 7 (M) – 22% female Governing Board: 2018 Total: 21 – 2 (F) + 19 (M) – 10% female 2020 Total: 25 – 3 (F) + 22 (M) – 12% female Center for American Progress (CAP) Head: Neera Tanden (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 19 – 3 (F) + 16 (M) – 16% female 2020 Total: 16 – 3 (F) + 13 (M) – 19% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 3 – 0 (F) + 3 (M) – 0% Governing Board: 2018 Total: 9 – 2 (F) + 7 (M) – 22% female 2020 Total: 10 – 3 (F) + 7 (M) – 30% female	German Marshall Fund (GMF) Head: Karen Donfried (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 44 – 12 (F) + 32 (M) – 27% female 2020 Not Available Governing Board: 2018 Total: 19 – 5 (F) + 14 (M) – 26% female 2020 Total: 21 – 8 (F) + 13 (M) – 38% female Heritage Foundation Head: Kay Coles James (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 32 – 7 (F) + 25 (M) – 22% female 2020 Total: 46 – 10 (F) + 36 (M) – 22% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 14 – 2 (F) + 12 (M) – 14% female Governing Board: 2018 Total: 25 – 6 (F) + 19 (M) – 24% female 2020 Total: 27 – 5 (F) + 22 (M) – 19% female Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) Head: Robert L. Borosage (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 16 – 7 (F) + 9 (M) – 44% female 2020 Total: 36 – 13 (F) + 23 (M) – 36% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 1 – 1 (M) + 0 (F) – 0% Governing Board: 2018 Total: 18 – 8 (F) + 10 (M) – 44% female 2020 Total: 18 – 8 (F) + 10 (M) – 44% female Lexington Institute Head: Merrick “Mac” Carey (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 6 – 1 (F) + 5 (M) – 17% female 2020 Total: 6 – 0 (F) + 6 (M) – 0% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 1 – 0 (F) + 1 (M) – 0% female Governing Board: 2018 Total: 7 – 0 (F) + 7 (M) – 0% female 2020 Total: 6 – 0 (F) + 6 (M) – 0% female New America Head: Anne-Marie Slaughter (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 104 – 34 (F) + 70 (M) – 33% female 2020 Total 103 – 42 (F) + 61 (M) – 41% female Nuclear Experts: None Governing Board: 2018 Total: 22 – 6 (F) + 16 (M) – 27% female 2020 Total: 20 – 6 (F) + 14 (M) – 30% female RAND Corporation Head: Michael D. Rich (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 613 – 245 (F) + 368 (M) – 40% female 2020 Total 541 – 229 (F) + 312 (M) – 42% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total 47 – 12 (F) + 31 (M) – 28% female Governing Board: 2018 Total: 26 – 7 (F) + 19 (M) – 27% female 2020 Total 24 – 7 (F) + 17 (M) – 30% female

*Appendix:* Think Tanks
Stimson Center Head: Brian Finlay (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 72 – 37 (F) + 35 (M) – 51% female 2020 Total: 106 – 45 (F) + 61 (M) – 42% female * Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 40 – 18 (F) + 22 (M) – 45% female Governing Board: 2018 Total: 27 – 7 (F) + 20 (M) – 26% female 2020 Total: 30 – 9 (F) + 21 (M) – 30% female Third Way Head: Jonathan Cowan (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2020 Total: 17 – 8 (F) + 9 (M) – 47% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 8 – 4 (F) + 4 (M) – 50% female Governing Board: 2020 Total: 30 – 6 (F) + 24 (M) – 20% female US Institute of Peace (USIP) Head: … Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 72 – 35 (F) + 37 (M) – 49% female 2020 Total: 84 – 41 (F) + 43 (M) – 49% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 7 – 2 (F) + 5 (M) – 29% female Governing Board: 2018 Total: 15 – 3 (F) + 12 (M) – 20% female 2020 Total: 15 – 3 (F) + 12 (M) – 20% female The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Head: Jane Harman (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 187 – 64 (F) + 123 (M) – 34% female 2020 Total: 151 – 46 (F) + 105 (M) – 30% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 4 – 1 (F) + 3 (M) – 25% female Governing Board: 2018 Total: 16 – 5 (F) + 11 (M) – 31% female 2020 Total: 17 – 5 (F) + 12 (M) – 29% female	Arms Control and Nuclear Security Think Tanks Arms Control Association Head: Daryl G. Kimball (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2020 Total: 7 – 3 (F) + 4 (M) – 43% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 7 – 3 (F) + 4 (M) – 43% female Governing Board: 2020 Total: 35 – 12 (F) + 23 (M) – 34% female Center for Arms Control and NonProliferation Head: Edward Levine (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2020 Total: 19 – 2 (F) + 17 (M) – 11 % female Nuclear Experts 2020 Total: 19 – 2 (F) + 17 (M) – 11% female Governing Board: (Does not include the Szilard Advisory Board) 2020 Total: 24 – 5 (F) + 19 (M) – 21% female Federation of American Scientists Head: Ali Nouri (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2020 Total: 18 – 3 (F) + 15 (M) – 17% female Nuclear Experts 2020 Total: 12 – 3 (F) + 9 (M) – 25% female Governing Board: 2020 Total: 17 – 6 (F) + 11 (M) – 35% female Global Zero Head: Derek Johnson (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2020 Total: 7 – 3 (F) + 4 (M) – 43% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 7 – 3 (F) + 4 (M) – 43% female Governing Board: Not Available James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Head: William Potter (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2020 Total: 13 – 5 (F) + 8 (M) – 38% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 13 – 5 (F) + 8 (M) – 38% female Governing Board: 2020 Total: 4 – 2 (F) + 2 (M) – 50% female Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School Head: Matthew Bunn (M), Steven Miller (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2020 Total: 30 – 8 (F) + 22 (M) – 27% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 30 – 8 (F) + 22 (M) – 27% female Governing Board: 2020 Total: 45 – 15 (F) + 30 (M) – 33% female	Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) Head: Ernest J. Moniz (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2018 Total: 18 – 9 (F) + 9 (M) – 50% female 2020 Total: 22 – 12 (F) + 10 (M) – 55% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 19 – 9 (F) + 10 (M) – 47% female Governing Board: 2018 Total: 34 – 7 (F) + 27 (M) – 21% female 2020 Total: 35 – 8 (F) + 27 (M) – 23% female Physicians for Social Responsibility Head: Jeff Carter (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2020 Total: 6 – 2 (F) + 4 (M) – 33% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 2 – 0 (F) + 2 (M) – 0% female Governing Board: 2020 Total: 27 – 11 (F) + 16 (M) – 41% female Pugwash Council Head: Sergio Duarte (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2020 Total: 43 – 12 (F) + 31 (M) – 28% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 43 – 12 (F) + 31 (M) – 28% female Governing Board: 2020 Total: 8 – 2 (F) + 6 (M) – 25% female Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control Head: Valerie Lincy (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 2020 Total: 10 – 4 (F) + 6 (M) – 40% female Nuclear Experts: 2020 Total: 10 – 4 (F) + 6 (M) – 40% female Governing Board: 2020 Total: 9 – 3 (F) + 6 (M) – 33% female

Notes: Absolute Numbers and Gender Ratio of Articles in International Security Journals – January 2014-December 2019

Contemporary Security Policy 152 25 16% 109 72% 18 12% Nuclear Security Articles 47 8 17% 32 68% 7 15% Cooperation and Conflict 168 51 30% 94 56% 23 14% Nuclear Security Articles 5 2 40% 3 60% – Critical Studies on Security 200 90 45% 95 48% 15 8% Nuclear Security Articles 28 13 46% 14 50% 1 4% European Journal of International Security 63 17 27% 40 63% 6 10% Nuclear Security Articles 14 2 14% 10 72% 2 14% International Security 114 26 23% 77 67% 11 10% Nuclear Security Articles 32 6 19% 20 62% 6 19% Journal of Conflict Resolution 403 60 15% 224 56% 119 29% Nuclear Security Articles 18 4 22% 11 61% 3 17% Journal of Global Security Studies 117 30 26% 68 58% 19 16% Nuclear Security Articles 16 3 19% 10 62% 3 19% Journal of Strategic Studies 233 26 11% 192 82% 15 7% Nuclear Security Articles 56 9 16% 41 73% 6 11% Security Dialogue 191 80 42% 89 47% 22 11% Nuclear Security Articles 17 8 47% 7 41% 2 12% Security Studies 159 34 22% 107 67% 18 11% Nuclear Security Articles 21 4 19% 15 71% 2 10% Survival 347 48 14% 280 81% 19 5% Nuclear Security Articles 84 12 14% 70 83% 2 3% Journal Total No Women* Men* Mixed Gender Teams

Notes: Absolute Numbers and Gender Ratio of Articles in Arms Control Journals – January 2014-December 2019

Arms Control Today 251 47 19% 191 76% 13 5% Bulletin of Atomic Scientist 392 85 22% 271 69% 36 9% International Journal of Nuclear Studies 54 11 20% 32 60% 11 20% Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament 63 7 11% 52 83% 4 6% Nonproliferation Review 161 28 17% 115 72% 18 11% Journal Total No Women* Men* Mixed Gender Teams *Includes articles by single authors and by same sex coauthors

*Methodology*
Think Tanks All data come from the think tanks’ own websites. Data for the think tanks were collected between September 2019 and January 2020, except for Third Way. Data for Third Way were collected in July 2020. Data for the governing boards of all think tanks were collected in July 2020. We were not able to retrieve data for experts from the German Marshall Fund’s (GMF) website. The Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) no longer features a national or international security program on its website. Hence, data for GMF and BPC are incomplete. While gender is generally defined and discussed as meaning more than just whether one is a man or a woman, this scorecard takes the binary approach. We identified experts and authors as either women or men by examining their bios, photographs and use of pronouns. This scorecard tallies experts, analysts and fellows. We did not include people whose main responsibilities are in the administrative, operational, personnel, development, communication, and editorial sectors. Experts in foreign policy, defense and national and international security were selected based on the identification of such experts by the think tanks themselves. Nuclear security experts were identified by searching the think tank websites and expert bios for any the following terms: nuclear deterrence, weapons of mass destruction, nuclear policy, general nuclear issues, nuclear security (nuclear materials, fuel cycle, nuclear energy, radiological security), arms control and disarmament, nuclear technologies, defense strategy with a nuclear focus, regional studies with nuclear focus (North Korea, China, Iran, Asia-Pacific, Korea, Middle East). We did not analyze experts’ seniority. Some think tanks include junior staff; others identify only mid-level and senior staff. We did not distinguish between nonresident and resident experts. Again, for each think tank, we followed the think tank’s own identification of its experts. In the case of RAND we excluded all adjunct experts. Adjuncts at RAND are the equivalent of non-residential fellows in other institutions. RAND will feature some adjunct experts, but not all adjuncts on its website. Upon request and in consultation with RAND we decided to leave all adjuncts off this tally. The following experts, analysts, fellows, scholars and staff have been included for: AEI: All Foreign and Defense Policy Scholars; Atlantic Council: All Fellows and Non-Resident Fellows mentioned under Experts; Aspen Institute: All Security & Global Affairs, including the Aspen Strategy Group, the Cybersecurity & Technology Program, and the Homeland Security Program; Bipartisan Policy Center: No Information; Brookings Institution: All Experts in the	Foreign Policy Program; Cato Institute: All Nat./ Int. Security Experts; Carnegie Endowment: All Experts in the Washington, DC office; CSBA: All All Nat./Int. Security Experts; CAP: Foreign Policy and Security Program; CSIS: All Experts; CFR: All Experts; CNAS: All Experts; GMF: Not Available; Heritage Foundation: Heritage Foundation: All Experts in the International, National Security, and Nuclear Energy Issue Areas; IPS: All Experts; Lexington Institute: All Experts; New America: All Analysts and Fellows in the Cybersecurity Initiative, the International Security Program and the Gender and Security Program; RAND: All experts in the Homeland Security and Public Safety, the International Affairs, and the National Security Programs. Our tally does not do not include Adjuncts, Operational Staff and Legislative Assistants. It may also be noted that some experts in the Homeland Security and Public Safety program are more focused on public safety and domestic issues. Similarly, some experts in the International Affairs Program are focused on non-security international affairs issues; Stimson Center: Senior Research Team & Distinguished Fellows; Third Way: Experts in Climate and Energy and National Security; USIP: All Experts; The Wilson Center: All Experts; Arms Control Association: All Expert Staff; Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation: All Experts; FAS: All Expert Staff; Global Zero: All Expert Staff; James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies: All Expert Staff; Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs: All Experts; NTI: All Expert Staff; Physicians for Social Responsibility: All Expert Staff; Pugwash Council: All Expert Staff; Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control: All Expert Staff. The Full Think Tank Data Set is available from WIIS. Journals Sixteen journals were examined over the period January 2014–December 2019: 11 security studies journals and 5 journals focused exclusively on arms control and nuclear security issues. 11 – International Security Journals: Contemporary Security Policy; Cooperation &Conflict; Critical Studies on Security; European Journal of International Security; International Security; Journal of Conflict Resolution; Journal of Global Security Studies; Journal of Strategic Studies; Security Dialogue; Security Studies; Survival. 5 – Arms Control and Nuclear Security Journals: Arms Control Today; Bulletin of Atomic Scientists; International Journal of Nuclear Studies; Journal for Peace &Nuclear Disarmament; Nonproliferation Review. The survey covered all articles published in these journals. We excluded editorial comments, reviews of any kind (i.e., book reviews) external news articles or blogs, letters to the editor, addendums and other nonrelevant sections.	We established 6 datasets. Data set 1: All 16 journals. Comprises all articles from the 11 international security and 5 arms control and nuclear security journals from January 2014 to December 2019. Does not include letters to the editor, book reviews, or external blogs. Total articles: 3,068 by women (individual and coauthor): 665 by men (individual and coauthor): 2,036 by mixed gender teams: 367 articles with a gender perspective: 91 Data set 2: All international security journals (11 journals). January 2014-December 2019 Total articles: 2,147 by women (individual and coauthor): 487 by men (individual and coauthor): 1,375 by mixed gender teams: 285 gender articles: 71 arms control/nuclear articles: 338 Data set 3: All arms control and nuclear security journals (5 journals). January 2014-December 2019 Total articles: 921 by women (individual and coauthor): 178 by men (individual and coauthor): 661 by mixed gender teams: 82 articles with a gender perspective: 20 Data set 4: All arms control and nuclear security articles (16 journals). Comprises all articles from the 5 nuclear journals and 338 arms control/nuclear security issues articles from the 11 security journals. Total articles: 1,259 by women (individual and coauthor): 250 by men (individual and coauthor): 893 by mixed gender teams: 116 articles with a gender perspective: 21 Data set 5: All nuclear security articles in all journals (16 journals). Total articles: 877 by women (individual and coauthor): 144 by men (individual and coauthor): 661 by mixed gender teams: 72 Data set 6: All nuclear security articles in internationals security journals (11 journals). Total articles: 194 by women (individual and coauthor): 29 by men (individual and coauthor): 149 by mixed gender teams: 16 All data is available from WIIS. Contact: info@ wiisglobal.org, Subject: Scorecard data

By Clodagh Quain and Isabelle Roccia

Fifth-generation telecommunications (5G) technology promises to dramatically increase the interconnectedness and efficiency of commercial and civilian communication infrastructures. 5G will also enable other advances. On the civilian side, it will improve existing applications and give rise to others, from telemedicine to connected cars. It also presents an opportunity to enhance NATO’s capabilities, improving logistics, maintenance, and communications. For instance, 5G will speed communication and improve response time in a theater of operation.

These developments also pose challenges. 5G is part of a complex architecture. To leverage its full benefits, millions of sensors and devices will need to be deployed and connected, from smart home appliances and connected toys to fullscale factories and critical infrastructures. The number of connected devices is projected to total 41.6 billion worldwide by 2025.¹ By 2030, this estimate ratchets up to 125 billion.² Of these, mobile devices will grow from 8.8 billion in 2018 to 13.1 billion devices by 2023 – 1.4 billion of which will be 5G capable.³ Because devices are connected to one another or to a network, security risks will multiply. The Alliance faces an increased challenge in ensuring that NATO Allies’ 5G networks and the critical infrastructures that rely on them

can withstand multiple physical and cybersecurity threats.

NATO’s main concern in this context is the risk associated with foreign ownership or management of critical infrastructure, including by private operators and foreign state actors in supply chains. That such ownership could result in collusion between the supplier and a country’s intelligence or security services is deemed particularly worrisome by many governments, critical infrastructure operators and industry alike.⁴For NATO allies, supply-chain risk management is therefore a critical aspect of the strategic and operational challenges posed by 5G.

At the NATO meeting in London in December 2019, Allies prioritized 5G security as part of its security and resilience agenda. The final declaration stated, “NATO and Allies, within their respective authority, are committed to ensuring the security of our communications, including 5G, recognizing the need to rely on secure and resilient systems.”⁵Including 5G in the London Declaration formalized NATO’s work in this emerging field.

Background

5G technology is transformative on several fronts. It will challenge the design and implementation of existing infrastructure and applications. The velocity and pervasiveness of 5G technology will stimulate development of advanced applications, including smart cities and autonomous vehicles.

A diverse set of suppliers form the 5G ecosystem, which encompasses network infrastructures, spectrum, devices and software. While Ericsson (Sweden), Nokia (Finland) and Huawei (China) are the three best-known vendors, they represent only a small number of the stakeholders involved. The telecommunications industry estimates that operators will have

to invest $1.1 trillion by the end of 2025 to build 5G networks.⁶

In 2016, the European Commission developed a 5G Action Plan for Europe to support launching the rollout of commercial 5G services in all EU member states by the end of 2020.⁷ Subsequently, there will be a rapid buildup of infrastructure in urban areas and along major transport routes by 2025.⁸

At the Prague 5G Security Conference in May 2019, 32 EU and NATO members adopted recommendations known as the Prague Proposals.⁹They propose principles that governments should apply to 5G deployment, stipulating that communication networks and services should be “designed with resilience and security in mind. They should be built and maintained using international, open, consensus-based standards and risk-informed cybersecurity best practices.” State representatives also called for the adoption of principles of fairness, transparency, risk-based policy and interoperability.

Relevance for NATO

Since 1949, NATO has centered on safeguarding the security and freedom of its members. Its mandate has evolved in political and geographic terms as the world changed. Today, emerging technology, with its many political, military and commercial implications, is driving NATO’s need to adapt.

Given its broad membership overlap with the European Union, deployment of 5G in Europe will undoubtedly affect the Alliance. The implications for NATO allies are strategic and operational in nature and affect defensive and offensive postures. At a minimum, dependence on 5G exposes critical infrastructure to more vulnerabilities, including software vulnerabilities, which NATO allies must address.¹⁰ That said, 5G can also improve capabilities such as communication security.¹¹

At the multilateral level, NATO, like the European Union, seeks to balance collective and national interests. At the Munich Security Conference on February 15, 2020, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg referred to guidelines and basic requirements that both organizations had developed for infrastructure investment—notably in telecommunications and 5G.¹²

On January 29, 2020, the Network and Information Systems (NIS) Cooperation Group published an EU toolbox, with measures to mitigate risks identified in the EU coordinated risk assessment report of October 9, 2019:

strategic measures on regulatory powers for incident reporting, security measures, threats and assets;
initiatives to promote a diverse supply and value chain;
technical measures to strengthen the security of networks and equipment; and
risk mitigation plans.¹³

NATO’s leadership also seeks to develop a minimum set of common practices for resilient telecommunications while avoiding encroachment on individual state approaches. At the October 2019 NATO Defense Ministerial meeting, for example, representatives agreed to update the baseline requirements for civilian telecommunications, including 5G.¹⁴ This update covered foreign ownership, foreign control and direct investment. While civilian infrastructure remains a “national responsibility,” Article 3 of NATO’s founding treaty states that resilience, intended to prevent the failure of critical infrastructure or hybrid attacks, is part of states’ commitments to the Alliance and to one another. The Secretary General reiterated NATO’s approach the following month at the NATO Industry Forum in Washington, DC, where he linked resilience of supply chains and that of nations and the Alliance.¹⁵

NATO members maintain the right to decide national policies for regulating critical infrastructure and 5G vendors. For example, UK Foreign Secretary Dominic Raab addressed the House of Commons on January 28, 2020, outlining the government’s review of national telecommunications and its position on “high risk vendors.” The United Kingdom approved the use of equipment acquired from “high risk vendors” while restricting those vendors’ access to “safety critical networks.”¹⁶ The foreign secretary stressed that the review would not hamper his government’s ability to share sensitive data with its partners over highly secure networks. In May 2020, the UK Government decided to review the impact of the decision on national networks with the assistance of the National Cyber Security Centre.

What Is at Stake?

Foreign ownership or management of critical infrastructure is a significant risk for NATO allies. Consequently, more governments may look to adopt procurement rules that limit sourcing to trusted vendors.

Such a position creates another risk, however. Indeed, the operators of critical infrastructure may have only limited capacity to detect, prevent and recover from the cybersecurity risks they face if they cannot choose the technologies and processes they need to match security requirements stemming from their size, complexity and risk profile. These operators must remain in control of how they improve their overall security posture if they are to meet the security and resilience objectives set nationally or at NATO. Innovation with state-of-the-art technology is critical in the interconnected environment in which Allies find themselves, through cross-border infrastructure (for energy supply, for instance) or shared functions (such as airspace control). NATO’s value-added in this context is to facilitate the development and sharing of baseline requirements for supply-chain risk management among Allies. It can also be to share best practices and information on risks and threats. This coordination would ensure that all individual state efforts contribute to more secure, resilient critical infrastructures.

Recommendations

As NATO allies move forward, they should focus on four main issues: leveraging NATO and EU membership, assessing supply-chain management issues, adopting a principled approach and building international consensus.

