Recognizing the Violent Extremist Ideology of ‘Incels’

By Shannon Zimmerman, Luisa Ryan and David Duriesmith

 

In April 2018 Alek Minassian drove a van into a crowd of people in Toronto, killing ten people. A few minutes before, he had posted on Facebook, “The Incel rebellion has already begun! We will overthrow all Chads and Stacys! All hail the supreme gentleman Elliot Rodger.”

Minassian was referring to Elliot Rodger, the 22-year-old male who committed the Isla Vista, Calif., attack which killed six people in 2014. Before his rampage, Rodger had posted a ‘manifesto’ online – a lengthy tirade against the failures of modern society to provide him sexual access to women. Rodger is often portrayed in the media as the godfather of Incel ideology and is referred to as the “Supreme Gentleman” in online spaces such as Reddit and incel.me. He was the first individual to be labeled a terrorist of the alt-right by the Southern Poverty Law Center, which tracks far-right activity. 1

Minassian’s Facebook post indicated that his act was linked to a broader political ideology rooted in a toxic combination of male supremacy and white supremacy. While lone-wolf attackers who invoke anti-feminist ideas- like Minassian- are often framed as mentally ill loners, this attack was terrorist in nature and should be considered as such. Like the response to Elliot Rodger’s earlier attack at Isla Vista, media reporting after the Toronto attack quickly emphasized Minassian’s struggles with mental health and cited claims from friends that he “wasn’t a terrorist.”2 This treatment fails to recognize the corrosive political ideology that underpinned Minassian’s attack and his desire to terrorize the public. These qualities should rightly define his actions as terrorism. 

Who are Incels?

Incel, shorthand for ‘involuntarily celibate,’ is a violent political ideology based on a new wave of misogyny and white supremacy.3 Incel ideology is predicated on the notion that feminism has ruined society, therefore there is a need for a ‘gender revolt’ in order to reclaim a particular type of manhood based on both male and white superiority.4 Incels believe that by defending women’s bodily autonomy, feminism has upset the natural order which organizes society around monogamous heterosexual couplings. As a result, physically attractive young women (labeled as ‘Stacys’) now choose to sleep with the most physically desirable men (labeled as ‘Chads’).5 Incels often frame this pattern of behavior as a form of theft, whereby their entitled access to women’s bodies is thwarted by women’s preference for more desirable ‘Chads.’ These (mostly) young men are frustrated at a world they see as denying them power and sexual control over women’s bodies. In their eyes, they are victims of oppressive feminism, an ideology which must be overthrown, often through violence.

The diagram on the next page (taken from the subreddit r/ braincell) reflects how this ideology views the world. Incel ideology presents a mythologized view that prior to the sexual revolution in the ‘60s, every man had access to a female partner; subsequent to the women’s empowerment movement, fewer and fewer men have access to a partner. They frame this shift as a profound injustice to men who cannot find a sexual partner, suggesting that society has failed to give men what they are entitled to (access to women’s bodies) and that the only recourse is violent insurrection.

Drawing the link between incels and other forms of violent extremism

There has been some debate as to whether incel attacks count as terrorism. Media reporting has often been reticent to classify these attacks as terror and some officials, including the Canadian police, refused to call the Toronto attack an act of terrorism.6 However, the nature of incel violence meets the requirement of the U.S. State Department’s description, which defines the term ‘terrorism’ as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”7 While incels have not yet formed organized violent groups or cells, the existing attacks have been premeditated, politically motivated and perpetrated violence against civilians. These factors clearly designate incel attacks as a form of terrorism and require incel ideology to be explored as a form of violent extremism.

At the heart of this ideology are hardened misogynistic notions of traditional gender roles. Rather than focusing on a particular religious or ethnic group, these attacks are motivated by shared beliefs about sexuality, male supremacy and the need to violently reestablish ‘traditional’ gender norms. The substantial online communities, previously congregating on the now defunct subreddit r/incel and more recently on incel.me and r/braincells subreddit, validate this world view and encourage direct action in pursuit of their goals.

Incel ideology is just one of many forms of misogynistic violence. Addressing this misogyny and the violence it produces is the most effective way to prevent some of the conditions which lead to domestic terrorist attacks. Early action will also go a long way towards addressing the core tenets of far-right ideologies, which are increasingly impacting and unsettling the American public at large.

There is an undeniable link between misogyny and violence. Experts say that domestic violence is a way for a male abuser to impose and enforce ‘traditional’ gender roles, which are based on ideas of men having control over women.8 The important factor here is that it is violence or threats of violence that are used to exert that control. This link starts with domestic violence but may extend far beyond the privacy of the home to include mass shootings or terrorist attacks. Recent research shows that more than 50% of the mass shootings executed in the United States between 2009 and 2016 were preceded by the shooter’s murder of a partner, ex-partner or family member.9 For example, James Hodgkinson, who opened fire at a GOP baseball practice, allegedly assaulted his daughter and was accused of abuse by two of his three ex-wives.10

Researchers such as Cynthia Cockburn, Rachel Pain and Sara Meger have shown the deep links between men’s sexual violence and their use of armed violence in public. In the case of incel terrorism, the links to violence are overt.11 Incel discussions often explicitly connect women’s non-provision of sexual access to the need for sexually marginalized men to deploy brutal violence in the public sphere in order to defend this ‘entitlement’. While not all incels are white supremacists or terrorists, affiliates are connected to these more extreme violent expressions by a toxic view of gender relations, which provides the “linking thread, a kind of fuse, along which violence runs.”12 Incel discussions often draw explicitly on white supremacist calls for armed insurrection to overthrow the prevailing order and restore an order based on men’s supremacy over women. The parallels between Minassian’s call for “Incel Rebellion” and white supremacists’ calls for ethno-nationalist insurrection are not coincidental.13 Incels who argue for an armed insurrection often use similar terminology to white supremacists in relation to the need for men to overthrow the prevailing system. Frustration with the current system, and adherence to an ideology that promotes violent solutions, not only makes incels dangerous actors in and of themselves, but also increases the probability that they will be amenable to broader extremist recruitment tactics.

The Islamic State advertises its treatment of women as a recruitment tool, showing men- particularly men from western countries- that the caliphate will allow them to restore ‘traditional’ gender norms of male dominance.14 This ideology appeals to individuals who desire to control the women in their own lives. Omar Mateen, the Pulse nightclub shooter who killed 49 people in the second deadliest mass shooting in recent American history, was loosely affiliated with ISIS. He mentally and physically abused his wife.15 This pattern fits a number of other so-called ‘lone wolf’ attacker profiles, such as Khalid Masood, the Westminster attacker; Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, who committed the van attack in Nice; Tamerlan Tsarnaev, one of the Boston Marathon bombers, and Man Haron Monis, who carried out the Sydney Lindt café siege and has been charged with

22 counts of aggravated sexual assault.16 According to Nimmi Gowrinathan, the restrictive gender roles promoted by terrorist organizations often act as a “pull” factor for potential recruits who have pre-existing attitudes or desires in that direction. Addressing misogynistic attitudes is one of the best ways to prevent an escalation to violence.

The risk of misogyny-linked terror groups is particularly pertinent to the United States today. A 2017 survey by the Thomson Reuters Foundation found that the United States is now among the top 10 most dangerous nations for women when assessed on healthcare, discrimination, cultural traditions, sexual violence, non-sexual violence and human trafficking.17 The U.S. ranked third, tying with Syria, in regard to the danger of sexual violence including rape, sexual harassment, coerced sex and lack of justice in rape cases. The U.S. ranked sixth for non-sexual violence against women and was the only Western country to show up on the list. The other countries, in order of danger to women, were listed as India, Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Yemen and Nigeria.

It may be easy to believe that incels are an extreme fringe group that do not pose a threat to national or international security. However, Incels represent just one end of a spectrum of extremist groups spanning a vast range of political ideologies, all united by militant misogyny. These groups range from white-supremacists and neo-Nazis to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State. Incels are just one aspect of a violent ideological masculinity, an ideology that is growing. Misogynist online groups, from men’s rights activists, to ‘pick up artist’ communities and Incels, have increased in number and size over recent years.18 The subreddit r/incels had roughly 40,000 members when it was shut down in 2017 for inciting violence against women.19 But incels are not confined to “one tiny bit of Reddit” rather “it’s a movement that has tens of thousands of people who visit these boards, these subreddits, which are safe places for them.”20

There are arguments both for and against banning websites that promote violence against women, such as the subreddit r/incel. Some argue that these groups should be allowed to remain, as they gather promoters of violent ideology together where they might be monitored rather than forcing them to scatter, only to grow and proliferate. However, if allowed to remain, these online communities permit both violent content and norms to flourish and possibly be enacted in the real world.21 Reddit, the site which hosted then banned the subreddit r/incel, has recently established policies that prohibit content that “encourages, glorifies, incites or calls for violence or physical harm against an individual or group of people.” The platform has also been clamping down on pages which are dedicated to far-right groups, banning two such groups for sharing personal information without permission as a form of harassment, also known as ‘doxing.’22 The incel Reddit thread was just one of countless online forums, blogs and networks collectively called the ‘Manosphere,’ which focus on issues of men’s rights and male supremacy where incels, and those with similar ideologies, gather. These forums act as an echo chamber reifying and amplifying extremist beliefs. It should be noted that since the closing of r/incel the community has moved to other subreddits, such as r/braincells, or to dedicated sites like https://incels.me/.

Ideologies based on ideas of domination through fear facilitate violent acts and should be considered as a form of terrorism. Recently, the Southern Poverty Law Center added male supremacy to the list of ideologies it tracks on its ‘hate map’, placing it alongside white nationalist, racist skinhead, neo-Nazi, neo-nationalist and other hate groups.23 Just as white supremacist violence is now well-recognized as a form of terrorism, it is important that male supremacist attacks be similarly acknowledged.

Policy implications

Crafting and supporting policies that provide alternatives to violent white supremacist and misogynistic rhetoric/ actions is an effective method to increase both domestic and international security. Understanding the complex interactions between domestic violence, misogyny, alt-right ideology, and terrorism opens up several new avenues for preventative policy responses.

Address the ideology

  • Address misogynistic ideology with the same seriousness as other forms of violent extremism. There has been a tendency both in media reporting and government responses to treat incel attacks as purely a result of mental illness or random acts of violence. Incel ideology must be treated as the form of violent extremist thought that it is, and relevant existing laws and policies should be applied. The role of incel ideology in promoting ‘lone-wolf’ attacks means that it requires a similar response to the promotion of jihadi or neo-Nazi ideology online.
  • Encourage and support policies that identify and sanction speech that is intended to incite violence or harm against an individual or group of people, including that which is based on gender. Such policies, where they already exist, need to be enforced. Gender-based threats need to be taken as seriously as threats based on religion and ethnicity.

Act on early warning signs

The speed at which people radicalize makes radicalization difficult to track. However, those that engage in terrorist attacks often have long histories of violence, particularly domestic violence. If mass shootings and terrorist attacks are connected to domestic or family violence, there are warning signs that, if acknowledged, can be used to help prevent future violence.

  • Strengthen domestic violence laws to prevent abusers from accessing weapons, including mechanisms to remove guns from individuals who have exhibited dangerous behavior. This would include closing background check loopholes which allow individuals prohibited from buying guns to purchase them.
  • Ensure the application of domestic violence laws and facilitate the creation of laws which prohibit violence based on gender.
  • Craft policies which identify and address violent behaviors rather than profiling individuals based on race or religion, tactics which only further alienate individuals. Policies can acknowledge domestic violence as an important precursor to larger violent acts.
  • Acts of domestic violence need to be understood as a security threat rather than a ‘personal’ matter, and thus treated accordingly. This includes supporting domestic violence survivors and prosecuting perpetrators before they can harm others.