Leveraging Membership: 5G affects strategic, political, industrial and commercial elements on both sides of the Atlantic. The integrated economies of the European Union and the United States share a common value system, with policies that traditionally align with NATO’s, despite conflicting messages from the current US administration regarding its commitment to the Alliance. Despite the inherent cross-border, integrated nature of critical infrastructure in Europe, EU member states approach supply-chain evaluation differently. As the European Union seeks a coordinated, harmonized process for 5G supply-chain assessment, it is important that NATO and the EU align their policies in this regard. The lack of such alignment might create challenges for NATO, such as overdependence on one supplier.

Supply-Chain Risk Management: NATO allies must consider the global, interconnected nature of supply chains and the threats they face as they weigh effective approaches to 5G supply-chain risk management. Their approaches should ultimately strengthen NATO’s strategic mission, inform procurement guidelines and harmonize risk-management baselines across Allies. Such risk management entails identifying likely threats, vulnerabilities and potential consequences, tailoring mitigation strategies to risks and prioritizing actions based on an assessment of the most relevant, potentially impactful risks.¹⁷

A Principled Approach: A similar or harmonized set of principles should underpin effective supply-chain risk management.These principles should do the following:

encourage interoperability of systems and the use of stateof-the-art technologies;
develop a more secure global cybersecurity ecosystem that recognizes norms for responsible behavior and prioritizes collective defense against malicious threats;
collaborate with key nongovernmental stakeholders, including industry, to adapt to an ever-changing environment of new technologies and new threats;
invest in research and development of new technological approaches to fostering supply-chain integrity; and
avoid prohibiting the acquisition or integration of some technologies simply because they were developed abroad.

Building International Consensus: Several international organizations and groups have begun to assess the 5G environment and its related security risks. The Prague 5G Repository produced a library of tools, frameworks and legislative measures to assist NATO member states. Multilateral organizations, such as the EU, and states have come to similar conclusions. They too underline major risks that have national security implications. Integrity, confidentiality and availability of networks and communications are also key to their security.

Conclusion

5G innovation is not just a technological choice but a strategic one. Even in a collective defense system such as NATO, states remain sovereign, making decisions based on their assessment of the geopolitical environment. A state approach driven primarily by economic opportunity may undermine collective defense and security.

To both build and manage 5G capabilities, NATO’s allies will need to leverage EU and NATO membership; balance national and collective methods for supply-chain risk management; apply a principled approach to supply-chain integrity; and coordinate at the state and international levels.

• ensure, where possible, transparency of supply-chain risk management policies and their implementation, in part to facilitate best practices;

Former director of Carnegie Europe Tomáš Valášek referred to critical civilian networks as “the path of least resistance” for adversaries in the digital age to divide NATO from within.¹⁸To protect this critical infrastructure, he argues, both the public and private sectors will need to invest in IT expertise. This shared challenge presents an opportunity for NATO and other multilateral organizations to fill gaps for their member states and to adapt to emerging technology beyond their traditional role. It is a novel test for NATO: to broker strategic geopolitical rivalries and national security concerns over critical infrastructure while developing its own modern capabilities and addressing the multiple fractures in global and allied security today.

References

International Data Corporation (IDC), The Growth in Connected IoT Devices Is Expected to Generate 79.4ZB of Data in 2025, press release (Framingham, MA: IDC, June 18, 2019).
IHS Markit, The Internet of Things: A Movement, Not a Market, presentation (London: IHS Markit, 2017), p. 2.
Cisco, Annual Internet Report (2018–2023), white paper(San Jose: Cisco, 2020), p. 2.
Kadri Kaska, Henrik Beckvard, and Tomáš Minárik, Huawei, 5G, and China as a Security Threat (Tallinn: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2019).
NATO, London Declaration: Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London 3-4 December 2019, press release (Brussels: NATO, December 4, 2019).
GSMA Intelligence, The Mobile Economy 2020 (London: GSM Association, 2020), p. 5.
European Commission, 5G for Europe: An Action Plan, COM(2016) 588 final (Brussels: European Commission, 2016), p. 4.
European Commission, Future Connectivity Systems, 5G for Europe Action Plan (Brussels: European Commission, December 19, 2019).
Flexera, Vulnerability Review 2018: Global Trends (Itasca, IL: Flexara Software LLC, 2018).
Karl Norrman, Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi, and Eva Fogelström, 5G Security—Enabling a Trustworthy 5G System, Ericsson White Paper (Stockholm: Ericsson, January 8, 2020).
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Transcript of Opening Re-marks, Munich Security Conference, Brussels, February 15, 2020.
European Commission, Cybersecurity of 5G Networks: EU Toolbox of Risk Mitigating Measures (Brussels:European Commission, January 29, 2020).
NATO Secretary General Jen Stoltenberg, Press Conference Follow-ing the Meeting of NATO Defense Ministers, Brussels, October 25, 2019.
NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, Keynote Address at the NATO Industry Forum, Washington DC, November 14, 2019.
United Kingdom, Foreign Secretary’s Statement on Telecommunica-tions, London, UK Foreign Secretary Office, January 28, 2020.
BSA | The Software Alliance (BSA), BSA Principles for Good Governance: Supply Chain Risk Management (Washington, DC: BSA, 2019).
Tomáš Valášek et al., “NATO at 70: What Next?” Politico (April 3, 2019).

9. Government of the Czech Republic, Prague 5G Security Conference Announced Series of Recommendations: The Prague Proposals,press release, May 3, 2019.

Authors

Clodagh Quain is Policy Analyst at the Institute of International and European Affairs (IIEA), Dublin, Ireland. The views expressed here are those of the author and not of the IIEA.

Isabelle Roccia is Senior Manager, Policy – EMEA at BSA | The Software Alliance in Brussels, Belgium.

This publication is the result of a joint WIIS DC, WIIS Brussels, WIIS France, and WIIS UK project focused on new challenges for the NATO alliance and showcasing the expertise of the Next Generation women defense experts. Through a competitive selection process six Next Generation experts were invited to participate in programs on the sidelines of the 2019 December NATO Leaders meeting. We would like to thank our six experts for their thoughtful contributions to this initiative, WIIS Global for publishing their research and the US Mission to NATO for providing the generous grant without which this project would not have been possible. With this support, we were able to turn an idea to promote greater cooperation among our affiliates and cities into a reality. We hope this project encourages more collaboration across borders and helps bolster the overall WIIS mission of supporting women in the international security field.

The NATO Consortium Team: Michelle Shevin-Coetzee, WIIS-DC; Armida van Rij, WIIS

UK; Florence Fernando and Pauline Massart, WIIS Brussels; Ottavia Ampuero and Jessica
Pennetier, WIIS France

By Kulani Abendroth-Dias and Carolin Kiefer

If World War III will be over in seconds, as one side takes control of the other’s systems, we’d better have

Data, the food of all algorithms, lie at the core of cohesive EU and NATO AI strategies. Such strategies must encompass the regulation of data in high- and low-risk technologies with

and Romania have tested and often deployed AI and ML facial recognition tools, many of which were developed in the United States and China, for predictive policing and border control.3 AI and ML systems aid in contact tracing and knowledge sharing to contain the COVID-19 virus.4 However, the civilian and military strategies that drive use of AI and ML for the collection and use of data diverge across the member states of the European Union and the North a greater understanding of how data feed AI and ML technologies and systems, the results they produce become skewed. For example, a facial analysis and recognition system insufficiently trained to analyze and recognize women or people of color will often misidentify people in these populations, which could lead to inaccurate criminal profiling and arrests.7 Machines don’t make errors, but humans do. Policymakers need to rapidly identify parameters and systems of governance for these technologies that

maximize their efficiency while protecting civilian rights.

Growth in the development of AI-driven technologies has been exponential, but strategies to regulate their implementation have yet to catch up. The European Union and NATO need to develop coordinated, comprehensive, and forward-looking strategies based on data protection protocols to regulate AI use and deployment to counter myriad threats. Such strategies will be critically important if the transatlantic alliance is to adapt a common defense system to evolving threats in the digital age. Beyond Definitions

AI and ML are changing the security landscape-for example, by the deployment of disinformation to undermine political participation or of unmanned autonomous vehicles (UAVs), which may or may not operate as lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). The states that are party to the Group of

Governmental Experts (GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapons

the smarter, faster, more resilient network. dual uses. They should guide policies governing predictive

or delivery within the European Union, Amazon policing, border surveillance, facial analysisand countering disinformation.6 and recognition now sells facial recognition cameras for door

locks, webcams, home security systems, and office To regulate data use effectively, policymakers need to attendance driven by artificial intelligence (AI) better understand the technical, political, economic and

and machine learning (ML)-powerful tools with civilian 2 social risks and biases in data collection methods. Without and military purposes. Germany, France, Spain, Denmark

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).5

(LAWS), which aligns its work with the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), have devoted considerable attention to defining autonomous weapons. Unfortunately, the group has not yet paid enough attention to the data. Prolonged focus on what constitutes LAWS rather than the data that drive them impedes the important investigation of how best to regulate the technologies’ rapid development and use for security and defense. Discussion of the types, limits, and biases of data that drive AI and ML is pertinent throughout the myriad sectors in which they find application.8

Recently, the GGE took steps to move the debate from definitions of autonomous systems to why data matter. In 2020, it decided that the 11 guiding principles that frame the development and use of LAWS needed no further expansion.9 The group agreed to give greater attention to how the principles can be unpacked. It decided to distinguish between high- and low-risk AI technologies and gain a better understanding of dual-use technologies.10 Differentiating between uses for civilian and military operations should focus on how data will be mined and drive algorithms at both levels.11 NATO and the European Union should lead in facilitating these discussions and regulations.

Data Governance

According to the European Commission’s February 2020 white paper on artificial intelligence, “Europe’s current and future sustainable economic growth and societal well-being increasingly draws on value created by data…. AI is one of the most important applications of the data economy.”12 However, the report concludes, for AI to “work for people and be a force for good in society” it must be trustworthy.13 It highlights “trustworthy AI” 27 times in its 26 pages.

Governance of data is key to this trust.14 The EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) was a step in the right direction, but it needs to be expanded to cover AI and ML data collection and use in national and international security contexts. Close consultation and data coordination between the European Union and NATO is integral in this regard.

An understanding of who drives the development of AIdriven technologies for European security and how they are funded can illuminate the political, technical, and social, and legal bottlenecks confronting EU and NATO data regulation, both in the member states and at a supranational level. While the defense sector has traditionally driven technology innovation, private companies have taken the lead in recent years. 15 According to the OECD, Google, Microsoft, Amazon, and Intel have spent more than $50 billion a year on digital innovation.16 This sum dwarfs the ‚Ç¨13 billion budgeted by the European Defense Fund (EDF) for 2021-27 – for defense spending in general, not solely for AI-driven technologies.17 NATO and the European Union should pay particular attention to these private-sector actors when developing policies for data protection and strategies to encourage US and European technological innovation. NATO and the European Union should work with the CCW GGE to determine clear operational distinctions between the commercial and military uses of data for AIdriven technologies.18 NATO and the European Union need comprehensive, legally enforceable AI strategies to regulate the use of data and the integrity of information networks to better protect their citizens while keeping the Alliance agile.

The Way Forward

In EU and NATO contexts, the development and implementation of dual-use technologies and cyberprotection policies remain fragmented. This fragmentation could undermine the ability to respond to evolving threats to European security and stability. Examples abound: Cambridge Analytica’s involvement in Britain’s Leave Campaign, radicalization via social media, the politicized use of data via hybrid-use platforms to influence behavior (from political participation to violent action), and targeted cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns in the Visegrad Four and the Baltic states.19 Therefore, coherent EU and NATO AI strategies require the regulation of the data that drive emerging technologies. Regulation to promote network integrity and protect data access must be key tenets of EU and NATO strategies to deploy AI that can react faster and more effectively in the face of new security threats.

AI and ML systems are valuable, as demonstrated by their use in contact tracing and knowledge sharing in the search for a cure during the Covid-19 pandemic.20 For the transatlantic relationship to thrive, NATO and the EU must work together to develop coordinated AI strategies that address appropriate use and misuse of data. As the EU and NATO develop these strategies, they should focus on five activities:

Govern the use of data in dual-use technologies.

While AI strategies may sound exciting and innovative to policymakers and the general public, responsible data use sounds less so. Yet it is essential. EU and NATO strategies need to distinguish between high- and low-risk technologies, dual- and hybrid-use platforms, and the types, limits, and mediums by which data can be collected and anonymized (or at least kept confidential) for civil and military uses. These limits need to be developed and regulated in discussions with civilian and military actors who are mining data across sectors, from the traditional security and military arena to healthcare, logistics, and entertainment companies. Discussions should include how the rights of citizens and those residing in NATO and EU countries-e.g., lawful migrants, asylum seekers, refugees-will be protected.

Acknowledge bias in datasets.

There should be a comprehensive discussion on how bias in datasets influences the training of algorithms, which in turn influences security targets and undermines the integrity of a system. Policymakers, human rights actors, and technology developers should be in the room for this discussion. An awareness of these biases within security forces can help them better evaluate the outcomes the algorithms produce, interpret targets with caution, avoid errors, and generate more effective responses.

Ensure purpose-limited data collection and sharing.

Personal data collected and tracked for specific purposes (e.g., contact tracing during a pandemic) should generally not be shared and used for other purposes. Where an overlap in data collection is deemed necessary for EU-NATO security purposes, tight regulations for civilian protection should spell out where, with whom, and for how long the data can be stored, with strong legal and operational deterrents for backdoor access to data. Private-sector companies should limit how data are used to influence behavior: Should they be used in political campaigns the same way that they are used to nudge consumer behaviors on what to buy? The European Union’s GDPR sets up important rules in this regard. It can be viewed as the cornerstone of an EU-NATO strategy for the development and regulation of AI for security and defense.

Adapt traditional defense and deterrence strategies to the digital age.

The evolving nature of security threats in the digital age calls into question traditional strategies of defense and deterrence. Collaboration between NATO, the European Commission, the European Defence Agency (EDA), the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) and technology developers should focus on efficiency-trimming current weapons systems and technologies used by the European Union on the battlefield and in the cyber realm while using AI and ML to inform strategy. The weaponized use of social media data must be addressed, not solely via counternarratives but by working in concert with social media companies to develop AI and ML techniques to identify and shut down fake news at the source. The integrity of networks set up by actors outside of NATO member states needs to be raised as a security concern as well, including incentives to drive the local business development of such networks.

Build trust via counter-AI agencies to protect citizen rights and detect AI-driven forgeries.

Agencies that currently promote the responsible use of AI need to work in tandem with NATO and EU agencies to develop comprehensive AI strategies. The strategies should promote digital literacy, advance critical thinking through online modules, and publicize the precautions NATO and the European Union are taking to protect citizen data in order to build public trust. Partnerships between EU, NATO, and such agencies need to go beyond traditional NGO-security agency relationships to integrate AI protection mechanisms into security policy itself. Ideally, these organizations would work with NATO partner countries to better identify targets, weaknesses, and priorities to build resilient intelligence architectures.

Map the development and use of AI-driven technologies across EU and NATO member states.

NATO security operations are in place at member state borders. However, most of the AI technologies being developed, test, or adapted are deployed within France and Germany, key EU member states. AI-driven security threats differ across states, especially disinformation. For example, the content, medium, and speaker of disinformation shared in the Czech Republic may differ considerably from disinformation shared in Germany. Adapting traditional deterrence strategies to the digital age requires an understanding of the contextbased nature of these threats. It is therefore integral to include experts across the EU and NATO member states in the development and implementation of AI strategies. A comprehensive mapping of the security threats faced-and development and use of AI-driven technologies to combat such threats across EU and NATO member states-can help better train personnel and develop more targeted solutions and localized data protection policies.

Conclusion

The digital industry is already transforming the Alliance. NATO is essential to setting up a coordinated structure to develop and regulate AI- and ML-driven technologies for NATO members’ security and defense. While sociopolitical and economic priorities in the development and regulation of AI vary across sectors and countries, awareness of the use and misuse of data in driving AI-and ML-driven technologies is a common thread that binds these debates together. The use of data fed into a system run by AI and ML technology can have vast implications for the nature of future security threats and the development of technologies to combat them. Cohesive EU and NATO strategies for AI will determine how strong and agile the Alliance will become.

References

Pedro Domingos, The Master Algorithm: How the Quest for the Ultimate Learning Machine Will Remake Our World (New York: Basic Books, 2015).

See Daniel S. Hoadley and Nathan J. Lucas, Artificial Intelligence and National Security (Washington DC.: Congressional Research Service,

2018); Greg Allen and Taniel Chan, Artificial Intelligence and National Security (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 2017). Artificial intelligence comprises a vast number of fields, including machine learning, natural language processing, robotics, computer vision, and knowledge representation and reasoning. In this policy brief, the authors largely refer to the use of AI- and ML- driven technologies for EU and NATO security and defense.

Steven Feldstein, The Global Expansion of AI Surveillance (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, September 2019).

The Cybersecurity Strategy of the Visegrad Group Countries Coronavirus, Artificial Intelligence web page (April 12, 2020).

Raluca Csernatoni, An Ambitious Agenda or Big Words? Developing a

European Approach to AI, Egmont Security Policy Brief No. 117 (Brussels: Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations, November 2019).

Michael Chui et al., Notes from the AI Frontier: Insights from Hundreds of Use Cases (New York: McKinsey Global Institute, 2018).

Philipp Gr√ºll, “Germany’s Plans for Automatic Facial Recognition Meet Fierce Criticism,” EURACTIV (January 10, 2020).

Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans and Avi Goldfarb, Prediction Machines: The Simple Economics of Artificial Intelligence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press, 2018).

See the UN’s 1980 Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.

German Federal Foreign Office, Chair’s Summary: Berlin Forum for Supporting the 2020 Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (Berlin: German Federal Foreign Office, April 2020).

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, The Human Element in Decisions About the Use of Force (Geneva: UNIDIR, March 2020).

European Commission, On Artificial Intelligence: A European

Approach to Excellence and Trust, white paper, COM (2020) 65 final (Brussels: European Commission, February 19, 2020), p. 1. See also European Commission, A European Strategy for Data, COM (2020) 66 final (Brussels: European Commission, February 19, 2020).

EC, On Artificial Intelligence, p. 25.

Ibid.

Dieter Ernst, Competing in Artificial Intelligence Chips: China’s Challenge amid Technology War, Special Report (Center for International Governance Innovation, March 26, 2020).

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Private Equity Investment in Artificial Intelligence (Paris: OECD, December 2018).

European Commission, European Defence Fund (Brussels: European Commission: March 20, 2019). Arguably, Washington would do well not to view the EDF with suspicion and skepticism but rather as a vehicle to stimulate more transatlantic discussion on “home-grown” innovation and development.

Daniele Amoroso et al., “Autonomy in Weapon Systems: The Mili-tary Application of Artificial Intelligence as a Litmus Test for Germany’s New Foreign and Security Policy,” Democracy Vol. 49 (Heinrich B√∂ll Foundation, 2018).

Marek G√≥rka, “The Cybersecurity Strategy of the Visegrad Group

Countries,” Politics in Central Europe Vol .14, No. 2 (2018), pp. 75-98. See also Alistair Knott, “Uses and Abuses of AI in Election Campaigns,” presentation, N.d.

Council of Europe, AI and Control of Covid-19.

By Naďa Kovalčíková and Gabrielle Tarini

The rise of China poses a strategic challenge for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The Alliance needs a comprehensive political, economic, and security strategy to deal with China’s growing

global power. The more assertive a role China plays in world affairs, the more it could undercut NATO’s cohesion and military advantages by translating commercial inroads in Europe into political influence, investing in strategically important sectors, and achieving major breakthroughs in advanced digital technologies.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has repeatedly emphasized the need for NATO allies to assess and better understand the implications of China’s increased presence and activity in the North Atlantic.¹ At their London meeting in December 2019, NATO leaders noted that “China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.”² At the 2020 Munich Security Conference in February 2020, China again featured prominently in the discussions. Plenary sessions and many of the side sessions focused on China, with US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Defense Secretary Mark Esper, and Stoltenberg all highlighting the role for transatlantic cooperation in addressing China’s rise.³

This policy brief examines the challenge that China presents for NATO and the importance of a common posture toward China. It also considers China’s perception of NATO as a stumbling block to its global ambitions, and it provides recommendations for how the Alliance should approach China moving forward.

China’s Rise and Its Implications for NATO

China has used its growing economic, political and military capabilities to pursue an increasingly assertive foreign policy, and NATO has rightly begun to assess the implications for the Alliance. As the secretary general remarked in December 2019, “This is not about moving NATO into the South China Sea, but it’s about taking into account that China’s coming closer to us, in the Arctic, in Africa, investing heavily in our infrastructure, in Europe, in cyberspace.”⁴

China’s increased involvement in European allies’ economies poses a challenge to NATO’s political cohesion. China’s annual foreign direct investment (FDI) in Europe has grown exponentially since 2008.⁵ Europe is also one of the most important destinations for China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a global development strategy initiated by China in 2013. Last spring, Italy became the first G7 country to join BRI, while Greece joined China’s “17+1 grouping,” an initiative aimed at enhancing ties between China and Central and Eastern Europe.⁶

Chinese commercial inroads today can lead to wider political influence tomorrow, which well may be China’s objective. An analysis from the Mercator Institute for Chinese Studies, for example, contends that China “incentivizes state-led Chinese banks as well as State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) to fill financing or investment gaps in EU member states and accession countries in exchange for political support for Chinese positions, such as on territorial claims in the South China Sea or human rights.”⁷ Most recently, during the

COVID-19 pandemic, China has attempted to make political inroads in Europe through “mask diplomacy.”⁸ China is widely publicizing its provision of medical masks and critical health equipment to affected European states and promoted false narratives over Chinese state media Twitter accounts (such as claims that COVID-19 actually began outside of China).⁹ These actions have helped China deflect criticism of its initial response to the virus and elevate its image in Europe as a global humanitarian player.

NATO allies also face pressure to address Chinese companies’ investments in Europe’s strategic sectors such as telecommunications, energy, transportation and ports. Chinese investments in these sectors have direct security implications for the Alliance, as it depends on national critical infrastructure to execute its activities and missions. For example, national telecommunication networks that are hacked or disrupted by foreign governments could threaten NATO networks such as the Federated Mission Network that are critical to command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) and allied decisionmaking.¹⁰ 5G equipment made by companies with obscure ownership structures and close ties to the Chinese Communist Party “could use wellconcealed kill switches to cripple Western telecom systems” during conflict, or even during peacetime.¹¹ Moreover, the protection and integrity of digital information is also critical to secure force mobilization and plans for reinforcement. Civilian roads, ports and rails are an integral part of NATO’s plans for military mobilization. Chinese investments in European ports and rail could complicate NATO’s ability to reinforce and resupply Europe in a warfighting scenario. Currently, Chinese SOEs have invested in 12 ports in seven NATO countries that are key for military mobility planning in the east, south and southeast of NATO.¹²

Finally, China’s advances in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) threaten to undermine NATO’s current military and intelligence advantages. China’s “New Generation AI Development Plan” calls for China to “catch up on AI technology and applications by 2020, achieve major breakthroughs by 2025, and become a global leader in AI by 2030.”¹³ China sees AI as a way to leapfrog—in other words, skip—a generation of military technology.¹⁴

NATO relies on individual members to incorporate AI into their national defense capabilities. However, if all do not master and integrate this technology at the same pace, it may erode decades of work to strengthen interoperability. Moreover, European technologies to run AI operations— including robotics and efficient electronic chips such as

Dutch ASML semiconductors—are in high demand in China. If foreign state-backed companies were to acquire this technology, with its dual commercial and military applications, it would cause serious security concerns for the

Alliance.¹⁵

China’s Perception of NATO

Generally, Beijing views NATO as a stumbling block to its global ambitions. As Adam Liff’s work on China and the U.S. alliance system has shown, Beijing expresses “deepening frustration towards, and even open opposition to” America’s alliances.¹⁶ China has not yet publicly expressed its vision of an alternative international system—and indeed scholars vigorously debate China’s long-term strategic objectives—but it is clear that China believes it can exercise greater influence on the world stage if power is more broadly diffused.¹⁷

China’s efforts to date seem to have focused largely on driving a wedge in U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific, but China would undoubtedly welcome a fractured transatlantic relationship, where US and European threat perceptions and policy priorities increasingly diverge.¹⁸ As a recent analysis of China-Europe relations noted, China wants to “weaken Western unity, both within Europe and across the Atlantic.”¹⁹ Consequently, it prefers to deal with European states individually rather than through the European Union’s collective leadership. Thus President Xi Jinping was likely displeased when French President Emmanuel Macron unexpectedly invited German Chancellor Angela Merkel and European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker to join his bilateral meeting with China in March 2019.²⁰ China also seeks to fragment EU unity on economic issues and trade, criticizing it for “politicizing” economic and trade issues in its Policy Paper on the European Union.²¹ China knows that NATO has neither robust tools nor a legacy of regulating political economy issues. China’s use of this narrative contributes to internal tension within the Alliance between those who guard against NATO’s involvement in these areas, especially since 21 EU members are also NATO allies.²²

In sum, a united NATO and a cohesive transatlantic relationship thwart China’s desire to increase multipolarity in the international system, while a fractured NATO enables China to play Europe off America and Europe off itself.

Recommendations

Developing a united stance toward China will require NATO to synchronize regional priorities. It will also need to strengthen partnerships with other institutions and countries, given that much of what needs to be done currently falls outside NATO’s core competencies. NATO could strive for greater cohesion toward China in three areas: politics, military and technology.

Political Recommendations

To date, there is little evidence that NATO allies are coming closer to a solid political consensus on how to address China’s rise.²³ In order to operationalize allies’ views in the London Declaration on the “opportunities and challenges”²⁴ that China’s growing influence presents and limit its ability to undermine transatlantic cohesion or make further political inroads in Europe, NATO should do the following:

Consistently coordinate allied efforts to ensure that Chinese initiatives, such as the BRI or the 17+1 grouping with Central and Eastern European countries, do not allow Beijing to gain political support for Chinese positions, such as on human rights or territorial claims, and drive wedges between allies.
Increase cooperation with the EU on screening and assessing Chinese FDI in allied critical infrastructure and advanced technologies, which rely heavily on sensitive data. NATO should contribute to defining key criteria on FDI in domains with dual civilian-military applications.
Encourage allies to make full use of their existing screening mechanisms for foreign investment and encourage those that do not have one to set it up.²⁵ NATO’s EU allies should also systematically implement the EU’s foreign investment screening mechanism in order to mitigate the risks of foreign investors acquiring control over critical technologies, infrastructure, or sensitive information with potential security implications to all NATO allies. Increased transparency about Chinese FDI in critical infrastructure across NATO would help to mitigate the potential impact on NATO’s overall political cohesion.

engagement and expertise. Such partnerships could inaugurate a new consultative body, which could pave the way for more coordinated planning and intelligence sharing.²⁷

•

NATO should coordinate its efforts with the European Union in this domain, as AI and other advanced technologies are developed primarily in the private sector and can have both civilian and military applications. EU-NATO collaboration may be hampered by the fact

Enhance NATO’s political partnerships with IndoPacific countries, especially with Australia (within the “Enhanced Opportunities Partner” framework²⁶ or other tailored platforms) and Japan to strengthen interregional Military Recommendations

It would be difficult and inadvisable to reposture the Alliance toward a hypothetical contingency with China: NATO members already have varied preferences over which region should receive priority focus and, with the exception of the United States, do not have the expeditionary capabilities to project power into the Indo-Pacific region. Nevertheless, there are four areas where NATO could improve its posture vis-à-vis China:

Increased Chinese naval activity in the Mediterranean Sea, Baltic Sea, and the High North, often in collaboration with Russia, is a direct concern for NATO.²⁸ NATO need not make plans to fight China in the North Atlantic. However, as a noted NATO and maritime affairs expert argues, allies must be prepared to “monitor and interact with another growing naval power operating in waters of key interest to the transatlantic alliance.”²⁹
NATO should step up its existing military partnerships with Indo-Pacific countries, in particular in NATO exercises, the Partnership Interoperability Platform, and other capacity building programs.³⁰
Working with the EU, NATO tabletop exercises should focus on enhancing military mobility in Europe to mitigate against the effects of rising, potentially coercive Chinese investments and to secure a more robust, integrated civilian-military infrastructure.
NATO allies should continuously assess and avoid investment in Chinese military equipment that would plug into NATO’s command and control system.³¹

Technological Recommendations

NATO allies should coordinate efforts to incorporate AI-based military technologies into their national capabilities in order to avoid duplication and economize.
The roadmap on disruptive technologies adopted by NATO’s Allied Command Transformation in 2018 should guide allies toward increased and better tailored investments in military technology powered by AI, biotechnology and cyber and quantum computing. NATO should also continue to adapt its Defense Planning Process to account for rapid, fundamental technological evolution.³²

that not all EU member states or NATO allies have written national AI strategies, and as one analyst notes, “Europe’s political and strategic debate on AI-enabled military technology is underdeveloped.”³³ NATO should encourage all allies to develop their respective AI strategies, while the European Union can guide them by collecting and publishing best practices and encouraging countries to limit potentially burdensome regulations on AI before it is applied. The European Union in collaboration with NATO may also consider establishing an AI Center of Excellence.³⁴

Cybersecurity in 5G networks is another area where

NATO should coordinate its efforts with the European Union. Because this issue concerns mostly civilian networks, NATO does not have robust tools to tackle this problem alone. Thus the European Union and the European Commission in particular should lead in coordinating and implementing action. In its new “toolbox,” rolled out in January 2020, the European Union recommended measures to mitigate the cybersecurity risks of 5G.³⁵ The plan, which could ban suppliers from core parts of telecoms networks if they are identified as “high-risk” vendors, could allow European countries to limit Chinese tech giant Huawei’s role in Europe in the future. NATO allies should not only consider the EU measures when appropriate but also push for more transparency into foreign companies’ ownership structures and state influence. In general, each NATO member should strengthen oversight of telecom network security by creating mechanisms to review contracts between operators and suppliers and conducting national-level audits of the security practices of 5G companies.

In sum, NATO must strive to maintain transatlantic unity in the face of a rapidly evolving technology and global security landscape. As China seeks to divide allied democracies, it is critical for NATO allies, in coordination with the EU and other partners, to address a widening array of emerging economic, political, societal and technological challenges to the Alliance.

Authors

Naďa Kovalčíková is a Program Manager and Fellow at the Alliance for Securing Democracy at the German Marshal Fund of the United States.

Gabrielle Tarini is a Policy Analyst at the non-profit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.

References

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, opening remarks at the

Munich Security Conference, February 15, 2020, at the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Sub-Committee on Security and Defence (SEDE), January 21, 2020, and doorstep statement ahead of the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Heads of State and/or Government , December 4, 2019.

NATO, London Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and

Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London 3-4, December 2019 (Brussels: NATO, December 4, 2019).

Daniel W. Drezner, “What I Learned at the Munich Security Conference,” commentary, Washington Post (February 17, 2020).
NATO, “Questions and Answers by NATO Secretary General

Jens Stoltenberg at the ‘‘NATO Engages: Innovating the Alliance’ Conference,” transcript (London: NATO, December 3, 2019).

Thilo Hanemann, Mikko Huotari and Agatha Kratz, Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 Trends and Impact of New Screening Policies, MERICS Papers on China (Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies, June 3, 2019).
Federiga Bindi, Why Did Italy Embrace the Belt and Road Initiative? commentary (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 19, 2020); Jonathan E. Hillman and Masea McCalpin, Will China’s ‘16+1’ Format Divide Europe? (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 11, 2019).
Thorsten Benner et al., Authoritarian Advance: Responding to China’s Growing Political Influence in Europe, report (Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies, February 2018), p. 106, p. 15.
AFP News, “Mask Diplomacy: China Tries to Rewrite Virus Narrative,” France 24 (March 20, 2020).
Matt Schrader, Analyzing China’s Propaganda Messaging in Europe

(Alliance for Securing Democracy, March 20, 2020). See also Elizabeth Braw, “Beware of Bad Samaritans,” Foreign Policy (March 30, 2020).

Kadri Kaska, Henrik Beckvard and Tomáš Minárik, Huawei, 5G and China as a Security Threat, report (Brussels: NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2019).
Lindsay Gorman, “5G Is Where China and the West Finally Diverge,” The Atlantic (January 4, 2020).
Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and Turkey. See also Ian Anthony, Jiayi Zhou and Fei Su, EU Security Perspectives in an Era of Connectivity: Implications for Relations with China, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security, No. 2020/3 (Stockholm: SIPRI, February 2020), p.14.
Graham Webster et al., China’s Plan to ‘Lead’ in AI: Purpose,

Prospects, and Problems, blog post (Washington, DC: New America, August 1, 2017); Ryan Hass and Zach Balin, US-China Relations in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, report (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, January 10, 2019).

Gregory Allen, Understanding China’s AI Strategy: Clues to Chinese

Strategic Thinking on Artificial Intelligence and National Security, report (Washington, D.C., The Center for a New American Security,February 6, 2019), p. 8.

Alexandra Alper, Toby Sterling and Stephen Nellis, “Trump Administration Pressed Dutch Hard to Cancel China Chip-Equipment Sale: Sources,” Reuters (January 6, 2020).
Adam Liff, “China and the US Alliance System,” The China Quarterly Vol. 233 (March 2018).
Nadège Rolland, China’s Vision for a New World Order, NBR Special Report No. 83 (Washington, D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, January 2020).
Scott Harold, Chinese Views on European Defense Integration, MERICS China Monitor (Berlin: Mercator Institute for China Studies, December 19, 2018).
Thomas Wright and Thorsten Benner, testimony to U.S. China

Economic and Security Review Commission, hearing on “China’s Relations with U.S. Allies and Partners in Europe and the Asia Pacific,” April 5, 2018.

Keegan Elmer, “France’s Emmanuel Macron Asks Angela Merkel and Jean-Claude Juncker to Join Meeting with Xi Jinping in Paris,” South China Morning Post (March 22, 2019).
Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, China’s Policy Paper on the European Union (Brussels: Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the European Union, December 2018).
Jens Ringsmose and Sten Rynning, “China Brought NATO Closer Together,” War On the Rocks (February 5, 2020).
23 Noah Barkin, “The U.S. and Europe Are Speaking a Different Language on China,” Foreign Policy (February 16, 2020).
NATO, “London Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in London, 3-4 December 2019” (December 4, 2019).
European Commission, Guidance to the Member States Concerning Foreign Direct Investment (FDI Screening Regulation)” (Brussels: EC, March 25, 2020).
NATO, Partnership Interoperability Initiative (Brussels: NATO, March 24, 2020).
Fabrice Pothier, How Should NATO Respond to China’s Growing Power? analysis (London: IISS, September 12, 2019).
Mercy A. Kuo, “NATO-China Council: Now Is the Time: Insights from Ian Brzezinski,” The Diplomat (October 15, 2019).
Magnus F. Nordenman, “Five Questions NATO Must Answer in the North Atlantic,” Proceedings Vol. 145, no. 3 (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, March 2019).
Ibid.
Turkey, for example, was interested in buying China’s HQ-9 missile systems in 2013 but ultimately abandoned their bid after significant pressure from other NATO allies. See Denise Der, “Why Turkey May Not Buy Chinese Missile Systems After All,” The Diplomat (May 7, 2014).
Nicholas Burns and Douglas Lute, NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis, report (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, February 2019).
Ulrike Franke and Paola Sartori, Machine Politics: Europe and the AI Revolution, Policy Brief (Berlin: European Council on Foreign Relations, July 11, 2019).
Wendy R. Anderson and Jim Townsend, “As AI Begins to Reshape

Defense, Here’s How Europe Can Keep Up,” Defense One (May 18, 2018); Institute for Security Studies, The EU, NATO and Artificial Intelligence: New Possibilities for Cooperation? report (Paris: ISS, 2019).

EU Commission, Cybersecurity of 5G Networks – EU Toolbox of Risk Mitigating Measures (Brussels: EU, January 29, 2020).

We hope this project encourages more collaboration across borders and helps bolster the overall WIIS mission of supporting women in the international security field.

The NATO Consortium Team: Michelle Shevin-Coetzee, WIIS-DC; Armida van Rij, WIIS UK; Florence Fernando and Pauline Massart, WIIS Brussels; Ottavia Ampuero

By Shannon Zimmerman

The majority of countries have gender-blind foreign policies. While this may seem like a good thing, such policies fail to acknowledge and address existing gendered discrimination, inequalities, and

violence. They also fail to take active steps to include women and other marginalized groups. Feminist foreign policy, in contrast, is designed to take into account and address these existing imbalances. On September 12, 2019, Women In International Security (WIIS)–Australia and the Asia-Pacific Centre for the Responsibility to Protect (APR2P) convened a workshop to assess whether Australia has a feminist foreign policy and, if not, what steps could be taken to advance such a policy.

A feminist foreign policy, while more difficult to implement, is a smart strategic move. Greater gender equality promotes both a nation’s relative state of peace and healthier, more resilient domestic security environments. Most important for foreign policy, states with more gender equality are more stable. These states have higher gross domestic products and economic growth rates, higher levels of health and lower levels of corruption. They also exhibit less aggression toward other states. Recognition of the interconnection of gender equality and national security has led to the emergence of feminist foreign policies that push against the systematic, global subordination of women. Sweden’s Foreign Minister Margot Wallström explained her pursuit of a feminist foreign policy by noting that, “Striving toward gender equality is not only a goal in itself but also a precondition for achieving our wider foreign, development, and security-policy objectives.” Promoting true gender equality abroad, while cultivating it at home, is a win/win policy move.

Four countries currently have explicitly feminist foreign policies: Sweden, Canada, France, and Mexico. Sweden first unveiled its policy in 2014. It encompassed all domains— foreign and national security, development, and trade—and emphasized promoting gender equality in its own right as well as to further other foreign policy priorities. In 2017, Canada launched a more limited Feminist International Assistance Policy focused on development assistance, but it eschewed the broader realms of diplomacy, defense and trade. France followed suit with its 2018 International Strategy on Gender Equality, which also focuses on foreign assistance including some diplomatic aspects. Mexico has the latest feminist foreign policy, announced in January 2020. Each of these policies has strengths and weaknesses but are notable for explicitly acknowledging gender equality as a core component for achieving foreign policy goals.

What Does a Feminist Foreign Policy Look Like?

What makes a foreign policy ‘feminist’ is contingent on a country’s specific conditions and environment. Sweden, for example, has crafted its policy around the “three Rs”: women’s and girl’s Rights, women’s Representation in the decisionmaking process, and the necessary Resources to promote gender equality and equal opportunities. Canada’s Feminist International Assistance Policy focuses on addressing barriers to success for women and girls, such as poverty, education and economic opportunities. These policies are solid starts, but they are state-centric, promote Western ideals, and assume a cis-gender binary. They do not address power relations, a core cause of inequality. Nor do they encompass those with intersectional identities.

Embracing the full complexity of a feminist approach can result in policies that address some of the most systemic foreign policy challenges. Lyric Thompson and Rachel Clement argue that a feminist foreign policy should seek to address patriarchal, racist, and neo-colonist imbalances of power. To this end, Thompson and Clement offer up a more inclusive definition of feminist foreign policy that goes beyond the dominant gender-binary, ethnocentric, Westerncentric conceptions: “A Feminist Foreign Policy is the policy of a state that defines its interactions with other states and movements in a manner that prioritizes gender equality and enshrines the human rights of women and other traditionally marginalized groups, allocates significant resources to achieve that vision, and seeks through its implementation to disrupt patriarchal and male-dominated power structures across all of its levers of influence (aid, trade, defense, and diplomacy), informed by the voices of feminist activists, groups, and movements.”

A feminist foreign policy implies a collaborative effort between the state that develops the policy and the states with which it engages. Scholars Karin Aggestam, Annika Bergman Rosamond, and Annica Kronsel further this idea by arguing that a feminist foreign policy is an ethical commitment to the care and support of distant others. In this view, a feminist foreign policy is concerned not only with achieving state objectives but also with the impact of its policies on recipient communities, with special consideration given to marginalized groups. This approach can result in divergences between countries national interests and those of the recipient country. For example, Saudi Arabia, a country known for its oppressive treatment of women, cut ties with Sweden and refused to issue visas to Swedish business travels after remarks made by Sweden’s feminist foreign minister Margot Wallström. Inversely, countries which adhere to a feminist foreign policy gain political legitimacy because they are seen as actors who are willing to pursue the values they espouse.

These two conceptions can be combined to identify characteristics of a feminist foreign policy:

created in consultation with a diverse group of domestic actors;
a collaborative effort between the policy-making state and other states;
an emphasis on equal rights that is backed up with representation and resources;
inclusive of LGBTQ identities;
implemented across all levels of influence (aid, trade, defense and diplomacy); and
addresses structural power imbalances.

How Does Australia Measure Up?

Australia has a mixed record of promoting feminist ideals, both domestically and through its foreign policy. The administration of Australia’s first female prime minister, Julia Gillard, received praise for supporting inclusion and equality “at the very highest political level.” Additionally, Julie Bishop, Australia’s first female foreign minister, may have eschewed the feminist label but nonetheless spoke of making gender equality central to global peace and security. In pursuit of this goal, Australia released a Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Strategyin 2016. Successive governments made commitments to gender equality as a foreign policy goal. It is clear that Australia recognizes the utility of gender equality but, compared against the criteria cited above, there is a way to go before Australia can claim to have a feminist foreign policy.

Perhaps the first challenge is the limited inclusion of diverse domestic actors in Australia’s policymaking process and the lack of female representation within Australia’s policymaking apparatuses. In a July 2019 report, the Lowy Institute found a continued gender imbalance within Australian government departments and organizations responsible for international relations. The report noted that not a single one of the 33 white papers, reviews, and other major foreign and security policy-shaping documents produced by the Australian government in the last 50 years has been led by a woman. Australia’s most recent foreign policy document, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, was exclusively written and formally reviewed by men. The lack of female representation in policymaking raises questions as to Australia’s ability to “practice what it preaches” in its foreign policy.

Second, Australia has a strongly self-centered foreign policy, with only passing reference to the impact of these policies outside its borders. The 2017 White Paper lists five objectives:

“the promotion of an open, inclusive, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region in which the rights of all states are respected;
the delivery of more opportunities for our businesses globally and stand against protectionism;
ensuring Australians remain safe, secure, and free in the face of threats such as terrorism;
the promotion and protection of international rules that support stability and prosperity and enable cooperation to tackle global challenges, and;
increased support for a more resilient Pacific and

Timor-Leste.”

Except for the first objective of an inclusive and prosperous

Indo-Pacific region, the priorities listed by the Foreign Policy White Paper present policy options as a choice between

Australia’s national interest and the interests of distant others.

Even efforts to promote a more resilient Pacific and TimorLeste are pursued to ensure that instability in those states does not impact Australia. While a self-interested approach to foreign policy is to be expected, too much emphasis on one-sided relationships to promote Australian economic growth and state security can create “winners” and “losers” in foreign policy. The needs of recipient communities are not explored and addressed, nor are the potential negative impacts of such policies on particular communities considered. This limits more collaborative opportunities that could be mutually beneficial to all actors involved.

These opportunities are even more limited because Australia—like Canada and France—appears to limit the gendered aspects of their policy to development and aid. This excludes gender considerations from the key spheres of trade, defense, and diplomacy. For Australia, this means that gender overall is downplayed as militarised understandings of security guide most policy actions, particularly in the Indo-pacific. More inclusive or ‘feminine’ ideals such as aid and poverty eradication appear secondary to the main agenda despite the fact that some of Australia’s most pressing challenges are related to issues of development.

Third, in the context of Australian policy, gender is understood and applied narrowly as a synonym for women and girls. There is no reference to the rights of LGBTQ individuals or those with intersectional identities. Although Australian policy does mention the importance of supporting indigenous peoples and those with disabilities, it fails to make key intersections with gender. Most importantly for achieving any policy objective, Australia does not yet have clear indicators of how increased representation of women will be achieved and where resources for gender programming will come from. Guaranteed resources are the basis upon which all effective policies are built.