Extremist ideologies advocating violence of any kind are a domestic security concern. Holistically addressing these ideologies and the environments in which they thrive is an effective approach to preventing both large and small scale violence targeted at specific groups, be those groups identified by race, religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, or other.

References

  1. ‘The alternative right (alt-right) is defined by the Merriam-Webster dictionary as a right-wing political movement whose members reject mainstream conservative politics and instead promote extremist beliefs and policies based on ideas of white nationalism. While there is no single ideology of the alt-right, it is commonly employed to describe figures such as Richard Spencer who support extremist ideology without adopting the traditional trappings of neo-Nazism or conventional conservatism. The alt-right movement is closely associated with online forums such as 4chan which were integral to the emergence of the incel movement. 
  2. Stewart Bell, “He Wasn’t a Terrorist’: Those Who Knew Alek Minassian Struggle to Explain the Toronto Van Attack,” https:// globalnews.ca/news/4168222/he-wasnt-terrorist-toronto-attack/, [10 Sept. 2018].
  3. The term ‘incel’ was originally coined by a Canadian College student who started a website entitled ‘Alana’s Involuntary Celibacy Project’ in order to discuss her sexual inactivity with others. The site was intended to foster an inclusive community to help people struggling to form relationship but was co-opted by the current incel movement.
  4. Smaller groups of “Ricels” and “Currycels” representing East and South Asian incels exist, and explicitly tie their celibacy to preference for whiteness in society. 
  5. Debbie Ging, “Alphas, betas, and incels: Theorizing the Masculinities of the Manosphere,” in Men and Masculinities (Dublin City University, Glasnevin, 2017).
  6. Rich Barlow, “Call it What you Want – The ‘Incel rebellion’ Is Terrorism,” http://www.wbur.org/cognoscenti/2018/04/30/call-it-whatyou-want-the-incel-rebellion-is-terrorism, [10 Sept. 2018].
  7. United States State Department, “Legislative Requirements and Key Terms,” https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/65464.pdf, [10 Sept. 2018].
  8. Amanda Taub, “Control and Fear: What Mass Killings and Domestic Violence Have in Common,” https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/16/ world/americas/control-and-fear-what-mass-killings-and-domesticviolence-have-in-common.html, [10 Sept. 2018)].
  9. Everytown for Gun Safety, “Mass Shootings in the United States: 2009-2016,” https://everytownresearch.org/reports/mass-shootingsanalysis/ [10 Sept. 2018].
  10. Charlotte Alter, “Why So Many Mass Shooters Have Domestic Violence in Their Past.” http://time.com/4818506/james-hodgkinsonvirginia-shooting-steve-scalise/ [10 Sept. 2018]; Petula Dvorak, “‘Tormented and traumatized’: Rage toward women fuels mass shooters,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/tormented-and-traumatizedrage-toward-women-fuels-mass-shooters/2018/07/02/205263aa-7dea11e8-bb6b-c1cb691f1402_story.html?utm_term=.3ca80bc6ede5 [10 Sept. 2018].
  11. For work on the continuum of violence, see R. Pain, “Intimate War,” in Political Geography, 44, pp.64-73; Sara Meger, Rape Loot Pillage: The Political Economy of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict, (Oxford University Press).
  12. C Cockburn, “Gender relations as causal in militarization and war: A feminist standpoint,” in International Feminist Journal of Politics 12(2) (2010).
  13. Aja Romano, “How the alt-right’s sexism lures men into white supremacy,” https://www.vox.com/culture/2016/12/14/13576192/altright-sexism-recruitment [10 Sept. 2018].
  14. Amanda Taub, “Control and Fear: What Mass Killings and Domestic Violence Have in Common,” The New York Times, https://www.nytimes. com/2016/06/16/world/americas/control-and-fear-what-mass-killingsand-domestic-violence-have-in-common.html [10 Sept. 2018].
  15. Jack Healy, “Sitora Yusufiy, Ex-Wife of Orlando Suspect, Describes Abusive Marriage,” https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/sitorayusufiy-omar-mateen-orlando-shooting.html?_r=0 [10 Sept. 2018].
  16. Australia Associated Press, “Sydney siege inquest: Man Haron Monis was a ‘psychopathic lone wolf terrorist,’” https://www.theguardian.com/ australia-news/2016/may/02/sydney-siege-inquest-man-haron-moniswas-a-psychopathic-lone-wolf-terrorist  [10 Sept. 2018].
  17. The Thomson Reuters Foundation, “The World’s most dangerous countries for women 2018,”  http://poll2018.trust.org/country/?id=usa [10 Sept. 2018].
  18. Trends noted most visibly in the Global North, including the United States (Peter Finocchiaro, “Is the men’s rights movement growing?” https://www.salon.com/2011/03/29/scott_adams_mens_rights_ movement/ [10 Sept. 2018]) and Australia (Greg Callaghan, “Cassie Jaye’s film on the men’s rights movement shocked Australia. Why?” https://www.smh.com.au/lifestyle/cassie-jayes-film-on-the-mensrights-movement-shocked-australia-why-20170726-gxj34p.html [10 Sept. 2018]) However, the trend is a global one, including nations such as India (Suman Naishadham, “Why India’s Men’s Rights Movement is Thriving,” https://www.vice.com/en_au/article/9b8akp/why-indiasmens-rights-movement-is-thriving [10 Sept. 2018].)
  1. Christine Hauser, “Reddit Bans ‘Incel’ Group for Inciting Violence Against Women,” The New York Times, https://www.nytimes. com/2017/11/09/technology/incels-reddit-banned.html [25 Sept. 2018]
  2. Zoe Williams, “’Raw hatred’: why the ‘incel’ movement targets and terrorizes women,” https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/25/ raw-hatred-why-incel-movement-targets-terrorises-women  [10 Sept. 2018]. 
  3. Perrie Samotin and Lilly Dancyger, “Incels: Breaking Down the Disturbing, Thriving Online Community of Celibate Men,” https://www. glamour.com/story/what-is-incel-breaking-down-online-communitycelibate-men [10 Sept. 2018].
  4. Alex Hern, “Reddit bans far-right groups alt-right and alternative right,” https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/feb/02/redditbans-far-right-groups-altright-alternativeright [10 Sept. 2018].
  5. Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC), “Male Supremacy: Male supremacy is a hateful ideology advocating for the subjugation of women,” https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/ideology/male-supremacy  [10 Sept. 2018].

By Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Soraya Kamali-Nafar

For over 30 years, Women In International Security (WIIS) has worked to advance the role of women in national and international security. While much progress has been made, the number of women occupying prominent positions in foreign and defense policy remains limited. As a result, the role of women in decisionmaking in foreign and defense policies is under-developed.

Indeed, while women constitute 40 percent of the Foreign Service officer corps, they hold only one-third of the chief of mission positions.1 Women make up 33 percent of the Department of Defense civilian staff and 18 percent of the DOD active duty officer corps, and they remain grossly under-represented at the highest ranks—less than 8 percent have the rank of general or flag officer.2

Women also remain under-represented as expert commentators in the media. Women accounted for just  24 percent of foreign affairs and national security experts invited to speak on major political talk shows.3 Manels— that is, event panels with only men—remain common in  the United States, including in Washington, DC.4

The lack of women in prominent positions in the foreign policy and national and international security establishments In 2000, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, which recognized the importance of the role of women in matters related to international peace and security.7 In 2011, the US rolled out a US National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security, and in November 2017, the US Congress adopted the Women, Peace and Security Act, which posited that “the United States should be a global leader in promoting the meaningful participation of women in conflict prevention, management and resolution, and post-conflict relief and recovery efforts.”8

Think tanks play an important role in shaping foreign and defense policy agendas. Think tank experts shape these agendas by moving in and out of many critical positions in the US government and by participating in policy debates  in the media.

Many think tanks have recognized the importance of diversifying their staff and recruiting and retaining more women.9 Many have in recent years added programs highlighting women in the field (see below). Unfortunately, many think tanks continue to suffer from significant gender gaps. First, only 32 percent of the national and international security think tanks are headed by a woman.

is surprising since for over a decade more than 60 percent of those enrolled in graduate programs (masters and doctoral programs) in the social and behavorial sciences (including political science and international relations) have been women.5 The 7,000-member International Studies Association (ISA), the professional association for scholars, practitioners, and graduate students in the field of international studies, has 43 percent female membership. Amongst its graduate student members, women are in the majority.6

Figure 1: Heads of Washington, DC Think Tanks

Figure 2: Average % of Experts in Washington, DC 

Think Tanks by Gender

Figure 3: Average % of Governing Board Members of

Washington, DC Think Tanks by Gender

Second, on average only 27 percent of expert staff are women. Only 3 out of 22 think tanks (14 percent) have achieved gender parity within their expert staff. Third, only 22 percent of think tank governing boards are women. Finally, only one think tank has integrated gender in its programs.

Since 2007, the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP) of the University of Pennsylvania has published an annual Global Go To Think Tank Index Report. The report measures the roles think tanks play in governments and civil societies around the world. It does so by ranking think tanks in a variety of categories, including top think tanks by region and areas of research.10

Table 1: Washnigton, DC Think Tanks with Women at the Helm 
Center for American Progress (CAP)Ms. Neera Tanden, President and CEO2011
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)Ms. Victoria Nuland, CEO 2018
German Marshall Fund (GMF)Dr. Karen Donfried, President2014
Heritage FoundationMs. Kay Coles James, President2017
New America Dr. Anne-Marie Slaugther, President and CEO2013
US Institute of Peace (USIP)Ms. Nancy Lindborg, President and CEO2015
Wilson Center for International ScholarsMs. Jane Harman, President and CEO2011

Unfortunately, the Global Go To Think Tank Index Report does not consider how gender balances or gender programming influence these roles. In sum, up until now there has not been a systematic effort to collect data on the gender balances within the major thinks tanks active in national and international security arena.11 Nor has there been a systematic effort to survey the programs of think tanks to see how gender is integrated into them.

The WIIS Gender Scorecard: Washington, DC Think Tanks fills this gap by presenting data with regard to the gender balance of 22 major think tanks that work on foreign policy and national and international security issues and are based in the Washington, DC area. We also present information about the gender and women’s programs within these think tanks.

This scorecard is part of a broader WIIS initiative to promote the integration of gender perspectives into national and international security agendas.12 Indeed, we believe that gender perspectives are insufficiently integrated into analyses of national and international security challenges.13 An important step in the right direction is to achieve gender parity at the level of the expert staffs. In addition, we believe that it is important to achieve gender parity at the level of the governing boards of thinks tanks. Indeed, boards of directors and trustees have judiciary responsibilities for the governance of thinks tanks, they oversee think tank activities, and help set the strategic direction. Without leadership from the top, gender gaps will remain.14

By publishing this scorecard, we hope to stimulate discussions within the think tanks on how to close the gender gaps on their expert staffs and governing boards. We also hope to stimulate a broader discussion about the importance of gender when examining important international security challenges. We believe that a more diverse staff within think tanks, as well as more diverse governing boards, will stimulate innovative and better approaches to critical national and international security challenges and help to make the world a better place.

Scoring the Tanks

The scorecard reviews think tanks along four main axes:

percentage of women that lead the think tanks;

percentage of women experts in the think tank’s foreign policy and national and international security programs;

percentage of women in the governing bodies of the  think tanks.

number of think tanks with significant commitment to gender and/or women’s programming.