Lastly, Australia’s core foreign policy objectives promote the continuation of the Western-dominated rules-based global order. The current order was fashioned after World War II and based upon ideas of liberal democracy, particularly the freedom of trade and the promotion of commerce. These core values were powerfully influenced by the interests and values of Western countries at the time and reflect their racial, religious, gendered, and economic biases. This order has been contested for decades by Russia and, more recently, by emerging powers such as China. The United States has also become an unexpected source of contention as the Trump administration has begun to distance itself competitive and expansive realist focus on relative power between states to one of mutual gains in an increasingly interconnected region. In order to do so, foreign policy must promote a global order based upon rules that strive to achieve equality between countries and individuals. It can be argued that the current world order is simply not structured to do that.

In light of these critiques, workshop participants provided several recommendations for how Australia might approach its foreign policy in a more inclusive, equalityfocused manner, thus generating a better policy and potentially attracting and retaining more women to work in international relations.

Recommendations

Include Women at All Levels. It is difficult for any nation to promote a feminist policy if it does not itself model feminist ideals. In comparison with many other countries, Australia has remarkably inclusive foreign policy consultation. In preparation for the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, a task force held roundtable discussions across Australia, interviewed over 60 prominent Australians and subjectmatter experts, and received over 9,000 written submissions. However, it is unclear who these experts were and how many of them were women or held feminist viewpoints. The Lowy report noted that women play almost no role in the actual drafting of key Australian foreign policy documents. Women and non-gender-binary participants need to be an equal part of policymaking at all levels, not just as advisors but as leaders and substantive content contributors.

from liberal democratic ideals. A feminist foreign policy has the potential to help Australia redirect policies from a

Address Structural Power Imbalances. Australia needs to recognize and reject outdated policies and engage with its foreign partners on equal footing to ensure mutual benefits. Australia is in a privileged position in the Asia Pacific. Since its founding as a state, it has been supported by strong allies that have helped it become and remain a major player in the region. Historically, this power was not always used for the betterment of those with whom Australia came into contact. To construct a foreign policy focused on equality, Australia needs to first take ownership of the negative impact that its foreign policy actions have had on its neighboring states. It also needs to reconsider relationships that have at times prevented—or been used as an excuse to avoid—relationship building with regional neighbors. Policymakers should strive to ensure that these biased, dated policies are not used as precedent for current policies and instead actively work toward crafting new policies that address these imbalances and strengthen collaborative relationships.

Foster Cooperative Policies and Structures. Australia should engage in “smart” power relationships with its regional neighbors and move beyond security collaboration to address broader issues. Drawing on feminist conceptions of ethics of care, Australia can promote cooperative rather than competitive relationships with its neighbors. This necessitates looking beyond the needs of states to address the needs of individuals, particularly marginalized groups. Policies that focus on state needs often overlook those most in need. While this might be a contentious approach to making decisions on engagement and aid delivery, it would show that Australia is willing to put its money where it claims its values lie, encouraging recipient states to ensure their priorities also focus on equality. An inclusive foreign policy— and one that will attract a diverse array of civil servants who want to help implement such policy—should adopt inclusive language that reflects a wider set of skills, including cultural credentials in the exercise of diplomacy and interpersonal skills.

A Comprehensive Approach to Foreign Policy. The world in which Australian foreign policy is seen to operate is referred to as “contested,” “competitive,” “uncertain,” and even “dangerous.” References to national security, found 62 times, overshadow the phrase foreign policy, which is found 22 times. A strong feminist foreign policy would eschew policy built on a nationalized military-based security premised on states’ rights and a patriarchal, rules-based order. Australia can draw upon new relationships and resources to craft a comprehensive approach to foreign policy. Such an approach would embrace human security, which encompasses economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security. Human security is feminist in that it is people-cantered, universal, and tries to prevent suffering, particularly through early prevention. It also acknowledges the interdependent nature of all aspects of security, which extend far beyond protection of physical borders. As security clearly motivates Australia’s foreign policy, embracing a broader understanding of security can address some of the most gendered oversights of existing policy. In particular, it will encourage policymakers to draw equally on all types of foreign influence, balancing military options with trade, aid, and diplomacy.

Conclusion

Genuine pursuit of a feminist foreign policy will not be easy. The structures of government are designed to promote and support masculine ideas of security. Crafting an effective, inclusive, and enduring feminist foreign policy would require substantial resources and overturning male-dominated power structures. Additionally, countries with particularly gendered approaches to governance may push back against Australian efforts to implement feminist policy. However, the current realpolitik approach to Australia’s foreign policy may not be addressing key causes of instability, which are often rooted in gendered relations. A foreign policy that moves beyond the realist emphasis on hard power to foster inclusive, collaborative relationships with other countries and that emphasizes gender equality is the smartest choice for Australia and would be well worth the effort.

References

For a summary of major studies, see Ted Piccone, Democracy, Gender

Equality, and Security, Policy Brief (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, September 2017). For statistics regarding the relationship between gender parity and peace, see Council on Foreign Relations, Women’s Participation in Peace Processes, CFR website (New York, CFR, January 30, 2019).

Valerie M. Hudson, Mary Caprioli, Bonnie Ballif-Spanvill, Rose

McDermott, and Chad F. Emmett, “The Heart of the Matter: The Security of Women and the Security of States,” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 3 (2009), pp. 7-44.

Valerie M. Hudson et al., Sex and World Peace (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012).
Jenny Nordberg, “Who’s Afraid of a Feminist Foreign Policy?,” New Yorker (April 15, 2015).
Government Offices of Sweden, Handbook on Sweden’s Feminist Foreign Policy (Stockholm: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019).
Government of Canada, Feminist International Assistance Policy (Ottawa: Global Affairs Canada).
Government of France, France’s International Strategy for Gender Equality (2018-2022) (Paris: Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs).
Lyric Thompson, “Mexican Diplomacy Has Gone Feminist,” Foreign Policy (January 14, 2020).
Lyric Thompson and Rachel Clement, Defining Feminist Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: International Center for Research on Women, 2019), p.7.
Karin Aggestam, Annika Bergman Rosamond, and Annica Kronsell, “Theorising Feminist Foreign Policy,” International Relations, Vol. 33, No.1 (2019), pp. 23–39.
Nordberg, “Who’s Afraid of a Feminist Foreign Policy?”12 Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment Strategy (Canberra: Australian Government, February 2016).

13 Danielle Cave et al., Foreign Territory: Women In International Relations (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2019).

Australian Government, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Canberra: Australian Government, 2017).Ibid, p. 3.Richard Menhinick, ‘The Rules-Based Global Order’: Be Alert and Alarmed, The Strategist (Canberra: Australian Strategic Policy Institute,

April 12, 2019). For an example of how the existing rules-based global order is being used to promote particular agendas, see P. Chacko and K. Jayasuriya, “Trump, The Authoritarian Populist Revolt, and the Future of the Rules-Based Order in Asia,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 2 (2017), pp. 121–27.

Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2009).
Fiona Robinson, The Ethics of Care: A Feminist Approach to Human Security (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011).
The term “human security” first appeared in the 1994 Human Development Report published by the United Nations Development Program.
For example, Saudi Arabia. See Nordberg, “Who’s Afraid of a Feminist Foreign Policy?”
Valerie Hudson, “What Sex Means for World Peace,” Foreign Policy

(April 24, 2012).

By Sarah Kenny

On August 12, 2017, neo-Nazis and white supremacists shocked the United States and the world alike with a deadly display of domestic terrorism. Tiki-torches, firearms, and fists overwhelmed the University of Virginia’s campus and the streets of downtown Charlottesville, Virginia, leaving an activist and two state police officers dead and dozens injured.

Since August 2017, the list of far-right extremist atrocities in the United States and elsewhere has only grown. On October 24, 2018, two black shoppers were shot at a grocery store in Jeffersontown, Kentucky. Three days later, a man opened fire on a service at the Tree of Life synagogue in Squirrel Hill, Pennsylvania, the deadliest anti-Semitic attack in US history.¹

The following week, a man who identified as an ‘incel’ (involuntarily celibate) opened fire in a Tallahassee yoga studio.² On March 15, 2019, an Australian man carried out a shooting rampage at two mosques in Christchurch, New Zealand. August 3rd marks the murder of 22 shoppers at an El Paso, Texas Walmart; the perpetrator of this mass shooting has admitted to targeting Mexicans in a white nationalist manifesto he released in advance of the attack.³

Depictions of the alt-right, like the grisly images from Charlottesville, feature few to no women actors. This lack of representation of women in the alt-right insinuates that women play an insignificant role in this movement, if any at all. But women do in fact make significant contributions to the alt-right movement. Moreover, the systematic mischaracterization of the alt-right movement as a genderless movement weakens governmental, civil society, and community level approaches to preventing and countering far-right extremism.

Research on far-right violent extremism is limited and on the role that women play even more so. This paper’s arguments and recommendations are informed by primary source interviews I conducted with two former neo-Nazi women: Angela King and Shannon Martinez. King was involved in right-wing extremist activity into her mid-20s, when she was sent to federal prison for a hate crime. After her release from prison, King pursued higher education and co-founded Life After Hate, a peace activism organization that supports deradicalization. Martinez likewise turned her back on farright extremism at the age of 20 and has since dedicated her career to counterextremist activism.

What Is the Alt-Right?

In 2008, University of Virginia graduate Richard Spencer coined the term “alternative right” (alt-right) to rebrand an age-old American sociopolitical tradition: white supremacy.

According to the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), the alt-right “is a set of far-right ideologies, groups and individuals whose core belief is that ‘white identity’ is under attack by multicultural forces using ‘political correctness’ and ‘social justice’ to undermine white people and ‘their’ civilization.”⁴ Furthermore, the SPLC notes that “alt-righters eschew establishment conservatism, skew young, and embrace white ethno-nationalism as a fundamental value.” Ethnonationalism can be understood as “advocacy of or support for the political interests of a particular ethnic group, especially its national independence or self-determination.” While the term alt-right is merely a decade old, the ideals that this platform espouses are a rebranding of a rich tradition of far-right activism in America. According to George Michael, a scholar of right-wing extremism at Westfield State University, “The alt-right derives from the same impulses that have launched other white extremist groups, including a belief that white civilization, the white race in particular, is imperiled.”⁵

The most prominent example of organized white supremacism in the mainstream American conscious is the Ku Klux Klan. African American political thinker Marcus

Garvey, founder of the Universal Negro Improvement

Association and the “Back to Africa” movement, called the KKK the “invisible government of America,” a claim that speaks to the project of white supremacy that still lives on in many of nation’s most powerful institutions.⁶ While white hoods and cross burnings are no longer socially acceptable to the great majority of Americans, the principles that KKK-affiliated individuals have espoused over the last century live on in members of today’s alt-right, among others.

A distinguishing factor that differentiates alt-right activity from historical far-right violent extremism is the alt-right’s use of online meetings and community-building efforts. According to the SPLC, the alt-right is “characterized by heavy use of social media and online memes,” although these features of communication are often shielded from the mainstream eye.⁷ Much of the online activity occurs on the “deep web,” a part of the internet that is inaccessible to most search engines. Furthermore, extremist groups convene on the “dark web,” “a small portion of the deep web that has been intentionally hidden and is inaccessible through standard web browsers.”⁸

Myths about Women in the Alt-Right

§ Alt-right adherents are a homogenous group of violent, racist young men.

Images of extremism in Charlottesville on August 11 and 12, 2017, and elsewhere primarily feature violent young men. Sociology scholar Kathleen Blee reflects this archetypal depiction in Understanding Racist Activism, where she describes common preconceptions of the alt-right actor as “a deviant, hate-filled extremist who acts on his own deeply-held hostilities toward the victim’s social group.”⁹ This definition overlooks the social dynamics and demographic diversity within alt-right membership.

Men-centric definitions are not unique to alt-right archetypes. Women have been excluded from history books, scholarship, and policy analysis of most social and political movements. Such systemic exclusion has effectively gendered these social movements, including the alt-right. Thus “the logic is circular: organized racism is a male province,” Blee deduces.¹⁰ To ignore the role and agency of women in political groups perpetuates erasure and subordination. Furthermore, this neglect is an incomplete, inaccurate account of society.

Women join alt-right and extremist movements. Precise participation estimates prove challenging to calculate due in part to the hidden nature of alt-right organizing. In her 2017 analysis of the alt-right, “The Rise of the Valkyries,” journalist Seyward Darby contended that women make up between 15 and 20 percent of this movement.¹¹ Any demographic that constitutes a fifth of a movement’s base is worth examination.¹² Moreover, a diverse group of women join movements like the alt-right. Instead of transferring stereotypes about alt-right membership from men to women—assuming that all women members are lower-

class, uneducated, apolitical, violent racists—it is critical to examine how gender influences membership. An intersectional gender analysis of member demographics is a superior tool to analyze the nature of women in the alt-right.¹³

In a November 2017 Newsweek article, “Alt-Right Women Asked to ‘Choose Submission’ to Grow Political Movement,” a popular alt-right personality named Martina Markota speaks to the challenging relationship between her political perspective and experience as a woman. She shared, “I’m a conservative.… I identify as a woman. Being both tends to get you treated unfairly in media.”¹⁴ Another woman in the article shared, “I’m from a Northern city, and I’m highly educated, actually.… The reason I won’t give my name to you is because I’ve seen how the media distorts things about women like me.” Stereotypes that all far-right women are “trailer-park trash” can lead scholars to ignore the influence of alt-right ideology on those who hail from diverse walks of life, a dangerous miscalculation.¹⁵ Such examples shed light on the relationship between womanhood and whiteness.

§ Radicalization is an individualistic, belief-driven process.

An individualistic model of radicalization maintains that a person, motivated by strong beliefs, goes out of their way to find community within an ideologically consistent group or movement. However, the individualistic framework neglects the gendered motivations of many women who join the altright. For many women, joining extremist movements arises from social interactions and/or pivots on a life incident that acts as a point of conversion.

Understanding membership as a social process that precedes belief formation has broad implications for the myth that the alt-right solely comprises individual racists who seek out a place to be openly racist. In “Becoming a Racist,” Kathleen Blee challenges the theory of belief-driven activism—“the notion that people come into racist movements because they have racist ideas”—as the single motivating factor for far-right membership.¹⁶ Her research demonstrates that “racial ‘awareness’ is more often a consequence of association with members of racist groups than a cause motivating participation.”¹⁷ Instead, “social camaraderie, a desire for simple answers to complex political problems, or even the opportunity to take action against formidable social forces can co-exist with—even substitute for—hatred as the reason for participation in organized racist activities.”¹⁸

While scholars and academics have largely neglected the complex social nature of mobilization, far-right leaders surely understand the dynamics of recruitment. Blee recounts the story of a Southern Klan leader admitting that “in order to bring in men, the men will follow the women…. If the wife is into it, she’ll drag the husband along.”¹⁹ Alt-right figure Lana Lokteff illuminates the social nature of conversion: “The alt-right in America … attracted young guys and gals, and guys with girlfriends.… They stopped caring about their old friends because they met new ones. White women in particular are starving for a true sisterhood.”²⁰

The social nature of radicalization also affects women’s ability to acquire leadership roles within the organization. As the Klan leader that Blee quotes said, “We don’t hold women back from promotions or climbing the ladder. We can’t afford to not let them have whatever positions they want to work for.”²¹ While clearly demonstrating reticence about women’s leadership, the Klan leader at the same time recognizes that he must set aside traditional gender role expectations to increase women’s participation.

Life-changing or traumatic instances can motivate group membership. Over years of interviews and research on farright extremist groups in America, Blee has documented a “narrative of conversion pivoted on a single dramatic life event” driving women’s membership. She describes this conversion as “an ordeal that clarified perception, sharpened value priorities, and seemed to reveal the racial and ethnic dynamics of history,” thereby serving as a catalyst for joining.²²

My interviews with Martinez and King illustrate the transformative process to which Blee refers. Drawing upon her experience of rape and stories she has encountered in years of deradicalization work with other former skinheads, for anger and rage that the individual is already feeling and grappling with, and also as a release valve.”

To cope with the trauma of her own rape, Martinez “found it a relief to make her anger and rage smaller and more focused” by joining the skinheads who occupied the margins of the countercultural scene she already identified with as a young adolescent, although previously on the left wing of the ideological spectrum. Martinez said she did not join the group specifically to target nonwhite individuals. Rather, her extremism was motivated by a desire to express the rage her trauma had induced. That nonwhite individuals were on the receiving end of this rage was a tragic but not predetermined reality.

King’s childhood and adolescence were characterized by pain similar to that of Martinez. “I never expected to make it past the age of 30,” King told me. “Things had happened to me that could have caused me to end up on any number of selfdestructive paths. I had started associating with local gangs until I was raped, so I found a new way. I didn’t say, ‘Wow, you’re all racists and I want to get involved,’ but it was because they accepted me and because I didn’t have to explain why I was aggressive and angry.”Throughout King’s struggle to deal with her personal pain and trauma, she found a community that accepted her hurt and anger. As in Martinez’s case, King’s new peer group came with the cost of extreme discriminatory principles and activity, a cost that her deep suffering, in part, drove her to accept. Trauma certainly does not send every victim toward extremist organizations. However, this understanding of trauma as a conversion factor for extremist mobilization helps to construct a more complete process of why and how people may join such movements.

§ Women alt-right adherents are irrational and apolitical.

Martinez speaks to trauma’s role as a catalyzing factor for many who join far-right, extremist organizations. “I strongly believe, and there’s just a bit of research going on right now … that trauma is a crucial piece of this puzzle that acts as sort of the tripwire, that the people who are entering into these violent movements of all ideologies are looking for a sense of belonging and idea and some purpose for their life,” Martinez said. “The ideology serves as this megaphone, on one hand

Men’s past and present motivations to join far-right extremist groups are often perceived as somewhat cogent. According to Blee, “White men—who were privileged in economic life, public politics, and the family—had a clear interest in racist appeals to traditionalism, economic stability, and national resurgence.”²³ Thereby, men’s involvement “was rational and self-interested. Gender wasn’t peripheral to the Right … indeed, it was paramount.” If men’s motivations are rational, self-interested, and grounded in a gendered order, then what of women’s motivations?

Women of the alt-right do not view the movement as being in opposition to their beliefs. Rather, many women view the movement as “a refuge where [they] can embrace their femininity and their racial heritage without shame.”²⁴ Blee also finds that “women’s entrance into organized racism is not a simple matter of their obliviousness to the political agenda of racist groups, nor of personal gullibility on the part of individual women.” Rather, she notes, most “women work to create a rational connection between themselves and the goals of racist politics.”²⁵

Movement leaders like Lokteff help facilitate this rational connection for adherents. In a speech at a rightist conference in Stockholm titled “How the Left Is Betraying Women,” she spoke to the character of the alt-right women: they “aren’t from the trailer park, and they’re not weak and naive— they’re the kind of women that other women want to be like. They’re smart, beautiful women who realize that mass immigration isn’t working, and it’s changing their lifestyle for the worse.”²⁶ Lokteff strategically manipulates the mainstream label of irrationality and uses it to build community among women who understand their ideologies as rational and thereby seek corresponding political outlets.

Factions of the alt-right accept that women can and should have a political role in the movement, yet this role has a narrow expression within the broader project of ethnonationalism. Women and men have distinct roles in the war to preserve the future of white civilization, a civilization founded upon an immutable understanding of gender. Lokteff equates nationalism to the values of womanhood— beauty, family, and home—and promises that the left is losing women to the right because the nationalist movement will continue to elevate these values. She argues, “We value the beauty of Western civilization and the refined human form. European men … facilitated beauty in all its forms. It’s the ultimate romantic gesture to European women. They built our civilization to enable the home and family and to protect women.”²⁷

The Nordic symbol of the valkyrie encapsulates the call to political action to which alt-right women are responding. Valkyries describe a group of maiden women sent to war by the ancient god Odin, some of whom were tasked with slaying righteous enemies, others with guarding their loved ones. Associated with “fairness, brightness, and gold, as well as bloodshed,” this mythical figure supports a preeminent narrative in alt-right thought that Western civilization finds itself under an exceptional era of attack.”²⁸ Therefore, alt-right women interested in preserving a white nation must leave behind their natural and preferable roles in the home to protect the future of white civilization.²⁹ Yet come the end of battle, women are expected to return home and rely upon the ordinarily sufficient protection they receive from their spouses.

Policy Implications

Recognize the role that women play in supporting, countering, and preventing violent extremism.

Far-right violent extremism, including alt-right activity, presents a significant international security threat.³⁰ Thereby, women in the alt-right present a significant international security threat. The systemic exclusion of women from programming and strategies for countering/ preventing violent extremism “may cause us to seriously underestimate the destructive potential of this movement,” Blee writes.³¹ Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, UN special rapporteur on counterterrorism and human rights, notes that “when women come into view in terrorism and counterterrorism policy, they typically do so as the wives, daughters, sisters, and mothers of terrorist actors, or as the archetypal victims of senseless terrorist acts whose effects on the most vulnerable (women) underscore the unacceptability of terrorist targeting.”³² Martinez’s description of the alt-right reflects similar themes: women “work in interceptive space and a legal space where it’s not material support but that there is support offered. This is a particularly big area where women are involved, where they’re not breaking the law, but they’re providing support nevertheless.” While women are less likely to break the law, there has been acknowledgment in recent U.S. legislative efforts that some women can and do perpetrate illegal acts of violent extremism.³³

In order to recognize and legitimate the role of women in this movement, US actors should draw parallels to global trends in violent extremism. By comparing alt-right radicalization to global radicalization processes, scholars of far-right violent extremism can glean valuable insights from the more extensive body of research that exists on the threat of Islamist extremism.³⁴ Joana Cook and Catherine Zheng are among those contributing to this work.³⁵ Martinez’s experiences have informed her belief that there are fewer differences between flavors of extremism than many believe. When I first met Martinez, she was on her way home from a presentation in the United Arab Emirates about deradicalization. Addressing members of the United Nations, she contended that many of the patterns within the Neo-Nazi skinhead organization to which she belonged closely resemble patterns that have led young women and men to join organizations such as ISIS.

Incorporate gender mainstreaming into deradicalization efforts.

Civil society organizations that support deradicalization efforts should conduct gender analyses of their programming. Furthermore, these groups should mainstream a gender perspective in their work to prevent and counter violent extremism.³⁶ I asked King about the role that gender played in her programming at Life After Hate, an organization dedicated to working with people leaving extremist movements. “I don’t differentiate my treatment of the people I work with,” King said. “I use my vulnerability to connect to people. The women and men that I work with have a lot in common that they talk about openly.” After making this initial claim that gender was not a featured framework in her professional methodology, she shared some observations that seemed to demonstrate otherwise. King noted, “Among the women that I’m friends with and have worked with, there’s a lot of criticism about how they were treated and abused. Women are afraid of criticizing the men now that they’re out and changed.” Here, King points to a marked difference in women’s understanding of themselves as former members of the movement and as people that are independent of the movement. Presenting a problem for consideration, King pondered “how to create a best practice around the issue of how to facilitate healthy conversations between men and women who were formally involved regarding issues that women were affected by and men were not.”

In addition to civil society organizations, public schools should incorporate a gendered counterextremism curriculum into general health and wellness education. Martinez has strong convictions about the role that education should play in counter-racist activism and preventing violent extremism. Drawing on her experiences as a mother of seven, she stated, “We teach our kids at home and in school about what to do if there’s a fire or school shooter, preparing our kids for these dangers, but for some reason, we won’t talk about how radicalization happens. We should absolutely develop curriculum around how recruitment happens in spaces like gangs as well, which is all the same.…” Positing that the dynamics of radicalization are foundationally gendered, such material would equip boys and girls alike with tools of awareness and resiliency in the face of extremism. § Invest in the power of personal relationships.

Personal interactions hold great transformative power for countering violent extremism. Relationships between women who harbor extremist ideologies and those who challenge their worldviews offer great potential for deradicalization, as “personal allegiances are as important as ideological commitments to many women activists.”³⁷ If such personal allegiances played a large role in a woman’s radicalization processes, they necessarily fit into the puzzle of deradicalization. Yet forming relationships with those outside of one’s extreme ideological camp proves challenging, Martinez laments, speaking to the deep shame and self-loathing that she knows adherents to extremist ideologies have internalized. Offering advice to those who have thought about engaging with women who hold extremist views, Martinez cautions that “objectifying the person with whom you’re trying to dialogue just exacerbates the problem and there’s just a deepening cycle of disconnect from others.”³⁸ Her point underscores the importance of recognizing the humanity of others in deradicalization and counterextremism efforts.

King’s deradicalization story is a testament to the power of personal relationships. At 23, King was arrested and sent to federal prison for robbery.³⁹ Reflecting on her time in prison, King recalls, “I was treated with kindness by women that I didn’t deserve it from, such as women of color and different nationalities. I was treated the opposite of what I felt that I deserved and started to feel like a human being again with hopes.” Beyond finding friendships, King fell in love with a black woman. She noted, “From the age of 10, I knew that I was gay, but I ran far away from it. In prison, I acknowledged my sexuality for the first time, and I started to see things through a broader lens. Gender roles started to go outside the lines of what I’d been taught.”

Conclusion

The alt-right, an expression of far-right violent extremism, presents a security risk to citizens in the United States and around the world. As globalization, mass immigration, and multiculturalism flourish, various collectives of fearful individuals and populist politicians will continue to embrace ethnonationalist worldviews and employ violent means to enforce them.

To combat this security risk, it is essential to acknowledge that women make significant contributions to the altright and violent extremism. Women can no longer be misrepresented and excluded from efforts to prevent and counter this form of violent extremism. Exclusion has proven both disingenuous and dangerous along the road to realizing a comprehensive threat analysis and strategy.

Martinez is keenly aware of the challenges in adopting such an inclusive strategy. She acknowledges that “there are some growing pains right now” but nevertheless “hold[s] out a lot of hope” and believes that “the culture that is coming up is way more inclusive.” Her optimism is worth investing in.

References

Lois Beckett, “Pittsburgh shooting: Suspect Railed against Jews and Muslims on Site Used by ‘Alt-Right,’ ” The Guardian (October 27, 2018.
Mihir Zaveri, Julia Jacobs, and Sarah Nervosh, “Gunman in Yoga Studio Shooting Recorded Misogynistic Videos and Faced Battery Charges,” New York Times (November 3, 2018).
Rebecca Falconer, “El Paso suspect confessed to targeting Mexicans in mass shooting,” Axios (August 9, 2019).
Southern Poverty Law Center, “Alt-Right,” website, www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/alt-right
Seyward Darby, “The Rise of the Valkyries,” Harper’s (September 2017),
David Chambers, Hooded Americanism: The First Century of the Ku Klux Klan (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965).
Southern Poverty Law Center, “Alt-Right.”
Bright Planet, “Clearing Up Confusion—Deep Web vs. Dark Web” (March 27, 2014),.
Kathleen M. Blee, Understanding Racist Activism: Theory, Methods, and Research (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group), 70.
Ibid, p. 125
Darby, “Rise of the Valkyries.”
In an interview with me, former skinhead Angela King cautioned against pinning hard statistics to membership in such organizations, noting that “one person could have 10 social media accounts, so we’ll never get accurate numbers about who’s involved. These kinds of groups are always in transition, always waning and waxing.”
Intersectionality, a concept rooted in feminist theory, provides a helpful theoretical tool to understand the complex beliefs of women in the alt-right. The term intersectionality has been defined as “the interconnected nature of social categorizations such as race, class, and gender, regarded as creating overlapping and interdependent systems of discrimination or disadvantage.”YW Boston, “What Is Intersectionality, and What Does It Have to Do with Me?” blogpost (March 29, 2017).
Michael Edison Hayden, “Alt-Right Women Asekd to ‘Choose Submission’ to Grow Political Movement,” Newsweek (November 16, 2017).
Lana Lokteff, “How the Left Is Betraying Women,” Youtube (February 27, 2017).
Kathleen M. Blee “Becoming a Racist: Women in Contemporary Ku Klux Klan and Neo-Nazi Groups,” Gender and Society 10, no. 6: (1996): 127.
Blee, Understanding Racist Activism.
Blee, Understanding Racist Activism.
Blee, “Becoming a Racist.”
Lokteff, “How the Left Is Betraying Women.”
Blee, “Becoming a Racist.
Ibid.
Blee, Understanding Racist Activism.
Darby, “Rise of the Valkyries.”
Blee, “Becoming a Racist.”
Lokteff, “How the Left Is Betraying Women.”
Ibid.
“Valkyrie,” Encyclopedia Britannica.
Ibid. The alt-right and its various incarnations over time have embraced Celtic and Nordic ideology to brand themselves with ideological symbolism.
The United States saw a 70 percent increase in “violent attacks perpetrated in the name of far-right ideology” over the course of Trump’s first year in office. Stephen Tankel, “Riding the Tiger: How Trump Enables Right-Wing Extremism,” War on the Rocks blog (November 5, 2018). However, the Trump administration has slashed federal funding and external grant programs to counter violent extremism at home. Julia Edwards Ainsley, “White House Budget Slashes ‘Countering Violent
Extremism’ Grants,” Reuters (May 23, 2017). Daniel Byman writes that “right-wing groups like neo-Nazis are at times lumped in with animal rights organizations as a domestic threat or discussed in the context of their overseas connections.” “Takeaways from the Trump Administration’s New Counterterrorism Strategy,” Order from Chaos blog (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, October 5, 2018), Furthermore, the US government lacks the legal tools to prevent and prosecute much domestic extremist activity and the actors who employ it.Legal advocates like Mary McCord, senior litigator and visiting professor of law at the Institute for Constitutional Advocacy and Protection at Georgetown University Law School, are encouraging congressional actors to enact a domestic terrorism statute. McCord’s legal advocacy aligns with Martinez’s prescriptions for countering the violent extremist threat: “The government needs to reassess how they define terrorism and include white nationalism. If they are declared terrorist organizations, the government can mobilize resources they currently can’t.”
Blee, Understanding Racist Activism.
Fionnuala Ní Aoláin, “Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism” (New York: United Nations, Human Rights Council, 2017).
On March 8, 2019, which was International Women’s Day, Congresswoman Lois Frankel introduced H.R. 1653, the Women and Countering Violence Extremism Act of 2019. This legislation aims “to ensure that the United States recognizes women’s varied roles in all aspects of violent extremism and terrorism and promotes their meaningful participation as full partners in all efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism, and for other purposes.” The June 2019 US Strategy on Women, Peace, and Security issued calls to “empower women as partners in preventing terrorism and countering radicalization and recruitment.”
Julia Ebner, senior research associate with the Institute for Strategic Dialogue, argues that far-right and Islamist extremists actually reinforce one another’s ideologies, creating an echo chamber that blurs the neat lines of domestic and foreign extremism altogether (Julia Ebner, The Rage: The Vicious Circle of Islamist and Far-Right Extremism (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2018).
Joana Cook, A Woman’s Place: U.S. Counterterrorism since 9/11 (London: Hurst, 2019); Catherine Zheng, “Women in ISIS: The Rise of Female Jihadists,” Harvard Political Review blog (March 18, 2017).
A gender analysis can be defined as “a critical examination of how differences in gender roles, activities, needs, opportunities, and rights/ entitlements affect men, women, girls, and boys in certain situation or contexts.” UN Women, “Gender Equality Glossary.”
Blee, Understanding Racist Activism.
Celeste Headless and Sean Powers, “A Former Skinhead on Life After Hate,” Georgia Public Broadcasting (August 22, 2017).
Larry Lebowitz, “Woman Pleads Guilty to Role in Robbery and Beating,” South Florida Sun Sentinal (December 4, 1998).

By Shannon Zimmerman, Luisa Ryan and David Duriesmith

In April 2018 Alek Minassian drove a van into a crowd of people in Toronto, killing ten people. A few minutes before, he had posted on Facebook, “The Incel rebellion has already begun! We will overthrow all Chads and Stacys! All hail the supreme gentleman Elliot Rodger.”

Minassian was referring to Elliot Rodger, the 22-year-old male who committed the Isla Vista, Calif., attack which killed six people in 2014. Before his rampage, Rodger had posted a ‘manifesto’ online – a lengthy tirade against the failures of modern society to provide him sexual access to women. Rodger is often portrayed in the media as the godfather of Incel ideology and is referred to as the “Supreme Gentleman” in online spaces such as Reddit and incel.me. He was the first individual to be labeled a terrorist of the alt-right by the Southern Poverty Law Center, which tracks far-right activity.¹

Minassian’s Facebook post indicated that his act was linked to a broader political ideology rooted in a toxic combination of male supremacy and white supremacy. While lone-wolf attackers who invoke anti-feminist ideas- like Minassian- are often framed as mentally ill loners, this attack was terrorist in nature and should be considered as such. Like the response to Elliot Rodger’s earlier attack at Isla Vista, media reporting after the Toronto attack quickly emphasized Minassian’s struggles with mental health and cited claims from friends that he “wasn’t a terrorist.”² This treatment fails to recognize the corrosive political ideology that underpinned Minassian’s attack and his desire to terrorize the public. These qualities should rightly define his actions as terrorism.

Who are Incels?

Incel, shorthand for ‘involuntarily celibate,’ is a violent political ideology based on a new wave of misogyny and white supremacy.³ Incel ideology is predicated on the notion that feminism has ruined society, therefore there is a need for a ‘gender revolt’ in order to reclaim a particular type of manhood based on both male and white superiority.⁴Incels believe that by defending women’s bodily autonomy, feminism has upset the natural order which organizes society around monogamous heterosexual couplings. As a result, physically attractive young women (labeled as ‘Stacys’) now choose to sleep with the most physically desirable men (labeled as ‘Chads’).⁵ Incels often frame this pattern of behavior as a form of theft, whereby their entitled access to women’s bodies is thwarted by women’s preference for more desirable ‘Chads.’ These (mostly) young men are frustrated at a world they see as denying them power and sexual control over women’s bodies. In their eyes, they are victims of oppressive feminism, an ideology which must be overthrown, often through violence.

The diagram on the next page (taken from the subreddit r/ braincell) reflects how this ideology views the world. Incel ideology presents a mythologized view that prior to the sexual revolution in the ‘60s, every man had access to a female partner; subsequent to the women’s empowerment movement, fewer and fewer men have access to a partner. They frame this shift as a profound injustice to men who cannot find a sexual partner, suggesting that society has failed to give men what they are entitled to (access to women’s bodies) and that the only recourse is violent insurrection.

Drawing the link between incels and other forms of violent extremism

There has been some debate as to whether incel attacks count as terrorism. Media reporting has often been reticent to classify these attacks as terror and some officials, including the Canadian police, refused to call the Toronto attack an act of terrorism.⁶ However, the nature of incel violence meets the requirement of the U.S. State Department’s description, which defines the term ‘terrorism’ as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”⁷ While incels have not yet formed organized violent groups or cells, the existing attacks have been premeditated, politically motivated and perpetrated violence against civilians. These factors clearly designate incel attacks as a form of terrorism and require incel ideology to be explored as a form of violent extremism.

At the heart of this ideology are hardened misogynistic notions of traditional gender roles. Rather than focusing on a particular religious or ethnic group, these attacks are motivated by shared beliefs about sexuality, male supremacy and the need to violently reestablish ‘traditional’ gender norms. The substantial online communities, previously congregating on the now defunct subreddit r/incel and more recently on incel.me and r/braincells subreddit, validate this world view and encourage direct action in pursuit of their goals.

Incel ideology is just one of many forms of misogynistic violence. Addressing this misogyny and the violence it produces is the most effective way to prevent some of the conditions which lead to domestic terrorist attacks. Early action will also go a long way towards addressing the core tenets of far-right ideologies, which are increasingly impacting and unsettling the American public at large.

There is an undeniable link between misogyny and violence. Experts say that domestic violence is a way for a male abuser to impose and enforce ‘traditional’ gender roles, which are based on ideas of men having control over women.⁸ The important factor here is that it is violence or threats of violence that are used to exert that control. This link starts with domestic violence but may extend far beyond the privacy of the home to include mass shootings or terrorist attacks. Recent research shows that more than 50% of the mass shootings executed in the United States between 2009 and 2016 were preceded by the shooter’s murder of a partner, ex-partner or family member.⁹ For example, James Hodgkinson, who opened fire at a GOP baseball practice, allegedly assaulted his daughter and was accused of abuse by two of his three ex-wives.¹⁰

Researchers such as Cynthia Cockburn, Rachel Pain and Sara Meger have shown the deep links between men’s sexual violence and their use of armed violence in public. In the case of incel terrorism, the links to violence are overt.¹¹ Incel discussions often explicitly connect women’s non-provision of sexual access to the need for sexually marginalized men to deploy brutal violence in the public sphere in order to defend this ‘entitlement’. While not all incels are white supremacists or terrorists, affiliates are connected to these more extreme violent expressions by a toxic view of gender relations, which provides the “linking thread, a kind of fuse, along which violence runs.”¹² Incel discussions often draw explicitly on white supremacist calls for armed insurrection to overthrow the prevailing order and restore an order based on men’s supremacy over women. The parallels between Minassian’s call for “Incel Rebellion” and white supremacists’ calls for ethno-nationalist insurrection are not coincidental.¹³ Incels who argue for an armed insurrection often use similar terminology to white supremacists in relation to the need for men to overthrow the prevailing system. Frustration with the current system, and adherence to an ideology that promotes violent solutions, not only makes incels dangerous actors in and of themselves, but also increases the probability that they will be amenable to broader extremist recruitment tactics.

The Islamic State advertises its treatment of women as a recruitment tool, showing men- particularly men from western countries- that the caliphate will allow them to restore ‘traditional’ gender norms of male dominance.¹⁴ This ideology appeals to individuals who desire to control the women in their own lives. Omar Mateen, the Pulse nightclub shooter who killed 49 people in the second deadliest mass shooting in recent American history, was loosely affiliated with ISIS. He mentally and physically abused his wife.¹⁵ This pattern fits a number of other so-called ‘lone wolf’ attacker profiles, such as Khalid Masood, the Westminster attacker; Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, who committed the van attack in Nice; Tamerlan Tsarnaev, one of the Boston Marathon bombers, and Man Haron Monis, who carried out the Sydney Lindt café siege and has been charged with

22 counts of aggravated sexual assault.¹⁶ According to Nimmi Gowrinathan, the restrictive gender roles promoted by terrorist organizations often act as a “pull” factor for potential recruits who have pre-existing attitudes or desires in that direction.Addressing misogynistic attitudes is one of the best ways to prevent an escalation to violence.

The risk of misogyny-linked terror groups is particularly pertinent to the United States today. A 2017 survey by the Thomson Reuters Foundation found that the United States is now among the top 10 most dangerous nations for women when assessed on healthcare, discrimination, cultural traditions, sexual violence, non-sexual violence and human trafficking.¹⁷ The U.S. ranked third, tying with Syria, in regard to the danger of sexual violence including rape, sexual harassment, coerced sex and lack of justice in rape cases. The U.S. ranked sixth for non-sexual violence against women and was the only Western country to show up on the list. The other countries, in order of danger to women, were listed as India, Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen and Nigeria.

It may be easy to believe that incels are an extreme fringe group that do not pose a threat to national or international security. However, Incels represent just one end of a spectrum of extremist groups spanning a vast range of political ideologies, all united by militant misogyny. These groups range from white-supremacists and neo-Nazis to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Incels are just one aspect of a violent ideological masculinity, an ideology that is growing. Misogynist online groups, from men’s rights activists, to ‘pick up artist’ communities and Incels, have increased in number and size over recent years.¹⁸ The subreddit r/incels had roughly 40,000 members when it was shut down in 2017 for inciting violence against women.¹⁹ But incels are not confined to “one tiny bit of Reddit” rather “it’s a movement that has tens of thousands of people who visit these boards, these subreddits, which are safe places for them.”²⁰

There are arguments both for and against banning websites that promote violence against women, such as the subreddit r/incel. Some argue that these groups should be allowed to remain, as they gather promoters of violent ideology together where they might be monitored rather than forcing them to scatter, only to grow and proliferate. However, if allowed to remain, these online communities permit both violent content and norms to flourish and possibly be enacted in the real world.²¹ Reddit, the site which hosted then banned the subreddit r/incel, has recently established policies that prohibit content that “encourages, glorifies, incites or calls for violence or physical harm against an individual or group of people.” The platform has also been clamping down on pages which are dedicated to far-right groups, banning two such groups for sharing personal information without permission as a form of harassment, also known as ‘doxing.’²² The incel Reddit thread was just one of countless online forums, blogs and networks collectively called the ‘Manosphere,’ which focus on issues of men’s rights and male supremacy where incels, and those with similar ideologies, gather. These forums act as an echo chamber reifying and amplifying extremist beliefs. It should be noted that since the closing of r/incel the community has moved to other subreddits, such as r/braincells, or to dedicated sites like https://incels.me/.

Ideologies based on ideas of domination through fear facilitate violent acts and should be considered as a form of terrorism. Recently, the Southern Poverty Law Center added male supremacy to the list of ideologies it tracks on its ‘hate map’, placing it alongside white nationalist, racist skinhead, neo-Nazi, neo-nationalist and other hate groups.²³ Just as white supremacist violence is now well-recognized as a form of terrorism, it is important that male supremacist attacks be similarly acknowledged.

Policy implications

Crafting and supporting policies that provide alternatives to violent white supremacist and misogynistic rhetoric/ actions is an effective method to increase both domestic and international security. Understanding the complex interactions between domestic violence, misogyny, alt-right ideology, and terrorism opens up several new avenues for preventative policy responses.

Address the ideology

Address misogynistic ideology with the same seriousness as other forms of violent extremism. There has been a tendency both in media reporting and government responses to treat incel attacks as purely a result of mental illness or random acts of violence. Incel ideology must be treated as the form of violent extremist thought that it is, and relevant existing laws and policies should be applied. The role of incel ideology in promoting ‘lone-wolf’ attacks means that it requires a similar response to the promotion of jihadi or neo-Nazi ideology online.
Encourage and support policies that identify and sanction speech that is intended to incite violence or harm against an individual or group of people, including that which is based on gender. Such policies, where they already exist, need to be enforced. Gender-based threats need to be taken as seriously as threats based on religion and ethnicity.

Act on early warning signs

The speed at which people radicalize makes radicalization difficult to track. However, those that engage in terrorist attacks often have long histories of violence, particularly domestic violence. If mass shootings and terrorist attacks are connected to domestic or family violence, there are warning signs that, if acknowledged, can be used to help prevent future violence.

Strengthen domestic violence laws to prevent abusers from accessing weapons, including mechanisms to remove guns from individuals who have exhibited dangerous behavior. This would include closing background check loopholes which allow individuals prohibited from buying guns to purchase them.
Ensure the application of domestic violence laws and facilitate the creation of laws which prohibit violence based on gender.
Craft policies which identify and address violent behaviors rather than profiling individuals based on race or religion, tactics which only further alienate individuals. Policies can acknowledge domestic violence as an important precursor to larger violent acts.
Acts of domestic violence need to be understood as a security threat rather than a ‘personal’ matter, and thus treated accordingly. This includes supporting domestic violence survivors and prosecuting perpetrators before they can harm others.

Extremist ideologies advocating violence of any kind are a domestic security concern. Holistically addressing these ideologies and the environments in which they thrive is an effective approach to preventing both large and small scale violence targeted at specific groups, be those groups identified by race, religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, or other.