Heads of Think Tanks

Of the 22 institutions surveyed, only seven (32 percent) are led by women – the Center for American Progress, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), the German

Marshall Fund (GMF), the Heritage Foundation, New America, the US Institute of Peace (USIP), and the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars.

Experts

Only three think tanks—the Stimson Center, the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), and the US Institute of Peace (USIP) —have reached gender parity at the level of their expert staff.

On average, only 27 percent of the expert staff of Washington, DC thinks tanks surveyed are women.

Figure 4: % of Women Experts in Washington, DC Think Tanks


51 50 49

Governing Boards

The gender gap is particularly stark at the level of the governing boards. No think tank has achieved gender parity. The Institute for Policy Studies and the Aspen Institute come closest, with 44 percent and 43 percent women, respectively.

On average, only 22 percent of the Board of Directors or Trustees are composed of women.

Gender or Women’s Programming

Most Washington, DC think tanks do not consider the role of gender in national and international security. For many in the traditional security think tank community—men and women—gender is often equated with “women” or a “woman’s point of view.” A 2016 survey by the New America

Foundation found that the majority of US policymakers and elites had little knowledge and understanding of gender. Most equated gender with women. If at all open to the idea of a gender

Figure 5: % of Women on Governing Boards of Washington, DC Think Tanks widespread within the DC foreign policy and security think tank

Table 2: % of Women Experts in Washington, DC Think Tanks
RankThink Tank% of Women 
  1Stimson Center51%
  2Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)50%
  3US Institute of Peace (USIP) 49%
  4Institute for Policy Studies (IPS)44%
  5RAND Corporation40%
  6Center for a New American Security (CNAS)37%
  7Wilson Center for International Scholars34%
  8New America33%
  9Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)30%
10    Atlantic Council  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)29%  
13  CATO Institute German Marshall Fund (GMF)27%  
15Brookings Institution26%
16Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC)24%
17Heritage Foundation22%
18American Enterprise Institute (AEI)21%
19Aspen Institute20%
20Lexington Institute17%
21Center for American Progress (CAP)16%
22Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)13%

the programming center on gender to the front office and began mainstreaming gender throughout its work in 2015, most notably in its field projects and programs. Since 2016, USIP has had a director for gender policy and strategy that oversees and advises all programs on gender. The director sits in the Policy, Learning and Strategy Center, which reports directly to USIP’s president.

None of the other think tanks have integrated gender into their national and international security programming. Most other think tanks have separate programs that have a focus on women, rather than gender. A few think tanks work on the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda, but most of that work is not integrated into their other national or international security programs.16

Think tanks with notable programs on women and/or the WPS agenda include the following:17

The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) launched a Women In National Security program in 2014.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) launched a Smart Women, Smart Power Program in December 2014 and a Women’s Global Leadership Program in 2015.

The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) has a Women and Foreign Policy Program and a Women and Foreign Policy Program Advisory Council founded in 2002.

New America started work on the WPS agenda in its Better Life Lab and Political Reform Program.

The RAND Corporation has a webpage called Rand Women

To Watch. It also has programs on Gender Equity in the Workplace and Gender Integration in the Military, which addresses issues related to women and transgender military personnel. In its work on Female Populations RAND addresses issues faced by women and girls, including women refugees, migrants, and gender-based and intimate partner violence.

The Woodrow Wilson Center has a Global Women’s Leadership Initiative (GWLI) (since 2012) and a Women In Public Service Project.

Most research on the WPS agenda and the intersections of women, gender, and national and international security issues is carried out outside of the foreign policy and national and international security think tank establishment by nongovernmental organizations and civil society groups. While many of these groups are active in advocacy and operational work, many also conduct research and produce policy papers. Most of these organizations are members of the US Civil Society Working Group on Women, Peace and Security  (US CSWG). (see box page 6).

Table 3: % of Women on Governing Boards of Washington, DC Think Tanks

Rank     Think Tank         % of Women  

Institute for Policy Studies (IPS)     44%

Aspen Institute    34%

Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)           31%

            Wilson Center for International Scholars

Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC)      29%

New America      27%

            RAND Corporation

  8         German Marshall Fund (GMF)       26%

            Stimson Center

Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA)        25%

Heritage Foundation         24% 12 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) 23%

Center for American Progress (CAP)           22%

Brookings Institution        21%

            Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)

16         Atlantic Council 20%

            US Institute of Peace (USIP)

18         CATO Institute    11%      Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS)     

20         Center for a New American Security (CNAS)           10%

21-22    American Enterprise Institute (AEI)            0%

            Lexington Institute

Concluding Thoughts

The main security policy establishments, including think tanks, continue to be staffed and managed mostly by men.

The top 10 think tanks in the United States, as ranked by the Go To Think Tank Index Report—Brookings, CSIS, CEIP, Heritage Foundation, Wilson Center, RAND, CAP, CFR, Cato, Atlantic Council—are often not those who do best in terms of gender balance or gender programming, the Wilson Center being the exception.

While we see an increasing number of women entering the field of national and international security, their influence remains limited. Only 3 out of 22 think tanks have achieved  gender parity at the level of their expert staff.

We hope that the publication of this scorecard will stimulate discussions and encourage thinks tanks to conduct a gender analysis of their organizations.18

Such an analysis should include a more fine-grained examination of the gender balance within their institutions. For example, what positions do men and women occupy within the foreign and national and international security expert positions available at the organization? How are hiring and retention policies affecting the gender imbalances? Are there gender pay gaps? Do men and women get interviewed and quoted equally? If not, why not? These discussions should include not just the human resources department, but also and most important the staff of the policy programs in question.

In addition, think tanks should examine the gender balance at their governing boards and how they can increase efforts to attract more women to the boards. Organizations, like WIIS can help think tanks identify women with the necessary expertise and experience.

A think tank gender analysis would also include an examination of how gender is integrated into the analysis of national and international security issues. Program directors should be encouraged to examine how research on women and gender can become a more integral part of their foreign policy and national security programs, instead of standalone, siloed, programs.

Change within institutions require leadership from the top. They also require that programs and program staff are held accountable. Collecting gendered data on such things as new hires, panels, and media outreach is often a first step.19

Lastly, think tanks may consider appointing a Gender Advisor (GENAD). Such advisors have been particularly useful in government settings (USAID, State and DoD) and international organizations (United Nations, NATO). When appointing GENADs, it is important to locate them in policy positions or in the think tank’s front office so that they have direct access to the leadership.

Members of the USCSWG
4Girls GLocal Leadership Alliance for Peacebuilding American Red Cross Amnesty International USA Asia Foundation Baha’is of the United States Equality Now Fuller Project for International Reporting Futures Without Violence George Washington University Center for Gender Equality in International Affairs Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace & Security Human Rights Watch Inclusive Security Institute for State Effectiveness (ISE) International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) International Civil Society Action Network (ICAN) International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) International Republican Institute (IRI) International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) Mina’s List / Peace is Loud National Democratic Institute Our Secure Future: Women Make the Difference PAI Peace X Peace Promundo – U.S. Protect the People Saferworld Strategy for Humanity The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP) United Nations Association of the USA U.S. National Committee of UN Women Vital Voices Global Partnership WomanStats Project Women Enabled International Women for Afghan Women Women In International Security (WIIS) Women of Color Advancing Peace and Security (WCAPS) Women’s Action for New Directions (WAND) Women’s Refugee Commission Secretariat: USIP Fiscal Sponsor/Agent: WIIS

Much progress has been made with regard to gender equality. In the last two decades the number of women studying national and international affairs has grown enormously. Students (women and men) are also increasingly interested in analyzing the role of gender and gender inequalities on national and international security. Think tanks no longer have many excuses for the persisting gender gaps and the neglect of gender perspectives. In a world with increasingly complex national and international security challenges, think tanks need to appeal to broad expertise in order to advance peace and security in the 21st century.

Methodology

The WIIS Gender Scorecard: Washington, DC Think Tanks surveys 22 think tanks with a strong presence in the Washington, DC area. They all work on a broad range of international affairs and national and international security issues. Most are mentioned in the 2017 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report and/or get regular mention in the media.20

This scorecard does not include university-based research institutes (e.g., the McCain Institute or the Center for Transatlantic Relations). The scorecard also excludes those think tanks focused on a specific region (e.g., the Middle East) or one functional area (e.g., migration or international economic development).

While gender can be defined and discussed as more than just women and men, this survey takes a binary approach and conducted its evaluation using women and men and based its evaluation on the names and photographs found on organizations’ websites.

Data on each of the think tanks were collected in August 2018 from the think tanks’ own websites. Experts in foreign policy, defense, and national and international security were selected based on the identification of such experts by the think tanks themselves. We did not analyze the positions of the experts. Some think tanks include junior staff; others will identify only more senior staff. Similarly, we did not distinguish between non-resident and resident experts. For each think tank, we followed the think tanks’ own identification of its experts. For the full data set, see the WIIS Gender Scorecard: Washington, DC Think Tanks Data Set – 2018 at wiisglobal.org.