References

‘The alternative right (alt-right) is defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary as a right-wing political movement whose members reject mainstream conservative politics and instead promote extremist beliefs and policies based on ideas of white nationalism. While there is no single ideology of the alt-right, it is commonly employed to describe figures such as Richard Spencer who support extremist ideology without adopting the traditional trappings of neo-Nazism or conventional conservatism. The alt-right movement is closely associated with online forums such as 4chan which were integral to the emergence of the incel movement.
Stewart Bell, “He Wasn’t a Terrorist’: Those Who Knew Alek Minassian Struggle to Explain the Toronto Van Attack,” https:// globalnews.ca/news/4168222/he-wasnt-terrorist-toronto-attack/, [10 Sept. 2018].
The term ‘incel’ was originally coined by a Canadian College student who started a website entitled ‘Alana’s Involuntary Celibacy Project’ in order to discuss her sexual inactivity with others. The site was intended to foster an inclusive community to help people struggling to form relationship but was co-opted by the current incel movement.
Smaller groups of “Ricels” and “Currycels” representing East and South Asian incels exist, and explicitly tie their celibacy to preference for whiteness in society.
Debbie Ging, “Alphas, betas, and incels: Theorizing the Masculinities of the Manosphere,” in Men and Masculinities (Dublin City University, Glasnevin, 2017).
Rich Barlow, “Call it What you Want – The ‘Incel rebellion’ Is Terrorism,” http://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2018/04/30/call-it-whatyou-want-the-incel-rebellion-is-terrorism, [10 Sept. 2018].
United States State Department, “Legislative Requirements and Key Terms,” https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65464.pdf, [10 Sept. 2018].
Amanda Taub, “Control and Fear: What Mass Killings and Domestic Violence Have in Common,” https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/16/ world/americas/control-and-fear-what-mass-killings-and-domesticviolence-have-in-common.html, [10 Sept. 2018)].
Everytown for Gun Safety, “Mass Shootings in the United States: 2009-2016,” https://everytownresearch.org/reports/mass-shootingsanalysis/ [10 Sept. 2018].
Charlotte Alter, “Why So Many Mass Shooters Have Domestic Violence in Their Past.” http://time.com/4818506/james-hodgkinsonvirginia-shooting-steve-scalise/ [10 Sept. 2018]; Petula Dvorak, “‘Tormented and traumatized’: Rage toward women fuels mass shooters,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/tormented-and-traumatizedrage-toward-women-fuels-mass-shooters/2018/07/02/205263aa-7dea11e8-bb6b-c1cb691f1402_story.html?utm_term=.3ca80bc6ede5 [10 Sept. 2018].
For work on the continuum of violence, see R. Pain, “Intimate War,” in Political Geography, 44, pp.64-73; Sara Meger, Rape Loot Pillage: The Political Economy of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict, (Oxford University Press).
C Cockburn, “Gender relations as causal in militarization and war: A feminist standpoint,” in International Feminist Journal of Politics 12(2) (2010).
Aja Romano, “How the alt-right’s sexism lures men into white supremacy,” https://www.vox.com/culture/2016/12/14/13576192/altright-sexism-recruitment [10 Sept. 2018].
Amanda Taub, “Control and Fear: What Mass Killings and Domestic Violence Have in Common,” The New York Times, https://www.nytimes. com/2016/06/16/world/americas/control-and-fear-what-mass-killingsand-domestic-violence-have-in-common.html [10 Sept. 2018].
Jack Healy, “Sitora Yusufiy, Ex-Wife of Orlando Suspect, Describes Abusive Marriage,” https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/sitorayusufiy-omar-mateen-orlando-shooting.html?_r=0 [10 Sept. 2018].
Australia Associated Press, “Sydney siege inquest: Man Haron Monis was a ‘psychopathic lone wolf terrorist,’” https://www.theguardian.com/ australia-news/2016/may/02/sydney-siege-inquest-man-haron-moniswas-a-psychopathic-lone-wolf-terrorist [10 Sept. 2018].
The Thomson Reuters Foundation, “The World’s most dangerous countries for women 2018,” http://poll2018.trust.org/country/?id=usa [10 Sept. 2018].
Trends noted most visibly in the Global North, including the United States (Peter Finocchiaro, “Is the men’s rights movement growing?” https://www.salon.com/2011/03/29/scott_adams_mens_rights_ movement/ [10 Sept. 2018]) and Australia (Greg Callaghan, “Cassie Jaye’s film on the men’s rights movement shocked Australia. Why?” https://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/cassie-jayes-film-on-the-mensrights-movement-shocked-australia-why-20170726-gxj34p.html [10 Sept. 2018]) However, the trend is a global one, including nations such as India (Suman Naishadham, “Why India’s Men’s Rights Movement is Thriving,” https://www.vice.com/en_au/article/9b8akp/why-indiasmens-rights-movement-is-thriving [10 Sept. 2018].)

Christine Hauser, “Reddit Bans ‘Incel’ Group for Inciting Violence Against Women,” The New York Times, https://www.nytimes. com/2017/11/09/technology/incels-reddit-banned.html [25 Sept. 2018]
Zoe Williams, “’Raw hatred’: why the ‘incel’ movement targets and terrorizes women,” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/25/ raw-hatred-why-incel-movement-targets-terrorises-women [10 Sept. 2018].
Perrie Samotin and Lilly Dancyger, “Incels: Breaking Down the Disturbing, Thriving Online Community of Celibate Men,” https://www. glamour.com/story/what-is-incel-breaking-down-online-communitycelibate-men [10 Sept. 2018].
Alex Hern, “Reddit bans far-right groups alt-right and alternative right,” https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/feb/02/redditbans-far-right-groups-altright-alternativeright [10 Sept. 2018].
Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), “Male Supremacy: Male supremacy is a hateful ideology advocating for the subjugation of women,” https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/male-supremacy [10 Sept. 2018].

By Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Soraya Kamali-Nafar

For over 30 years, Women In International Security (WIIS) has worked to advance the role of women in national and international security. While much progress has been made, the number of women occupying prominent positions in foreign and defense policy remains limited. As a result, the role of women in decisionmaking in foreign and defense policies is under-developed.

Indeed, while women constitute 40 percent of the Foreign Service officer corps, they hold only one-third of the chief of mission positions.¹ Women make up 33 percent of the Department of Defense civilian staff and 18 percent of the DOD active duty officer corps, and they remain grossly under-represented at the highest ranks—less than 8 percent have the rank of general or flag officer.²

Women also remain under-represented as expert commentators in the media. Women accounted for just 24 percent of foreign affairs and national security experts invited to speak on major political talk shows.³ Manels— that is, event panels with only men—remain common in the United States, including in Washington, DC.⁴

The lack of women in prominent positions in the foreign policy and national and international security establishments In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, which recognized the importance of the role of women in matters related to international peace and security.⁷ In 2011, the US rolled out a US National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, and in November 2017, the US Congress adopted the Women, Peace and Security Act, which posited that “the United States should be a global leader in promoting the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention, management and resolution, and post-conflict relief and recovery efforts.”⁸

Think tanks play an important role in shaping foreign and defense policy agendas. Think tank experts shape these agendas by moving in and out of many critical positions in the US government and by participating in policy debates in the media.

Many think tanks have recognized the importance of diversifying their staff and recruiting and retaining more women.⁹ Many have in recent years added programs highlighting women in the field (see below). Unfortunately, many think tanks continue to suffer from significant gender gaps. First, only 32 percent of the national and international security think tanks are headed by a woman.

is surprising since for over a decade more than 60 percent of those enrolled in graduate programs (masters and doctoral programs) in the social and behavorial sciences (including political science and international relations) have been women.⁵ The 7,000-member International Studies Association (ISA), the professional association for scholars, practitioners, and graduate students in the field of international studies, has 43 percent female membership. Amongst its graduate student members, women are in the majority.⁶

Figure 1: Heads of Washington, DC Think Tanks

Figure 2: Average % of Experts in Washington, DC

Think Tanks by Gender

Figure 3: Average % of Governing Board Members of

Washington, DC Think Tanks by Gender

Second, on average only 27 percent of expert staff are women. Only 3 out of 22 think tanks (14 percent) have achieved gender parity within their expert staff. Third, only 22 percent of think tank governing boards are women. Finally, only one think tank has integrated gender in its programs.

Since 2007, the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP) of the University of Pennsylvania has published an annual Global Go To Think Tank Index Report. The report measures the roles think tanks play in governments and civil societies around the world. It does so by ranking think tanks in a variety of categories, including top think tanks by region and areas of research.¹⁰

*Table 1:* Washnigton, DC Think Tanks with Women at the Helm
Center for American Progress (CAP)	Ms. Neera Tanden, President and CEO	2011
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)	Ms. Victoria Nuland, CEO	2018
German Marshall Fund (GMF)	Dr. Karen Donfried, President	2014
Heritage Foundation	Ms. Kay Coles James, President	2017
New America	Dr. Anne-Marie Slaugther, President and CEO	2013
US Institute of Peace (USIP)	Ms. Nancy Lindborg, President and CEO	2015
Wilson Center for International Scholars	Ms. Jane Harman, President and CEO	2011

Unfortunately, the Global Go To Think Tank Index Report does not consider how gender balances or gender programming influence these roles. In sum, up until now there has not been a systematic effort to collect data on the gender balances within the major thinks tanks active in national and international security arena.¹¹ Nor has there been a systematic effort to survey the programs of think tanks to see how gender is integrated into them.

The WIIS Gender Scorecard: Washington, DC Think Tanks fills this gap by presenting data with regard to the gender balance of 22 major think tanks that work on foreign policy and national and international security issues and are based in the Washington, DC area. We also present information about the gender and women’s programs within these think tanks.

This scorecard is part of a broader WIIS initiative to promote the integration of gender perspectives into national and international security agendas.¹² Indeed, we believe that gender perspectives are insufficiently integrated into analyses of national and international security challenges.¹³ An important step in the right direction is to achieve gender parity at the level of the expert staffs. In addition, we believe that it is important to achieve gender parity at the level of the governing boards of thinks tanks. Indeed, boards of directors and trustees have judiciary responsibilities for the governance of thinks tanks, they oversee think tank activities, and help set the strategic direction. Without leadership from the top, gender gaps will remain.¹⁴

By publishing this scorecard, we hope to stimulate discussions within the think tanks on how to close the gender gaps on their expert staffs and governing boards. We also hope to stimulate a broader discussion about the importance of gender when examining important international security challenges. We believe that a more diverse staff within think tanks, as well as more diverse governing boards, will stimulate innovative and better approaches to critical national and international security challenges and help to make the world a better place.

Scoring the Tanks

The scorecard reviews think tanks along four main axes:

percentage of women that lead the think tanks;

percentage of women experts in the think tank’s foreign policy and national and international security programs;

percentage of women in the governing bodies of the think tanks.

number of think tanks with significant commitment to gender and/or women’s programming.

Heads of Think Tanks

Of the 22 institutions surveyed, only seven (32 percent) are led by women – the Center for American Progress, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), the German

Marshall Fund (GMF), the Heritage Foundation, New America, the US Institute of Peace (USIP), and the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars.

Experts

Only three think tanks—the Stimson Center, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), and the US Institute of Peace (USIP) —have reached gender parity at the level of their expert staff.

On average, only 27 percent of the expert staff of Washington, DC thinks tanks surveyed are women.

Figure 4: % of Women Experts in Washington, DC Think Tanks

51 50 49

Governing Boards

The gender gap is particularly stark at the level of the governing boards. No think tank has achieved gender parity. The Institute for Policy Studies and the Aspen Institute come closest, with 44 percent and 43 percent women, respectively.

On average, only 22 percent of the Board of Directors or Trustees are composed of women.

Gender or Women’s Programming

Most Washington, DC think tanks do not consider the role of gender in national and international security. For many in the traditional security think tank community—men and women—gender is often equated with “women” or a “woman’s point of view.” A 2016 survey by the New America

Foundation found that the majority of US policymakers and elites had little knowledge and understanding of gender. Most equated gender with women. If at all open to the idea of a gender

Figure 5: % of Women on Governing Boards of Washington, DC Think Tanks _{widespread within the DC foreign}policy and security think tank

*Table 2:* % of Women Experts in Washington, DC Think Tanks
Rank	Think Tank	% of Women
1	Stimson Center	51%
2	Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)	50%
3	US Institute of Peace (USIP)	49%
4	Institute for Policy Studies (IPS)	44%
5	RAND Corporation	40%
6	Center for a New American Security (CNAS)	37%
7	Wilson Center for International Scholars	34%
8	New America	33%
9	Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)	30%
10	Atlantic Council Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)	29%
13	CATO Institute German Marshall Fund (GMF)	27%
15	Brookings Institution	26%
16	Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC)	24%
17	Heritage Foundation	22%
18	American Enterprise Institute (AEI)	21%
19	Aspen Institute	20%
20	Lexington Institute	17%
21	Center for American Progress (CAP)	16%
22	Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)	13%

the programming center on gender to the front office and began mainstreaming gender throughout its work in 2015, most notably in its field projects and programs. Since 2016, USIP has had a director for gender policy and strategy that oversees and advises all programs on gender. The director sits in the Policy, Learning and Strategy Center, which reports directly to USIP’s president.

None of the other think tanks have integrated gender into their national and international security programming. Most other think tanks have separate programs that have a focus on women, rather than gender. A few think tanks work on the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, but most of that work is not integrated into their other national or international security programs.¹⁶

Think tanks with notable programs on women and/or the WPS agenda include the following:¹⁷

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) launched a Women In National Security program in 2014.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) launched a Smart Women, Smart Power Program in December 2014 and a Women’s Global Leadership Program in 2015.

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) has a Women and Foreign Policy Program and a Women and Foreign Policy Program Advisory Council founded in 2002.

New America started work on the WPS agenda in its Better Life Lab and Political Reform Program.

The RAND Corporation has a webpage called Rand Women

To Watch. It also has programs on Gender Equity in the Workplace and Gender Integration in the Military, which addresses issues related to women and transgender military personnel. In its work on Female Populations RAND addresses issues faced by women and girls, including women refugees, migrants, and gender-based and intimate partner violence.

The Woodrow Wilson Center has a Global Women’s Leadership Initiative (GWLI) (since 2012) and a Women In Public Service Project.

Most research on the WPS agenda and the intersections of women, gender, and national and international security issues is carried out outside of the foreign policy and national and international security think tank establishment by nongovernmental organizations and civil society groups. While many of these groups are active in advocacy and operational work, many also conduct research and produce policy papers. Most of these organizations are members of the US Civil Society Working Group on Women, Peace and Security (US CSWG). (see box page 6).

Table 3: % of Women on Governing Boards of Washington, DC Think Tanks

Rank Think Tank % of Women

Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) 44%

Aspen Institute 34%

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 31%

Wilson Center for International Scholars

Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) 29%

New America 27%

RAND Corporation

8 German Marshall Fund (GMF) 26%

Stimson Center

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) 25%

Heritage Foundation 24% 12 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) 23%

Center for American Progress (CAP) 22%

Brookings Institution 21%

Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)

16 Atlantic Council 20%

US Institute of Peace (USIP)

18 CATO Institute 11% Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)

20 Center for a New American Security (CNAS) 10%

21-22 American Enterprise Institute (AEI) 0%

Lexington Institute

Concluding Thoughts

The main security policy establishments, including think tanks, continue to be staffed and managed mostly by men.

The top 10 think tanks in the United States, as ranked by the Go To Think Tank Index Report—Brookings, CSIS, CEIP, Heritage Foundation, Wilson Center, RAND, CAP, CFR, Cato, Atlantic Council—are often not those who do best in terms of gender balance or gender programming, the Wilson Center being the exception.

While we see an increasing number of women entering the field of national and international security, their influence remains limited. Only 3 out of 22 think tanks have achieved gender parity at the level of their expert staff.

We hope that the publication of this scorecard will stimulate discussions and encourage thinks tanks to conduct a gender analysis of their organizations.¹⁸

Such an analysis should include a more fine-grained examination of the gender balance within their institutions. For example, what positions do men and women occupy within the foreign and national and international security expert positions available at the organization? How are hiring and retention policies affecting the gender imbalances? Are there gender pay gaps? Do men and women get interviewed and quoted equally? If not, why not? These discussions should include not just the human resources department, but also and most important the staff of the policy programs in question.

In addition, think tanks should examine the gender balance at their governing boards and how they can increase efforts to attract more women to the boards. Organizations, like WIIS can help think tanks identify women with the necessary expertise and experience.

A think tank gender analysis would also include an examination of how gender is integrated into the analysis of national and international security issues. Program directors should be encouraged to examine how research on women and gender can become a more integral part of their foreign policy and national security programs, instead of standalone, siloed, programs.

Change within institutions require leadership from the top. They also require that programs and program staff are held accountable. Collecting gendered data on such things as new hires, panels, and media outreach is often a first step.¹⁹

Lastly, think tanks may consider appointing a Gender Advisor (GENAD). Such advisors have been particularly useful in government settings (USAID, State and DoD) and international organizations (United Nations, NATO). When appointing GENADs, it is important to locate them in policy positions or in the think tank’s front office so that they have direct access to the leadership.

Members of the USCSWG

4Girls GLocal Leadership Alliance for Peacebuilding American Red Cross Amnesty International USA Asia Foundation Baha’is of the United States Equality Now Fuller Project for International Reporting Futures Without Violence George Washington University Center for Gender Equality in International Affairs Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace & Security Human Rights Watch Inclusive Security Institute for State Effectiveness (ISE) International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN) International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) International Republican Institute (IRI) International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) Mina’s List / Peace is Loud National Democratic Institute Our Secure Future: Women Make the Difference PAI Peace X Peace Promundo – U.S. Protect the People Saferworld Strategy for Humanity The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP) United Nations Association of the USA U.S. National Committee of UN Women Vital Voices Global Partnership WomanStats Project Women Enabled International Women for Afghan Women Women In International Security (WIIS) Women of Color Advancing Peace and Security (WCAPS) Women’s Action for New Directions (WAND) Women’s Refugee Commission Secretariat: USIP Fiscal Sponsor/Agent: WIIS

Much progress has been made with regard to gender equality. In the last two decades the number of women studying national and international affairs has grown enormously. Students (women and men) are also increasingly interested in analyzing the role of gender and gender inequalities on national and international security. Think tanks no longer have many excuses for the persisting gender gaps and the neglect of gender perspectives. In a world with increasingly complex national and international security challenges, think tanks need to appeal to broad expertise in order to advance peace and security in the 21st century.

Methodology

The WIIS Gender Scorecard: Washington, DC Think Tanks surveys 22 think tanks with a strong presence in the Washington, DC area. They all work on a broad range of international affairs and national and international security issues. Most are mentioned in the 2017 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report and/or get regular mention in the media.²⁰

This scorecard does not include university-based research institutes (e.g., the McCain Institute or the Center for Transatlantic Relations). The scorecard also excludes those think tanks focused on a specific region (e.g., the Middle East) or one functional area (e.g., migration or international economic development).

While gender can be defined and discussed as more than just women and men, this survey takes a binary approach and conducted its evaluation using women and men and based its evaluation on the names and photographs found on organizations’ websites.

Data on each of the think tanks were collected in August 2018 from the think tanks’ own websites. Experts in foreign policy, defense, and national and international security were selected based on the identification of such experts by the think tanks themselves. We did not analyze the positions of the experts. Some think tanks include junior staff; others will identify only more senior staff. Similarly, we did not distinguish between non-resident and resident experts. For each think tank, we followed the think tanks’ own identification of its experts. For the full data set, see the WIIS Gender Scorecard: Washington, DC Think Tanks Data Set – 2018 at wiisglobal.org.

*Table 4:* WIIS Gender Scorecard: Washington, DC Think Tanks in alphabetical order.
American Enterprise Institute (AEI) head: Arthur Brooks (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 21% women total: 29 6 (F) + 23 (M) Governing Board: 0% women total: 27 0 (F) +27 (M) Atlantic Council head: Fred Kempe (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 29% women total: 227 66 (F) + 161 (M) Governing Board: 20% women total: 200 39 (F) +161 (M) Aspen Institute head: Dan Porterfield (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 20% women total: 10 2 (F) + 8 (M) Governing Board: 34% women total: 77 26 (F) + 51 (M) Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) head: Jason Grumet (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 24% women total: 17 4 (F) + 13 (M) Governing Board: 29% women total: 17 5 (F) + 12 (M) Brookings Institution head: John R. Allen (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 26% women total: 109 28 (F) + 81 (M) Governing Board: 21% women total: 89 19 (F) +70 (M) Cato Institute head: Peter Goettler (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 27% women total: 11 3 (F) + 8 (M) Governing Board: 11% women total: 19 2 (F) + 17 (M) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) head: William J. Burns (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 29% women total: 31 9 (F) + 22 (M) Governing Board: 23% women total: 31 7 (F) + 24 (M) Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) head: Thomas G. Mahnken Nat./Int. Security Experts: 13% women total: 32 4 (F) + 28 (M) Governing Board: 25% women total: 8 2 (F) + 6 (M) Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) head: John J. Hamre (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 30% women total: 108 32 (F) + 76 (M) Governing Board: 11% women total: 44 5 (F) + 39 (M) Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) head: Richard N. Haass (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 29% women total: 75 22 (F) + 53 (M) Governing Board: 31% women total: 36 11 (F) + 25 (M)	Center for a New American Security (CNAS) head: Victoria Nuland (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 37% women total: 78 29 (F) + 49 (M) Governing Board: 10% women total: 21 2 (F) + 19 (M) Center for American Progress (CAP) head: Neera Tanden (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 16% women total: 19 3 (F) + 16 (M) Governing Board: 22% women total: 9 2 (F) + 7 (M) German Marshall Fund (GMF) head: Karen Donfried (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 27% women total: 44 12 (F) + 32 (M) Governing Board: 26% women total: 19 5 (F) + 14 (M) Heritage Foundation head: Kay Coles James (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 22% women total: 32 7 (F) + 25 (M) Governing Board: 24% women total: 25 6 (F)+19 (M) Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) head: John Cavanagh (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 44% women total: 16 7 (F) + 9 (M) Governing Board: 44% women total: 18 8 (F) + 10 (M) Lexington Institute head: Merrick “Mac” Carey (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 17% women total: 6 1 (F) + 5 (M) Governing Board: 0% women total: 7 0 (F) + 7 (M) New America head: Anne-Marie Slaughter (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 33% women total: 104 34 (F) + 70 (M) Governing Board: 27% women total: 22 6 (F) + 16 (M) Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) head: Ernest J. Moniz (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 50% women total: 18 9 (F) + 9 (M) Governing Board: 21% women total: 34 7 (F) + 27 (M) RAND Corporation head: Michael D. Rich (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 40% women total: 613 245 (F) + 368 (M) Governing Board: 27% women total: 26 7 (F) + 19 (M) Stimson Center head: Brian Finlay (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 51% women total: 72 37 (F) + 35 (M) Governing Board: 26% women total: 27 7 (F) + 20 (M)	US Institute of Peace (USIP) head: Nancy Lindborg (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 49% women total: 72 35 (F) + 37 (M) Governing Board: 20% women total: 15 3 (F) + 12 (M) Wilson Center for International Scholars head: Jane Harman (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 34% women total: 187 64 (F)+123 (M) Governing Board: 31% women total: 16 5 (F) + 11 (M) NOTE: The following experts, fellows, scholars, and staff have been included for: AEI: All Foreign and Defense Policy Scholars; Atlantic Council: All fellows and non-resident fellows mentioned under experts; Aspen Institute: All staff and experts from the following programs: Security & Global Affairs, including the Aspen Strategy Group, the Cybersecurity & Technology Program, and the Homeland Security Program; Bipartisan Policy Center: All experts mentioned under the National Security Project; Brookings Institution: All experts mentioned under the Foreign Policy Program; CATO: All experts mentioned under Foreign Policy and National Security; Carnegie Endowment: All experts in the Washington, DC office; CSBA: all national and international security analysts and fellows; CSIS: All experts; CFR: All experts; CNAS: All experts (staff and adjunct fellows); CAP: All experts mentioned under the Foreign Policy and Security Program; GMF: All experts; Heritage Foundation: All experts staff identified as working on national and international security issues; IPS: all experts identified as working on foreign policy and national and international security; Lexington Institute: All experts; New America: All current staff and fellows mentioned in the following programs: Cybersecurity Initiative and International Security. NTI: All experts: Rand Corporation: All experts mentioned under Homeland Security & Public Safety, International Affairs, and National Security & Terrorism programs; Stimson Center: All national & international security experts mentioned under “Staff”, note: we did not include development staff, finance officers, or other administrative staff members; USIP: All experts; Wilson Center: All experts. For a full list of experts go to the WIIS Gender Scorecard: Washington, DC Think Tanks Data Set – 2018 at wiisglobal.org

References

See Andrea Strano, “Foreign Service Women Today: The Palmer Case and Beyond,” The Foreign Service Journal, March 2016. On the lack of women in leadership positions, see also Katherine Kidder, Amy Schafer, Phillip Carter, and Andrew Swick, From College to Cabinet: Women In

National Security, (Washington, DC: CNAS, 2017); Women In Public Service Project, Wilson Center, Roadmap to 50×50, Power and Parity in Women’s Leadership, (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, May 2018); Joan Johnson-Freese, “Half of Heaven: Why More Women are Needed in National Security,” TedxTalks, August 17, 2018; and Adrianna Pita, Tamara Cofman Wittes and Sarah Yerkes, “Presence and Voice: Women In Foreign Policy,” A Brookings Podcast, June 8, 2016.

See DOD, Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity, DoD Diversity and Inclusion 2013 Summary Report (Alexandria, VA: DOD, 2013), pp. B3-B6; and Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, 2017 Annual Report, (Alexandria, VA: DOD-Dacowits, 2017). See also Kidder et al. From College to Cabinet.

See Foreign Policy Interrupted, “Women’s Voices Marginalized in

2016 News Coverage of Foreign Affairs and National Security,” Media Matters, March 8, 2017. Foreign Policy Interrupted reports similar numbers with respect to the number of women who have seen their Opeds published. See website: www.fpinterrupted.com. See also: Amanda Taub, “The #ManPanel problem: Why are female experts still so widely ignored?,” Vox, March 16, 2016.

Several initiatives to combat manels and gender discrimination were launched in 2015. In Australia, the Panel Pledge was launched—i.e., a commitment not to appear on male only panels. In Geneva, the International Gender Champion network was launched, committing heads of organizations to no longer sit on single-sex panels. See also, Daniel Drezner, “A Few Thoughts on Manels,” Washington Post Blog, June 7, 2018; and Tamara Wittes and Marc Lynch, “The mysterious absence of women from Middle East policy debates,” Washington Post, January 20, 2015.

See Hironao Okahana and Enyu Zhou, Graduate Enrollment and

Degrees: 2006-2016 (Washington, DC: Council of Graduate Schools, 2017). For example, in the Fall of 2016, first-time graduate enrollment in the social and behavorial sciences (including anthropology, economics, political science and international relations) saw 38 percent men and 62 percent women enrolled in doctoral programs and 35.5 percent men and 64.5 percent women enrolled in Masters programs. A separate study should examine what happens with these graduates.

See “Gender Distribution of ISA Membership” at https://www.isanet.org/ISA/About-ISA/Data/Gender. In the international security thematic group of ISA women make up 37 percent; in foreign policy analysis women 34 percent; in peace studies 53 percent. Women outnumber men in 8 of the 29 thematic groups: interdisciplinary studies, environmental studies, feminist theory and gender studies, global development, global health, human rights, international law, and peace studies. Women also outnumber men in three of its four caucuses: Global South Caucus LGBTQ and allies caucus; and the Women Caucus. The Online Media Caucus has 48 percent women members.

See, for example, Kathleen Kuehnast, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Helga Hernes, eds., Women and War: Power and Protection in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: USIP, 2011), and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Michael E. Brown, “WPS+GPS: Adding Gender to the Peace and Security Equation,” WIIS Policybrief, November 2017

The US NAP on WPS was updated in June 2016. See also Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017, Public Law No:115-68, 10/06/2017.

See for example Vestige Strategies, Advancing Diversity and Inclusion in the Foreign Policy Sector, (Washington, DC: Vestige Strategies, July 2018). See also the activities of The Think Tank Diversity Consortium (TTDC).

James McGann, 2017 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, (Philadelphia, PA: TTCSP, the Lauder Institute, The University of Pennsylvania, 2018).

Micah Zenko has been one of the few foreign policy experts paying attention to this issue. See for example, Micah Zenko, “Where are the Women in Foreign Policy Today,” Foreign Policy Blog Post (September

26, 2015). In the past, WIIS has surveyed women in the State Department, staff in the US Congress and women in Peacekeeping, but never did a survey of women in think tanks. See wiisglobal.org

This scorecard is also part of a broader initiative of the Leadership Council for Women In National Security (LC-WINS) that seeks greater diversity within think tanks. LC-WINS is an informal group of foreign policy and national security professionals created in 2017. 13. See de Jonge Oudraat and Brown, “WPS+GPS”

Leadership should also encourage men and women to integrate gendered perspectives into their analysis of international security problems.

See Heather Hurlburt, Elizabeth Weingarten and Carolina Marques de Mesquita, A Guide to Talking Women, Peace, and Security Inside the U.S. Security Establishment (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, 2017)

In 2015, the Compton Foundation launched a $5 million special peace and national security initiative with a focus on the Women, Peace and Security agenda and the integration of a gendered perspective in US Foreign Policy. Thanks to these grants The Council on Foreign Relations, CNAS, and New America greatly expanded their programs on women and the WPS agenda.

We do not include those think tanks that view women and gender mostly through a domestic lens (Brookings and CAP) or those that might have an occasional publication related to women and gender and national or international security.

An increasing number of companies in the corporate sector seek EDGE (Economic Dividends for Gender Equality) workplace gender equality certification. WIIS has also a growing portfolio of gender evaluation and analysis and gender trainings.

The collection of data and the setting of benchmarks and objectives has proven to be very effective within the Scandinavian academic and think tank community. In August 2018, a consortium of seven European universities launched a new Charter that seeks to build a stronger commitment to gender equality in higher education and research institutions. The Charter is part of an EU Horizon 2020 initiative entitled the SAGE (Systematic Action for Gender Equality) project. It outlines 12 principles that support structural, cultural and political

change to eradicate sexism, bias, and other forms of discrimination

in research and higher education, and advance an intersectional and inclusive concept of gender. See “New European Charter to Promote Gender Equality in the University Sector,” Press Release, Trinity College

Dublin, August 22, 2018; see also http://sage-growingequality.eu. The Irish Minister of State for Higher Education, Mary Mitchell O’Connor, announced that University funding would in future be linked to how well universities are tackling gender inequality, including gender inequalities among staff. See Catherine Sanz, “University funding will be linked to gender equality,” The Times, August 21, 2018.

20. McGann, 2017 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report. We also consulted https://thebestschools.org/features/most-influential-think-

tanks/

By Pearl Karuhanga Atuhaire and Grace Ndirangu

The international community has taken a strong stance against conflict-related sexual violence, deeming it a war crime. However, international actors are paying scant attention to sexual- and

gender-based violence (SGBV) in refugee settings. Urban refugee women and girls and those in refugee camps often grapple with SGBV in their countries of asylum, long after they have fled their homes and communities. Our research among refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo currently in Kenya and Uganda has unearthed a high incidence of SGBV against refugee women and girls. Research by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) indicates that one in five refugee and displaced women experience sexual violence.¹ Many of the survivors often have no one to turn to for protection and resort to sex work and other risky means to survive.

In this policy brief, we examine the extent of the problem, identify obstacles to progress, and recommend actions governments and humanitarian organizations can take to better protect refugees. In short, we argue that refugee settlements are not safe spaces for refugee women. Humanitarian officials, governments, and the international community must do more to address this problem.

Extent of the Problem

In Kenya, refugees are mainly settled in camps, while in Uganda, refugees are placed in settlements where they live temporarily as they await integration, resettlement, or settled in the southwest in Kyaka I and II, Rwamwanja, and Nakivale settlements. As of 2016, Kyaka II had 28,364 refugees, with Congolese accounting for 88 percent and Rwandese 12 percent of the population.⁵

Most of these refugees, both urban and rural, experienced SGBV at the hands of rebel and militia groups in their country of origin and they continue to be at risk after flight. Female refugees are particularly vulnerable when they are separated from their husbands. The extra burden they carry as single mothers and family heads taking care of children and elderly relatives often leads them into dangerous, exploitative situations as they struggle to earn a living. Their children assume adult responsibilities. Many children are forced into dangerous means of survival, such as transactional sex work, early marriages, and trading sex for favors. Others may have temporary jobs, such as washing clothes, performing domestic chores, working in shops and construction sites, and selling produce and other wares in the market. However, these jobs earn them meager wages and still expose them to frequent abuse.

Among urban refugees in Kenya, some of the young women told us stories, such as this one:

repatriation.²Kenya has about 24,063 Congolese refugees who have settled in urban areas around Nairobi.³ Most of these urban refugees have temporary or part-time jobs to support their families.⁴ Congolese refugees in Uganda are mainly

[H]e would pass by my work station when I was cooking and he could rub himself against my body or even touch my breasts. When I told him to stop, he would laugh and say that there is nothing I can do to him. If I left the job, it would be difficult for me to get another one and then my kids would suffer.

Another young woman reported:

I worked in a beauty parlor as a masseuse. Some of the clients were male. Some of them would request a massage, and when it was over they would then ask me to perform sexual favors. If I refused, they would threaten to tell my boss that I was being rude. I refused to give in, and after being reported so many times, my boss was threatening to fire me, so I quit. I now do casual jobs.

Most women and girls who work as domestic help have reported being sexually abused by their male employers or by male members of the households where they work. If these women and girls are in the country illegally, they are vulnerable to blackmail, with people threatening to report them to the authorities. Often, these women and girls work without pay, and most do not report these incidents for fear of reprisal and ostracism by other community members.

Women in refugee camps and settlements are also often abused by their husbands or other male family members or providers. These men often control the family resources and are the sole decision makers in their families. In Kyaka II in 2016, most perpetrators of SGBV were known to their victims. They were uncles, fathers, foster fathers, or even perpetrators from their country of origin who ended up in the same settlement.

One refugee woman told us this in an interview: When I first came to this settlement as a young orphan refugee girl, I was assigned a foster father, but this foster father took advantage of me and defiled me.… [B]y then, I was fourteen years old. He came from the bar late one night when I was already asleep, and he forced himself on me and defiled me. I could not tell anyone about it because he told me the next morning not to report this, otherwise he would throw me out of his house. Since I had no other place to go, I just kept silent about the whole issue.

Adolescent girls are married off by their parents, who negotiate the price with prospective husbands.⁶ High levels of poverty and the practice of bride prices contribute to high child marriage rates among the Congolese, as does family debt, which encourages families to include girls as part of financial settlements.⁷ In Kyaka II, most girls are married off when they are as young as 14 years old. During a focus group discussion with refugee women, some women from the Hema

Clan in Congo argued,

Among us, the Hema, most families marry off their daughters when they are as young as 14 years. It is a cultural norm that we cannot change. If a woman opposed the practice, the community would reject her, and she could even be killed…. So much as the settlement officials say it is wrong, in our culture it is done silently, and as mothers of these children, we don’t have much say about it because we fear rejection from our husbands and families.

SGBV survivors may have been mutilated during the abuse, suffered other physical injuries, or contracted sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS. In some instances, women develop incontinence and uncontrolled bleeding, which affect relationships with their immediate family and the community. The women suffer psychologically as well, from post-traumatic stress disorder, stress, depression, anxiety, low self-esteem, inability to form healthy relationships, insomnia, and somatic symptoms of headaches. SGBV thus often leaves women incapacitated and unable to care for themselves and their families.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), local authorities, and international actors are aware of these problems, and they have attempted to put mechanisms and measures in place to address SGBV among refugee women. But they cannot do it alone. Without the commitment of local authorities, host governments, and host-country organizations little progress will be made. Refugee women face high levels of discrimination in the host community, difficulties in getting jobs that pay a sufficient wage, and an inability to actively participate in leadership positions. These obstacles lead refugee women to distrust the system and lack confidence in efforts to help them. Host-country authorities, local agencies, and policymakers need to develop and implement policies that address the needs of refugee women and enhance their integration into the host community.

Obstacles to Progress

Governments and humanitarian organizations face seven main obstacles to protecting women from SGBV:insufficient legal frameworks, lack of political will, inept law enforcement and court processes, limited awareness among women that they have rights, economic barriers, cultural norms, and inadequate data.

Insufficient legal framework

Existing legal frameworks in Kenya and Uganda can be said to cover SGBV. The Penal Code Act of Kenya (revised edition 2014) and Uganda (Amendment Act of 2007) prohibit all acts of violence. However, they do not directly address SGBV, despite its prevalence. In Kenya, for example, SGBV can only be inferred to be an assault under sections 250 and 251 of the code. There is no specific offense such as wife or husband battery, nor are their provisions for marital rape or domestic violence. The inadequacies of the law make it difficult to address SGBV, whether experienced by Kenyan citizens or refugees in Kenya.

In Kenya, the Sexual Offences Act was enacted in 2006 to curb SGBV. It defines sexual offenses and makes provisions for prevention and protection from harm arising from unlawful sexual acts. However, enactment has not been accompanied by training and dissemination of information on its provisions to police and agents of the justice system. Civil society organizations undertook most of the awareness raising that has occurred. Consequently, most Kenyans are unaware of the law’s existence. Poor investigation of cases means that convictions are rare and survivors of violence are thus denied justice.⁸

While Uganda’s penal code addresses rape and defilement (rape of a minor below 18 years old), it falls short when it comes to addressing issues of marital rape which is common during conflict. Ugandan law criminalizes SGBV, but the relevant laws are rarely applied. Relevant laws include the Domestic Violence Act of 2010, the Prevention of Female Genital Mutilation Act of 2009, the Prevention of Trafficking of Persons Act of 2009, the National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325, and the Penal Code Act of 2007, among others. Ugandan communities are not familiar with these laws, which puts refugee women and girls at greater risk from SGBV while in Uganda. While humanitarian agencies have been redoubling their efforts to raise awareness on SGBV and women’s rights, these efforts are likely to yield little in the absence of robust enforcement of the law.

Poor law enforcement and slow court systems

In most refugee settlements as well as outside them, police are slow to respond to reports of SGBV and in other areas, there is inadequate police. Most police stations are reluctant to send officers to settlements to arrest perpetrators, primarily because SGBV is still widely considered a private matter. In a few cases where they are willing, police tend to lack investigative skill and capacity for handling these cases. Police stations lack examination rooms and kits to collect evidence from survivors. Moreover, in cases where evidence is collected, stations lack storage space, and in most cases evidence goes missing or is tampered with, becoming inadmissible in court. Court processes are lengthy, and refugee victims are often subject to perpetrator intimidation and prosecutorial bias.

Especially at risk are asylum seekers who hold Refugee Status Determination (RSD) appointment slips, which they get when they register for asylum and which serve as a form of identification. Most law enforcement officers are not aware that the slips confirm the legal status of these refugees as they await the outcome of the RSD process. Survivors who bear the slips are hesitant to approach police stations for fear of police harassment and sometimes extortion or illegal detention. Survivors have also reported that their abusers taunt them and threaten to report that they are in the country illegally.

Aggravated by gaps in law and policy, the reluctant enforcement and implementation of existing policies and laws on SGBV conspire to keep survivors’ needs from being adequately addressed. In most cases, police officers accuse survivors of bringing their problems upon themselves. In cases of sexual violence, the police accuse women and girls of dressing inappropriately and thereby inviting violence. When women are beaten, police accuse them of disrespecting their husbands, which they imply deserves ‘a slap or two.’ The gender-insensitive handling of such cases increases the trauma to women and girls.

Lack of political will

Lack of political will and poor or nonexistent accountability mechanisms keep perpetrators from being held accountable for SGBV crimes. There is a paradoxical relationship between national law and cultural belief, which international law does not touch. Where cultural beliefs do not take the national legal framework into account, corrupt leaders are free to advance and justify abuses in their communities. Consequently, law becomes silent and does not protect victims.

Without political will, all efforts to fight SGBV are constrained. With inadequate operational and logistical support, survivors’ immediate needs go unmet, and there is no capacity to prevent SGBV. Refugee women who report SGBV return to communities where perpetrators are living, since there are no safe housing facilities where they can stay while investigations and legal processes are ongoing. In addition, survivors are only offered counselling and some small financial stipend. There is no sustainable support to enable them to be self-reliant, so they return to the same jobs where they were abused.

Limited awareness of rights

Refugee women’s rights are human rights. Women’s rights have received greater recognition today, as evidenced by the various international tools relating to women: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Beijing Platform for Action (1995), UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions, the International Criminal Court, and the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993). Yet refugee women’s rights are still negated, despite significant steps to address the challenges they face.⁹ Most refugee women themselves do not understand these rights, which serves as a further obstacle to redress of SGBV.

Economic barriers

Refugee women and girls often take on roles as heads of households in their host countries, usually because they became separated from spouses or traditional male support during flight. As heads of households with a responsibility for children, they are more enmeshed in family networks than are male refugees. Because they may not be self-reliant, their vulnerability to male providers increases. Refugee women’s needs for economic resources make them vulnerable to SGBV, and these economic needs are often underestimated. Consequently, some refugee women continue working in abusive environments because leaving these jobs threatens their ability to care for their families.

While the 1951 Refugee Convention recognizes the right to freedom of movement and to seek paid employment, among others, refugees do not see these rights fully recognized in protracted exile.¹⁰ Freedom of movement is a precondition for the enjoyment of other rights; denying it undermines refugees’ socioeconomic well-being and increases their vulnerability. Women are particularly vulnerable, as they become reliant on scant humanitarian assistance.

In Kenya, refugees cannot get formal employment without Class M work permits. Although the Ministry of Immigration issues them freely, the process for acquiring them is lengthy and slow—as long as two years. Refugees thus resort to odd jobs and informal sector work.

Uganda requires refugees to get exit permits before leaving their settlements. This impinges on refugee women’s selfreliance and economic well-being. Families of SGBV survivors cannot relocate or hire lawyers, and they often rely on legal aid services, where service is slow, the case backlog large, and staffing inadequate. Due to restrictions on movement from within the settlement system and from husbands, most women end up compromising their bodies through transactional sex, which makes them vulnerable to sexually transmitted diseases.

Cultural norms

Predominant cultural and social norms perpetuate unequal power relations between women and men, exposing women and girls to vulnerable situations that often lead to SGBV. Unmarried women are often ostracized by both men and women, particularly if they have been violated sexually. Married women risk their spouses divorcing them when they report they have been a victim of SGBV.

Some of the Congolese refugee women become pregnant as a result of rape in the country of asylum. Such women (in most cases who end up being single mothers) are often treated as pariahs, and many opt to live away from members of their communities. This is because they fear the ridicule that women who have conceived out of wedlock or out of rape often encounter in the community once the information is out. Others who have given birth to children conceived out of rape by rebels or men in host countries are expelled from their communities. One Congolese community member stated “once the men in the community know that a certain was woman was raped, they label her as damaged. Such a woman is unlikely to get married as no man wants her.” Gender stereotypes also foster discrimination against women in public spheres. Such stereotypes emerge from socially constructed roles of men and women in society. Stereotypes such as “women are weak, men are strong” make physical and sexual violence against women more likely. A social worker in Kyaka II, for example, noted the cultural normalization of male violence among the Hema tribe living there, saying, “Beating a woman is normal.”

Inadequate data

Data collection on SGBV among women and girls remains a challenge since it primarily relies on self-reporting by survivors. In refugee settings and among the Congolese, the stigma and ostracism survivors face after coming forward impede such reporting. Most data is collected from health facilities, but not all victims of SGBV report to health facilities for medical assistance. Fear of ostracism leads many women refugees to avoid reporting abuses when the perpetrators are also refugees. In some instances, the community resolves SGBV cases itself. Indeed, community leaders fear that if SGBV cases are brought to the authorities’ attention, perpetrators’ resettlement process and status determination will be compromised. Given these obstacles, creation of gender-based violence information management systems cannot adequately address the data collection problem.