Table 4: WIIS Gender Scorecard: Washington, DC Think Tanks in alphabetical order. 
American Enterprise Institute (AEI) head: Arthur Brooks (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 21% women total: 29                    6 (F) + 23 (M) Governing Board: 0% women total: 27          0 (F) +27 (M) Atlantic Council head: Fred Kempe (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 29% women total: 227                     66 (F) + 161 (M) Governing Board: 20% women total: 200                  39 (F) +161 (M) Aspen Institute head: Dan Porterfield (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 20% women total: 10                    2 (F) + 8 (M) Governing Board: 34% women total: 77          26 (F) + 51 (M) Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) head: Jason Grumet (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 24% women total: 17                    4 (F) + 13 (M) Governing Board: 29% women total: 17          5 (F) + 12 (M) Brookings Institution head: John R. Allen (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 26% women total: 109                    28 (F) + 81 (M) Governing Board: 21% women total: 89          19 (F) +70 (M) Cato Institute head: Peter Goettler (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 27% women total: 11                    3 (F) + 8 (M) Governing Board: 11% women total: 19          2 (F) + 17 (M) Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) head: William J. Burns (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 29% women total: 31                    9 (F) + 22 (M) Governing Board: 23% women total: 31          7 (F) + 24 (M) Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) head: Thomas G. Mahnken Nat./Int. Security Experts: 13% women total: 32                    4 (F) + 28 (M) Governing Board: 25% women total: 8            2 (F) + 6 (M) Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) head: John J. Hamre (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 30% women total: 108                    32 (F) + 76 (M) Governing Board: 11% women total: 44          5 (F) + 39 (M) Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) head: Richard N. Haass (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 29% women total: 75                    22 (F) + 53 (M) Governing Board: 31% women total: 36          11 (F) + 25 (M)Center for a New American Security (CNAS) head: Victoria Nuland (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 37% women total: 78                    29 (F) + 49 (M) Governing Board: 10% women total: 21                    2 (F) + 19 (M) Center for American Progress (CAP) head: Neera Tanden (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 16% women total: 19                    3 (F) + 16 (M) Governing Board: 22% women total: 9    2 (F) + 7 (M) German Marshall Fund (GMF) head: Karen Donfried (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 27% women total: 44                    12 (F) + 32 (M) Governing Board: 26% women total: 19                    5 (F) + 14 (M) Heritage Foundation head: Kay Coles James (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 22% women total: 32                    7 (F) + 25 (M) Governing Board: 24% women total: 25                    6 (F)+19 (M) Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) head: John Cavanagh (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 44% women total: 16                    7 (F) + 9 (M) Governing Board: 44% women total: 18          8 (F) + 10 (M) Lexington Institute head: Merrick “Mac” Carey (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 17% women total: 6       1 (F) + 5 (M) Governing Board: 0% women total: 7            0 (F) + 7 (M) New America head: Anne-Marie Slaughter (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 33% women total: 104       34 (F) + 70 (M) Governing Board: 27% women total: 22     6 (F) + 16 (M) Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) head: Ernest J. Moniz (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 50% women total: 18                    9 (F) + 9 (M) Governing Board: 21% women total: 34          7 (F) + 27 (M) RAND Corporation head: Michael D. Rich (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 40% women total: 613            245 (F) + 368 (M) Governing Board: 27% women total: 26                    7 (F) + 19 (M) Stimson Center head: Brian Finlay (M) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 51% women total: 72                    37 (F) + 35 (M) Governing Board: 26% women total: 27                    7 (F) + 20 (M)US Institute of Peace (USIP) head: Nancy Lindborg (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 49% women total: 72     35 (F) + 37 (M) Governing Board: 20% women total: 15         3 (F) + 12 (M) Wilson Center for International Scholars head: Jane Harman (F) Nat./Int. Security Experts: 34% women total: 187  64 (F)+123 (M) Governing Board: 31% women total: 16         5 (F) + 11 (M) NOTE: The following experts, fellows, scholars, and staff have been included for: AEI: All Foreign and Defense Policy Scholars; Atlantic Council: All fellows and non-resident fellows mentioned under experts; Aspen Institute: All staff and experts from the following programs: Security & Global Affairs, including the Aspen Strategy Group, the Cybersecurity & Technology Program, and the Homeland Security Program; Bipartisan Policy Center: All experts mentioned under the National Security Project; Brookings Institution: All experts mentioned under the Foreign Policy Program; CATO: All experts mentioned under Foreign Policy and National Security; Carnegie Endowment: All experts in the Washington, DC office; CSBA: all national and international security analysts and fellows; CSIS: All experts; CFR: All experts; CNAS: All experts (staff and adjunct fellows); CAP: All experts mentioned under the Foreign Policy and Security Program; GMF: All experts; Heritage Foundation: All experts staff identified as working on national and international security issues; IPS: all experts identified as working on foreign policy and national and international security; Lexington Institute: All experts; New America: All current staff and fellows mentioned in the following programs: Cybersecurity Initiative and International Security. NTI: All experts: Rand Corporation: All experts mentioned under Homeland Security & Public Safety, International Affairs, and National Security & Terrorism programs; Stimson Center: All national & international security experts mentioned under “Staff”, note: we did not include development staff, finance officers, or other administrative staff members; USIP: All experts; Wilson Center: All experts. For a full list of experts go to the WIIS  Gender Scorecard: Washington, DC Think Tanks Data Set – 2018 at wiisglobal.org

References

See Andrea Strano, “Foreign Service Women Today: The Palmer Case and Beyond,” The Foreign Service Journal, March 2016. On the lack of women in leadership positions, see also Katherine Kidder, Amy Schafer, Phillip Carter, and Andrew Swick, From College to Cabinet: Women In

National Security, (Washington, DC: CNAS, 2017); Women In Public Service Project, Wilson Center, Roadmap to 50×50, Power and Parity in Women’s Leadership, (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, May 2018); Joan Johnson-Freese, “Half of Heaven: Why More Women are Needed in National Security,” TedxTalks, August 17, 2018; and Adrianna Pita, Tamara Cofman Wittes and Sarah Yerkes, “Presence and Voice: Women In Foreign Policy,” A Brookings Podcast, June 8, 2016.

See DOD, Office of Diversity Management and Equal Opportunity, DoD Diversity and Inclusion 2013 Summary Report (Alexandria, VA: DOD, 2013), pp. B3-B6; and Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services, 2017 Annual Report, (Alexandria, VA: DOD-Dacowits, 2017). See also Kidder et al. From College to Cabinet.

See Foreign Policy Interrupted, “Women’s Voices Marginalized in

2016 News Coverage of Foreign Affairs and National Security,” Media Matters, March 8, 2017. Foreign Policy Interrupted reports similar numbers with respect to the number of women who have seen their Opeds published. See website: www.fpinterrupted.com. See also: Amanda Taub, “The #ManPanel problem: Why are female experts still so widely ignored?,” Vox, March 16, 2016.

Several initiatives to combat manels and gender discrimination were launched in 2015. In Australia, the Panel Pledge was launched—i.e., a commitment not to appear on male only panels. In Geneva, the International Gender Champion network was launched, committing heads of organizations to no longer sit on single-sex panels.  See also, Daniel Drezner, “A Few Thoughts on Manels,” Washington Post Blog, June 7, 2018; and Tamara Wittes and Marc Lynch, “The mysterious absence of women from Middle East policy debates,” Washington Post, January 20, 2015.

See Hironao Okahana and Enyu Zhou, Graduate Enrollment and

Degrees: 2006-2016 (Washington, DC: Council of Graduate Schools, 2017). For example, in the Fall of 2016, first-time graduate enrollment in the social and behavorial sciences (including anthropology, economics, political science and international relations) saw 38 percent men and 62 percent women enrolled in doctoral programs and 35.5 percent men and 64.5 percent women enrolled in Masters programs. A separate study should examine what happens with these graduates.

See “Gender Distribution of ISA Membership” at https://www.isanet.org/ISA/About-ISA/Data/Gender. In the international security thematic group of ISA women make up 37 percent; in foreign policy analysis women 34 percent; in peace studies 53 percent. Women outnumber men in 8 of the 29 thematic groups: interdisciplinary studies, environmental studies, feminist theory and gender studies, global development, global health, human rights, international law, and peace studies. Women also outnumber men in three of its four caucuses: Global South Caucus LGBTQ and allies caucus; and the Women Caucus. The Online Media Caucus has 48 percent women members.

See, for example, Kathleen Kuehnast, Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Helga Hernes, eds., Women and War: Power and Protection in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: USIP, 2011), and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Michael E. Brown, “WPS+GPS: Adding Gender to the Peace and Security Equation,” WIIS Policybrief, November 2017

The US NAP on WPS was updated in June 2016. See also Women, Peace and Security Act of 2017, Public Law No:115-68, 10/06/2017.

See for example Vestige Strategies, Advancing Diversity and Inclusion in the Foreign Policy Sector, (Washington, DC: Vestige Strategies, July 2018). See also the activities of The Think Tank Diversity Consortium (TTDC).

James McGann, 2017 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, (Philadelphia, PA: TTCSP, the Lauder Institute, The University of Pennsylvania, 2018).

Micah Zenko has been one of the few foreign policy experts paying attention to this issue. See for example, Micah Zenko, “Where are the Women in Foreign Policy Today,” Foreign Policy Blog Post (September

26, 2015). In the past, WIIS has surveyed women in the State Department, staff in the US Congress and women in Peacekeeping, but never did a survey of women in think tanks. See wiisglobal.org

This scorecard is also part of a broader initiative of the Leadership Council for Women In National Security (LC-WINS) that seeks greater diversity within think tanks. LC-WINS is an informal group of foreign policy and national security professionals created in 2017. 13.  See de Jonge Oudraat and Brown, “WPS+GPS”

Leadership should also encourage men and women to integrate gendered perspectives into their analysis of international security problems.

See Heather Hurlburt, Elizabeth Weingarten and Carolina Marques de Mesquita, A Guide to Talking Women, Peace, and Security Inside the U.S. Security Establishment (Washington, DC: New America Foundation, 2017)

In 2015, the Compton Foundation launched a $5 million special peace and national security initiative with a focus on the Women, Peace and Security agenda and the integration of a gendered perspective in US Foreign Policy. Thanks to these grants The Council on Foreign Relations, CNAS, and New America greatly expanded their programs on women and the WPS agenda.

We do not include those think tanks that view women and gender mostly through a domestic lens (Brookings and CAP) or those that might have an occasional publication related to women and gender and national or international security.

An increasing number of companies in the corporate sector seek EDGE (Economic Dividends for Gender Equality) workplace gender equality certification. WIIS has also a growing portfolio of gender evaluation and analysis and gender trainings.

The collection of data and the setting of benchmarks and objectives has proven to be very effective within the Scandinavian academic and think tank community. In August 2018, a consortium of seven European universities launched a new Charter that seeks to build a stronger commitment to gender equality in higher education and research institutions. The Charter is part of an EU Horizon 2020 initiative entitled the SAGE (Systematic Action for Gender Equality) project. It outlines 12 principles that support structural, cultural and political

change to eradicate sexism, bias, and other forms of discrimination

in research and higher education, and advance an intersectional and inclusive concept of gender. See “New European Charter to Promote Gender Equality in the University Sector,” Press Release, Trinity College

Dublin, August 22, 2018; see also http://sage-growingequality.eu. The Irish Minister of State for Higher Education, Mary Mitchell O’Connor, announced that University funding would in future be linked to how well universities are tackling gender inequality, including gender inequalities among staff. See Catherine Sanz, “University funding will  be linked to gender equality,” The Times, August 21, 2018.

20.  McGann, 2017 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report. We also consulted https://thebestschools.org/features/most-influential-think-

tanks/

By Pearl Karuhanga Atuhaire and Grace Ndirangu

The international community has taken a strong stance against conflict-related sexual violence, deeming it a war crime. However, international actors are paying scant attention to sexual- and

gender-based violence (SGBV) in refugee settings. Urban refugee women and girls and those in refugee camps often grapple with SGBV in their countries of asylum, long after they have fled their homes and communities. Our research among refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo currently in Kenya and Uganda has unearthed a high incidence of SGBV against refugee women and girls. Research by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) indicates that one in five refugee and displaced women experience sexual violence.1 Many of the survivors often have no one to turn to for protection and resort to sex work and other risky means to survive.

In this policy brief, we examine the extent of the problem, identify obstacles to progress, and recommend actions governments and humanitarian organizations can take to better protect refugees. In short, we argue that refugee settlements are not safe spaces for refugee women. Humanitarian officials, governments, and the international community must do more to address this problem.

Extent of the Problem

In Kenya, refugees are mainly settled in camps, while in Uganda, refugees are placed in settlements where they live temporarily as they await integration, resettlement, or settled in the southwest in Kyaka I and II, Rwamwanja, and Nakivale settlements.  As of 2016, Kyaka II had 28,364 refugees, with Congolese accounting for 88 percent and Rwandese 12 percent of the population.5

Most of these refugees, both urban and rural, experienced SGBV at the hands of rebel and militia groups in their country of origin and they continue to be at risk after flight. Female refugees are particularly vulnerable when they are separated from their husbands. The extra burden they carry as single mothers and family heads taking care of children and elderly relatives often leads them into dangerous, exploitative situations as they struggle to earn a living. Their children assume adult responsibilities. Many children are forced into dangerous means of survival, such as transactional sex work, early marriages, and trading sex for favors. Others may have temporary jobs, such as washing clothes, performing domestic chores, working in shops and construction sites, and selling produce and other wares in the market. However, these jobs earn them meager wages and still expose them to frequent abuse.

Among urban refugees in Kenya, some of the young women told us stories, such as this one:

repatriation.2 Kenya has about 24,063 Congolese refugees who have settled in urban areas around Nairobi.3 Most of these urban refugees have temporary or part-time jobs to support their families.4 Congolese refugees in Uganda are mainly

[H]e would pass by my work station when I was cooking and he could rub himself against my body or even touch my breasts. When I told him to stop, he would laugh and say that there is nothing I can do to him. If I left the job, it would be difficult for me to get another one and then my kids would suffer.      

Another young woman reported:

I worked in a beauty parlor as a masseuse. Some of the clients were male. Some of them would request a massage, and when it was over they would then ask me to perform sexual favors. If I refused, they would threaten to tell my boss that I was being rude. I refused to give in, and after being reported so many times, my boss was threatening to fire me, so I quit. I now do casual jobs.  

Most women and girls who work as domestic help have reported being sexually abused by their male employers or by male members of the households where they work. If these women and girls are in the country illegally, they are vulnerable to blackmail, with people threatening to report them to the authorities. Often, these women and girls work without pay, and most do not report these incidents for fear of reprisal and ostracism by other community members.

Women in refugee camps and settlements are also often abused by their husbands or other male family members or providers. These men often control the family resources and are the sole decision makers in their families. In Kyaka II in 2016, most perpetrators of SGBV were known to their victims. They were uncles, fathers, foster fathers, or even perpetrators from their country of origin who ended up in the same settlement.

One refugee woman told us this in an interview: When I first came to this settlement as a young orphan refugee girl, I was assigned a foster father, but this foster father took advantage of me and defiled me.… [B]y then, I was fourteen years old. He came from the bar late one night when I was already asleep, and he forced himself on me and defiled me. I could not tell anyone about it because he told me the next morning not to report this, otherwise he would throw me out of his house. Since I had no other place to go, I just kept silent about the whole issue.

Adolescent girls are married off by their parents, who negotiate the price with prospective husbands.6 High levels of poverty and the practice of bride prices contribute to high child marriage rates among the Congolese, as does family debt, which encourages families to include girls as part of financial settlements.7 In Kyaka II, most girls are married off when they are as young as 14 years old. During a focus group discussion with refugee women, some women from the Hema

Clan in Congo argued,

Among us, the Hema, most families marry off their daughters when they are as young as 14 years. It is a cultural norm that we cannot change. If a woman opposed the practice, the community would reject her, and she could even be killed…. So much as the settlement officials say it is wrong, in our culture it is done silently, and as mothers of these children, we don’t have much say about it because we fear rejection from our husbands and families.

SGBV survivors may have been mutilated during the abuse, suffered other physical injuries, or contracted sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS. In some instances, women develop incontinence and uncontrolled bleeding, which affect relationships with their immediate family and the community. The women suffer psychologically as well, from post-traumatic stress disorder, stress, depression, anxiety, low self-esteem, inability to form healthy relationships, insomnia, and somatic symptoms of headaches. SGBV thus often leaves women incapacitated and unable to care for themselves and their families.

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), local authorities, and international actors are aware of these problems, and they have attempted to put mechanisms and measures in place to address SGBV among refugee women. But they cannot do it alone. Without the commitment of local authorities, host governments, and host-country organizations little progress will be made. Refugee women face high levels of discrimination in the host community, difficulties in getting jobs that pay a sufficient wage, and an inability to actively participate in leadership positions. These obstacles lead refugee women to distrust the system and lack confidence in efforts to help them. Host-country authorities, local agencies, and policymakers need to develop and implement policies that address the needs of refugee women and enhance their integration into the host community.

Obstacles to Progress

Governments and humanitarian organizations face seven main obstacles to protecting women from SGBV:insufficient legal frameworks, lack of political will, inept law enforcement and court processes, limited awareness among women that they have rights, economic barriers, cultural norms, and inadequate data.

Insufficient legal framework

Existing legal frameworks in Kenya and Uganda can be said to cover SGBV. The Penal Code Act of Kenya (revised edition 2014) and Uganda (Amendment Act of 2007) prohibit all acts of violence. However, they do not directly address SGBV, despite its prevalence. In Kenya, for example, SGBV can only be inferred to be an assault under sections 250 and 251 of the code. There is no specific offense such as wife or husband battery, nor are their provisions for marital rape or domestic violence. The inadequacies of the law make it difficult to address SGBV, whether experienced by Kenyan citizens or refugees in Kenya.

In Kenya, the Sexual Offences Act was enacted in 2006 to curb SGBV. It defines sexual offenses and makes provisions for prevention and protection from harm arising from unlawful sexual acts. However, enactment has not been accompanied by training and dissemination of information on its provisions to police and agents of the justice system. Civil society organizations undertook most of the awareness raising that has occurred. Consequently, most Kenyans are unaware of the law’s existence. Poor investigation of cases means that convictions are rare and survivors of violence are thus denied justice.8

While Uganda’s penal code addresses rape and defilement (rape of a minor below 18 years old), it falls short when it comes to addressing issues of marital rape which is common during conflict. Ugandan law criminalizes SGBV, but the relevant laws are rarely applied. Relevant laws include the Domestic Violence Act of 2010, the Prevention of Female Genital Mutilation Act of 2009, the Prevention of Trafficking of Persons Act of 2009, the National Action Plan on UN Security Council Resolution 1325, and the Penal Code Act of 2007, among others. Ugandan communities are not familiar with these laws, which puts refugee women and girls at greater risk from SGBV while in Uganda. While humanitarian agencies have been redoubling their efforts to raise awareness on SGBV and women’s rights, these efforts are likely to yield little in the absence of robust enforcement of the law.

Poor law enforcement and slow court systems

In most refugee settlements as well as outside them, police are slow to respond to reports of SGBV and in other areas, there is inadequate police. Most police stations are reluctant to send officers to settlements to arrest perpetrators, primarily because SGBV is still widely considered a private matter. In a few cases where they are willing, police tend to lack investigative skill and capacity for handling these cases. Police stations lack examination rooms and kits to collect evidence from survivors. Moreover, in cases where evidence is collected, stations lack storage space, and in most cases evidence goes missing or is tampered with, becoming inadmissible in court. Court processes are lengthy, and refugee victims are often subject to perpetrator intimidation and prosecutorial bias.

Especially at risk are asylum seekers who hold Refugee Status Determination (RSD) appointment slips, which they get when they register for asylum and which serve as a form of identification. Most law enforcement officers are not aware that the slips confirm the legal status of these refugees as they await the outcome of the RSD process. Survivors who bear the slips are hesitant to approach police stations for fear of police harassment and sometimes extortion or illegal detention. Survivors have also reported that their abusers taunt them and threaten to report that they are in the country illegally.

Aggravated by gaps in law and policy, the reluctant enforcement and implementation of existing policies and laws on SGBV conspire to keep survivors’ needs from being adequately addressed. In most cases, police officers accuse survivors of bringing their problems upon themselves. In cases of sexual violence, the police accuse women and girls of dressing inappropriately and thereby inviting violence. When women are beaten, police accuse them of disrespecting their husbands, which they imply deserves ‘a slap or two.’ The gender-insensitive handling of such cases increases the trauma to women and girls.

Lack of political will

Lack of political will and poor or nonexistent accountability mechanisms keep perpetrators from being held accountable for SGBV crimes. There is a paradoxical relationship between national law and cultural belief, which international law does not touch. Where cultural beliefs do not take the national legal framework into account, corrupt leaders are free to advance and justify abuses in their communities. Consequently, law becomes silent and does not protect victims.

Without political will, all efforts to fight SGBV are constrained. With inadequate operational and logistical support, survivors’ immediate needs go unmet, and there is no capacity to prevent SGBV. Refugee women who report SGBV return to communities where perpetrators are living, since there are no safe housing facilities where they can stay while investigations and legal processes are ongoing. In addition, survivors are only offered counselling and some small financial stipend. There is no sustainable support to enable them to be self-reliant, so they return to the same jobs where they were abused.

Limited awareness of rights

Refugee women’s rights are human rights. Women’s rights have received greater recognition today, as evidenced by the various international tools relating to women: the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Beijing Platform for Action (1995), UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) and subsequent resolutions, the International Criminal Court, and the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993). Yet refugee women’s rights are still negated, despite significant steps to address the challenges they face.9 Most refugee women themselves do not understand these rights, which serves as a further obstacle to redress of SGBV.

Economic barriers

Refugee women and girls often take on roles as heads of households in their host countries, usually because they became separated from spouses or traditional male support during flight. As heads of households with a responsibility for children, they are more enmeshed in family networks than are male refugees. Because they may not be self-reliant, their vulnerability to male providers increases. Refugee women’s needs for economic resources make them vulnerable to SGBV, and these economic needs are often underestimated. Consequently, some refugee women continue working in abusive environments because leaving these jobs threatens their ability to care for their families.

While the 1951 Refugee Convention recognizes the right to freedom of movement and to seek paid employment, among others, refugees do not see these rights fully recognized in protracted exile.10 Freedom of movement is a precondition for the enjoyment of other rights; denying it undermines refugees’ socioeconomic well-being and increases their vulnerability. Women are particularly vulnerable, as they become reliant on scant humanitarian assistance.

In Kenya, refugees cannot get formal employment without Class M work permits. Although the Ministry of Immigration issues them freely, the process for acquiring them is lengthy and slow—as long as two years. Refugees thus resort to odd jobs and informal sector work.

Uganda requires refugees to get exit permits before leaving their settlements. This impinges on refugee women’s selfreliance and economic well-being. Families of SGBV survivors cannot relocate or hire lawyers, and they often rely on legal aid services, where service is slow, the case backlog large, and staffing inadequate. Due to restrictions on movement from within the settlement system and from husbands, most women end up compromising their bodies through transactional sex, which makes them vulnerable to sexually transmitted diseases.

Cultural norms

Predominant cultural and social norms perpetuate unequal power relations between women and men, exposing women and girls to vulnerable situations that often lead to SGBV. Unmarried women are often ostracized by both men and women, particularly if they have been violated sexually. Married women risk their spouses divorcing them when they report they have been a victim of SGBV.

Some of the Congolese refugee women become pregnant as a result of rape in the country of asylum. Such women (in most cases who end up being single mothers) are often treated as pariahs, and many opt to live away from members of their communities. This is because they fear the ridicule that women who have conceived out of wedlock or out of rape often encounter in the community once the information is out. Others who have given birth to children conceived out of rape by rebels or men in host countries are expelled from their communities. One Congolese community member stated “once the men in the community know that a certain was woman was raped, they label her as damaged. Such a woman is unlikely to get married as no man wants her.” Gender stereotypes also foster discrimination against women in public spheres. Such stereotypes emerge from socially constructed roles of men and women in society. Stereotypes such as “women are weak, men are strong” make physical and sexual violence against women more likely. A social worker in Kyaka II, for example, noted the cultural normalization of male violence among the Hema tribe living there, saying, “Beating a woman is normal.”

Inadequate data

Data collection on SGBV among women and girls remains a challenge since it primarily relies on self-reporting by survivors. In refugee settings and among the Congolese, the stigma and ostracism survivors face after coming forward impede such reporting. Most data is collected from health facilities, but not all victims of SGBV report to health facilities for medical assistance. Fear of ostracism leads many women refugees to avoid reporting abuses when the perpetrators are also refugees. In some instances, the community resolves SGBV cases itself. Indeed, community leaders fear that if SGBV cases are brought to the authorities’ attention, perpetrators’ resettlement process and status determination will be compromised. Given these obstacles, creation of gender-based violence information management systems cannot adequately address the data collection problem.

Recommendations

Governments, UNHCR, and other humanitarian organizations do provide invaluable humanitarian support to refugees. However, a shift at all levels is required if pervasive SGBV is to be relegated to the past in refugee settings.