Recommendations

Governments, UNHCR, and other humanitarian organizations do provide invaluable humanitarian support to refugees. However, a shift at all levels is required if pervasive SGBV is to be relegated to the past in refugee settings.

Law enforcement. Humanitarian actors and host governments should work together to implement reforms in the host countries’ justice systems. The law must be tougher on perpetrators of SGBV—for example, by denying refugee registration to asylum seekers with records of committing SGBV offenses. There ought to be screening during RSD interviews to deregister refugees who are found to have committed SGBV offenses. Denial of RSD status to past perpetrators will help deter would-be perpetrators. This will also help ensure that perpetrators do not continue to live in the same community as their victims and continue threatening them, especially as their cases go to court. Increased funding and partnerships with local legal partners could help refugee survivors access legal services. Police officers need to be trained on how to screen and record cases of SGBV. Better training and equipping of police will also enable them to collect and store evidence. Host governments and local partners can together strengthen witness protection systems and set up safe houses to host survivors of SGBV. Taking such steps to better protect women who have undergone SGBV will restore the confidence of other survivors and encourage them to report their own cases.
Political will. Host-country governments and local authorities should together formulate and implement reforms in all parts of the legal system. The police must be trained to handle SGBV cases in a gender-sensitive manner and be given logistical support to follow up on cases. Corrupt leaders and officials should be prosecuted for failure to enforce the law, whether from reticence or ignorance. Although police stations in Kenya and Uganda are required to have a gender desk, they often do not. Where there is one, it often has no female officer assigned to it.
Refugee women’s rights. Host countries, humanitarian agencies, and local organizations need to educate refugee women (and community leaders) on their rights. Women and girls should be fully aware of what constitutes SGBV, where to report cases, and how to protect evidence so law enforcement officers can collect it. Refugee women and girls also need to know their rights as refugees and what protection their legal documentation affords them. Knowledge is power. If women are made to believe their asylum certificates do not entitle them to protection, they will be less likely to report crimes perpetrated against them. Local and nationwide awareness raising and advocacy can also help prevent sexual violence, abuse, and exploitation of refugee women.
Economic barriers. The government, UNHCR, and other humanitarian agencies working in refugee settings need to help survivors find long-term solutions to secure their livelihoods. This could include providing market information, access to loans from financial institutions and grants to start businesses. The government should remove restrictions on refugees’ movement so they can more readily find much-needed employment and earn supplementary income. The prime minister’s office should review laws regarding refugees’ permission to exit their settlements to seek work. They should speed the issuance of exit permits and let refugees move freely within and outside settlements without questioning.
Cultural norms. The host government and other humanitarian actors should engage with local community leaders so they understand the national laws that protect refugee women. These leaders should learn of the adverse effects of early marriages on girls, the need for educating girls as well as boys, and the need for women to be represented at all levels of leadership. Refugee communities should hear how gender stereotypes promote SGBV. All humanitarian actors and leaders in local communities should be trained in use of gender-sensitive language. Male engagement is fundamental. Because the ethos of patriarchy has permitted men to perpetrate SGBV, men must be involved in preventing further violence. International and local agencies serving refugees should incorporate men in programming on raising awareness, becoming peer educators in the fight against SGBV, and engaging them in resolving family conflicts. Such programs go hand in hand with the need for programs for empowering women and girls to find safe means of sustaining themselves.
Data collection. All humanitarian actors and host governments should stress the urgency of reporting SGBV. They should urge refugee communities to end stigmatization of survivors and to encourage women to report their cases to the police, crime scene investigators, and health officials. When SGBV occurs, survivors should know where to go first.

Finally, the governments of Uganda and Kenya should consider local integration as a more permanent solution for long-term refugees. Both should review previous research work on the benefits of such integration for the host countries and educate host communities of these benefits and encourage refugee communities to embrace resettlement solutions.

Conclusion

The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women affirms that violence against women constitutes a violation of women’s rights and fundamental freedoms. Further, Article 4 of the African Union’s Maputo Protocol is devoted entirely to the topic of violence against women, calling for a range of state measures: punishment of perpetrators, identification of causes of violence against women, and provision of services for survivors.

Yet, SGBV in refugee settings continues. Host governments must take seriously the mandate to protect all women within their boundaries. Failure to protect refugee women and girls seeking asylum constitutes a failure on the part of the host government. International actors, local actors, and the African Union must work closely with host governments to help them meet the obligations to which they committed when they ratified these protocols and other conventions that seek to end SGBV.

References

IRC, Clinical care for survivors of gender-based violence, (New York: International Rescue Committee, 2016).
A refugee settlement is a type of refugee encampment encompassing a certain geographical area allocated by the government or community in the country of asylum.
The urban areas around Nairobi include Kasarani, Kayole, Kitengela, and Rongai, with a few living in the Kabiria area of Kawangware. See also UNHCR, Figures at a Glance, (UNHCR Kenya, December 31,

Sara Pavanello, Hidden and exposed: Urban Refugees in Nairobi, Kenya, (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2010).
UNHCR, Kyaka II Fact Sheet, (Kampala: UNHCR Uganda, 2016).
United Nations Population Fund, Marrying Too Young; End Child Marriage, (New York: UNFPA, 2012).
Free the Slaves, Wives in Slavery; Forced Marriage in the Congo, (Washington: Free the Slaves, 2013).
Dr. Ruth Aura, Situational Analysis and the Legal Framework on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Kenya: Challenges and Opportunities, (Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting, 2012).
Mulki Al-Sharmani, “Navigating Refugee Life,” UN Chronicle XLVII, no.1 (February 2010).
J. Milner and G. Loescher, Responding to Protracted Refugee Situations: Lessons from a Decade of Discussion, (Oxford, UK: Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2011).

By Luisa Ryan and Shannon Zimmerman

On November 14–15, 2017, the government of Canada hosted the UN Peacekeeping Defense Ministerial Conference.¹ Over 500 delegates from 70 countries, the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO met in Vancouver to discuss improvements to UN peacekeeping operations and secure new pledges from UN member states.

At the conference, Canada announced the launch of the Elsie Initiative on Women in Peace Operations.² Named after the trailblazing feminist Elsie MacGill, this initiative will join Canada and the UN in partnership with other interested member states to address the obstacles to placing more uniformed women in peace operations.³ While member states have committed to a target contribution of 15 percent female personnel, currently uniformed female peacekeepers make up only around 3 percent of troops deployed. Often, this dearth of women peacekeepers reflects the lack of women in the national militaries of troop contributing countries. The Elise Initiative represents a practical, innovative measure by an active member of the peacekeeping community to address this fundamental deficit and advance gender inclusion.

The Elsie Initiative members will develop a systematic approach to deploying more women in peace operations. Through tailored technical support, the initiative aims to help troop contributing countries recruit and retain female soldiers. It is one of the first initiatives to directly address the lack of female personnel at the deploying country level. Canada As one of the co-hosts of the 2017 UN Peacekeeping ministerial, the United States is in a strong position to partner in the work of the Elsie Initiative. By so doing, it can entrench the concept of gender parity in its current UN peacekeeping training programs and deployments and better lead knowledge-sharing efforts with partner militaries. The Elsie Initiative also gives the United States an opportunity to reinforce partnerships that enhance global security while bolstering its leadership in gender parity and UN reform. There is bipartisan recognition of the fiscal and strategic value of UN peace operations in achieving US national security and foreign policy objectives.⁵

contributed an initial $15 million to establish the initiative and pledged an additional $6 million to assist UN missions in supporting and leveraging women’s contributions within peace operations.⁴

The Presidential Memo of September 28, 2015, noted that UN peace operations are one of the most meaningful mechanisms for international burden-sharing to address the threat of violent extremist groups, human trafficking, endemic diseases, and mass flows of refugees and displaced persons.⁶ The 2018 National Defense Strategy builds upon this memo, highlighting the value of international partnerships as the backbone of collective security, particularly the value of strengthening alliances and attracting new partners to share the burden of global security.⁷ Efforts such as the Elsie initiative to improve the effectiveness of peace operations will directly benefit US national interests by strengthening alliances and enabling recipient countries to take an increasing role in providing for collective and regional security.

Background

UN peacekeeping operations play a vital role in maintaining international peace and security. Currently, over 100,000 UN personnel from 125 countries are deployed in 15 missions.⁸ This makes peace operations the largest deployed military force in the world. While the annual budget for peacekeeping is approximately US$6.8 billion, this amounts to less than 0.5 percent of global military spending. Thus peacekeeping operations are by far the most cost-effective method for intervening in conflict and postconflict countries.

The 2017 Defense Ministerial Conference focused on what it called the “3Ps”: pledges, planning, and performance. It was an effort to chart progress from the 2016 defense ministerial held in London, facilitate pledges from member states to fill key capacity gaps such as rapid deployment units and helicopters, and to increase the UN’s capacity to plan and undertake peace operations.⁹ Canada in particular focused on increasing women’s participation in security forces and peacekeeping operations.

To be most effective, peace operations—and armed forces in general—should strive for gender representation that reflects the composition of their country’s populations. Female peacekeepers provide different perspectives on protection, peacebuilding, intelligence gathering, and early warning. Having female peacekeepers allows the mission to connect with women in conflict-affected communities, who often bear the brunt of violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, and may also curb sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers.

The role of women in peacekeeping and peacebuilding was highlighted in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace, and Security. Since then, seven other UN resolutions have addressed engaging women in conflict resolution.¹⁰ Despite this apparent support, the UN has struggled to implement these resolutions internally within the UN structure as well as externally in deployed operations. Key challenges include lack of funding, political will, and available uniformed female personnel.¹¹ The 3 percent of UN peacekeepers that are women are largely employed in supporting roles.¹² At the current rate of increase, it would take 37 years to reach the five-year target that the UN Security Council set in 2015: to double the number of uniformed women deployed in UN peacekeeping operations.¹³

Very few women serve in the police and militaries of the countries that contribute to peace operations. Several of the core troop and police contributing countries, such as Ethiopia, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, have an evolving but limited culture of women in the security services.¹⁴ When asked to deploy women troops or police, these countries fall far short of the target percentages, despite their best efforts. Recent Department of Peacekeeping Operations figures show that only eighteen of all the troop contributing countries reached the target of 15 percent deployment of women that was set at the 2016 defense ministerial. Fifty countries sent only female police officers, and forty sent no women at all. Western countries may have slightly higher percentages of women. For example, in October 2017 women made up roughly 16 percent of the US army. However, Western countries contribute far fewer soldiers to peace operations, some none at all.

Even when women police and soldiers are present, UN missions have struggled to leverage their participation effectively. Female peacekeepers may be given gender-specific jobs such as teaching women self-defense or conducting classes on sexual violence and HIV/AIDS. Additionally, women officers are often confined to more administrative roles or not given the same consideration as their male colleagues—despite having the same qualifications. This restriction limits both the strategic impact women can have in peacekeeping operations and the credibility of gender equality efforts within missions. Yet female peacekeepers have proven themselves to be just as effective as male peacekeepers, perhaps more so. For example, the Indian AllFemale Formed Police Unit that was deployed to Liberia, from 2007 to 2016, was so effective and professional that then Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf specifically requested they provide her security detail.¹⁵ As the Indian contingent’s commander in Liberia, Colonel Madubala Bala also noted, “When the local women see the female peacekeepers, they get inspired by them—[They see] ladies can perform the same role as male counterparts.” In fact, when the all-female unit arrived, 6 percent of Liberia’s security sector was made up of women; that number has since jumped to 17 percent, surpassing many more developed nations.¹⁶

The Elsie Initiative has been criticized for perpetuating a pattern of developed countries leading policy and financing while troops from the global south serve in increasingly dangerous contexts. Monique Cuillerier, a Canadian representative with the Women, Peace, and Security Network, observed, “It’s hard to see how Canada can actually fulfill many of their recently announced ‘Women, Peace, and Security’ priorities if Canadian peacekeepers are sitting on the sidelines.”¹⁷

It is important to highlight the differing commitments and policy influence of the global north and south in UN peacekeeping. However, these critiques should not detract from the important goals of the Elsie Initiative. The initiative’s focus on inclusivity, sharing of peacekeeping best practice, and financial and training assistance between nations may help distribute the burdens of peacekeeping but these efforts should not serve as a substitute for contributing troops to peace operations.

Having done more than any other state to partner with and build the capacity of troop contributing countries, the United States should ally with Canada in its efforts to achieve gender parity in peace operations. Past US efforts included the Africa Contingency Operations Training & Assistance (ACOTA) program and the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which focus on building recipient countries’ capacity to become active contributors to regional security and their own. Like these, the Elsie Initiative will enable countries to draw upon resources to make them more effective security providers.

Policy Recommendations for the United States¹⁸

The United States is in an ideal position to leverage its existing expertise to support efforts to integrate women into the military and into peace operations. Below are several ways it could support and augment its current initiatives:

Promote the Value of Female Peacekeepers. Female peacekeepers make a peace operation more effective. Peacekeepers likely understand the value of protecting women and listening to their concerns but may not yet understand the value of deploying female peacekeepers. Training could emphasize the utility of female peacekeepers conducting body searches on women, engaging with the female population, and investigating instances of sexual assault and supporting survivors. These benefits should be highlighted as an addition to the general benefit of having a well-trained, capable soldier regardless of gender. Such training should be interactive, providing space for male soldiers to ask questions and address concerns, and could decrease the likelihood that female soldiers are relegated to menial or administrative tasks. Men and women, boys and girls will experience conflict differently, necessitating a gender lens. Peacekeepers’ ability to identify and address these conflict factors enhance their effectiveness and the quality of the peace they are able to support.

Continue to Support Current US Training Efforts. USsupported peacekeeper training should be gender sensitive and include not just training on sexual exploitation and abuse but also the role gender plays in conflict. Additionally, peacekeeper training should continue to include skills such as conflict analysis (including gender analysis), mediation, and negotiation. Training could be jointly conducted with civilian staff to encourage understanding of perspectives across components. Such skills allow peacekeepers to avoid highly masculine military-based approaches and craft inclusive and therefore more sustainable approaches to resolving tensions on the ground.¹⁹

Add Value Directly to Troop Contributing Countries. The United States deploys specialized trainers and equipment, ensuring that forces receiving US support and training can become effective, professional, and contribute to the efficacy of peace operations. This expertise could be leveraged to support increased deployment of female soldiers from partner countries. Best practices may include design and logistical advice on dedicated facilities for ablutions and hygiene in austere conditions. It may also include policy advice on advancement and leave to ensure that women with families are able to deploy and will benefit from the experience as much as men do.

Lead by Example. The United States should commit to deploying an increased number of female US military and police personnel to UN peace operations. This can be accomplished most simply by ensuring that the current limited number of staff officers deployed to force headquarters have adequate female representation. Such deployments provide US women unique skills development opportunity while setting an example for other countries.

Share Lessons and Expertise. The United States has a diverse array of programs already in operation domestically as well as in partnership with other nations that could inform the effective, efficient inclusion of women in peace operations. Collecting these best practices and lessons learned and sharing them with troop contributing countries would be an easy, effective way of increasing their capacity to integrate women. Particularly valuable would be information to help military leadership begin integration without enforcing stereotypes. For example, the US military can provide best practices for the recruitment and retention of females, help with reform of personnel sections to accommodate common life milestones such as marriage and childbirth, and revising gendered standards for physical capabilities to ensure that what is being measured is what really counts in peace operations.

Troop contributing countries may have limited experience in deploying women to austere living conditions in potentially very remote communities. Female troops may require separate considerations. More conservative nations may have further cultural needs that may affect the appropriate deployment of female officers. Mobile and temporary operating bases—which are becoming more common, especially in the more robust missions—may also need to be altered to accommodate women. The US has mission design and planning expertise in deploying female troops that it can share for the benefit of all countries.

Play the Long Game. Integrating women into the militaries of troop contributing countries and then into peacekeeping forces is vitally important for ensuring the best possible mission results. These efforts will take time. Rather than rushing to promote women to positions of authority or into new roles without proper training, there should be a gradual increase over a five- to ten-year period, addressing all levels from recruit to field grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers. These soldiers need career management and mentorship to ensure that male colleagues do not elbow them out.

The United States has a strong interest in collective security and regional capacity. US support to peacekeeper training has improved the effectiveness of peacekeepers from dozens of countries in conflicts around the world. Deepening this support to ensure that troop contributing countries are able to recruit and retain female soldiers—thereby making peacekeeping forces more inclusive and effective—is a logical next step in improving allies’ abilities to contribute to global security.

References

Initiated at the 2015 Leadership Summit on Peacekeeping hosted in Washington, D.C., the first UN Peacekeeping Defense Ministerial took place in London in 2016. The 2017 conference in Vancouver is the second such conference.
Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau, “The Elsie Initiative on Women in Peace Operations,” November 15, 2017.
Gender has long been a focus of Canadian foreign policy and an opportunity for Canada to leverage its expertise and act as a policy entrepreneur. By undertaking the Elsie Initiative, Canada is enacting several recommendations on gender-responsive peacekeeping from the 2015 Global Study on Women, Peace and Security, the HighLevel Independent Panel on Peace Operations, and Security Council Resolution 2242.
Government of Canada, “UN Peacekeeping Defense Ministerial,” website, 2017.
Christopher Holshek, “America Needs Peacekeeping Missions More Than Ever,” Foreign Policy (November 10, 2015).
The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “United States

Support to United Nations Peace Operations,” Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, September 28, 2015.

U.S. Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge,” 2018.
UN Peacekeeping, “Data,” web page, 2017.
UN News Centre, “Largest Gathering of Defence Ministers Dedicated to UN Peacekeeping to Kick Off in Vancouver,” November 13, 2017.
The following UN Security Council Resolutions are considered part of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda: 1325 (2000); 1820 (2009); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2010); 1960 (2011); 2106 (2013); 2122 (2013), and 2242 (2015).
For more on this, see Kathleen Kuehnast and Shannon Zimmerman, “No Will; No Way: Women, Peace, and Security in Peacekeeping Operations,” Peace & Stability Operations Journal Online 3, no. 1 (2012).
UN Women, “Keeping the Peace in an Increasingly Militarized

World,” In: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations

Security Council Resolution 1325 (New York: United Nations, 2015).

Joint Statement by Phumzile Mlambo Ngcuka and Pramila Patten on the launch of the Elsie Initiative, November 16, 2017, accessed

February 2, 2018, http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2017/11/ joint-statement-by-phumzile-mlambo-ngcuka-and-pramila-patten-onthe-launch-of-the-elsie-initiative.

Bangladesh only allowed women to join the military after 2003 Fellows and only began recruiting women in 2013. India has had some success with women in peacekeeping, deploying the UN’s first all-female peacekeeping force of 105 Indian policewomen, who deployed to Liberia. Currently, the number one contributor to UN peace operations, Ethiopia, is an exception in this regard, with roughly 16 of the soldiers it has deployed being women.
Lesley J. Pruitt, The Women in Blue Helmets: Gender, Policing and the UN’s First All-Female Peacekeeping Unit (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2016).
UN News Centre, “Hailed as ‘Role Models,’ All-Female Indian Police Unit Departs UN Mission in Liberia,” February 12, 2016.
Tonda Maccharles and Bruce Campion-Smith, “Canada to Spread its Peacekeeping Efforts Around,” Toronto Star (November 15, 2017).
In some cases, these recommendations reiterate and build upon those provided by a 2011 AFRICOM study, “Study on Women in African Militaries.”
Alison Milofsky, Joseph Sany, Illana Lancaster, and Jeff Krentel,

“Conflict Management Training for Peacekeepers: Assessment and Recommendations,” Special Report 411 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, August 2017).

*Table 2:* Percentage of Women Experts in Foreign Policy and International Security Think Tanks
Rank	Think Tank	% of Women
1	Aspen Institute	50%
2	US Institute of Peace (USIP)	49%
3	Third Way	47%
4	RAND Corporation	42%
4	Stimson Center	42%
6	New America	41%
7	Institute for Policy Studies (IPS)	36%
8	Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)	31%
8	Atlantic Council	31%
10	The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars	30%
10	Center for a New American Security (CNAS)	30%
12	Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)	27%
13	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP)	26%
	American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
	Brookings Institution
16	Heritage Foundation	22%
17	Center for American Progress (CAP)	19%
18	Cato Institute	11%
19	Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)	10%
20	Lexington Institute	0%

*Table 3:* Percentage of Women Experts in Arms Control and Nuclear Security Think Tanks
Rank	Think Tank	% of Women
1	Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)	55%
2	Arms Control Association	43%
2	Global Zero	43%
4	Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control	40%
5	James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies	38%
6	Physicians for Social Responsibility	33%
7	Pugwash Council	28%
8	Managing the Atom Project, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School	27%
9	Federation of American Scientists	17%
10	Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation	11%

The WIIS Gender Scorecard: Think Tanks and Journals Spotlight on the Nuclear Security Community

The Headlines

Scoring the Tanks

Heads of Think Tanks

• WOMEN Experts

Substantive Focus

Gender and Women’s Programming

Scoring the Journals

Nuclear Security Issues

Gender Perspectives

Concluding Thoughts

References

Background

Relevance for NATO

Recommendations

Conclusion

References

Authors

China’s Rise and Its Implications for NATO

China’s Perception of NATO

Recommendations

Political Recommendations

Technological Recommendations

Authors

References

Recommendations

Conclusion

References

Myths about Women in the Alt-Right

Policy Implications

Conclusion

References

Drawing the link between incels and other forms of violent extremism

Policy implications

Address the ideology

Act on early warning signs

References

Extent of the Problem

Obstacles to Progress

Insufficient legal framework

Poor law enforcement and slow court systems

Lack of political will

Limited awareness of rights

Economic barriers

Cultural norms

Inadequate data

Recommendations

Conclusion

References

Background

Policy Recommendations for the United States18

References

• ^WOMENExperts

Policy Recommendations for the United States¹⁸