  • Law enforcement. Humanitarian actors and host governments should work together to implement reforms in the host countries’ justice systems. The law must be tougher on perpetrators of SGBV—for example, by denying refugee registration to asylum seekers with records of committing SGBV offenses. There ought to be screening during RSD interviews to deregister refugees who are found to have committed SGBV offenses. Denial of RSD status to past perpetrators will help deter would-be perpetrators. This will also help ensure that perpetrators do not continue to live in the same community as their victims and continue threatening them, especially as their cases go to court. Increased funding and partnerships with local legal partners could help refugee survivors access legal services. Police officers need to be trained on how to screen and record cases of SGBV. Better training and equipping of police will also enable them to collect and store evidence. Host governments and local partners can together strengthen witness protection systems and set up safe houses to host survivors of SGBV. Taking such steps to better protect women who have undergone SGBV will restore the confidence of other survivors and encourage them to report their own cases.
  • Political will. Host-country governments and local authorities should together formulate and implement reforms in all parts of the legal system. The police must be trained to handle SGBV cases in a gender-sensitive manner and be given logistical support to follow up on cases. Corrupt leaders and officials should be prosecuted for failure to enforce the law, whether from reticence or ignorance. Although police stations in Kenya and Uganda are required to have a gender desk, they often do not. Where there is one, it often has no female officer assigned to it.
  • Refugee women’s rights. Host countries, humanitarian agencies, and local organizations need to educate refugee women (and community leaders) on their rights. Women and girls should be fully aware of what constitutes SGBV, where to report cases, and how to protect evidence so law enforcement officers can collect it. Refugee women and girls also need to know their rights as refugees and what protection their legal documentation affords them. Knowledge is power. If women are made to believe their asylum certificates do not entitle them to protection, they will be less likely to report crimes perpetrated against them. Local and nationwide awareness raising and advocacy can also help prevent sexual violence, abuse, and exploitation of refugee women.
  • Economic barriers. The government, UNHCR, and other humanitarian agencies working in refugee settings need to help survivors find long-term solutions to secure their livelihoods. This could include providing market information, access to loans from financial institutions and grants to start businesses. The government should remove restrictions on refugees’ movement so they can more readily find much-needed employment and earn supplementary income. The prime minister’s office should review laws regarding refugees’ permission to exit their settlements to seek work. They should speed the issuance of exit permits and let refugees move freely within and outside settlements without questioning.
  • Cultural norms. The host government and other humanitarian actors should engage with local community leaders so they understand the national laws that protect refugee women. These leaders should learn of the adverse effects of early marriages on girls, the need for educating girls as well as boys, and the need for women to be represented at all levels of leadership. Refugee communities should hear how gender stereotypes promote SGBV. All humanitarian actors and leaders in local communities should be trained in use of gender-sensitive language. Male engagement is fundamental. Because the ethos of patriarchy has permitted men to perpetrate SGBV, men must be involved in preventing further violence. International and local agencies serving refugees should incorporate men in programming on raising awareness, becoming peer educators in the fight against SGBV, and engaging them in resolving family conflicts. Such programs go hand in hand with the need for programs for empowering women and girls to find safe means of sustaining themselves.
  • Data collection. All humanitarian actors and host governments should stress the urgency of reporting SGBV. They should urge refugee communities to end stigmatization of survivors and to encourage women to report their cases to the police, crime scene investigators, and health officials. When SGBV occurs, survivors should know where to go first.

Finally, the governments of Uganda and Kenya should consider local integration as a more permanent solution for long-term refugees. Both should review previous research work on the benefits of such integration for the host countries and educate host communities of these benefits and encourage refugee communities to embrace resettlement solutions.

Conclusion

The UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women affirms that violence against women constitutes a violation of women’s rights and fundamental freedoms. Further, Article 4 of the African Union’s Maputo Protocol is devoted entirely to the topic of violence against women, calling for a range of state measures: punishment of perpetrators, identification of causes of violence against women, and provision of services for survivors.

Yet, SGBV in refugee settings continues. Host governments must take seriously the mandate to protect all women within their boundaries. Failure to protect refugee women and girls seeking asylum constitutes a failure on the part of the host government. International actors, local actors, and the African Union must work closely with host governments to help them meet the obligations to which they committed when they ratified these protocols and other conventions that seek to end SGBV.

References

  1. IRC, Clinical care for survivors of gender-based violence, (New York: International Rescue Committee, 2016).
  2. A refugee settlement is a type of refugee encampment encompassing a certain geographical area allocated by the government or community in the country of asylum.
  3. The urban areas around Nairobi include Kasarani, Kayole, Kitengela, and Rongai, with a few living in the Kabiria area of Kawangware. See also UNHCR, Figures at a Glance, (UNHCR Kenya, December 31,
  • Sara Pavanello, Hidden and exposed: Urban Refugees in Nairobi, Kenya, (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2010).
  • UNHCR, Kyaka II Fact Sheet, (Kampala: UNHCR Uganda, 2016).
  • United Nations Population Fund, Marrying Too Young; End Child Marriage, (New York: UNFPA, 2012).
  • Free the Slaves, Wives in Slavery; Forced Marriage in the Congo, (Washington: Free the Slaves, 2013).
  • Dr. Ruth Aura, Situational Analysis and the Legal Framework on Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Kenya: Challenges and Opportunities, (Nairobi: National Council for Law Reporting, 2012).
  • Mulki Al-Sharmani, “Navigating Refugee Life,” UN Chronicle XLVII, no.1 (February 2010).
  • J. Milner and G. Loescher, Responding to Protracted Refugee Situations: Lessons from a Decade of Discussion, (Oxford, UK: Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2011).

By Luisa Ryan and Shannon Zimmerman

On November 14–15, 2017, the government of Canada hosted the UN Peacekeeping Defense Ministerial Conference.1 Over 500 delegates from 70 countries, the African Union, the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO met in Vancouver to discuss improvements to UN peacekeeping operations and secure new pledges from UN member states.

At the conference, Canada announced the launch of the Elsie Initiative on Women in Peace Operations.2 Named after the trailblazing feminist Elsie MacGill, this initiative will join Canada and the UN in partnership with other interested member states to address the obstacles to placing more uniformed women in peace operations.3 While member states have committed to a target contribution of 15 percent female personnel, currently uniformed female peacekeepers make up only around 3 percent of troops deployed. Often, this dearth of women peacekeepers reflects the lack of women in the national militaries of troop contributing countries. The Elise Initiative represents a practical, innovative measure by an active member of the peacekeeping community to address this fundamental deficit and advance gender inclusion.

The Elsie Initiative members will develop a systematic approach to deploying more women in peace operations. Through tailored technical support, the initiative aims to help troop contributing countries recruit and retain female soldiers. It is one of the first initiatives to directly address the lack of female personnel at the deploying country level. Canada As one of the co-hosts of the 2017 UN Peacekeeping ministerial, the United States is in a strong position to partner in the work of the Elsie Initiative. By so doing, it can entrench the concept of gender parity in its current UN peacekeeping training programs and deployments and better lead knowledge-sharing efforts with partner militaries. The Elsie Initiative also gives the United States an opportunity to reinforce partnerships that enhance global security while bolstering its leadership in gender parity and UN reform. There is bipartisan recognition of the fiscal and strategic value of UN peace operations in achieving US national security and foreign policy objectives.5

contributed an initial $15 million to establish the initiative and pledged an additional $6 million to assist UN missions in supporting and leveraging women’s contributions within peace operations.4

The Presidential Memo of September 28, 2015, noted that UN peace operations are one of the most meaningful mechanisms for international burden-sharing to address the threat of violent extremist groups, human trafficking, endemic diseases, and mass flows of refugees and displaced persons.6 The 2018 National Defense Strategy builds upon this memo, highlighting the value of international partnerships as the backbone of collective security, particularly the value of strengthening alliances and attracting new partners to share the burden of global security.7 Efforts such as the Elsie initiative to improve the effectiveness of peace operations will directly benefit US national interests by strengthening alliances and enabling recipient countries to take an increasing role in providing for collective and regional security.

Background

UN peacekeeping operations play a vital role in maintaining international peace and security. Currently, over 100,000 UN personnel from 125 countries are deployed in 15 missions.8 This makes peace operations the largest deployed military force in the world. While the annual budget for peacekeeping is approximately US$6.8 billion, this amounts to less than 0.5 percent of global military spending. Thus peacekeeping operations are by far the most cost-effective method for intervening in conflict and postconflict countries.

The 2017 Defense Ministerial Conference focused on what it called the “3Ps”: pledges, planning, and performance. It was an effort to chart progress from the 2016 defense ministerial held in London, facilitate pledges from member states to fill key capacity gaps such as rapid deployment units and helicopters, and to increase the UN’s capacity to plan and undertake peace operations.9 Canada in particular focused on increasing women’s participation in security forces and peacekeeping operations.

To be most effective, peace operations—and armed forces in general—should strive for gender representation that reflects the composition of their country’s populations. Female peacekeepers provide different perspectives on protection, peacebuilding, intelligence gathering, and early warning. Having female peacekeepers allows the mission to connect with women in conflict-affected communities, who often bear the brunt of violence, including conflict-related sexual violence, and may also curb sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeepers.

The role of women in peacekeeping and peacebuilding was highlighted in UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace, and Security. Since then, seven other UN resolutions have addressed engaging women in conflict resolution.10 Despite this apparent support, the UN has struggled to implement these resolutions internally within the UN structure as well as externally in deployed operations. Key challenges include lack of funding, political will, and available uniformed female personnel.11 The 3 percent of UN peacekeepers that are women are largely employed in supporting roles.12 At the current rate of increase, it would take 37 years to reach the five-year target that the UN Security Council set in 2015: to double the number of uniformed women deployed in UN peacekeeping operations.13

Very few women serve in the police and militaries of the countries that contribute to peace operations. Several of the core troop and police contributing countries, such as Ethiopia, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan, have an evolving but limited culture of women in the security services.14 When asked to deploy women troops or police, these countries fall far short of the target percentages, despite their best efforts. Recent Department of Peacekeeping Operations figures show that only eighteen of all the troop contributing countries reached the target of 15 percent deployment of women that was set at the 2016 defense ministerial. Fifty countries sent only female police officers, and forty sent no women at all. Western countries may have slightly higher percentages of women. For example, in October 2017 women made up roughly 16 percent of the US army. However, Western countries contribute far fewer soldiers to peace operations, some none at all.

Even when women police and soldiers are present, UN missions have struggled to leverage their participation effectively. Female peacekeepers may be given gender-specific jobs such as teaching women self-defense or conducting classes on sexual violence and HIV/AIDS. Additionally, women officers are often confined to more administrative roles or not given the same consideration as their male colleagues—despite having the same qualifications. This restriction limits both the strategic impact women can have in peacekeeping operations and the credibility of gender equality efforts within missions. Yet female peacekeepers have proven themselves to be just as effective as male peacekeepers, perhaps more so. For example, the Indian AllFemale Formed Police Unit that was deployed to Liberia, from 2007 to 2016, was so effective and professional that then Liberian President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf specifically requested they provide her security detail.15 As the Indian contingent’s commander in Liberia, Colonel Madubala Bala also noted, “When the local women see the female peacekeepers, they get inspired by them—[They see] ladies can perform the same role as male counterparts.” In fact, when the all-female unit arrived, 6 percent of Liberia’s security sector was made up of women; that number has since jumped to 17 percent, surpassing many more developed nations.16

The Elsie Initiative has been criticized for perpetuating a pattern of developed countries leading policy and financing while troops from the global south serve in increasingly dangerous contexts. Monique Cuillerier, a Canadian representative with the Women, Peace, and Security Network, observed, “It’s hard to see how Canada can actually fulfill many of their recently announced ‘Women, Peace, and Security’ priorities if Canadian peacekeepers are sitting on the sidelines.”17

It is important to highlight the differing commitments and policy influence of the global north and south in UN peacekeeping. However, these critiques should not detract from the important goals of the Elsie Initiative. The initiative’s focus on inclusivity, sharing of peacekeeping best practice, and financial and training assistance between nations may help distribute the burdens of peacekeeping but these efforts should not serve as a substitute for contributing troops to peace operations.

Having done more than any other state to partner with and build the capacity of troop contributing countries, the United States should ally with Canada in its efforts to achieve gender parity in peace operations. Past US efforts included the Africa Contingency Operations Training & Assistance (ACOTA) program and the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), which focus on building recipient countries’ capacity to become active contributors to regional security and their own. Like these, the Elsie Initiative will enable countries to draw upon resources to make them more effective security providers.

Policy Recommendations for the  United States18

The United States is in an ideal position to leverage its existing expertise to support efforts to integrate women into the military and into peace operations. Below are several ways it could support and augment its current initiatives:

Promote the Value of Female Peacekeepers. Female peacekeepers make a peace operation more effective. Peacekeepers likely understand the value of protecting women and listening to their concerns but may not yet understand the value of deploying female peacekeepers. Training could emphasize the utility of female peacekeepers conducting body searches on women, engaging with the female population, and investigating instances of sexual assault and supporting survivors. These benefits should be highlighted as an addition to the general benefit of having a well-trained, capable soldier regardless of gender. Such training should be interactive, providing space for male soldiers to ask questions and address concerns, and could decrease the likelihood that female soldiers are relegated to menial or administrative tasks. Men and women, boys and girls will experience conflict differently, necessitating a gender lens. Peacekeepers’ ability to identify and address these conflict factors enhance their effectiveness and the quality of the peace they are able to support.

Continue to Support Current US Training Efforts. USsupported peacekeeper training should be gender sensitive and include not just training on sexual exploitation and abuse but also the role gender plays in conflict. Additionally, peacekeeper training should continue to include skills such as conflict analysis (including gender analysis), mediation, and negotiation. Training could be jointly conducted with civilian staff to encourage understanding of perspectives across components. Such skills allow peacekeepers to avoid highly masculine military-based approaches and craft inclusive and therefore more sustainable approaches to resolving tensions on the ground.19

Add Value Directly to Troop Contributing Countries. The United States deploys specialized trainers and equipment, ensuring that forces receiving US support and training can become effective, professional, and contribute to the efficacy of peace operations. This expertise could be leveraged to support increased deployment of female soldiers from partner countries. Best practices  may include design and logistical advice on dedicated facilities for ablutions and hygiene in austere conditions. It may also include policy advice on advancement and leave to ensure that women with families are able to deploy and will benefit from the experience as much as men do.

Lead by Example. The United States should commit to deploying an increased number of female US military and police personnel to UN peace operations. This can be accomplished most simply by ensuring that the current limited number of staff officers deployed to force headquarters have adequate female representation. Such deployments provide US women  unique skills development opportunity while setting an example for other countries.

Share Lessons and Expertise. The United States has a diverse array of programs already in operation domestically as well as in partnership with other nations that could inform the effective, efficient inclusion of women in peace operations. Collecting these best practices and lessons learned and sharing them with troop contributing countries would be an easy, effective way of increasing their capacity to integrate women. Particularly valuable would be information to help military leadership begin integration without enforcing stereotypes. For example, the US military can provide best practices for the recruitment and retention of females, help with reform of  personnel sections to accommodate common life milestones such as marriage and childbirth, and revising gendered standards for physical capabilities to ensure that what is being measured is what really counts in peace operations.

Troop contributing countries may have limited experience in deploying women to austere living conditions in potentially very remote communities. Female troops may require separate considerations. More conservative nations may have further cultural needs that may affect the appropriate deployment of female officers. Mobile and temporary operating bases—which are becoming more common, especially in the more robust missions—may also need to be altered to accommodate women. The US has mission design and planning expertise in deploying female troops that it can share for the benefit of all countries.

Play the Long Game. Integrating women into the militaries of troop contributing countries and then into peacekeeping forces is vitally important for ensuring the best possible mission results. These efforts will take time. Rather than rushing to promote women to positions of authority or into new roles without proper training, there should be a gradual increase over a five- to ten-year period, addressing all levels from recruit to field grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers. These soldiers need career management and mentorship to ensure that male colleagues do not elbow them out.

The United States has a strong interest in collective security and regional capacity. US support to peacekeeper training has improved the effectiveness of peacekeepers from dozens of countries in conflicts around the world. Deepening this support to ensure that troop contributing countries are able to recruit and retain female soldiers—thereby making peacekeeping forces more inclusive and effective—is a logical next step in improving allies’ abilities to contribute to global security.

References

  1. Initiated at the 2015 Leadership Summit on Peacekeeping hosted in Washington, D.C., the first UN Peacekeeping Defense Ministerial took place in London in 2016. The 2017 conference in Vancouver is the second such conference.
  2. Prime Minister of Canada Justin Trudeau, “The Elsie Initiative on Women in Peace Operations,” November 15, 2017.
  3. Gender has long been a focus of Canadian foreign policy and an opportunity for Canada to leverage its expertise and act as a policy entrepreneur. By undertaking the Elsie Initiative, Canada is enacting several recommendations on gender-responsive peacekeeping from the 2015 Global Study on Women, Peace and Security, the HighLevel Independent Panel on Peace Operations, and Security Council Resolution 2242.
  4. Government of Canada, “UN Peacekeeping Defense Ministerial,” website, 2017.
  5. Christopher Holshek, “America Needs Peacekeeping Missions More Than Ever,” Foreign Policy (November 10, 2015).
  6. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “United States

Support to United Nations Peace Operations,” Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, September 28, 2015.

  • U.S. Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge,” 2018.
  • UN Peacekeeping, “Data,” web page, 2017.
  • UN News Centre, “Largest Gathering of Defence Ministers Dedicated to UN Peacekeeping to Kick Off in Vancouver,” November 13, 2017.
  • The following UN Security Council Resolutions are considered part of the Women, Peace, and Security Agenda: 1325 (2000); 1820 (2009); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2010); 1960 (2011); 2106 (2013); 2122 (2013), and 2242 (2015).
  • For more on this, see Kathleen Kuehnast and Shannon Zimmerman, “No Will; No Way: Women, Peace, and Security in Peacekeeping Operations,” Peace & Stability Operations Journal Online 3, no. 1 (2012).
  • UN Women, “Keeping the Peace in an Increasingly Militarized

World,” In: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations

Security Council Resolution 1325 (New York: United Nations, 2015).

  1. Joint Statement by Phumzile Mlambo Ngcuka and Pramila Patten on the launch of the Elsie Initiative, November 16, 2017, accessed

February 2, 2018,   http://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2017/11/ joint-statement-by-phumzile-mlambo-ngcuka-and-pramila-patten-onthe-launch-of-the-elsie-initiative.

  1. Bangladesh only allowed women to join the military after 2003           Fellows and only began recruiting women in 2013. India has had some success with women in peacekeeping, deploying the UN’s first all-female peacekeeping force of 105 Indian policewomen, who deployed to Liberia. Currently, the number one contributor to UN peace operations, Ethiopia, is an exception in this regard, with roughly 16 of the soldiers it has deployed being women.
  2. Lesley J. Pruitt, The Women in Blue Helmets: Gender, Policing and the UN’s First All-Female Peacekeeping Unit (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2016).
  3. UN News Centre, “Hailed as ‘Role Models,’ All-Female Indian Police Unit Departs UN Mission in Liberia,” February 12, 2016.
  4. Tonda Maccharles and Bruce Campion-Smith, “Canada to Spread its Peacekeeping Efforts Around,” Toronto Star (November 15, 2017).
  5. In some cases, these recommendations reiterate and build upon those provided by a 2011 AFRICOM study, “Study on Women in African Militaries.”
  6. Alison Milofsky, Joseph Sany, Illana Lancaster, and Jeff Krentel,

“Conflict Management Training for Peacekeepers: Assessment and Recommendations,” Special Report 411 (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, August 2017).

By Velomahanina T. Razakamaharavo, Luisa Ryan, and Leah Sherwood

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 expressed a global commitment to the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. Many policy statements and guidance

on gender mainstreaming have followed in the 17 years since UNSCR 1325’s passage, yet peace operations on the ground appear little affected. They continue to overlook the many roles women play in conflict and conflict resolution, fail to engage fully with women’s organizations, and fail to include women fighters in reintegration and security sector reform programs.1 They even perpetrate exploitation: Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) continues to be widespread within peace missions themselves, despite increased SEA and conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) training for operation forces.2 Further, peace operations have failed to address the more inclusive Gender, Peace and Security (GPS) agenda and the broader role gender plays in conflict dynamics. For example, while missions may seek to address the effects of conflict-related sexual violence on women and girls, they may miss similar impacts for male victims and their families.3

Improved gender training could help ameliorate this mismatch between policy rhetoric and practice. This policybrief outlines current gender training practice, identifies gaps, and recommends ways to strengthen training in order to help peace operations personnel better understand how to apply a gender lens in their missions.

Current Training Practice

The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) impacts on women and girls and the need to engage local women as agents of change, and its efforts subsequently turned to influencing gender attitudes among peacekeepers themselves.4 Training remains one of the best mechanisms available to DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS) to mainstream gender perspectives in peace operations.

DPKO reiterated its commitment to gender in 2010 by issuing guidance highlighting the importance of UNSCR 1325 and gender training.5 In 2014, DPKO and DFS followed up with Gender Forward Looking Strategy (2014–2018).6 The UN is attempting to integrate gender into DPKO core business areas, such as security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), as well as promoting an understanding of gender among the civilian, police, and military peacekeeping forces.

Despite departmental cooperation on these initiatives, gender mainstreaming in peace operations rarely rises above an “add women and stir” approach. Nor does it extend to men and boys. And its inability to curb sexual abuses and other practices inconsistent with UN ethics and directives threatens to undermine the WPS/GPS agenda altogether. To be able to identify inefficiencies in, or problems related to, gender training in peacekeeping operations, it is necessary to understand the UN gender peacekeeping training cogwheel. This cogwheel is composed of interrelated, intertwined, complementary processes and mechanisms. Figure 1 illustrates the levels at which action for better, more integrated training ought to be directed.

aims to promote and advance gender equality through its policies on gender mainstreaming. DPKO initially sought to raise peacekeepers’ awareness of conflict-related

Figure 1: The cogwheel of UN gender peacekeeping training                                                materials is up to their training institutions and

therefore may vary widely. These institutions may also design and implement their own training modules.

Other training packages delivered inmission may also include gender elements. Missionwide sessions on civilian protection and on conduct and discipline regularly touch on gender issues. For instance, new civilian recruits must complete web-based modules on sexual harassment and SEA, which falls under the purview of conduct and discipline but also has a gender dimension due to associated power dynamics, gender roles, and gender-based violence. However, Civil Affairs, which may be responsible for civilian protection, and Conduct and Discipline, which incorporates gender elements, largely operate independently. These areas in reality significantly overlap. Yet they are

Different recipients receive gender training at different phases of deployment. Civilian staff receive standardized predeployment training via online modules and through induction that takes place in person over several days. Uniformed peacekeepers receive gender training within predeployment packages provided by their home country. Additional induction is generally provided after arrival in-mission, although the time dedicated to gender and the content may vary widely. Specialized, ad hoc training may also be provided on an “as needed” basis on, for example, gender issues and protection of civilians. As most training occurs predeployment or in-mission, headquarters staff may only receive training on an ad hoc basis.7 Finally, all members of mission leadership teams receive preselection, predeployment, and induction on gender. DPKO offers a specific course for emerging leaders, preparing them to be senior staff, which includes a gender component. However, as demonstrated by the continuing challenges in mainstreaming gender across missions, the current training is not having the desired impact.

The training that in-coming police or military officers receive depends on their country of origin. The only training DPKO HQ is responsible for is the gender component of the Core Predeployment Training Materials (CPTM).8 It covers issues such as the differences between women and men (gender versus sex), the differentiated impacts of conflict on women and girls, the importance of the WPS/GPS agenda, the Women in Peacekeeping Legal Framework, gender equality, and other conceptual issues. These materials are available to member states, troop contributing countries (TCCs), police contributing countries (PCCs), gender units working for the missions, or any entity providing training to peacekeepers. However, how these units and states choose to use the compartmentalized in training, when they

ought to be addressed at multiple levels through cross-cutting and intersectional lenses. Integrated training can help solve this problem.

Key Challenges

There are numerous challenges associated with gender training in peace operations. Table 1 offers an overview of the nature of these challenges. First, it categorizes the root causes of poor gender training outcomes. Second, it breaks gender training down into the main stages it is offered: before and during. Lastly, the table shows challenges at training design, trainer and recipient selection, and training administration. The table shows where challenges cluster and reveals opportunity for change by identifying possible synergies. The conceptual approach taken is an adaptation of conflict diagnostic approaches commonly used in the peacebuilding field.9

Predeployment Gender Training

There are four main challenges for training at the predeployment stage: compliance, relevance, quality, and access.

First, although UN-developed gender training material is provided to them, its use by TCCs and PCCs during predeployment training is voluntary. Though the DPKO has declared gender training mandatory for member states, it has no authority to enforce compliance. As a result, the quality and comprehensiveness of the training varies widely, and personnel enter UNPKO service with differing levels of gender knowledge and exposure to the WPS/GPS agenda.10

Second, TCCs and PCCs bring their own varied cultural interpretations of gender to their missions. In some cases, contributing countries may not prioritize gender issues within their domestic military and police establishments. In this environment, the trainer’s and the recipient’s existing opinions and practices related to gender relations may therefore go largely unchallenged.

Third, there is room for improvement in the quality of gender training content. For both civilians and uniformed personnel, the predeployment gender module’s generalized nature makes it a poor-quality tool for recipients. Gender training is short and presented in passive learning environments, neither of which is conducive to developing understanding of complex ideas.

Finally, the training given to existing leadership or emerging leaders before deployment is not gender training per se; it is leadership training with a gender component. This difference is subtle but significant because gender training ought to generate comprehension of the WPS/GPS agenda. In practice, leadership training tends to outline UNSCR 1325 and provide checklists to implement it. Largely generic, nonmission-specific training on gender does not support mission leadership of gender mainstreaming or present a gender lens for understanding the conflict to which they are deployed. In addition, UN volunteers (nationally and internationally engaged) and national staff, who are vital to peace operations, often are overlooked in predeployment training.

In-Mission Gender Training

In-mission training challenges are present in training design, provision, accountability, and prioritization.

The limited capacity for gender training means that it often does not extend beyond the generic level. A lack of facilitators ensures that brief, superficial, siloed gender training will continue.11 Additionally, the staff who are available for designing and delivering training have varying degrees of expertise in gender issues and teaching skills. The difficulty

Table 1. Gender Training Problems: (Q) (I) (P) (T) (C) 
 DesignersProvidersRecipientsAdministration
Predeployment(Q), (C)(I), (Q), (C), (P)(Q), (C), (P)(Q), (I), (C), (T)
In-mission(Q), (T), (C), (P)(I), (Q), (P), (T)(Q), (C), (P)(Q), (T), (I), (P)
Categories: (Q) Quality Varied level of excellence, consistency, and fragmentation (of units, departments, and trainers) (P) People Mission leadership teams, gender advisors, future leaders (T) Time Physical time to complete task within budget and with resources allotted (C) Cultural Biases, lack of information and awareness, stereotypes, prejudices (I)              Institutional HQ, UN 

in translating concepts like gender into practical training was identified by the Integrated Training Service (ITS), which is responsible for periodic needs assessments to identify training required to implement UNSCR mandates, including UNSCR 1325. ITS’s 2013 report identified gender training as a priority, stating that more “understanding [is needed]of how to integrate cross-cutting issues like gender into work” and that gender concepts need to bebroken down into components so individual staff members understand the meaning of protection of civilians and how it relates to his or her job function.”12

The development of training materials and training itself have to compete with enormous workload demands that many staff face in-mission in difficult contexts. Uniformed staff may be deployed for only six-month periods, so there is limited time to learn new ways of analyzing social contexts and turnover is incredibly high. Yet gender training recipients need time to internalize and apply concepts. The 30- to 60-minute induction sessions are inadequate, for example, to explain that gender is not synonymous with “women’s issues.” It is also not enough time to internalize how to apply the gender lens, especially when other messaging, such as acknowledging that male staff may engage sex workers, contradicts it. As personnel arrive in-mission with varying levels of knowledge, effective gender training in-mission is essential.

Mission Leadership Teams (MLTs) have myriad competing demands to contend with, and gender issues may not seem to be the most pressing. Especially in ongoing conflicts, stopping active fighting and bringing the main parties to the negotiation table understandably are likely to receive highest priority. A comprehensive understanding of gender as an analytical tool has progressed but slowly, further hampered by those who perceive it as a development issue that can be taken up once the immediate crisis has passed.

However, a gender lens strengthens and complements the traditional security lens, by ensuring, for example, that women participate in peace processes or that appropriate provision is made for understanding how the conflict may be affecting women/girls and men/boys differently. Fostering an understanding of gender and the use of gender as a lens for analyzing unfolding conflicts would help UN peacekeeping staff identify vulnerabilities and opportunities in conflict and postconflict contexts. Highly specialized, contextspecific training should be provided to the MLT so they can incorporate gender into their own management strategies and ensure that gender training is a mission priority. In the context of recent cuts to mission budgets for dedicated gender activities and staff, this is particularly important.

Ways Forward

  1. General recommendations to improve UNPKO gender training:
    1. Gender training must be more responsive to the educational background, experience, and cultural backgrounds of recipients but also better reflect the cultural sensitivities of countries where the missions operate. Although gender training must meet requirements set by the UN, it should be presented in culturally relevant ways.
    1. Experiential learning ought to be applied in gender training. The use of scenarios, role-plays, and opportunities for discussion and debate will foster applicable, practical understandings of gender. It is vital to leverage new tools and pedagogy to convey concepts in digestible and useful ways. A Behavior Change Communication (BCC) approach could strengthen internalization of the GPS framework among UN staff.13 BCC envisages social change and individual change as two sides of the same coin.14 A BCC approach can support gender training as it focuses on the implementation of advocacy programs, communication techniques, and similar areas of best practice. Modifying recipients’ behavior is also a goal of gender training, so linking them could be helpful.
    1. Opportunities for those leading gender training in-mission to participate in academic conferences and other settings should be encouraged so that trainers stay abreast of the latest thinking on applying gender in conflict and postconflict contexts.
    1. Training must also address the experiences of men and boys so that gender is more robustly understood and not confined to “women’s issues.”
    1. The WPS/GPS agenda must be translated into accessible, practical knowledge that highlights its importance. Much of current training is conceptual.
  2. Recommendations to improve in-mission gender training:
    1. Context-specific gender training should be developed that encompasses gender dynamics in the host country, gendered aspects of the conflict, and how to apply an analytical lens to appropriate, real scenarios.
    1. The silos that surround UN units for the protection of civilians and conduct and discipline should be broken down during training to emphasize gender’s cross-sectional nature. While civilian protection training should be conducted by content experts, gender teams could contribute to discussions on the utility of a gender lens when assessing threats to civilians or opportunities for peacebuilding, for instance.
    1. Targeted training should be developed for all categories of actors and should be cross-cutting, covering all aspects of gender (e.g., SEA, gender equality,

SGBV).

  • Military and civilian training should be combined so that both share an understanding of challenges and opportunities related to gender across the spectrum of mission activities.
    • Training evaluation should be central to the UN, member states, and training institutions.15 Such evaluation will help determine training effectiveness but also identify opportunities to strengthen training and determine best practice.
    • Senior mission leadership, and the MLT in particular, should be given context-specific gender briefs before deployment. These briefs should be interactive and generate actionable plans on how to integrate a gender perspective into their team’s workstream.

Gender is a vital analytical tool for UN peacekeepers. Broader, more adept employment of a gender lens would contribute to better understanding of conflict dynamics in their areas of operation. It would enable them to identify vulnerabilities and challenges in early warning, protection of civilians, and peacebuilding. Currently, gender is still underused and poorly understood in missions, where personnel may see it is a lesser priority in the face of active conflict or as a development issue that other UN agencies and partners can take up at a later date. More effective training can deepen peacekeepers’ understanding of gender and how to use it as a tool in their everyday work. This brief has recommended improvements to gender training at the staff level and at the mission leadership level in order to ensure that a gender lens becomes an entrenched, critical element of the peacekeeping skill set.

References

  1. Robert Muggah, Security and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War (London/New York: Routledge, 2008).
  2. Stephen Moncrief, “Military Socialization, Disciplinary Culture, and Sexual Violence in UN Peacekeeping Operations,” Journal of Peace Research 54, no. 5 (2017), pp. 715–30.
  3. Élise Féron, “Support Programs for Male Survivors of Conflict-

Related Sexual Violence,” in Ronald E. Anderson, ed., Alleviating World Suffering: The Challenge of Negative Quality of Life (Cham: Springer, 2017), pp. 335–47.

  • Comfort Lamptey, “Gender Training in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations,” Gender and Peacebuilding in Africa Occasional Papers, no. 5 (Cape Town/Nairobi: Pambazuka Press, 2012).
  • DPKO/DFS Guidelines: Integrating a Gender Perspective into the Work of the United Nations Military in Peacekeeping Operations (New York: UN, 2010).
  • UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, DPKO/DFS Gender Forward Looking Strategy 2014– 2018 (New York: United Nations, 2014).
  • For example, no specific gender training was provided to HQ staff in 2017.
  • United Nations Peacekeeping Resource Hub, “DPKO-DFS Core Predeployment Training Materials (CPTM 2017) for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: CPTM Introduction,” UN website, 2017.
  • See Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction Network,

Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Handbook, (September, 2005)

  1. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces

(DCAF) and the Partnership for Peace Consortium (PfPC), PfPC

SSRWG and EDWG Handbook on Teaching Gender in the Military

  1. Lamptey, “Gender Training in UNPKO,” p. 18
  2. Aïssata Athie and Sarah Taylor, UN Peacekeeping: Where Is the Gender Expertise? (New York: IPI Global Observatory, 2017).
  3. Shanthi Kalatthil, John Langlois, and Adam Kaplan, Towards a

New Model: Media and Communication in Post-Conflict and Fragile

States (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, Communication for Governance & Accountability Program, Development Communication Division, External Affairs, 2008), p. 54.

  1. Communication for Development: Strengthening the Effectiveness of the United Nations (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, the International Labour Organization, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS, the United Nations Children’s Fund, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the World Health Organization, 2011), p.7.
  2. Alberto Cutillo, Deploying the Best: Enhancing Training for United Nations Peacekeepers (New York: International Peace Institute, 2013).